govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-1_19-cv-08935-5

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
  
 
DELLISA RICHARDSON, 
  
   Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
CASCADE SKATING RINK, et al., 
 
   Defendants. 
 
 
 
Civ. No. 19-8935-NLH-MJS 
 
OPINION 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEARANCE: 
DELLISA RICHARDSON 
1510 CHESTNUT LANE 
WESTVILLE, NJ 08093 
 
  Plaintiff appearing pro se 
 
CHRISTOPHER D. WARREN 
WARREN LAW GROUP 
112 W. 34TH STREET - 17TH FLOOR 
NEW YORK, NY 10120 
 
  On behalf of Defendants 
 
HILLMAN, District Judge 
 
 Before the Court is the motion [Docket Number 56] of pro se 
Plaintiff Dellisa Richardson, seeking a preliminary injunction 
against Defendants Cascade Skating Rink (“Cascade”) and Live 
Life Headphones LLC (“Live Life”) (collectively “Defendants”).  
Defendants oppose the motion.  (Brief in Opposition (“Opp. 
Br.”), [Dkt. No. 63]).  The Court has considered the parties’ 
submissions and decides this matter without oral argument 
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pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1(b).  For the reasons expressed 
below, Plaintiff’s motion will be granted.   
Background 
 On January 4, 2021, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint 
against Defendants claiming that they were infringing on her 
Silent Skate trademark.  Plaintiff’s Silent Skate trademark was 
filed on October 2, 2018 and federally registered on March 12, 
2019.  Plaintiff’s Silent Skate trademark is for “Arranging, 
organizing, conducting, and hosting social entertainment events; 
Hosting social entertainment events, namely, skating events, for 
others.”  ( [Dkt. No. 71-16], at 4).  Plaintiff hosts 
entertainment events at which participants listen to music 
through headphones while skating.  Despite Plaintiff’s Silent 
Skate trademark, Defendants have advertised similar skating 
events using the phrase “Silent Skate.”  As a result, Plaintiff 
alleges Defendants infringed on her Silent Skate trademark. 
DISCUSSION 
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case 
because it presents a federal question under the Lanham Act.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
II. Legal Standard 
A preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary remedy . . . 
which should be granted only in limited circumstances.”  Holland 
v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 285-86 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal 
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citations omitted).  A preliminary injunction should not be 
issued “unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the 
burden of persuasion.”  Id. (citation omitted).  That burden 
typically involves four factors: (1) a reasonable likelihood of 
success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm to the applicant; 
(3) whether the denial of a preliminary injunction would injure 
the moving party more than the issuance of an injunction would 
harm the non-moving party; and (4) whether the grant of relief 
would serve the public interest.  Id. (citation omitted). 
“[A] movant for preliminary equitable relief must meet the 
threshold for the first two ‘most critical’ factors: it must 
demonstrate that it can win on the merits (which requires a 
showing significantly better than negligible but not necessarily 
more likely than not) and that it is more likely than not to 
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.” 
Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(citations omitted). 
“If these gateway factors are met, a court then considers 
the remaining two factors and determines in its sound discretion 
if all four factors, taken together, balance in favor of 
granting the requested preliminary relief.”  Id.  “How strong a 
claim on the merits is enough depends on the balance of the 
harms: the more net harm an injunction can prevent, the weaker 
the plaintiff’s claim on the merits can be while still 
supporting some preliminary relief.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
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III. Analysis 
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
The first preliminary injunction factor requires Plaintiff 
to show that she is likely to prevail at the ultimate trial on 
the merits.  Opticians Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 
920 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1990).  “While ‘courts use a 
bewildering variety of formulations of the need for showing some 
likelihood of success . . . [a]ll courts agree that plaintiff 
must present a prima facie case but need not show that he is 
certain to win.’”  Mister Softee, Inc. v. Amanollahi, No. 14-
1687, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90370, at *16 (D.N.J. July 1, 
2014)(quoting Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 
2948). 
To state a claim for trademark infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 
1114, a plaintiff must show three elements: “(1) it has a valid 
and legally protectable mark; (2) it owns the mark; and (3) the 
defendant’s use of the mark to identify goods or services causes 
a likelihood of confusion.”  A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. 
Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 210 (3d Cir. 
2000).  
Defendants do not deny that Plaintiff has satisfied the 
first two elements because Plaintiff’s Silent Skate trademark is 
federally registered with the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (“USPTO”).  (Opp. Br. at 1.)  The “certificate of 
registration issued by the United States Patent and Trademark 
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Office” for Plaintiff’s Silent Skate trademark “constitutes 
prima facie evidence of the validity and ownership of a disputed 
mark’ and is therefore sufficient to establish the first and 
second elements of trademark infringement.”  Mister Softee, 
Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90370, at *17.1   
Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot satisfy the third element 
– a likelihood of confusion.  (Opp. Br., [Dkt. No. 63], at 1-2).  
A likelihood of confusion arises when “consumers viewing the 
mark would probably assume that the product or service it 
represents is associated with the source of a different product 
or service identified by a similar mark.”  A & H Sportswear, 
 
1 The Court notes Defendants’ fifth affirmative defense is for 
“Generic Use.”  Defendants argue “[t]he allegations made in the 
Amended Complaint are barred, in whole or in part, because the 
alleged marks at issue are generic.”  Defendants’ Answer to the 
Amended Complaint, [Dkt. No. 39], at 4.  The Court recognizes 
that registration serves as prima facie evidence of the validity 
of a mark, meaning that Plaintiff “is entitled to a strong prima 
facie presumption that its registered mark is either not merely 
descriptive or if descriptive, that secondary meaning is 
presumed, which amounts to the same thing.” Koninkijke Philips 
Elecs. N.V. v. Hunt Control Sys., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84299, 
at *50 (D.N.J. June 29, 2016)(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a); 2 
McCarthy on Trademarks § 11:43.).  However, this is a rebuttable 
presumption. J & J Snack Foods, Corp. v. Nestle USA, Inc., 149 
F. Supp. 2d 136, 145 (D.N.J. June 27, 2001)(“If plaintiff has a 
federal registration, then there is a strong presumption that 
the term is not generic, and a defendant must overcome that 
presumption.”).  Here, despite Defendants’ affirmative defense 
regarding generic use, Defendants fail to advance any argument 
in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the first element because the 
trademark, Silent Skate, is merely descriptive of the 
Plaintiff’s services.  Instead, Defendants appear to concede 
that elements one and two are satisfied.  For this reason, and 
this reason alone, the Court finds Plaintiff’s trademark, Silent 
Skate, is entitled to the presumption of validity. 
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Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 211 (3d 
Cir. 2000)(internal citations omitted); see also Lorillard 
Techs, Inc. v. NJ Ale House, L.C.C., No. 14-2044, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 31920, at *21 (D.N.J. Mar. 13, 2015).  The Third 
Circuit has established ten non-exhaustive factors when 
conducting a likelihood of confusion analysis.  Interpace Corp. 
v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1983).  However, the Third 
Circuit noted that when the trademark holder and the alleged 
infringer have competing goods or services, the court will 
rarely need to “look beyond the mark itself.”  Id. at 462.  In 
addition, the Third Circuit has also “repeatedly insisted that 
the Lapp factors are not to be mechanically tallied, but rather 
that they are tools to guide a qualitative decision.”   A&H 
Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 210.   
Moreover, the Third Circuit has held that “there is a great 
likelihood of confusion when an infringer uses the exact 
trademark” as the plaintiff.  Opticians, 920 F.2d at 195 
(finding “likelihood of confusion . . . inevitable, when . . . 
the identical mark is used concurrently”); see also U.S. Jaycees 
v. Phila. Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 142 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding 
that a “great likelihood of confusion [exists] when an infringer 
uses the exact trademark”); Tile, Inc. v. Blazing Prices, No. 
20-05653, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59328, *5-6 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 
2021) (“These devices bear Plaintiff’s registered mark. That 
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alone is sufficient to establish a likelihood of confusion under 
the Lanham Act.”). 
Here, the Court need not conduct a detailed analysis under 
each Lapp factor because Plaintiff sufficiently contends 
Defendants’ advertisements uses Plaintiff’s exact trademark, 
which is likely to cause consumer confusion.  See U.S. Jaycees, 
639 F.2d at 142 (“there is great likelihood of confusion when an 
infringer uses the exact trademark”); Opticians, 920 F.2d at 195 
(finding “likelihood of confusion . . . inevitable, when . . . 
the identical mark is used concurrently”).   
The issue of confusion is further demonstrated through the 
USPTO’s own rejection of Defendant Live Life’s trademark 
application for the mark Silent Sk8 because of the likelihood of 
confusion between Silent Sk8 and Plaintiff’s Silent Skate 
trademark.  (Plaintiff’s Brief in support of preliminary 
injunction, [Dkt. Nos. 56-1, 56-2]).  In assessing Live Life’s 
trademark application for the mark Silent Sk8, USPTO compared 
the two marks.  The USPTO found “applicant’s mark, SILENT SK8, 
sounds the same and has the same meaning as registrant’s mark, 
SILENT SKATE, creating a confusingly similar overall commercial 
impression between the marks.”  (USPTO Final Office Action, 
[Dkt. No. 71-16], at 5).   
The USPTO further explained “The marks are essentially 
phonetic equivalents and thus sound similar” and recognized that 
“[s]imilarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a 
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finding that the compared marks are confusingly similar.”  Id.  
The USPTO found that the misspelling of the word skate to sk8 
did not “significantly alter the shared overall commercial 
impression between the marks[,]” and, therefore, “consumers 
encountering applicant’s mark in the marketplace will 
immediately understand the mark to mean SILENT SKATE, and will 
assume there is a connection between applicant’s and 
registrant’s marks.”  Id. 
The USPTO next compared Plaintiff and Defendant Live Life’s 
services.  Defendant Live Life’s application explained that the 
mark Silent SK8 was for “providing skating rinks; Hosting social 
entertainment events, namely, skating events, for others; 
Hosting social entertainment events, namely, silent skating 
events, for others.”  Id. at 4.  Similarly, Plaintiff’s 
application, which was granted by the USPTO, explained that the 
mark Silent Skate was for “Arranging, organizing, conducting, 
and hosting social entertainment events; Hosting social 
entertainment events, namely, skating events, for others.”  Id.  
The USPTO found that the services of the companies were “highly 
related and partially overlapping” and thus “legally identical,” 
making the services “related for likelihood of confusion 
purposes.”  Id. at 5.  The USPTO concluded that “[b]ecause the 
marks are similar and the services are related, it is likely 
that consumers would believe that the services emanate from a 
common source.”  Id. at 6. 
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The Court finds the USPTO’s findings regarding the use of 
Silent Sk8, while not binding, nonetheless persuasive as to why 
Defendants’ use of the phrase Silent Skate in their 
advertisement, the exact wording of Plaintiff’s trademark, is 
highly likely to cause consumer confusion.  This conclusion is 
further buttressed by Plaintiff’s evidence that there has been 
actual consumer confusion because of Defendants’ use of the 
phrase Silent Skate.  (See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Exhibits regarding 
customer confusion, [Dkt. Nos. 68, 68-1, 68-2, 68-3, 68-4, 68-5, 
68-6, 68-7, 68-8, 68-9, 68-10, 68-11, and 68-12]).  For the 
foregoing reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff has demonstrated a 
likelihood of success on the merits of her trademark 
infringement claim. 
B. Irreparable Harm 
Previously, the Third Circuit had held irreparable injury 
is presumed in trademark infringement actions.  KOS 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708-09 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (“Trademark infringement amounts to irreparable 
injury as a matter of law.”).  “However, in light of eBay Inc. 
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392-93, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 
164 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2006), the Third Circuit reworked its 
position to hold no presumption of irreparable harm is afforded 
to parties seeking injunctive relief in Lanham Act cases.”  Hit 
Doctor Tri State Arsenal LLC v. Barth, No. 19-14579, 2020 WL 
729152, at *6 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2020)(citing Ferring Pharms., 
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Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2014); 
Buzz Bee Toys, Inc. v. Swimways Corp., 20 F. Supp. 3d 483, 511-
12 (D.N.J. 2014) (“[A]fter eBay, irreparable harm must be 
established as a separate element, regardless of whether a 
plaintiff has shown infringement.”)).  
As concerns the irreparable harm factor, Plaintiff must 
demonstrate that she will, in the absence of an injunction, 
“experience [immediate] harm that cannot adequately be 
compensated after the fact by monetary damages.”  Adams v. 
Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484-85 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(citation omitted); Goadby v. Phila. Elec. Co., 639 F.2d 117, 
121 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that irreparable harm only exists 
when “damages are difficult to ascertain or are inadequate”).  
In other words, irreparable harm only exists in the event the 
injury is “of a peculiar nature, [such] that compensation in 
money cannot [alone] atone for it,” Goadby, 639 F.2d at 121, or 
where monetary damages would be inadequate or exceedingly 
difficult to ascertain.  In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee 
Litigation, 689 F.2d 1137, 1146 (3d Cir. 1982).  A purely 
economic injury, compensable in money, by contrast, fails to 
satisfy the irreparable injury requirement.  See Morton v. 
Beyer, 822 F.2d 364, 371-72 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Bennington 
Foods LLC v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., LLP, 528 F.3d 176, 178-
79 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding harm that can be repaired through 
monetary damages is not irreparable).  However, “[g]rounds for 
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finding irreparable injury include loss of control of 
reputation, loss of trade, and loss of good will.”  Opticians 
Ass’c of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 198, 195 (3d 
Cir. 1990).  “A finding of irreparable injury can also be based 
on likely confusion.”  Id. at 196. 
Defendants incorrectly cite old case law, which held there 
is a presumption of irreparable harm once the Court has 
established a likelihood of confusion between the two marks at 
issue.  As detailed above, this presumption is no longer good 
law and instead Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating 
irreparable harm because of the trademark infringement.  Putting 
that issue aside, Defendants further claim Plaintiff cannot 
satisfy this element because her “papers are void of any mention 
of any sort of harm, let alone irreparable harm.”  (Opp. Br., 
[Dkt. No. 63], at 3).   
In response, Plaintiff argues that she has satisfied this 
requirement as she can “no longer continue to co-author a book 
called Evolution of Skating” because her collaborator “had 
concerns on how Live Life Headphones LLC Silent Sk8 product and 
services is different from my Silent Skate product and 
services.”  Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, [Dkt. No. 65-13].  
Plaintiff further explains that questioning of Defendants’ use 
of her trademark by customers and business associates is 
“humiliating and shameful” and has caused confusion.  
Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, [Dkt. No. 65-14].  In support of her 
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claims of shame, humiliation, and confusion Plaintiff has put 
forth multiple exhibits demonstrating actual customer confusion 
and frustration over Plaintiff’s “Silent Skate” mark and 
Defendants’ conduct of promoting events and ticket sales to 
events with the phrase “Silent Skate”.  See Plaintiff’s Exhibits 
regarding confusion and reputation, [Dkt. Nos. 68-1 to 68-12].  
Plaintiff thus argues she has suffered both tangible and 
intangible harms, including losses to good will, reputation, 
opportunities, and sales.   
On this record, the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations are 
sufficient to demonstrate irreparable harm.  Defendants acted 
without impunity, routinely promoting and conducting events 
marketed as “Silent Skate,” despite knowledge of Plaintiff’s 
trademark and her repeated requests that they cease and desist 
the allegedly infringing conduct.  As presented in various 
emails, text messages, and other communications, Defendants’ 
conduct has caused actual customer confusion and damage to 
Plaintiff.  Since confusion itself, between the Plaintiff’s 
trademark and Defendants’ misuse, goes to the issues of 
Plaintiff’s reputation and others’ good will, which can be 
otherwise virtually impossible to capture in terms of monetary 
relief, there is adequate grounds to find irreparable harm.  
See, e.g. Opticians Ass’n of Am., 920 F.2d at 195; Astrazeneca 
AB v. Camber Pharms., Inc., 2015 WL 7307101, at *5 (D. Del. Nov. 
15, 2015) (quoting Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 
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700, 726 (3d Cir. 2004)) (“‘Grounds for irreparable injury 
include loss of control of reputation, loss of trade, and loss 
of good will,’ intangible harms for which ‘it is virtually 
impossible to ascertain the precise economic consequences’”).   
Moreover, not only does Plaintiff allege that this 
confusion injured her reputation and good will among customers, 
but she also has suffered a trade loss in the form of a book 
deal.  This lost opportunity is the result of the confusion 
created by Defendants’ “Silent Sk8 product” and promotion of 
silent skating events.  While the loss of a book deal may be 
misconstrued as a merely economic opportunity, and the Court 
notes such a loss may be difficult to calculate, the Court finds 
the loss of a book deal in this case includes certain 
intangibles beyond monetary harm.  This lost business 
opportunity includes damage to Plaintiff’s reputation as well as 
the loss of potential publicity and exposure from the book.  
Accordingly, Defendants’ acts diluted Plaintiff’s trademark by 
causing confusion and other intangible losses.  Plaintiff 
therefore demonstrates a clear likelihood of irreparable harm 
satisfying the second element for injunctive relief.  Finding a 
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable 
harm, the Court addresses the remaining elements for a 
preliminary injunction. 
 
C. Remaining Elements for a Preliminary Injunction 
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1. Balance of Hardships 
As to balancing the hardships to the parties, this prong is 
designed “to ensure that the issuance of an injunction would not 
harm the infringer more than a denial would harm the mark's 
owner.”  Opticians Ass'n of Am., 920 F.2d at 197.  Thus, “[a]n 
injunction should not be granted if its impact on the enjoined 
party would be more severe than the injury the moving party 
would suffer if it is not granted.”  Litton Sys., Inc. v. 
Sundstrand Corp., 750 F. 2d 952, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1984).   
“[T]he balance [of hardships] weighs strongly in favor of 
[an injunction] where all that is requested is that Defendant 
comply with the [law and abstain from infringing].”  Warner 
Bros. Records Inc. v. Walker, 704 F.Supp.2d 460, 469 (W.D. Pa. 
2010) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Lava 
Records, LLC v. Ates, No. 05-1314, 2006 WL 1914166, at *4 (W.D. 
La. July 11, 2006)).  In striking a balance of the hardships, 
court should also be mindful of the relative sizes of the 
parties.  Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys., 
132 F.3d 701, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
A primary question of this element is whether, and to what 
extent, Defendants will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive 
relief is granted.  Such irreparable harm “must be of a peculiar 
nature, so that compensation in money alone cannot atone for 
it.”  Kos Pharms., 369 F.3d at 727.  As noted by the Third 
Circuit in this regard, “[i]njury to goodwill does not 
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constitute irreparable harm . . . . But, when the potential harm 
to each party is weighed, a party ‘can hardly claim to be harmed 
[where] it brought any and all difficulties occasioned by the 
issurance of the injunction upon itself.’”  Id. at 728 (quoting 
Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson – Merck 
Consumer Pharm. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 596 (3d Cir. 1983)). 
Defendants claim the equities favor denial of injunctive 
relief because they “are not using [Plaintiff’s] mark”, “there 
is no likelihood of confusion”, and Plaintiff cannot establish 
irreparable harm.  Citing no legal authorities or facts, 
Defendants further argue Plaintiff is free to host her own 
silent skating parties at any time, whereas, if the injunction 
is granted, then Defendants will be irreparably injured because 
“they would need to change their entire business model” (which, 
by their account is a “skating” rink and a “silent” disco 
company).  Arguing semantics, Defendants claim “silent” and 
“skate” are “commonly used words” that hold independent 
definitions to Plaintiff’s trademark.  Finally, Defendants claim 
it would be unjust to prevent them from using the phrase “silent 
skate” since “many other individuals, organizers, and companies 
are using the same words to advertise the same types of events 
without limitation.”   
In response, Plaintiff correctly contends that Defendants 
are unquestionably using her mark, causing confusion to 
customers and her business associates, and they are misstating 
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the relative hardships.  Plaintiff notes that Defendant Live 
Life is a headphone rental business that until 2018 was not 
involved in silent skating events.  Likewise, Plaintiff argues 
Defendant Cascade is far more than a mere silent skating event 
space.  She notes Cascade is a “World Famous”, celebrated 
skating rink (a “monument in the skate world”) that has appeared 
in the movie ATL and has successfully operated for over a decade 
prior to holding silent skating events.  Thus, Plaintiff argues 
injunctive relief would not challenge Defendants’ businesses’ 
ability to successfully operate (as they did before she brought 
the silent skate idea to them) since silent skating events are 
not fundamental to their business models.  
The Court finds a balance of the hardships weighs in favor 
of granting a preliminary injunction since the only harm is 
precluding, at least temporarily, Defendants from infringing 
upon Plaintiff’s mark.
2  Unlike Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro 
se and in forma pauperis, Defendants are established, and in the 
case of Cascade, successful businesses, that have failed to 
demonstrate how silent skating events are essential to or at the 
 
2 “One of the goals of the preliminary injunction analysis is to 
maintain the status quo, defined as ‘the last, peaceable, 
noncontested status of the parties.’” Opticians Ass'n of Am., 
920 F.2d at 197 (citation omitted) (first citing Arthur Guinness 
& Sons, PLC v. Sterling Pub. Co., 732 F.2d 1095, 1099, 1101–02 
(2d Cir. 1984); and then quoting 2 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and 
Unfair Competition § 30:19 (2d ed. 1984)).  The Court finds the 
requested relief merely returns the parties to the status quo 
prior to the alleged infringements of Plaintiff’s mark. 
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core of their business models such that an injunction would 
cause irreparable harm.  As concerns Defendants’ other 
protestations, and as noted above, the Court finds there is a 
likelihood of success that Defendants are knowingly infringing 
upon Plaintiff’s mark, thereby causing confusion.  Injunctive 
relief should come as no surprise here as Defendants were fully 
aware that Plaintiff would seek judicial relief since she made 
repeated demands to cease their continuing use of her “Silent 
Skate” mark.  In the absence of an injunction, nothing prevents 
Defendant from further acts of infringement.    
Thus, the Court finds that the balance of the hardships 
favors an injunction.  Plaintiff continues to suffer the harms, 
and the threat of harm, as outlined under the irreparable injury 
analysis.  Defendants have failed to identify any specific harm, 
let alone an economic harm, that would follow from permitting 
Plaintiff's application to proceed. 
2. Public Interest 
The Third Circuit instructs that “the most basic public 
interest at stake in all Lanham Act cases [is]: the interest in 
prevention of confusion, particularly as it affects the public 
interest in truth and accuracy.  We have often recognized that 
‘[p]ublic interest . . . in a trademark case is . . . most often 
a synonym for the right of the public not to be deceived or 
confused.’”  Kos Pharms., Inc., 369 F.3d at 730 (quoting Pappan 
Enters., Inc. v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 807 (3d 
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Cir 1998)).  Accordingly, as this Court finds there is a 
likelihood of confusion3 created by Defendants’ use of the phrase 
“Silent Skate,” which is the exact wording of Plaintiff’s 
trademark, “‘it follows that if such use continues, the public 
interest would be damaged.  Conversely, a prohibition upon 
[Defendants’] use of [Plaintiff’s] mark would eliminate that 
confusion.’”  Kos Pharms., Inc., 369 F.3d at 730 (quoting 
Opticians, 920 F.2d at 198).  The Court finds this element is 
easily satisfied. 
3.  The Bond Requirement 
“Generally, a bond is a condition of preliminary injunctive 
relief.”  Sprint Commc’ns. Co. L.P. v. CAT Commc’n Int’l., Inc., 
335 F.3d 235, 239 (3d Cir. 2003).  Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65(c) states that a “court may issue a preliminary 
injunction . . . only if the movant gives security in an amount 
that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages 
sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined . 
. . .”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c).  While, the posting of a bond is 
rarely discretionary, “[t]he amount of the bond is left to the 
 
3 Defendants’ public interest argument centers on the issue of 
confusion, claiming there is no deception or confusion present 
in the record.  Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that confusion is 
plainly presented.  The Court agrees.  As explained above, 
Defendants’ acts caused confusion; thus the Court rejects 
Defendants’ claim that “there is no likelihood of confusion 
created by the Defendants.” 
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discretion of court.”  Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 
F.2d 186, 210 (3d Cir. 1990). 
Here, the Court finds that security in the amount of $1,000 
deposited with the Clerk of the Court satisfies Rule 65(c) on 
the present record.  Central to the Court’s decision is 
Defendants’ representation that they are not using the 
infringing mark.  See Opp. Br., [Dkt. No. 63], at 3) 
(“Defendants are not using the mark that plaintiff is alleging 
that the Defendants are using”).  Thus, it stands to reason 
Defendants will not suffer harm if the Court enjoins them from 
activities they already abstain from.  Moreover, as discussed 
above, Defendants’ argument that injunctive relief might somehow 
disrupt their business models is unsupported in the record as 
they have made no specific showing of harm, let alone economic 
harm.  Nothing in this opinion precludes Defendants from 
promoting and hosting entertainment events in which participants 
roller skate and listen to music through headphones.  What 
Defendants may not do is use Plaintiff’s federally protected 
mark, or something confusingly similar, in doing so.  
In contrast and as detailed above, Plaintiff seeks to 
enforce an important public interest, namely, to protect her 
trademark and the public’s interest in avoiding confusion.  
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis and is 
therefore of limited financial means.  There is, therefore, some 
concern that setting a bond amount untethered to any economic 
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risk to Defendants occasioned by the awarding of a preliminary 
injunction will be nothing less than a Pyrrhic victory for 
Plaintiff denying her her statutory rights under the Lanham Act.   
On the other hand, Plaintiff maintains a commercial 
enterprise and this action is, in the end, intended to preserve 
whatever economic value the disputed mark represents.  Some 
amount of security is required and equitable and the Court has 
endeavored to set that amount on the record before it.  If 
Defendants believe, however, despite their stated disavowal to 
use the disputed mark, that the bond amount is too low they may 
petition the Court for additional security at any time before 
trial on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims.  Any such application 
must articulate with specificity the non-speculative economic 
harm caused by the injunction.  
CONCLUSION 
As the Court finds a reasonable likelihood of success on 
the merits of the trademark infringement claim and the other 
elements for a preliminary injunction to be satisfied, the Court 
will grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.  
An appropriate Order will be entered. 
 
Date:  March 20, 2022   s/ Noel L. Hillman   
At Camden, New Jersey   NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J. 
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