govinfo:USCOURTS-insd-1_25-cv-00864-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION 
 
COUNT US IN, et al., )  
 )  
Plaintiffs, )  
 )  
v. ) No. 1:25-cv-00864-RLY-MKK 
 )  
DIEGO MORALES, et al., )  
 )  
Defendants. )  
 
ENTRY ON PLANTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), the Supreme 
Court rejected a constitutional challenge to Indiana's law requiring citizens voting in 
person on election day to present photo identification.  To qualify as proof of 
identification, an ID must be issued by the government of the United States or Indiana 
and include the voter's name, a photograph of the voter, and an expiration date.  For 
nearly two decades, Indiana accepted student ID cards issued by Indiana public 
universities so long as they satisfied these four requirements.  But in 2025, Indiana 
enacted Senate Bill 10 ("SB 10").  This law— without otherwise changing the original 
law's requirements—eliminated student IDs as an acceptable form of identification at the 
polls.  Students who relied on their student IDs to vote and lack an alternative form of 
identification claim that the law will prevent them from voting in the upcoming 2026 
elections.   
Plaintiffs therefore move for a preliminary injunction to prevent Defendants from 
enforcing SB 10, arguing that the law (1) unconstitutionally burdens the right to vote in 
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violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and (2) intentionally discriminates 
against young voters in violation of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.  Having determined 
that, based on this record, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success 
on the merits of their claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the court 
GRANTS their motion for preliminary injunction. 
I. Background 
A. General Requirements to Vote in Indiana 
Indiana permits all citizens who are (or, by election day, will be) "at least eighteen 
(18) years of age" and have "reside[d] in a precinct continuously . . . for at least thirty 
(30) days" to register as voters.  Ind. Code § 3-7-13-1.  A person resides in their 
"residence," which is the place of the person's "true, fixed, and permanent home and 
principal establishment" and where the person "has, whenever absent, the intention of 
returning."  Id. § 3-5-2.1-90.   
To vote, all registered voters may cast ballots in person at their precinct on election 
day or at various locations up to 28 days before election day.  Id. §§ 3-11-8-2, 3-11-4-1, 
3-11-10-26.  Since 2005, voters have had to present proof of identification to cast a ballot 
in person.  Id. §§ 3-10-1-7.2(a), 3-11-8-25.1(a).  As originally enacted, Indiana's voter ID 
law required eligible proof of identification to: (1) display the voter's name; (2) include 
the voter's photograph; (3) display an expiration date; and (4) have been issued by the 
government of the United States or Indiana.  Id. § 3-5-2.1-84(a).  Although "the most 
likely source of acceptable identification is either drivers' licenses or identification cards 
issued by the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles ("BMV")," Indiana Democratic Party v. 
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Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 789 (S.D. Ind. 2006), a wide range of IDs satisfied these 
requirements, (Dkt. 86-2 at 2–12), including student IDs issued by many Indiana public 
universities, (id. at 7).
1 
If an eligible voter needs an ID but does not have one, the BMV will issue them a 
free ID.  Id. § 9-24-16-10(b)–(c).  Still, obtaining a card requires an applicant to present 
proof of identity, lawful status, Social Security number, and residency.  140 IAC 7-1.1-
3(a). 
Should a voter present at the polls without a valid form of identification, the voter 
is not turned away but permitted to cast a provisional ballot.  See Ind. Code § 3-11.7-2-
1(b)(1).  V oters who cast provisional ballots must then either appear before the circuit 
court clerk or county election board within ten days of the election and show a valid 
photo ID, id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(b)(1), or appear within ten days of the election and execute 
an affidavit stating that they are indigent and unable to obtain a photo ID without 
payment of a fee, id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(c).  Photo identification is unnecessary for voters 
who vote absentee-by-mail.  See id. § 3-11-4-2(h).  But Indiana limits absentee voting to 
voters who meet specific statutory criteria.  Id. § 3-11-10-24.
2   
B. Student ID Usage Pre-SB 10 
For nearly two decades, hundreds of thousands of students at Indiana public 
universities used their student ID cards to vote.  (See Dkt. 86-2 at 83–84 ¶¶ 8–12, 89–92 
 
1 Of the approximately 250,000 students enrolled in Indiana's public universities, (Dkt. 86-2 at 
71), nearly 200,000 attend schools with IDs that qualified before SB 10, (id. at 31). 
2 Most students cannot rely on absentee voting, which is not normally available to young voters 
outside of unique circumstances. 
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¶¶ 11–18, 95 ¶¶ 6–8).  For example, the election supervisor for Monroe County, which 
includes Indiana University-Bloomington, estimated that in the November 2024 general 
election about two-thirds of voters at the on-campus polling place used student IDs to 
vote.  (Id. at 102). 
Over the years, several universities took steps to ensure their student IDs 
conformed to the voter ID requirements.  After Indiana passed its voter ID law, public 
colleges and universities contacted state and local officials to confirm that their student 
IDs satisfied it.  (Dkt. 86-3 at 21–22).  In 2016, Indiana University at South Bend updated 
its student IDs to comply with the voter ID law.  (Id. at 24–25).  And in 2019, Purdue 
University did the same.  (Id. at 27–30).  Purdue's bursar explained, "[I]f we can help 
make voting more convenient for students, we want to do so."  (Id. at 28).  Even after 
Purdue shifted to mobile ID cards in 2023, it continued to provide physical, "vote-ready" 
ID cards that could be printed on site at polling locations.  (Id. at 41). 
For many students who relied on it, student IDs made the difference in whether 
they could vote.  (See, e.g., Dkt. 86-2 at 95 ¶¶ 6–8).  Students are far less likely than other 
voters to possess the most common alternative forms of ID, like an Indiana driver's 
license or ID card.  While 87.7% of Indiana residents have a driver's license, that rate 
drops to 73.4% for Hoosiers between the ages of 18 and 24—the predominant age group 
among Indiana college students.  (See id. at 32–34).  Out-of-state students, who constitute 
more than one-third of students at Indiana schools with qualifying IDs, are even less 
likely to have an Indiana driver's license or state ID, particularly since Indiana law does 
not require students to secure an in-state license.  (Id. at 31; see, e.g., id. at 83–84 ¶ 9, 96 
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¶¶ 10–11; Ind. Code § 9-13-2-78(1)(A) (exempting students "[a]ttending a postsecondary 
educational institution" from being required to obtain an Indiana driver's license)). 
Monroe County's election-day check-in data illustrates the point.  Although the 
County does not record the specific type of voter ID each person presents, voters who 
present Indiana driver's licenses or state IDs check in at the polls by scanning them, 
making the scans a reliable proxy.  (Dkt. 86-3 at 53; Dkt. 86-4 at 14; see Dkt. 86-2 at 35–
36).  In the 2022 and 2024 general elections, all but 5.1% of Monroe County voters 
scanned an Indiana driver's license or state ID at the polls on election day.  (Dkt. 86-2 at 
35).  But at precincts on or adjacent to Indiana University's Bloomington campus, that 
number roughly triples.  (Id. at 35–36).  In 2022, 20% of voters at one precinct on the 
IU's Bloomington campus did not present an Indiana driver's license or state ID at the 
polls.  (Id.).  And in both years, nine of the ten precincts with the highest proportion of 
voters who did not scan an Indiana driver's license or state ID at the polls were located on 
or next to IU's Bloomington campus.  (Id. at 36). 
Because most students are young, restrictions that disproportionately burden 
students necessarily fall hardest on Indiana's youngest voters.  At Indiana's public 
colleges and universities, 74.1% of voting-age students are between the ages of 18 and 
24.  (Id. at 32).  Moreover, Indiana's young voters are not spread evenly throughout the 
electorate—they are highly geographically concentrated on college campuses.  ( Id. at 33).  
Across Indiana's thousands of precincts, (Dkt. 86-5 at 28), only 20 have populations 
where more than 30% of voters are between the ages of 18 and 24; all but one sit on or 
adjacent to a college campus.  (Dkt. 86-2 at 33–34). 
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C. SB 10 
In April 2025, Indiana enacted SB 10, which amended its voter ID law to exclude 
student ID cards.  Ind. Code § 3-5-2.1-84(c).  SB 10 did not change the law's four long-
standing criteria for acceptable photo ID.  Instead, it clarified that "proof of 
identification" for voting purposes "does not include a document issued by an educational 
institution."  Id.   
Before SB 10, every other amendment that Indiana made to its voter ID law 
moved in the opposite direction, easing the requirements for certain types of ID.  In 2011, 
Indiana amended the law to exempt military documents from the expiration date 
requirement.  H.B. 1109, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011), enacted as Pub. 
L. No. 118-2011, 2011 Ind. Acts 1206.  Three years later, it did the same for identification 
issue by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs ("V A").  H.B. 1318, 118th Gen. 
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2014), enacted as Pub. L. No. 76-2014, 2014 Ind. Acts 828.  
And in 2021, Indiana exempted tribal identification cards from the expiration date 
requirement too.  H.B. 1485, 122d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2021), enacted as 
Pub. L. No. 2021-209, 2021 Ind. Acts 3161.  All these amendments created exceptions for 
IDs that otherwise do not meet the statute's criteria.  In contrast, SB 10 marked the first 
time that Indiana singled out a previously acceptable form of ID and barred its use at the 
polls.  Students are the only group that are told that their widely held, government-issued 
ID cannot be used to vote.  
Although supporters of SB 10 described it largely as an election-integrity measure, 
(see, e.g., Dkt. 86-6 at 35–36, 205–06, 365), there is no evidence that student IDs have 
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been used to engage in voter fraud or any other voting-related misconduct.  Proponents 
also suggested that poll workers might struggle to determine which student IDs were 
valid for voting.  (Id. at 212–13).  But poll worker training materials demonstrate that 
guidance for election workers addressed student IDs only briefly, noting the basic voter 
ID requirements and sometimes listing the schools whose identification qualified.  (See, 
e.g., Dkt. 86-7 at 438–605). 
D. This Lawsuit 
In May 2025, shortly after SB 10 was enacted, Plaintiffs Count US IN, 
Women4Change Indiana, and Josh Montagne brought this constitutional challenge.  
Count US IN is an Indiana-based non-profit organization.  (Dkt. 1 ¶ 14).  The 
organization's mission is "to elevate citizens' voices and foster inclusive, equitable 
political participation by encouraging diverse voter turnout, educating citizens on voting 
rights and protections, combating voter suppression, and cultivating partnerships to create 
political equity."  (Dkt. 86-2 at 88–89 ¶ 7).  Women4Change Indiana is an Indiana-based 
non-profit corporation.  (Dkt. 86-3 at 15 ¶ 3).  Its mission is "to promote civic education 
and encourage democratic participation to achieve better outcomes for women in 
Indiana."  (Id. ¶ 4).  Montagne is a 21-year-old student at Indiana University 
Bloomington.  (Dkt. 86-2 at 94 ¶¶ 3–4).  He is originally from Missouri but has lived in 
Indiana since 2023.  (Id. at 94, 96 ¶¶ 4, 10).  He is also registered to vote in Indiana and 
has voted in the state three times.  (Id. at 94–95 ¶¶ 4, 6).  Each time, he used his student 
ID card issued by Indiana University Bloomington to satisfy Indiana's photo ID 
requirement.  (Id. at 95 ¶ 6).  But he lacks an Indiana driver's license, an Indiana ID card, 
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or any other form of identification that satisfies Indiana's voter ID requirements after the 
passage of SB 10.  (Id. ¶ 7). 
Plaintiffs sued a host of Defendants in their official capacities.  They include: 
Diego Morales, the Indiana Secretary of State; Paul Okeson, the Chair of the Indiana 
Election Commission; Suzannah Overholt, the Vice-Chair of the Indiana Election 
Commission; Karen Celestino-Horseman and Litany Pyle, who are both members of the 
Indiana Election Commission; Bradley King and Angela Nussmeyer, who are Co-
Directors of the Indiana Election Division; and the Monroe County Board of Elections. 
The Plaintiffs challenge SB 10 on two grounds.  First, they argue that it 
unconstitutionally burdens the right to vote of students and young voters in violation of 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  Second, they argue that it intentionally 
discriminates against young voters in violation of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. 
Defendants moved to dismiss this lawsuit in July 2025.  (Dkt. 30).  In October, this 
court denied that motion.  (Dkt. 57).  In February 2026, Plaintiffs filed a motion for 
preliminary injunction.  (Dkt. 85).  They ask this court to enjoin Defendants from 
enforcing SB 10 during the upcoming elections to the extent that it eliminates student ID 
as an acceptable form of photo identification under Indiana's voter ID law.  
All other facts necessary to resolve this motion are addressed as necessary in the 
Discussion section. 
II. Legal Standard 
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate: (1) a 
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) no adequate remedy at law; and (3) 
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irreparable harm absent the injunction.  Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm'r of 
Ind. State Dep't of Health, 699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012).  In evaluating the merits 
element, the court "approach[es] the record from a neutral and objective viewpoint, 
assessing the merits as . . . they are likely to be decided after more complete discovery 
and litigation."  Doe v. Univ. of S. Ind., 43 F.4th 784, 792 (7th Cir. 2022).   
If the moving party fails to demonstrate any one of the three threshold 
requirements, the injunctive relief must be denied.  Girls Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. 
v. Girl Scouts of the U.S., Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1086 (7th Cir. 2008).  But if those 
threshold conditions are met, the court must then assess the balance of the harms—the 
harm to Plaintiffs if the injunction is not issued against the harm to Defendants if it is 
issued—and determine the effect of an injunction on the public interest.  Id.  "The more 
likely the [moving party] is to win, the less heavily need the balance of harms weigh in 
his favor; the less likely he is to win, the more need it weigh in his favor."  Roland Mach. 
Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 387 (7th Cir. 1984). 
III. Discussion 
A. Standing 
Standing "is a threshold question in every federal case because if the litigants do 
not have standing to raise their claims the court is without authority to consider the merits 
of the action."  Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724, 726 (7th Cir. 
2016) (quoting Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 1463, 1467 (7th 
Cir. 1988)).  Here, Defendants argue that neither Count US IN nor Women4Change 
Indiana have standing.  But "[o]nly injunctive relief is sought, and for that only one 
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plaintiff with standing is required."  Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 
949, 951 (7th Cir. 2007).  Defendants do not dispute that Montagne has standing, so 
whether these organizations have standing need not be addressed at this juncture. 
B. Sovereign Immunity 
The Secretary of State and the Election Division ("State Defendants") claim that 
they are immune from suit and that an injunction against them would not redress 
Plaintiffs' injuries because neither has a direct role in enforcing election laws.  The 
Eleventh Amendment "generally immunizes" suits brought against states and state 
officials acting in their official capacities.  Doe v. Holcomb, 883 F.3d 971, 975 (7th Cir. 
2018).  But there are several exceptions to this general rule.  Relevant here is the 
exception that allows private parties to sue state officials in their official capacities to 
enjoin ongoing violations of federal law.  See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908).  
To avoid the Eleventh Amendment, a plaintiff must name "a state official who has 'some 
connection with the enforcement' of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute."  
Holcomb, 883 F.3d at 975 (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157).  A plaintiff must 
"also establish that his injury is causally connected to that enforcement and that enjoining 
the enforcement is likely to redress his injury."  Id. at 975–76. 
The State Defendants maintain that responsibility for enforcement rests with 
"precinct election officer[s]" and "precinct election board[s]."  See Ind. Code §§ 3-10-1-
7.2(b)–(c), 3-11-8-25.1(b)–(c).  As such, they argue that Plaintiffs need an order against 
county officials.  The court disagrees. 
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The Secretary of State and the Election Division need only have "some connection 
with the enforcement" of SB 10.  Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157.  Under Indiana law, 
the Secretary of State is the "chief state election official," Ind. Code § 3-6-3.7-2(5), who 
must "perform all ministerial duties related to the administration of elections," id. § 3-6-
4.2-2(a) (emphasis added).  And the Election Division must "assist the [Election 
Commission] and the [Secretary]" in those tasks and instruct local election officials on 
their duties under state and federal law.  Id. §§ 3-6-4.2-2(b), 3-6-4.2-14.  Given these 
responsibilities, both state and federal courts in Indiana have concluded that the Secretary 
of State and the Election Division are proper defendants in challenges to Indiana election 
laws.  See Common Cause Ind. v. Ind. Sec'y of State, No. 1:12-cv-1603, 2013 WL 
12284648, at *1, *3 (S.D. Ind. Sep. 6, 2013); League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. 
Rokita, 915 N.E.2d 151, 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).  In any event, Defendants do not 
dispute that either the Indiana Election Commission or the Monroe County Board of 
Elections are immune from suit.   At a minimum, the court has the power to enjoin these 
two entities. 
C. The Purcell Principle 
The Supreme Court "has repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should 
ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election."  Republican Nat'l Comm. 
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 589 U.S. 423, 424 (2020) (per curiam) (citing Purcell v. 
Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam)).  This is because "[c]ourt orders affecting 
elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and 
consequent incentive to remain away from the polls."  Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4–5.  Because 
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the risk of confusion increases as election dates draw nearer, courts considering an 
application for an injunction shortly before an election must "weigh, in addition to the 
harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction, considerations specific to 
election cases and [their] own institutional procedures."  Id. at 4.  At the same time, the 
Supreme Court has "not forbidden all change close to an election."  Democratic Nat'l 
Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 2020).  Rather, "[h]ow close to an 
election is too close may depend in part on the nature of the election law at issue, and 
how easily the State could make the change without undue collateral effects.  Changes 
that require complex or disruptive implementation must be ordered earlier than changes 
that are easy to implement."  Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 881 n.1 (2022) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
Indiana's primary election day is set for May 4, 2026—a little less than three 
weeks from the day of this order.  Accordingly, the court must consider whether the relief 
sought by Plaintiffs would be so disruptive as to be barred by the Purcell principle.  See, 
e.g., Republican Nat'l Comm., 589 U.S. at 423–25 (district court violated Purcell 
principle by issuing injunction five days before scheduled election and providing relief 
for which the plaintiffs did not specifically ask); Common Cause Ind. v. Lawson, 978 F.3d 
1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2020) (staying injunction issued five weeks before an election); Am. 
Council of Blind of Ind. v. Ind. Election Comm'n, No. 1:20-cv-3118, 2022 WL 702257, at 
*6–7 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 9, 2022) (denying relief that would be "too disruptive" but granting 
relief that "would not constitute the kind of significant change or result in confusion that 
the Purcell principle seeks to avoid"). 
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Although an injunction would leave Defendants with little time to implement 
changes, the primary concerns underlying the Purcell principle—confusion and 
disruption—are largely absent here.  In more cases than not, "merely requir[ing] the 
revival of previous practices" will not prove so disruptive that the Purcell principle bars 
relief.  League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 248 (4th Cir. 
2014).  Such is the case here.  The requested relief only requires Defendants to accept 
student IDs as a form of voter identification— something Indiana has already done for 
nearly two decades.   
Defendants protest that they will need to update the election materials they have 
already printed.  But a comparison of Indiana's materials before and after SB 10 shows 
how little those materials will need to change.  The only relevant change that Indiana 
made to its Election Administrator's Manual is the addition of a single sentence that states 
"document[s] issued by an educational institution" can no longer "serve as photo ID for 
purposes of voting."  (Compare Dkt. 96-2 at 1100 (updated manual), with Dkt. 86-7 at 
241 (2024 manual without sentence)).  Other training materials similarly address SB 10 
in little more than a sentence.  (See Dkt. 96-2 at 1223, 1260, 1286).  Any necessary 
changes would therefore not introduce the sort of complexity that Purcell seeks to avoid, 
especially when one considers that student IDs otherwise meet the criteria for photo 
identification established by Indiana's voter ID law.
3  Allowing voters to use their student 
 
3 In his declaration, the Director of Elections for the Marion County Election Board 
("MCEB")—Indiana's most populous county—confirmed that "[i]f student IDs were once again 
allowed to be used in Indiana, MCEB could and would reincorporate the portions of those 
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IDs to vote "would not require a significant expenditure of resources by Defendants or 
election officials, would be a feasible change to implement in advance of the upcoming 
election, and is unlikely to cause voter confusion that would cause voters to be 
discouraged from voting."  Am. Council of Blind of Ind., 2022 WL 702257, at *7. 
Defendants also claim that Plaintiffs' delay in requesting an injunction is fatal to 
their request for preliminary relief.  But Plaintiffs filed this suit weeks after SB 10 was 
enacted—they did "not unduly delay[] bringing the complaint to court."  Merrill, 142 S. 
Ct. at 881 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  Nor did they delay filing this motion for 
preliminary injunction.  "Delay in pursuing a preliminary injunction may raise questions 
regarding the plaintiff's claim that he or she will face irreparable harm if a preliminary 
injunction is not entered."  Ty, Inc. v. Jones Grp., Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 903 (7th Cir. 2001).  
"Whether the defendant has been 'lulled into a false sense of security or had acted in 
reliance on the plaintiff's delay' influences whether we will find that a plaintiff's decision 
to delay in moving for a preliminary injunction is acceptable or not."  Id. (quoting Ideal 
Indus., Inc. v. Gardner Bender, Inc., 612 F.2d 1018, 1025 (7th Cir. 1979)).  Neither 
circumstance is present here.  The court will not penalize Plaintiffs for the time it took 
them to gather the evidence necessary to support their motion for preliminary injunction.  
See Rose v. Raffensperger, 143 S. Ct. 58 (2022) (mem.) (vacating stay). 
Purcell does not present a bar to Plaintiffs' request for relief.  As such, the court 
will consider whether Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements for injunctive relief.  
 
materials that discussed student IDs into its training and Election Day operations for forthcoming 
elections.  (Dkt. 96-2 at 803). 
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D. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
Plaintiffs make two arguments challenging the constitutionality of SB 10.  First, 
the law imposes unconstitutional burdens on students and young voters in violation of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments.  Second, the law violates the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment's ban on intentional age-based discrimination in voting.  For the reasons 
explained below, the court finds that Plaintiffs are reasonably likely to succeed on their 
claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  Therefore, the court need not address 
Plaintiffs' claim under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.  See Greater New Orleans Broad. 
Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999) ("It is . . . an established part of our 
constitutional jurisprudence that we do not ordinarily reach out to make novel or 
unnecessarily broad pronouncements on constitutional issues when a case can be fully 
resolved on a narrower ground.").  
1. First and Fourteenth Amendment 
"Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and 
democratic society."  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964).  "Especially since 
the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of 
other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to 
vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."  Id. at 562.  Still, "as a practical 
matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest 
and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process."  
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).  To balance these potentially conflicting 
constitutional principles, the "flexible Anderson-Burdick standard" governs challenges to 
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state election laws.  Acevedo v. Cook Cnty. Officers Electoral Bd., 925 F.3d 944, 948 (7th 
Cir. 2019). 
Under this standard, a court: 
must weigh "the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights 
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to 
vindicate" against "the precise interests put forward by the State as 
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule," taking into consideration 
"the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's 
rights." 
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 
780, 789 (1983)).  The level of scrutiny the court applies when weighing these interests 
depends on "the extent of [the law's] imposition" on the right to vote.  Acevedo, 925 F.3d 
at 948.  When First and Fourteenth Amendment rights "are subjected to 'severe' 
restrictions, the regulation must be 'narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of 
compelling importance.'"  Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 
279, 289 (1992)).  In contrast, "the state's important regulatory interests are generally 
sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions."  Anderson, 460 U.S. at 
788.  But even "slight" burdens "must be justified by relevant and legitimate state 
interests 'sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.'"  Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191 (op. 
of Stevens, J.) (quoting Norman, 502 U.S. at 288–89); see id. at 210–11 (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
 Before evaluating SB 10 under the Anderson-Burdick framework, however, the 
court first considers to what extent Crawford controls the outcome of this case.  In 
Crawford, a fractured Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to Indiana's 
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original voter ID law because "[t]he application of the statute to the vast majority of 
Indiana voters [was] amply justified by the valid interest in protecting 'the integrity and 
reliability of the electoral process.'"  Id. at 204 (op. of Stevens, J.) (quoting Anderson, 460 
U.S. at 788 n.9).  Defendants therefore claim that "[t]his is Crawford all over again."  
(Dkt. 91 at 30).  But there are a few reasons why that is not true, the most important of 
which concerns the burdened population.   
 In Crawford, the plurality opinion considered the extent to which Indiana's voter 
ID law burdened "all Indiana voters."  553 U.S. at 202–03 (op. of Stevens, J.).  
Defendants claim that just as in Crawford, the court must consider the burden SB 10 
imposes on all Indiana voters.  (Dkt. 91 at 24).  And if that were true, this indeed would 
be Crawford all over again.  But Crawford does not preclude the court from considering 
how SB 10 burdens a particular class of voters.  In fact, the plurality opinion recognized 
that under Indiana's voter ID law, "a somewhat heavier burden may be placed on a 
limited number of persons," such as the elderly, indigent, and homeless.  Crawford, 553 
U.S. at 199 (op. of Stevens, J.).  Although the Court ultimately evaluated the burden as 
applied to all Indiana voters, this was only because "on the basis of the evidence in the 
record," the Court could not "quantify . . . the magnitude of the burden on this narrow 
class of voters."  Id. at 200.  Accordingly, the court will consider the extent to which SB 
10 burdens all Indiana voters only if, "on the basis of the evidence in the record," the 
magnitude of the burden on students and young voters is unquantifiable.  Otherwise, the 
fact that an identifiable "class of voters" bears the effects of SB 10 likely warrants a more 
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rigorous inquiry into the state's justifications.  See Libertarian Party of Ill. v. Scholz, 872 
F.3d 518, 523–24 (7th Cir. 2017). 
Moreover, the Anderson-Burdick balancing test requires courts "to conduct fact-
intensive analyses when evaluating state electoral regulations."  Gill v. Scholz, 962 F.3d 
360, 365 (7th Cir. 2020).  The district court in Gill, by relying too heavily on an 
analogous case, "neglected to perform the fact-intensive analysis required for the 
Anderson-Burdick balancing test."  Id.  So although Crawford will no doubt prove 
instructive to the proper resolution of this motion, SB 10 imposes different burdens on a 
different group of voters and is justified by different state interests than the broader voter 
ID law at issue in Crawford.  To hold that Crawford forecloses relief without giving due 
weight to the particular facts of this case would be to commit legal error.  With these 
lessons in mind, the court turns to the particular facts of this case. 
i. Severity of the Burden 
To understand the extent to which SB 10 burdens the right to vote, the court looks 
first to the relevant text.  On its face, SB 10 is nondiscriminatory; under Indiana law, the 
term "proof of identification" for voting purposes no longer "include[s] a document 
issued by an educational institution."  Ind. Code § 3-5-2.1-84(c).  This regulation applies 
to voters of any age who hold a public-university-issued ID; it does not apply exclusively 
to young voters and students.  University faculty and staff, for example, are among those 
who possess a university-issued ID.  (Dkt. 92-6 ¶ 8; Dkt. 92-7 ¶ 8).  But its general 
applicability notwithstanding, the effects of SB 10 clearly "fall more heavily" on young 
voters and students, Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793 n.15 (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 
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134, 144 (1972)), given they possess a sizable majority of public-university-issued IDs, 
(see Dkt. 92-6 ¶ 3; Dkt. Dkt. 92-7 ¶ 4). 
Students also rely more heavily on their student IDs to vote because they often 
lack other options, unlike "faculty, staff, and affiliates" who are "more likely to possess 
alternate forms of ID."  (Dkt. 91 at 30).  Plaintiffs' evidence suggests as much.  In 
Monroe County, three voter precincts are on Indiana University's Bloomington campus.  
(Dkt. 86-3 at 35–36).  Almost 70% of the registered voters at those precincts are 18-24-
year-olds.  (See id. at 34).  This makes sense—almost 75% of students who attend an 
Indiana public college or university are 18-24-year-olds.  (See id. at 32).  In 2022, 18.5% 
of voters at these three precincts used a form of photo identification other than an Indiana 
driver's license or state ID (a student ID, passport, military ID, etc.).  (See id. at 36).  In 
2024, 15.3% used another form of ID.  (See id. at 35).  Across these two elections, only 
5.1% of all Monroe County voters used a form of identification other than an Indiana 
driver's license or state ID.  (Id.).  So voters at precincts on IU's Bloomington campus 
were at least three times less likely than the general electorate to present an Indiana 
driver's license or state ID at the polls.  Similar rates occurred at precincts adjacent to IU's 
Bloomington campus.  (See id. at 35–36).  These numbers likely understate the number of 
IU students who used something other than an Indiana driver's license to vote because 
they do not include early in-person or absentee voters (which constituted 60% of voters in 
2024 and 34% of voters in 2022).  (Id. at 37).  The Monroe County Election Supervisor 
agrees; she estimated that, at on-campus polling locations at IU, two-thirds of 2024 voters 
used a student ID to vote.  (Dkt. 86-2 at 102).  The evidence therefore supports what 
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common sense suggests: college students, the majority of whom are between the ages of 
18 and 24, are the class of voters most likely to use an ID issued by a public university to 
vote, and the most likely to be burdened by SB 10.  
This does not mean that SB 10 burdens every Indiana public university student 
between the ages of 18 and 24.  For those who possess an Indiana driver's license or a 
passport, the burden is no more than minimal, for they already have an acceptable 
alternative.  Rather, the burdened population is limited to those who possess a student ID 
(that would have satisfied Indiana's voter ID requirements before SB 10) but lack an 
acceptable alternative and are otherwise eligible to vote in Indiana.  According to 
Crawford, that such voters exist in the abstract matters little.  To demonstrate that a 
restriction imposes a special burden on a class of voters, one must at least provide the 
numbers of voters affected and "concrete evidence of the burden imposed on voters who 
currently lack" a permissible form of photo identification. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200–01 
(op. of Stevens, J.).  Defendants insist that Plaintiffs have provided neither. 
First, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs "do not put numbers on what the actual 
population affected is."  (Dkt. 91 at 30).  But Plaintiffs' expert estimated the impacted 
population to be approximately 90,000 students.  (Dkt. 86-2 at 38).  He also provided a 
more conservative estimate of approximately 60,000 students to account for potential 
passport ownership by U.S.-citizen students who pay out-of-state tuition.  (Id.).  Based on 
the evidence provided, however, the court estimates that the actual population affected is 
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likely closer to 40,000 students.4  And contrary to Defendants' claims, the estimates 
provided by Plaintiffs' expert exclude faculty, staff, and affiliates who possess university 
IDs, as well as students enrolled at Ivy Tech or Vincennes University.5  At any rate, courts 
applying Anderson-Burdick have found that laws burdening comparable numbers of 
voters triggered heightened scrutiny.  See, e.g., Fish v. Schwab, 957 F.3d 1105, 1133 (10th 
Cir. 2020) ("[T]he evidence of the approximately 30,000 disenfranchised voters means 
that heighted scrutiny is appropriate.").   
Defendants also claim that the burden of obtaining an Indiana ID is no greater for 
students than it was for the plaintiffs in Crawford.  But "[t]hose who find it difficult to 
 
4 A "brief" discussion on how the court arrived at this number.  Plaintiffs' expert begins his 
analysis by calculating the total number of 18-24-year-old students that are U.S. citizens and 
enrolled at Indiana public universities.  (Dkt. 86-2 at 32).  Of these 154,464 students, 100,109 
students are classified as "resident" because they are eligible for in-state tuition, which typically 
requires living in the state for 12 months before the beginning of the student's first semester.  
(Id.).  The remaining 52,355 students are classified as "nonresident."  (Id.).  From there, the 
expert applied the driver's license possession rate for 18-24-year-olds in Indiana to the "resident" 
group to achieve an estimate of approximately 27,000 students who lack an acceptable 
alternative ID.  (Id. at 33, 38).  The expert makes no changes to the "nonresident" group, 
although he does provide a more conservative estimate that halves the population to account for 
possible passport possession.  Neither the Defendants nor the court objects to the expert's 
methodology.  But the court thinks a more accurate estimate should account for (1) the national 
passport possession rate in the United States (excluding Indiana) within the "nonresident" group 
and (2) possible passport possession within the "resident" group.  Since the national passport 
possession rate in the United States (excluding Indiana) is about 53.5%, (see Dkt. 86-8 at 110–
11), the court estimates the "nonresident" population that lacks an acceptable alternative ID to be 
closer to 24,345 students.  As for the "resident" population, the court uses Indiana's driver's 
license possession rate among 18-24-year-olds, Indiana's passport possession rate, and the 
inclusion-exclusion principle, assuming independence, to reach an estimate of 17,219 students.  
(Id. at 33; Dkt. 86-8 at 110).  This puts the total population at approximately 41,564 students but 
does not account for students who possess qualifying ID other than an Indiana driver's license or 
passport.   
5 The expert excluded Ivy Tech because its IDs lack an expiration date and therefore did not 
qualify as voter ID before SB 10.  (Dkt. 86-3 at 31 n.30).  He also excluded Vincennes 
University because he was unable to determine if its student IDs qualified as voter ID before SB 
10.  (Id.).
 
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assemble the required documentation face 'somewhat heavier' burdens."  Luft v. Evers, 
963 F.3d 665, 679 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Crawford, 553 U.S. at 199 (op. of Stevens, 
J.)).  To avoid the same fate as the plaintiffs in Crawford, Plaintiffs must nonetheless 
provide "concrete evidence of the burden imposed" on students and younger voters that 
currently lack accepted photo identification.  Crawford, 553 U.S. at 201 (op. of Stevens, 
J.). 
Since Defendants claim that Montagne has the documents necessary to obtain an 
Indiana driver's license or state ID, the court begins by examining the documents an 
applicant for one of these forms of identification must supply.  They include (1) a 
document proving identity, like a U.S. birth certificate or an unexpired passport; (2) a 
document proving lawful status in the United States; (3) a document proving the 
applicant's Social Security number; and (4) two documents proving Indiana residency, 
like a bank statement or utility bill.  (Dkt. 86-8 at 68–74, 89); see Ind. Admin. Code § 9-
24-16-10.  As Plaintiffs explain, there are several reasons why students are less likely to 
possess these documents.  
Start first with the document proving identity.  For one, many students—especially 
out-of-state students— do not have ready access to their birth certificates while at school.  
(See Dkt. 86-2 at 84).  Montagne, for example, keeps his birth certificate at his parents' 
house in O'Fallon, Missouri.  (Id. at 96).  He prefers to keep his birth certificate and other 
sensitive documents at his parents' house to reduce the risk that they are lost or stolen.  
(Id.).  And while he could always order a copy of his birth certificate, doing so raises a 
new set of problems.  In Indiana, as in many other states, obtaining a birth certificate 
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requires a form of identification that lists an address matching the mailing address for the 
certificate.  (Dkt. 86-8 at 91).  But students often lack a form of identification that reflects 
their current address, for some students start their college experiencing living on campus, 
id. at 94—and therefore cannot obtain an identification card that reflects their current 
address in time to vote
6—and others frequently relocate (which requires frequent re-
registration), (see Dkt. 86-2 at 28).  And although a birth certificate is unnecessary for 
students who have a passport, those who lack a passport face the same challenge, for 
obtaining a passport also requires a birth certificate, (Dkt 86-8 at 89)—not to mention the 
attendant time (several weeks) and cost ($165),
7 (see id. at 121, 124). 
As for the second document, aside from a birth certificate, the only documents 
accepted to prove lawful status in the United States are a passport or various immigration 
documents.  (Id. at 89).  So this requirement raises the same problems as the first.  
Proof-of-residency documents present a new set of hurdles, especially for students 
who live on campus.  Those students often lack a mortgage, rental contract, homeowner's 
insurance, or utility bills in their own names.  (See, e.g., id. at 126–27, 129).  They often 
remain on their parents' health insurance and are therefore unlikely to receive medical 
bills at their campus address.  (See id. at 134–35).  And they are less likely to be 
employed, which means they are also less likely to have pay stubs or tax forms tied to 
 
6 Since an Indiana birth certificate can take up to 16 weeks to obtain, (Dkt. 86-8 at 105), a 
student who orders a birth certificate after arriving on campus when school starts in August may 
not receive it in time to obtain an ID and vote in November. 
7 Only 35.5% of Hoosiers own a passport.  (Dkt. 86-8 at 110).  This rate falls well below the 
national average of 53.1%.  (Id. at 111). 
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their residence.  (Compare id. at 137–38, with id. at 140).  These circumstances make it 
less likely that students have one— no less two—documents proving Indiana residency.   
Indiana does offer a free Indiana "Identification Card" that can be used to vote.  
(See id. at 196–99).  But the requirements for obtaining one have increased and now 
mirror those needed to obtain a driver's license.  In 2007, Indiana amended its law to 
require applications to present "valid documentary evidence" of the applicant's lawful 
status in the United States and Social Security number—neither of which had been 
required before.  (See id.; see also id. at 39–40, 45).  Moreover, anyone applying for an 
Indiana ID—whether a driver's license or the free ID card —must surrender any existing 
out-of-state driver's license or ID they possess.  See Ind. Code § 9-24-11-4; (see also Dkt. 
86-2 at 39).  Obtaining the free ID for voting therefore requires an applicant to surrender 
their driving privileges everywhere—a burden that weighs heaviest on out-of-state 
students wanting to vote in Indiana. 
In addition to "find[ing] it difficult to assemble the required documentation," Luft, 
963 F.3d at 679, other constraints, like inflexible class schedules, limited access to 
transportation, and limited funds, make it more challenging to obtain an alternative form 
of identification.  (See, e.g., Dkt. 86-2 at 97 ¶ 16; Dkt. 86-8 at 184 ¶ 14).  Montagne's 
experience is illustrative.  He lacks an unexpired passport.  (Dkt. 92-12 at 22–23, 40).  So 
under SB 10, he must obtain an Indiana driver's license or ID card to vote.  Because he 
does not have access to a car, he has no need for an Indiana driver's license.  (Id. at 22; 
Dkt. 86-2 at 95–96 ¶¶ 9, 11).  And although it is not impossible for Montagne to obtain an 
acceptable form of identification, it is burdensome.  (See Dkt. 92-12 at 73–74).  Even if 
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he retrieved his birth certificate from his parents' home in Missouri, (Dkt. 86-2 at 96 
¶ 10), he would still need to obtain several other documents.  Although he could use his 
lease to prove his residence, his lease incorporates other attendant living expenses, and he 
pays his roommate for their utility bills, which are registered in his roommate's name.  
(Dkt. 92-12 at 51).  On top of that, the nearest BMV office to Montagne is "about four 
miles away."  (Id. at 52).  Getting there by bus would require multiple bus lines and 
several hours, which might require Montagne to miss class.  (See id. at 52, 73–74).  On 
the one hand, these burdens—"the inconvenience of making a trip to the BMV , gathering 
the required documents, and posing for a photograph"— are nothing more than the "usual 
burdens of voting."  Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198 (op. of Stevens, J.).  On the other hand, 
Plaintiffs have provided evidence that suggests those burdens have at least a slightly 
greater impact on students and young voters than they do on all Indiana voters.  
Beyond these time and cost constraints, the court also finds relevant Defendants' 
selective treatment of student ID cards.  As discussed earlier, the law does not 
discriminate against students or young voters on its face.  But by eliminating student IDs 
as an acceptable form of identification, Defendants selectively excluded a form of 
identification that otherwise complies with the neutral criteria established by Indiana's 
voter ID law and that has been accepted as a form of voter identification for nearly two 
decades.  Defendants maintain that both Montagne and another IU student "possess the 
documents required to obtain a driver's license or state ID but choose not to" and that 
"Plaintiffs have not identified a single person who lacks another form of ID or will be 
unable to obtain another form of ID as a result of SB 10."  (Dkt. 91 at 28, 30).  But if the 
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mere theoretical availability of alternative ID is sufficient to render any burden minimal, 
Indiana could continue to eliminate previously accepted forms of identification— and 
continue to point to available alternatives to insulate itself from challenge—even if tens 
of thousands of Hoosiers had relied on the previously accepted form.  Surely this 
selective treatment of student ID plays some role in the Anderson-Burdick analysis.   
Moreover, unlike the groups in Crawford, students cannot rely on the safety valves 
designed for voters who lack identification.  See Luft, 963 F.3d at 675 ("[E]lectoral 
provisions cannot be assessed in isolation.").  The district court in Crawford explained 
that none of the allegedly disproportionately burdened groups even needed to obtain 
photo identification to vote because both the elderly and the disabled were entitled to vote 
absentee (which does not require photo identification) and the homeless would likely 
qualify for the law's indigency exception (which also does not require photo 
identification).  Ind. Democratic Party, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 823 n.70.  Neither avenue is 
available for the disproportionately burdened group here.  Absentee voting is limited to 
voters who meet specific statutory criteria, like illness or old age, and is not normally 
available to younger voters outside of unique circumstances.  Ind. Code § 3-11-10-24.  
Another safety valve, that "voters without photo identification may cast provisional 
ballots that will ultimately be counted," is similarly unavailing.  Crawford, 553 U.S. at 
199 (op. of Stevens, J.).  A provisional ballot is counted only if the voter appears in 
person within ten days of the election to present qualifying ID to the circuit clerk or 
county election board.  Ind. Code § 3-11.7-5-2.5(a)–(b).  But for students who lack ID—
and face the same structural barriers to obtaining one after election day as they do 
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before—this is no safety valve at all.  See Fish , 957 F.3d at 1128–29 (finding that the 
proof-of-citizenship requirement imposed a significant burden in part because voters 
lacked an "effective" safety valve that prevented them from being "turned away without a 
backup option for them to cast votes"). 
 For most voters, the burdens Plaintiffs describe do not "even represent a 
significant increase over the usual burdens of voting."  Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198 (op. of 
Stevens, J.).  But Crawford makes clear that voting restrictions may impose "a somewhat 
heavier burden" on "a limited number of persons."  Id. at 199.  On this record, Plaintiffs 
have demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that SB 10 imposes "a somewhat heavier 
burden" on students and young voters.  Therefore, under the flexible Anderson-Burdick 
framework, the court finds that SB 10 likely imposes a moderate burden on this class of 
voters.  
ii. Indiana's Interests 
Having determined that SB 10 likely imposes a moderate burden on the rights of 
students and young voters, the court now "'identif[ies] and evaluate[s] the precise 
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule' and 
weigh[s] these interests against the burdened rights."  Acevedo, 925 F.3d at 948 (quoting 
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).  "In doing so, we look to the 'legitimacy and strength' of the 
proffered interests, as well as 'the extent to which those interests make it necessary to 
burden the plaintiff's rights.'"  Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).  Defendants offer 
two primary justifications for SB 10: that it (1) increases public confidence in the 
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integrity of elections and (2) supports the related interest in "orderly administration and 
accurate recordkeeping" in elections.  Crawford, 553 U.S. at 196 (op. of Stevens, J.). 
a. Protecting Public Confidence 
In Crawford, Indiana largely relied on its interest "in deterring and detecting voter 
fraud" to justify its voter ID law.  Id. at 191, 194–97.  But Defendants do not invoke this 
interest to justify SB 10.  Instead, they rely on the "closely related" interest in "protecting 
public confidence" in the integrity of elections.  Id. at 197.  This interest "has independent 
significance, because it encourages citizen participation in the democratic process."  Id.  
Although protecting public confidence is undoubtedly a strong interest in the abstract, 
Defendants offer little evidence demonstrating why the burdens SB 10 imposes are 
necessary to further that interest.   
Defendants note that unlike student IDs, Indiana driver's licenses and state ID 
cards are issued "pursuant to rigorous, uniform, and statutorily mandated standards."  
(Dkt. 91 at 31).  They claim that "[r]eliance on such forms of identification at all stages of 
voting supports public confidence in election outcomes."  (Id.).  But even after SB 10, 
voters may use photo identification issued by the government of the United States to 
vote.  And Defendants do not argue that the issuing standards of those forms of photo 
identification mirror the standards employed by Indiana.  So even if Indiana prefers its 
own standards, it still accepts photo identification issued under other standards, which 
undermines its purported interest in uniformity. 
Defendants also rely on the declarations of two experts: Dr. Brian Gaines, a 
political scientist, and Matthew Crane, a Colorado election administrator.  (See Dkt. 92-4; 
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Dkt. 92-5).  But neither expert pointed to any data showing a connection between voter 
confidence and the use of student IDs at the polls.  (See Dkt. 96-2 at 231, 659).  Dr. 
Gaines relied on a study of Virginia residents to establish a connection between stricter 
voter ID laws and increased voter confidence.  That study found that Virginia residents 
reported lower perceptions of voter fraud after receiving a postcard describing Virginia's 
voter ID law.  (Id. at 794).  But that study is of little relevance here because the postcard 
listed student ID as an acceptable form of photo ID.  (Id. at 796).  Virginia's voter ID law 
therefore resembled Indiana's voter ID law as it existed before SB 10 was enacted, not 
after. 
Generally, photo ID laws "promote confidence" in the integrity of elections.  See 
Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2014).  But because SB 10 likely imposes a 
moderate burden on the right to vote, the court must evaluate the extent to which 
Defendants' interest in protecting public confidence makes it necessary to eliminate 
student IDs as a valid form of photo identification.  Without more evidence, the court 
cannot conclude that SB 10 is necessary to protect public confidence in Indiana's 
elections.  
b. Orderly Election Administration 
The same is true of Defendants' interest in "orderly administration and accurate 
recordkeeping" in elections.  Crawford, 553 U.S. at 196 (op. of Stevens, J.).  Defendants 
claim that SB 10 promotes this interest by streamlining Indiana's photo ID requirement to 
make the acceptable forms of identification more uniform, objective, and verifiable.  And 
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yet, if anything, SB 10 does the opposite, for it creates an exception for a single form of 
voter ID that otherwise meets the law's neutral requirements.   
Besides, Defendants provide no evidence that student IDs have ever caused 
confusion or otherwise complicated election administration.  In fact, before SB 10, 
student IDs merited only brief mention in poll-worker trainings.  (See Dkt. 86-7 at 438–
605).  And the characteristics of student IDs that Defendants warn may cause confusion 
are equally applicable to other forms of ID that the law still permits, including Veteran's 
Administration, military, and tribal ID cards, many of which are less uniform than student 
IDs.  (See, e.g., Dkt. 86 at 33–34).  Of course, eliminating these forms of identification 
would also streamline election administration by narrowing the field of acceptable IDs.  
But Defendants do not explain why student IDs alone need to go.  As with Defendants' 
interest in protecting public confidence, this inconsistency convinces the court that 
eliminating student IDs is unnecessary to further Indiana's interest in orderly election 
administration. 
There is no question about the legitimacy or importance of Indiana's interest in 
"protecting 'the integrity and reliability of the electoral process."  Crawford, 553 U.S. at 
204 (op. of Stevens, J.) (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n.9).  But student IDs have 
qualified as proof of identification under Indiana's voter ID law for nearly two decades.  
To eliminate the ID that students and young voters are far more likely to rely on, 
Defendants must better document the unique problems student IDs raise.  On this record, 
SB 10 looks more like a solution in search of a problem.  Having determined that 
Indiana's legitimate interests in protecting public confidence and orderly election 
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administration are not strong enough to justify the moderate burden that SB 10 imposes 
on students and young voters, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have a reasonable 
likelihood of success to prevail on their First and Fourteenth Amendment claim.  
E. Irreparable Harm 
Irreparable harm exists where "legal remedies such as monetary damages are 
inadequate" to address the harm.  Bedrossian v. Nw. Mem'l Hosp., 409 F.3d 840, 842 (7th 
Cir. 2005).  "The moving party must demonstrate that he will likely suffer irreparable 
harm absent obtaining preliminary injunctive relief."  Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. 
Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1044 (7th Cir. 2017).  
Although this requires "more than a mere possibility of harm," it does not "require that 
the harm actually occur before injunctive relief is warranted."  Id. at 1045.  "Nor does it 
require that the harm be certain to occur before a court may grant relief on the merits."  
Id.  "Rather, harm is considered irreparable if it 'cannot be prevented or fully rectified by 
the final judgment after trial.'"  Id. (quoting Girls Scouts of Manitou Council, 549 F.3d at 
1089). 
"[V]oting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional 
structure."  Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 
(1979).  As such, courts routinely find that restrictions on the right to vote constitute 
irreparable harm.  See Am. Council of Blind of Ind., 2022 WL 702257, at *9; Ind. State 
Conf. of the NAACP v. Lawson, 326 F. Supp. 3d 646, 663 (S.D. Ind. 2018), aff'd sub nom. 
Common Cause Ind. v. Lawson, 937 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2019) ("As has been held by 
numerous other courts, a violation of the right to vote is presumptively an irreparable 
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harm.  Because an individual cannot vote after an election has passed, it is clear that the 
wrongful disenfranchisement of a registered voter would cause irreparable harm without 
an adequate remedy at law." (citation omitted)); see also League of Women Voters of 
N.C., 769 F.3d at 247 ("[O]nce the election occurs, there can be no do-over and no 
redress."); Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2012) ("A restriction on 
the fundamental right to vote . . . constitutes irreparable injury."). 
To the extent that SB 10 burdens Plaintiffs' right to vote, they have shown the 
potential for irreparable harm.  Absent an injunction, Montagne, specifically, will be 
unable to vote in the upcoming primary or general elections.  And even if Defendants are 
right that SB 10 does not make it impossible for him to vote, the moderate burden that it 
imposes on his right to vote still constitutes irreparable harm as a matter of law.  See Ind. 
State Conf. of the NAACP, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 663.  Plaintiffs therefore satisfy this 
requirement for injunctive relief.  
F. Balance of Harms and the Public Interest 
Once a moving party has met its burden of establishing the threshold requirements 
for a preliminary injunction, the court must consider "the irreparable harm the non-
moving party will suffer if preliminary relief is granted, balancing that harm against the 
irreparable harm to the moving party if relief is denied" and "the public interest, meaning 
the consequences of granting or denying the injunction to non-parties."  Cassell v. 
Snyders, 990 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 
971 F.2d 6, 11–12 (7th Cir. 1992)).  Under the Seventh Circuit's "sliding scale" approach, 
the "more likely the plaintiff is to win, the less heavily need the balance of harms weigh 
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in his favor; the less likely he is to win, the more need it weigh in his favor."  Id. (quoting 
Valencia v. City of Springfield, Ill., 883 F.3d 959, 966 (7th Cir. 2018)). 
When a plaintiff is likely to succeed on a constitutional claim, "the balance of 
harms normally favors granting preliminary injunctive relief because the public interest is 
not harmed by preliminarily enjoining the enforcement of a statute that is probably 
unconstitutional."  ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 589–90 (7th Cir. 2012).  And as 
discussed above, absent injunctive relief, Montagne will either be unable to vote in the 
upcoming elections or face a moderate burden on his right to vote. 
Defendants argue that an injunction "would sow confusion among voters, 
undermine orderly election administration, and override a legitimate, democratically 
adopted measure."  (Dkt. 91 at 41).  The court has already addressed why the Purcell 
principle does not bar relief here.  As for the concern with election administration, no 
statewide elections have occurred since SB 10 was enacted.  Thus, an injunction would 
only require Indiana to conduct elections as it has since it enacted its voter ID law: 
accepting student ID cards that meet its voter ID law's neutral criteria.  And while its true 
that an injunction would override a democratically adopted law, Indiana has no valid 
interest in enforcing "a statute that is probably unconstitutional."  Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 
589–90.   
The balance of harms therefore weighs in favor of the Plaintiffs.  Moreover, the 
public interest weighs in favor of granting an injunction because the public has a "strong 
interest in exercising the 'fundamental political right' to vote."  Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4 
(quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972)). 
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IV. Bond 
Defendants will not incur any damages from the preliminary injunction.  
Therefore, the court waives the security requirement of Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  See Habitat Educ. Ctr. v. United States Forest Serv., 607 F.3d 453, 458 
(7th Cir. 2010) (district court can waive bond requirement when there is no danger the 
opposing party will incur any damages from the injunction). 
V. Conclusion 
Plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to succeed on their claim that SB 10 
imposes unconstitutional burdens on students and young voters in violation of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.  They have also established irreparable harm and satisfied 
the remaining requirements for a preliminary injunction.  Plaintiffs' motion for 
preliminary injunction (Dkt. 85) is therefore GRANTED.  The injunction will issue by 
separate order.  
 
IT IS SO ORDERED this 14th day of April 2026. 
 
        s/RLY 
 
 
Distribute Electronically to Registered Counsel of Record. 
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