govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-04218-3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
____________________________________ 
      ) 
THE NEW YORK TIMES    ) 
COMPANY, et al.,    ) 
      ) 
  Plaintiffs,   ) 
      ) 
 v.     ) Civil Action No. 25-04218 (PLF)  
      ) 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, et al. ) 
      ) 
  Defendants.   ) 
____________________________________) 
 
OPINION 
Proposed by Congress in 1789, and ratified in 1791, the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States provides: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redres s of 
grievances.   
U.S. Const. amend. I.   
The First Amendment empowers the press to publish what it will and the public to 
read what it chooses, free of official proscription.  In the words of Justice Black:   
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the 
protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy.  
The press was to serve the governed, not the governors.  The 
Government’s power to censor the press was abolished so that the 
press would remain forever free to censure the Government.  The 
press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government 
and inform the people.  Only a free and unrestrained press can 
effectively expose deception in government.  And paramount among 
the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of 
the government from deceiving the people . . . . 
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N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).  As the 
Supreme Court recently affirmed, “[t]he First Amendment is no word game.  And the rights it 
protects cannot be renamed away or their protections nullified by ‘mere labels.’”  Chiles v. 
Salazar, 607 U.S. ____, 2026 WL 872307, at *9 (Mar. 31, 2026) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963)).   
On the evening of F riday, March 20, 2026, this Court entered an Order declaring 
specific provisions of a policy newly issued by the Department of Defense (the “Department) 
regarding Pentagon Facilities Alternate Credentials (“PFACs”) (the “Policy”) to be unlawful and 
in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  See Order of 
March 20, 2026 (“Order”) [Dkt. No. 34].1  The Court vacated and set aside those provisions (the 
“Challenged Provisions”) as to The New York Times Company (“The Times”) and Julian E. 
Barnes, a long-time national security reporter with The Times, as well as all regulated parties.  
Id. at 1-3.  The Court also permanently enjoined the defendants from implementing or enforcing 
 
1  The documents reviewed by the Court in connection with the pending motion 
include:  Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Compliance with the Court’s Order (“Pls. Mot.”) [Dkt. 
No. 37]; Second Supplemental Declaration of Theodore J. Boutrous (“Second Supp. Boutrous 
Decl.”) [Dkt. No. 37-1] and Exhibits [Dkt. Nos. 37-2 to -9]; [Corrected] Brief of Pentagon Press 
Association as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. to Compel Compliance [Dkt. No. 39]; 
Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Compliance with the Court’s Order 
(“Defs. Opp.”) [Dkt. No. 41]; Declaration of Michael Bruns (“Bruns Decl.”) [Dkt. No. 41-1]; 
Declaration of Joel Manuel Valdez [Dkt. No. 41-3]; Plaintiffs’ Reply to Opposition to Plaintiffs’ 
Motion to Compel Compliance with the Court’s Order (“Reply”) [Dkt. No. 44]; Supplemental 
Declaration of Julian E. Barnes (“Supp. Barnes Decl.”) [Dkt. No. 44-1]; Second Supplemental 
Declaration of Julian E. Barnes [Dkt. No. 45]; Supplemental Declaration of Joel Manuel Valdez 
(“Supp. Valdez Decl.”) [Dkt. No. 46]; Plaintiffs’ Post-Hearing Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ 
Motion to Compel Compliance with the Court’s Order (“Pls. Supp. Br.”) [Dkt. No. 48-1]; Third 
Supplemental Declaration of Julian E. Barnes (“Third Supp. Barnes Decl.”); Defendants’ 
Response to Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief (“Defs. Supp. Br.”) [Dkt. No. 51]; Second 
Supplemental Declaration of Joel Manuel Valdez (“Second Supp. Valdez Decl.”) [Dkt. 
No. 51-1]; and Transcript of Oral Argument on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Compliance with 
the Court’s Order (“OA Tr.”).    
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those provisions “to deny, suspend, revoke, or not renew the PFAC of” any journalist from The 
Times, and it ordered the immediate reinstatement of the PFACs previously held by The Times’ 
reporters.  Id. at 3.     
Four days later, the plaintiffs returned to Court to file the instant motion to 
compel compliance with the Court’s Order.  See Pls. Mot.  The plaintiffs assert that the 
Department has attempted an “end-run around this Court’s ruling” by hastily issuing a new 
“interim” policy that defies the Court’s Order in both “letter and spirit.”  Id. at 1-2.  In response, 
the defendants argue that the Department has refrained from implementing or enforcing the 
Challenged Provisions, as the Court’s Order required.  See Defs. Opp. at 1-2.  But the defendants 
maintain that the Order does not preclude the Department from issuing a new policy, which they 
contend is what the Department has done.  See id.  After considering the parties’ written 
submissions, their oral arguments, and the relevant caselaw, the Court concludes that the 
defendants have failed to comply with its Order.   
 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Court discussed the background of this case at length in its Opinion issued on 
March 20, 2026.  See Opinion of March 20, 2026 (“Op.”) [Dkt. No. 35].  For purposes of the 
instant motion, it is sufficient to note the following.  On March 21, 2026, the day after this Court 
issued its Order and Opinion, the plaintiffs sent a letter to the Department asking how the seven 
Times reporters identified by name in the Order could obtain their reinstated PFACs.  See 
Second Supp. Boutrous Decl. at Ex. 4.  Counsel for amici the Pentagon Press Association also 
wrote to the Department to ask “when and how the Department will return the revoked PFACs 
and restore the access it revoked on October 15, 2025.”  Id. at Ex. 3.  Following a few additional 
inquiries, counsel for the Department emailed counsel for the plaintiffs late in the afternoon of 
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Monday, March 23, providing contact information for The Times’ journalists to “schedule 
pickup” of their physical credentials.  Id. at Ex. 5.  In that same email communication, the 
Department provided the plaintiffs with a “revised policy, in accordance with the Court’s 
decision.”  Id.  
The “revised policy” consists of a “Memorandum for Senior Pentagon 
Leadership” from Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell (the “Memorandum” or “Mem.”), a 
“Pentagon Reservation In-Brief for Media Members” (the “In-Brief”), and an Appendix 
(together with the In-Brief, the “Interim Policy”).  See Second Supp. Boutrous Decl. at Ex. 1 
[Dkt. No. 37-2].  The Memorandum states that the Department “disagrees with the Court’s 
decision and is pursuing an appeal.”  Mem. at 1.2  But “[i]n the interim,” the Memorandum 
explains, the Interim Policy will be in effect to “preserv[e] the Department’s legitimate security 
interests and its statutory obligation to ensure the safe, efficient, and secure operation of the 
Pentagon Reservation.”  Id.  The Memorandum further states that the Interim Policy “addresses 
the provisions the Court vacated while retaining all physical access restrictions, conduct 
requirements, and security measures that were not at issue in the litigation.”  Id.  In addition, the 
Memorandum asserts that “[t]he Court characterized the original Policy’s provisions in ways the 
Department believes were inaccurate” and that the Interim Policy “includes targeted 
clarifications to correct these mischaracterizations.”  Id. 
The In-Brief provides in pertinent part that “PFACs may be denied, revoked, or 
not renewed if a person meets any of the criteria set forth in Appendix A.”  Interim Policy at 6.  
Appendix A outlines certain conviction-based grounds for a PFAC denial, revocation, or 
 
2  As of the date of this Opinion, no appeal from the Court’s March 20, 2026 Order 
has been filed.   
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non-renewal, as well as “[c]onduct-[b]ased [g]rounds.”  Id. at 12-13.  The conviction-based 
grounds are not at issue.  Relevant here, the conduct-based grounds include the “inducement of 
unauthorized disclosure as defined in” the In-Brief.  Id. at 12.  The In-Brief, in turn, states that 
“[t]o correct the Court’s mischaracterization” of the Policy, “the Department has replaced the 
term ‘solicitation’ with ‘intentional inducement of unauthorized disclosure.’”  Id. at 10.  
“[I]ntentional inducement of unauthorized disclosure” is defined as “intentionally encouraging, 
inducing, or requesting that a specific Department employee disclose classified national security 
information or [controlled unclassified information] that the journalist knows that the specific 
Department employee is not authorized to disclos[e] under” one of three specified statutes.  Id.  
The In-Brief then states that “[a] journalist’s offer of anonymity or privacy protection to a 
Department employee in exchange for information shall create a rebuttable presumption that the 
journalist knew the employee was not authorized to disclose the information sought.”  Id.   
The same section of the In-Brief outlines six “safe harbors” that “do not constitute 
‘intentional inducement of unauthorized disclosure’ under” the Interim Policy.  Interim Policy 
at 11; see Defs. Opp. at 6.  Those safe harbors are: 
(a) Asking questions of Department personnel who are authorized 
to speak with the press, including Public Affairs Officers, 
designated spokespersons, and other personnel speaking on the 
record in their official capacity, regardless of the subject matter 
of the question; 
(b) Receiving unsolicited information, including classified national 
security information or controlled unclassified information;  
(c) Publishing calls for tips or other general appeals to the public at 
large that are not specifically directed at Department personnel; 
(d) Developing source relationships outside the Pentagon through 
independent reporting; 
(e) Communicating with Department personnel through official 
channels for public disclosure of information, including press 
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briefings, press conferences, interviews arranged through public 
affairs offices, and Freedom of Information Act requests; 
(f) Asking questions of any Department employee where the 
journalist does not know that the employee is not authorized to 
disclose the information sought.   
Interim Policy at 11.  
Finally, the Interim Policy provides that the Correspondents’ Corridor—the 
designated space in the Pentagon for reporters to work, Supp. Barnes Decl. ¶ 12—is closed 
effective immediately.  Interim Policy at 3.  According to the Interim Policy, “[a] new press 
workspace will be established” at some point in the future “in an annex facility outside the 
Pentagon,” and PFAC holders will be notified once that space is “operational.”  Id.  That space is 
not yet available for journalists to use, and the Interim Policy does not say when it will be.  See 
id.  In the meantime, PFAC holders are permitted to work from a building separate from the 
Pentagon that contains a library and conference center.  See Supp. Valdez Decl. ¶ 12; Supp. 
Barnes Decl. ¶ 9.  The Memorandum further states that PFAC holders will be able to access the 
Pentagon only “for scheduled press briefings, press conferences, and interviews arranged 
through public affairs offices” and only if they are “escort[ed] by authorized [Department] 
personnel at all times.”  Mem. at 2.  The Memorandum provides as the reason for this change 
that “following the Court’s vacatur of the PFAC Policy’s security screening provisions, the 
Department determined that unescorted access to the Pentagon cannot be responsibly maintained 
without the ability to screen PFAC holders for security risks.”  Id.   
On Tuesday, March 24, 2026, the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel compliance 
with the Court’s Order.  See Pls. Mot.  The defendants filed an opposition on March 27, see 
Defs. Opp., and the plaintiffs filed a reply on March 29, see Reply.  The Court heard oral 
argument on the motion to compel on March 30.  With the Court’s permission, the plaintiffs filed 
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a post-hearing brief on April 3, see Pls. Supp. Br., and the defendants filed a response on April 6, 
see Defs. Supp. Br.   
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
This Court has the “jurisdiction” and “inherent power to enforce its judgments.”  
Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 356 (1996); see Order at 4 (retaining “jurisdiction to enforce 
this Order”).  That authority is grounded in “the interest of the judicial branch in seeing that an 
unambiguous mandate is not blatantly disregarded by parties to a court proceeding.”  Int’l 
Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. Donovan (“Donovan”), 733 F.2d 920, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  
Fundamental to that authority is the power of the Court “to construe and interpret the language of 
the judgment.”  Anglers Conservation Network v. Ross, 387 F. Supp. 3d 87, 93 (D.D.C. 2019) 
(quoting Heartland Hosp. v. Thompson, 328 F. Supp. 2d 8, 11-12 (D.D.C. 2004)).  In 
determining whether an agency has complied with the terms of an order, “the Court is guided not 
only by the text of that order but also by its relevant opinions.”  Id.; see also, e.g., Afghan & Iraqi 
Allies Under Serious Threat Because of Their Faithful Serv. to the U.S. v. Rubio, No. 18-CV-
1388 (TSC), 2026 WL 322996, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2026).  “Success on a motion to enforce a 
judgment gets a plaintiff only the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled under its original action 
and the judgment entered therein.”  Anglers Conservation Network v. Ross, 387 F. Supp. 3d 
at 93 (citation modified). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
The plaintiffs challenge two aspects of the Interim Policy: the prohibition on the 
“inducement of unauthorized disclosure” and the closure of the Correspondents’ Corridor 
coupled with the escort requirement.  See Pls. Mot. at 5-15.  The defendants contend as a 
threshold matter that neither challenge is appropriately raised in a motion to compel.  See Defs. 
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Opp. at 3-4.3   In the defendants’ view, the Department was prohibited from retaining and 
enforcing the language of the Challenged Provisions but was otherwise free to act as it saw fit.  
See id. at 4-5.  The defendants maintain that if the plaintiffs wish to challenge the substance of 
the Interim Policy, they must do so by amending their complaint and filing a new substantive 
motion rather than by moving to compel compliance with the Court’s Order.  See id. at 2.  The 
Court disagrees.   
To be sure, the defendants are correct that once a court has invalidated an 
agency’s policy, the agency is empowered to “deal[] with the problem afresh by taking new 
agency action that [i]s consistent with the legal principles as articulated in the [c]ourt’s opinion.”  
Neguse v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Civil Action No. 25-2463 (JMC), 2026 WL 137017, 
at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2026) (citation modified); see also NAACP v. Donovan, 737 F.2d 67, 72 
(D.C. Cir. 1984).  The problem for the defendants, however, is that the Department has not in 
fact taken “new” action, at least with respect to the proscription on the “inducement of 
unauthorized disclosure.”  To the contrary, as explained in detail below, that proscription 
contained in the Interim Policy amounts to—in the Department’s words— a “clarification[]” of 
the prohibitions contained in the original Policy that this Court held to be unconstitutional.  
Mem. at 1.  The Department cannot simply reinstate an unlawful policy under the guise of taking 
“new” action and expect the Court to look the other way.  See Donovan, 733 F.2d at 922 
 
3  The defendants also assert that the plaintiffs did not confer in good faith prior to 
filing their motion to compel, in violation of Local Civil Rule 7(m).  See Defs. Opp. at 3; see 
also LCvR 7(m) (“Before filing any nondispositive motion in a civil action, counsel shall discuss 
the anticipated motion with opposing counsel in a good-faith effort to determine whether there is 
any opposition to the relief sought and, if there is, to narrow the areas of disagreement.”).  The 
record reflects, however, that the plaintiffs sought the defendants’ position on their anticipated 
motion to compel and provided the substantive basis for their requested relief.  See Bruns Decl. 
at Ex. A.  The plaintiffs thus have satisfied their obligations under Rule 7(m).   
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(holding that enforcing a prior judgment against the application of a new agency policy “is 
particularly appropriate . . . where an administrative agency plainly neglects the terms of [an 
order], and the case then returns to the court—under the same docket number and involving the 
same parties—on a motion to enforce the original [order]”); United States v. Christie Indus., Inc., 
465 F.2d 1002, 1007 (3d Cir. 1972) (explaining that a litigant cannot “avoid[] . . . [an] injunction 
through a mere change of terminology”). 
Nor can the Department take steps to circumvent the Court’s injunction and 
e
xpect the Court to turn a blind eye.  But that is exactly what the defendants have done by 
closing the Correspondents’ Corridor and imposing an escort requirement.  The Court’s Order 
requires the Department to restore the plaintiffs’ access to the Pentagon.  Rather than comply 
with that Order, the Department has cut off all PFAC holders’ meaningful access to the 
Pentagon.  When assessing a litigant’s compliance in the posture of an enforcement motion, a 
court need not accept a “dubious literal interpretation of the injunction, particularly where that 
interpretation is designed to evade the injunction’s goals.”  Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 781 
F. Supp. 3d 943, 990-91 (N.D. Cal.), aff’d in relevant part, 161 F.4th 1162 (9th Cir. 2025).  
Where an enjoined party engages in such evasive conduct, a motion to compel is the proper 
means of bringing that party into compliance.  See id. at 990-92 (granting a motion to enforce an 
injunction where the court “prohibited certain of [the enjoined party’s] policies that prevented 
meaningful competition” and the enjoined party “rewrote those policies by choosing a different 
anticompetitive path”); AIDS Vaccine Advoc. Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 768 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 
(D.D.C. 2025) (granting a motion to enforce a temporary restraining order where the government 
“ha[d] continued . . . the very action that the [order] enjoined”).   
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At bottom, the defendants ask this Court to hold that so long as the Department 
does not reinstate the exact words of the Challenged Provisions, and so long as it restores The 
Times’ reporters’ physical credentials, it has done enough.4  If the Department immediately uses 
new words to do the same thing?  Too bad.  The plaintiffs need to start over while the Court 
stands idly by.  If the Department immediately takes steps to undermine the purpose of the 
reporters’ credentials, namely, entry to the Pentagon?  Again, too bad.  The Court need not 
embrace such a narrow interpretation of its authority and permit such a blatant attempt to 
circumvent a lawful order of the Court to succeed.  See Donovan, 733 F.2d at 923; Epic Games, 
Inc. v. Apple Inc., 781 F. Supp. 3d at 991 (observing that such an “approach would require 
courts to effectively engage in a ‘whack-a-mole’ game to require compliance”).     
 
A. Inducement of Unauthorized Disclosure 
The Court carefully considered the Policy’s constraint on “solicitation” and the 
arguments for and against its permissibility.  In the context of the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment 
void for vagueness argument, the Court determined that the constraint was unacceptable because 
it encompassed “obtaining or attempting to obtain any information that the Department has not 
approved for release, regardless of whether that information is classified.”  Op. at 20-21.  The 
Court recognized that “obtaining and attempting to obtain information is what journalists do” 
and that “[a] primary way in which journalists obtain information is by asking questions.”  Id. 
at 21.  Punishing journalists for requesting and receiving non-public information thus would chill 
and penalize “essential journalistic practices that the plaintiffs and others engage in every day.”  
 
4  Ironically, the defendants’ own brief makes clear that the Department con tinues to 
use many of the words of the Challenged Provisions that this Court vacated.  See Defs. Opp. at 
8-12.   
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Id.  In no uncertain terms, the Court rejected the Department’s assertion that the Policy was 
permissible because it proscribed only criminal solicitation, concluding that the Policy punished 
“plainly lawful journalistic practices.”  Id. at 22; see also id. at 21 (explaining that the 
defendants’ argument that the Policy’s prohibition on solicitation was acceptable because it 
“simply proscribe[s] criminal solicitation . . . is just plain wrong”).  The Court also held in the 
context of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment forum argument that the Policy’s restrictions on 
journalists seeking information were unreasonable in light of the purpose of the Pentagon’s press 
spaces and that the Policy amounted to viewpoint discrimination “based on editorial viewpoint—
that is, whether the individual or organization is willing to publish only stories that are favorable 
to or spoon-fed by Department leadership.”  Id. at 30-36.  In rejecting the defendants’ argument 
that the Court should simply remand to the Department for clarification rather than vacate the 
Challenged Provisions in their entirety, the Court concluded that in light of the Policy’s 
“extremely serious” constitutional defects, “‘additional explanations’ on remand would not 
suffice.”  Id. at 38 (citation omitted). 
Because the Court vacated the Challenged Provisions, it was appropriate for the 
Department to issue a new policy, so long as the new policy “was consistent with the legal 
principles as articulated in the Court’s opinion.”  Neguse v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 2026 
WL 137017, at *1.  But the Department has done precisely what this Court expressly forbade it 
from doing: it has endeavored to “cure” the impermissible restrictions on a journalist seeking 
information not authorized for release by providing “targeted clarifications.”  Mem. at 1; see Op. 
at 38.  Specifically, the Interim Policy replaces the prohibition on “soliciting” non-public or 
unauthorized classified or unclassified information with a prohibition on “encouraging, inducing, 
or requesting” the disclosure of that non-public or unauthorized information.  Interim Policy 
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at 10.  That is simply using revised language to proscribe the same “lawful journalistic practices” 
that the vacated provisions encompassed.  Op. at 23.  Remarkably, even the Department 
acknowledges as much.  For example, the Interim Policy explains that the wording change was 
simply an effort “[t]o correct the Court’s mischaracterization” of the Policy.  Mem. at 1; Interim 
Policy at 10.  Commander Timothy Parlatore, Special Advisor to the Secretary of Defense, 
similarly explained that the Interim Policy responds to the Court’s Order by “us[ing] more words 
to say the same thing and to foreclose creative misinterpretations.”  Second Supp. Boutrous Decl. 
at Ex 6. 
The defendants suggest that the Department has solved the constitutional 
problems identified in the Court’s Opinion by inserting a “scienter requirement”: an adverse 
PFAC determination will be triggered only if the journalist attempts to obtain information that 
the journalist “knows” the Department employee is forbidden to disclose by law.  Defs. Opp. 
at 15-16; see Interim Policy at 10.  This addition, however, does not render the Interim Policy 
permissible.  For one, the supposed requirement is illusory—in  the plaintiffs’ words, “a mirage,” 
Reply at 6—because it presumes  scienter and provides no clear path to rebut that presumption.  
The Interim Policy provides that a journalist’s knowledge is presumed if the journalist offers a 
Department employee “anonymity or privacy protection.”  Interim Policy at 10.  The Department 
thus need not establish that a journalist actually knows anything to find the journalist 
presumptively in violation of the Interim Policy.  See id.  Considering that journalists 
“frequently” grant anonymity to sources, see Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 
1981), including sources authorized to speak to the press on the Department’s behalf, see Supp. 
Barnes Decl. ¶ 18, every Pentagon reporter routinely will be presumptively in violation of the 
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Interim Policy.5  While that presumption ostensibly is rebuttable, it is unclear just how a 
journalist would go about rebutting it.  The Interim Policy certainly does not indicate what 
evidence would suffice for journalists to prove what they did not know.  And as the plaintiffs 
point out, the Interim Policy “expressly provides that any doubts will be resolved in the 
Department’s favor.”  Reply at 7; see Interim Policy at 13-14.  
The defendants attempt to justify the presumption by asserting that “the most 
obvious reason to offer anonymity to a Department employee is because the journalist knows the 
employee is not authorized by law to disclose the information sought.”  Defs. Opp. at 19.  That 
contention is unsupported and simply wrong.  There are myriad reasons why a source may wish 
to remain anonymous—most apparently, a source may fear retaliation for disclosing information 
that is “unflattering,” even if not unauthorized by law.  Cf. Op. at 35 n.7 (observing “that the 
Pentagon has barred press photographers from briefings on the ongoing U.S.-Israeli war with 
Iran after they published photos of Secretary Hegseth that his staff deemed ‘unflattering’”).  As 
Mr. Barnes suggested, “[t]here are various reasons why a source may wish not to have their 
name published in connection with the information they provided, and honoring those 
preferences is often integral to [his] ability to gather and report the news.”  Supp. Barnes Decl. 
¶ 17; see also Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d at 710-11 (explaining that interference with a journalist’s 
use of “confidential source raises obvious First Amendment problems” because “journalists 
 
5  The Court gives little credence to the assurances of Deputy Press Secretary Joel 
Manuel Valdez that the Department will enforce the Interim Policy only upon a complaint by a 
Department employee.  See Supp. Valdez Decl. ¶¶ 30-33.  The plaintiffs correctly point out that 
Mr. Valdez’s proffered interpretation of the Interim Policy is not grounded in its text.  See Pls. 
Supp. Br. at 4.  Like the plaintiffs, the Court has “no reason to trust that officials will not follow 
the Interim Policy’s express language and revoke PFACs based on information in [the] 
[p]laintiffs’ reporting whenever it is not tied to a specific, authorized source.”  Id.  In any event, 
the Court struggles to see how the enforcement regime that Mr. Valdez promises changes the 
illusory nature of the scienter requirement.  
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frequently depend on” such sources “to gather news, and confidentiality is often essential to 
establishing a relationship with” a source).   
The defendants also emphasize the addition of six “safe harbors” as evidence that 
the Interim Policy is distinct from the original Policy in a way that complies with this Court’s 
Opinion and Order.  See Defs. Opp. at 16.  But like the scienter “requirement,” the safe harbors 
do not make clear that engagement in lawful journalistic practices will not trigger the revocation 
of a PFAC.  See Op. at 21-22.  As this Court has explained, asking questions is fundamental to 
the role of a journalist, and a journalist’s ability to ask questions is protected.  See id. at 21; see 
also id. at 22 (“[A] journalist asking questions is not a crime!”).  Yet the “safe harbors” explicitly 
leave open the possibility that “[a]sking questions” on certain topics and to certain officials could 
trigger the revocation or denial of a PFAC.  Interim Policy at 11.  They provide, for example, 
that asking questions about any subject to a Department official who is “authorized to speak with 
the press” is permissible.  Id.  But how is a journalist to know who is authorized to speak?  That 
uncertainty and lack of clarity is precisely what this Court held to be unacceptable. 
In sum, the re is little daylight between the Policy’s unconstitutional “solicitation” 
prohibition and the Interim Policy’s “inducement” prohibition, and the latter is impermissible for 
the same reasons as the former.  Simply put, the Department’s attempt to “clarif[y]” the Policy 
did not cure its constitutional infirmities.  That, of course, is exactly why this Court determined it 
was necessary to vacate the Policy and “re-establish the status quo” as it existed prior to “the 
unlawful agency action.”  Las Ams. Immigrant Advoc. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 783 
F. Supp. 3d 200, 233 (D.D.C. 2025) (quoting Texas v. United States, 40 F.4th 205, 219-20 (5th 
Cir. 2022) (per curiam)).  The Court explained that the Policy’s deficiencies were so entrenched 
that there was no alternative but to require the Department to scrap its prior approach and start 
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afresh.  See Op. at 38-39.  By failing to do so, the Department has violated this Court’s explicit 
mandate.     
 
B. Expulsion of PFAC Holders from the Pentagon 
In its March 20, 2026 Order, the Court directed the defendants to “immediately 
reinstate the PFACs of” Julian Barnes and six other Times journalists, “all of whom held a PFAC 
as of October 6, 2025.”  Order at 3.  Before doing so, the Court carefully considered the 
defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs had not established their entitlement to injunctive relief.  
The Court ultimately disagreed with the defendants, concluding in relevant part that the plaintiffs 
had shown irreparable injury because “[w]ithout their PFACs, the plaintiffs lack ‘the access to 
pursue [journalistically productive] conversations.’”  Op. at 36.  (quoting Karem v. Trump, 404 
F. Supp. 3d 203, 217 (D.D.C. 2019)).  The Court observed that “the only way to remedy the 
injury [from the loss of a press credential] is to return the [credential] and the access that comes 
with it.”  Id. at 36-37 (first alteration in original) (quoting Karem v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 
at 217).     
The Department did not comply with the Court’s Order.  Rather, the very ne xt 
business day, the Department announced that it was immediately closing the “Correspondents’ 
Corridor”—the area in the Pentagon from which journalists had worked for years .  See Mem. 
at 2; Interim Policy at 3; see also Supp. Barnes Decl. ¶ 12.  Instead, PFAC holders would be 
relegated to work from a space outside the Pentagon building.  See Supp. Valdez Decl. ¶ 12; 
Supp Barnes Decl. ¶ 9.  The Department further announced that journalists would no longer be 
permitted to access the Pentagon building at all without a Department escort and that even 
escorted access would be limited to specific events.  See Interim Policy at 3.  The justification 
offered by the Department for this sudden change is that this Court’s Order “remov[ed] . . . all 
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security screening authority” and that “unescorted access to the Pentagon cannot be responsibly 
maintained without the ability to screen credential holders for security risks.”  Second Supp. 
Boutrous Decl. at Ex. 7; see also id. at Ex. 6 (Commander Parlatore stating that the Court’s 
ruling “excised all of the security provisions and enforcement mechanisms and ordered that [the 
Department] immediately issue press passes under the revised, toothless policy”); Mem. at 2. 
In s
hort, this  is nonsense.  The Court did not “remove” or “excise” the 
Department’s authority to screen PFAC holders.  For one, The Times’ journalists named in the 
Court’s Order have already been screened by the Department—for example,  prior to the issuance 
of the Policy, Mr. Barnes had held a PFAC without issue for more than twenty years.  See Op. at 
4; Supp. Barnes Decl. ¶ 11.  Moreover, the Court was clear in its Opinion that it was leaving 
intact the security measures that previously existed for PFAC holders and that “served [the 
Department’s] proffered interests in safety and security for decades.”  Op. at 39.  Based on the 
undisputed facts, the Court found that “[t]he regular presence of PFAC holders at the Pentagon 
has enhanced the ability of journalists and news organizations to keep Americans informed about 
the U.S. military while posing no security or safety risk to Department property or personnel.”  
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).  There is no evidence whatsoever that the facts have changed in the 
weeks since this Court issued its summary judgment decision.  The rote invocation of “security” 
or “national security” has never been enough “to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the 
First Amendment.”  N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 719 (Black, J., 
concurring).  As Judge Leon observed in a recent decision, “[b]ald assertions of ‘national 
security’ cannot excuse the Government’s failure to follow the law.”  Nat’l Trust for Historic 
Pres. in the U.S. v. Nat’l Park Serv., __ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2026 WL 877779, at *16 (D.D.C. Mar. 
31, 2026).   
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In their opposition brief, the defendants state that the “relocation of the press 
workspace” is unconnected to the Court’s ruling and instead simply “fulfills a commitment 
announced . . . before this lawsuit was filed.”  Defs. Opp. at 20; see also Mem. at 2.  That 
assertion is undermined by the timing of the announced closure.  The Court cannot ignore the 
fact that the decision to bar all journalists from the Pentagon came the next business day after the 
Court ordered the Department to restore the plaintiffs’ access to the Pentagon.  Further, the 
testimony of Mr. Barnes supports that Department officials were ill-prepared to facilitate this 
“relocation,” suggesting that the Department had scrambled to close the Correspondents’ 
Corridor in direct response to this Court’s directives.  See Supp. Barnes Decl. ¶ 9; Third Supp. 
Barnes Decl. ¶ 6.6   
In light of all this, the Court has no choice but to conclude that the Department’s 
abrupt closure of the Correspondents’ Corridor and its ban on credentialed journalists traveling 
unescorted through the Pentagon are not security measures or efforts to make good on prior 
commitments but rather transparent attempts to negate the impact of this Court’s Order.  The 
point of the Court’s injunction was to restore The Times journalists’ access to the Pentagon, not 
merely to ensure that they have possession of a physical credential.  See Op. at 37.  But the 
access now available to PFAC holders in the wake of this Court’s Order is not even close to as 
meaningful as the broad access that PFAC holders had previously been afforded.  The PFACs 
 
6  Deputy Press Secretary Joel Manuel Valdez submitted a declaration purporting to 
refute Mr. Barnes’ account of his interactions with Pentagon Press Office staff on the day he 
went to pick up his PFAC.  See Supp. Valdez Decl.  But Mr. Valdez’s declaration does not 
contradict Mr. Barnes’ testimony about his conversations with Department staff, for which Mr. 
Valdez was not present.  See id.; see also Third Supp. Barnes Decl. ¶ 3.  The only thing Mr. 
Valdez’s declaration establishes is that some of the information given to Mr. Barnes was 
inaccurate.  See Supp. Valdez Decl. ¶¶ 15-21.  If anything, that fact supports the notion that 
Department officials were unsure of the parameters of the Interim Policy and were unprepared to 
implement it.  See id. 
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issued to Mr. Barnes and his colleagues permit them to access only a building separate from the 
Pentagon.  See Supp. Valdez Decl. ¶ 12.  PFAC holders may enter the Pentagon only for limited 
purposes approved by the Department, and only if the holder is accompanied by an escort at all 
times.  See id. ¶¶ 22-25; see also Interim Policy at 3.  These restrictions make it exceedingly 
difficult to cover the Department and the U.S. military from the Pentagon grounds, as the 
April 2, 2026 declaration from Mr. Barnes illustrates:  
Going through a sometimes -lengthy process of scheduling official 
appointments in order to ask even one or two questions to an 
official—even assuming that request is granted and that official does 
not have to reschedule— does not allow for meaningful engagement 
with Department personnel on a timeline consistent with news 
reporting.  As I stated in a prior declaration, reporting from the 
Pentagon has historically necessitated speaking to upwards of a 
dozen officials and other personnel from different press offices in a 
given day, sometimes in response to rapidly developing events.  
While I used to be able to walk from press office to press office 
throughout the day, I now would have to return to the library, call or 
email for an appointment, and wait for a response and approval, and 
for arrangement for and arrival of an escort.   That means I will be 
spending hours of my day just waiting and walking back and forth—
assuming I can get ahold of press offices and individuals and arrange 
interviews and be approved for an escort at all.  That process will 
dramatically interfere with my ability to meaningfully engage with 
anyone from the Department on Pentagon grounds, or to obtain the 
information necessary to inform the public in a timely manner.  
Third Supp. Barnes Decl. ¶ 8.
7  For decades, the plaintiffs and other reporters were permitted to 
move throughout the building and engage with Pentagon press officials and other personnel to 
 
7  On Monday, March 30, in response to a request that he had made three days 
earlier, on Friday, March 27, Mr. Barnes received an invitation to interview a Department 
official at the Pentagon the following day, Tuesday, March 31, at 12:45 p.m.  Third Supp. Barnes 
Decl. ¶ 5.  Mr. Barnes explained: 
 
On Tuesday, March 31, 2026, I arrived at the Pentagon at 12:10 p.m. 
and entered the Visitor Center security area.  I showed the attendant 
behind the glass my driver’s license and the PFAC.  I entered my 
social security number upon his request. I was advised that 
individuals holding PFACs must enter through corridor 8.  I replied 
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provide timely reporting to the American people.  See, e.g., Op. at 5-6.  That undisputedly is no 
longer the case.   
In short, the Department has responded to the Court’s express instruction to return 
the PFACs previously held by The Times’ journalists and restore the access to the Pentagon that 
came with those credentials by instead cutting off that access for all journalists.  That response 
flouts the Court’s explicit directives and disregards the constitutional principles at the heart of its 
Opinion.  
 
*** 
The Court cannot conclude this Opinion without noting once again what this case 
is really about: the attempt by the Secretary of Defense to dictate the information received by the 
American people, to control the message so that the public hears and sees only what the 
Secretary and the Trump Administration want them to hear and see.  The Constitution demands 
better.  The American public demands better, too.  Over the past few weeks, the Court has 
received dozens of letters and postcards from people across the country explaining what the First 
Amendment means to them.  To quote one such letter: 
  
 
that I had an appointment and the escort was going to meet me in 
the Visitor’s Center.  The supervisor repeated that anyone with a 
PFAC could enter only through corridor 8.  This was despite the fact 
that I was told to meet my escort in the Visitor’s Center and the fact 
that before I could have simply entered through the main gate using 
my PFAC.   After I arrived at the Pentagon, the interview was 
postponed, and I was immediately escorted out of the building.  
Id. ¶ 6.  This scenario exemplifies precisely the Kafkaesque nature of the Department’s 
implementation of the Interim Policy that the Court raised during oral argument.  See OA Tr. 
at 37.  The only response to Mr. Barnes’s declaration: “Mr. Barnes’s escort had not been fully 
briefed on the access procedures for PFAC holders under the Interim Policy.”  Second Supp. 
Valdez Decl. ¶ 9.  Really?  
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