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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

JACQUELINE CONWAY, *
*
Plaintiff, *
* Civ. No. MJM-25-1826
v. *
*
JASMINE JEFFRY, et al., *
*
Defendants. *
*
* * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Jacqueline Conway (“Plaintiff”) ini tiated this civil action against defendants
Jasmine Jeffry and Bryan McDowell (“Defendants” ), two officers of Baltimore County Police
Department, alleging several violations of he r rights under the U.S. Constitution and Maryland
Declaration of Rights, false arrest and imprisonment, assault and battery, bystander liability, and
malicious prosecution. ECF No. 2 (Compl.) at 7–24. This matter is before the Court on Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Complaint or for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 5) and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14). No hearing is necessary to resolve these motions. See Loc.
R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons set forth below, the Court shall grant in part and deny in
part Defendants’ motion, deny Plaintiff’s motion, and remand the remaining state-law claims to
the Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore County.1

1 On March 31, 2026, the Court entered an Order granting Defendants’ motion in full. Upon further
consideration of the record, however, the Court will not dismiss, but will decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction, over the state-law claims asserted in th e Complaint. Accordingly, the prior Order shall be
vacated, and an Amended Order will be entered consistent with this Memorandum Opinion. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e) (permitting court to alter or amend final judgment).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff is a retired Captain of the Baltimore City Sheriff’s Department; she retired “due
to back issues and career-ending back surger(i es).” ECF No. 14-1 (Conway Aff.), ¶¶ 1, 3. On
October 29, 2024, Plaintiff was working part-time as a food delivery driver for DoorDash. Id. ¶ 6.
That day, at approximately 2:03 p.m., Plaintiff arri ved at a residence in Baltimore County,
Maryland, to complete a delivery. Id.; see also ECF No. 14-7 (Pl. Ex. 7). According to Plaintiff,
the customer, Keyon Agnew, answered the door with only a t-shirt on and his genitals exposed.
ECF No. 5-2 (Defs. Ex. A) at 04:32–05:02; ECF No. 14-1, ¶ 7. Plaintiff im mediately returned to
her vehicle, moved her car across the street from Agnew’s residence, and called 911 multiple times.
ECF No. 5-2 at 05:32–05:38; ECF No. 14-1, ¶ 9; ECF No. 14-4 (Pl. Ex. 4) at 2; ECF No. 14-5 (Pl.
Ex. 5) at 4.
While waiting for emergency services to ar rive, Plaintiff received numerous phone calls
and texts from Agnew. ECF No. 5-2 at 05:40–05:53; ECF No. 14-1, ¶ 9; ECF No. 14-5 at 4. Agnew
eventually left his residence and approached Pl aintiff’s vehicle, fully clothed. ECF No. 5-2 at
06:16–06:18; ECF No. 5-3 (Defs. Ex. B) at 02:57–03:01; ECF No. 14-1, ¶ 10; ECF No. 14-4 at 2;
ECF No. 14-5 at 4. Plaintiff, a lawful gun owner, retrieved her firearm from her purse and told
Agnew to “get the fuck away from [her] truck.” ECF No. 5-2 at 06:18–06:22; ECF No. 5-3 at
02:33–02:37; ECF No. 14-1, ¶¶ 2, 11–12; ECF No. 14-4 at 2. Agnew complied and returned to his
residence, and Plaintiff stored her firearm. ECF No. 14-1, ¶ 12.
Plaintiff continued to wait in her car, but when no officer arrived at the scene, she decided
to drive to the Baltimore County Police Department precinct in Towson, Maryland to press charges
against Agnew. Id. ¶ 13. While driving to the precinct, Plaintiff saw Defendant Jeffry, a Baltimore
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County Police Officer, in the parking lot of a Walgreens store. Id. Plaintiff stopped to speak with
Defendant Jeffry about her encounter with Agnew, after which they proceeded back to the scene
of the incident. Id. Plaintiff remained in her vehicle whil e Defendant Jeffry began investigating
the incident by obtaining account s from Plaintiff and Agnew. See ECF Nos. 5-2 & 5-3. The
investigation, as well as the re mainder of Defendants’ encounter with Plaintiff that day, was
captured on Defendant Jeffry’s body-worn camera (“BWC”).
Defendant Jeffry’s investigation revealed conflicting accounts of the incident. Agnew told
Defendant Jeffry that when Plaintiff notified him that she was at his front door with his DoorDash
order, he answered the door while wearing a t-shirt and underwear. ECF No. 5-2 at 01:34–01:43;
ECF No. 14-4 at 3; ECF No. 14-5 at 4. He also told Defendant Jeffry that when he later approached
Plaintiff’s vehicle, Plaintiff told him, “Don’t come up to my vehicle, I’m put some bullets in you.”
ECF No. 5-2 at 02:26–02:36. Agnew added that when he was near Plaintiff’s vehicle, he could see
a “taser” in Plaintiff’s left ha nd that was pointed directly at him. ECF No. 5-3 at 01:10–01:13.
Agnew denied, however, seeing Plaintiff with a gun or seeing Plaintiff point a firearm at him. ECF
No. 14-1, ¶ 17; ECF No. 14-4 at 3; ECF No. 14-5 at 4. Plaintiff told Defendant Jeffry that when
Agnew approached her vehicle, he walked over “like he was getting ready to do something.” ECF
No. 5-2 at 08:36–08:41. Plaintiff also told Defendant Jeffry that she did not have a taser, ECF No.
5-3 at 02:08–02:14, and that she had her firearm in her right hand pointed downward towards the
passenger-side floorboard when Agnew was near her vehicle, id. at 02:42–02:48; see also ECF
No. 5-2 at 08:44–08:48; ECF No. 14-1, ¶ 11. Plaintiff stated that she “made sure [Agnew] saw [her
firearm],” ECF No. 5-3 at 02: 48–02:51, but she denied aiming her firearm towards Agnew, ECF
No. 5-2 at 08:59–09:01. In explaining how she used her weapon during the incident with Agnew,
Plaintiff shared with Defendant Jeffry that she retired from her role as Captain due to having back
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surgery, though she did not indicate how recent the surgery was or that it continued to cause her
pain. ECF No. 5-3 at 02:30–02:40.
Defendant McDowell, a Sergeant with the Ba ltimore County Police Department, arrived
at the scene of the incident during Defendant Jeffry’s investigation. ECF No. 14-1, ¶ 14. After
parking behind Plaintiff’s vehicl e, Defendant McDowell asked Plaintiff to exit her vehicle. ECF
No. 5-4 (Defs. Ex. C) at 00:40–00:54, 01:07–01:09; see also ECF No. 5-5 (Defs. Ex. D) at 01:14–
01:16. Once Plaintiff was outside her vehicle, De fendant Jeffry informed Plaintiff that she was
being arrested and charged with first-degree assault. ECF No. 5-4 at 01:57–02:10; ECF No. 5-5 at
02:03–02:16. Defendants also seized Plaintiff’s firearm. ECF No. 14-1, ¶ 32.
Defendant Jeffry walked Plaintiff to her police vehicle, an SUV, and applied handcuffs to
Plaintiff’s wrists behind her back, gently patted Plaintiff down, assisted Plaintiff in entering the
backseat of the vehicle by lightly touching Plaintiff’s right shoulder and giving her direction, and
buckled Plaintiff’s seatbelt. ECF No. 5-5 at 04:05–04:40, 07:00–07:17, 07:51–08:22, 09:09–09:30.
Shortly after being seated in the back of Defendan t Jeffry’s vehicle, Plain tiff stated, “This is so
uncomfortable.” Id. at 09:21–09:24. As Defendant Jeffry drove Plaintiff to the Towson police
precinct for booking procedures, Plaintiff asked Defe ndant Jeffry to “put [the vehicle’s] back
window up” because she did not want anyone to see her, and Defendant Jeffry complied,
responding, “Yes ma’am.” Id. at 10:52–10:57. Plaintiff expressed discomfort and pain in her back
twice during the ten-minute ride to the precinct. The first instance occurred when Plaintiff stated,
“oh my god, and my back,” the rest of her statement inaudible. Id. at 14:02–14:06. Defendant
Jeffry responded, “I’m trying to get you [to the precinct] pretty quick,” and Plaintiff replied, “that’s
okay.” Id. at 14:06–14:08. The second instance occurred when Plaintiff stated, “I have rods in my
back, these handcuffs is tearing [them] up,” id. at 19:28–19:33, to which Defendant Jeffry offered
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no response. Beyond those two comments, the two e ngaged in light conversation during the trip.
Id. at 10:04–20:45; ECF No. 14-4 at 4. After arrivi ng to the precinct, Plai ntiff asked Defendant
Jeffry to assist her in stepping out of the vehicle because of the “rods in [her] back,” and Defendant
Jeffry complied. Id. at 22:05–22:13. Plaintiff then thanke d Defendant Jeffry “for being kind to
[her],” and Defendant Jeffry replied, “Of course.” Id. at 22:13–22:17. After exiting the vehicle, the
BWC footage shows Plaintiff walking unassisted into the precinct and sitting and removing her
shoes, shoelaces, and belt without any apparent issue or expression of pain or discomfort. Id. at
22:25–22:57, 23:43–25:11, 25:35–25:44, 25:56–26:11, 26:56–27:16. Plaintiff now claims that her
handcuffs were “applied too tight[ly] and caused severe pain due to [her] recent back surgeries and
transportation in the cramped back seat of PO Jeffry’s police car.” ECF No. 14-1, ¶ 23.
Plaintiff was charged with first- and second-degree assault. See ECF Nos. 14-2 (Pl. Ex. 2)
& 14-3 (Pl. Ex. 3). She was released from the Towson precinct the same day as her arrest, “as the
Baltimore County Court Commissioner determined there was no probable cause for the charges
against her.” ECF No. 14-5 at 4.
On October 30, 2024, Defendant Jeffry texted Pl aintiff, notifying her that she “expressed
[her] concerns [about Plaintiff’s ar rest] with [her] direct supervis ors th[at] morning[,]” and that
they would be “reaching out to the [State’s] [A]ttorneys office in reference to this incident.” ECF
No. 14-6 (Pl. Ex. 6). Defendant Jeffry also indicated that the police were “hoping to pursue charges
against [Agnew].” Id. Later that day, Defendant Jeffry c ontacted a Baltimore County’s Assistant
State’s Attorney about the incident involving Pl aintiff and Agnew. ECF No. 14-5 at 5. Because
Defendant Jeffry believed that the “articulable fact s of the incident . . . highly suggested that
[Plaintiff’s arrest] was made pr ematurely and without a complete d and thorough investigation of
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all possible facts,” Defendant Jef fry “requested that [the Assistant State’s Attorney] review the
charges against [Plaintiff].” Id.
On November 22, 2024, the assault charges against Plaintiff were dismissed. ECF No. 14-
12 (Pl. Ex. 12). Five days later, Agnew was char ged with indecent exposure in connection with
the incident involving Plaintiff. ECF No. 14-14 (Pl. Ex. 14).
B. Procedural History
On March 3, 2025, Plaintiff initia ted this action in the Circuit Court of Maryland for
Baltimore County. See ECF No. 1-1. On June 9, 2025, Defendants removed the action to this Court
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(a). ECF No. 1. The Complaint sets forth federal and state
constitutional claims, along with claims under Maryland common law. Specifically, Counts I and
II assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 agains t Defendant Jeffry and Defendant McDowell,
respectively, based on alleged violations of Plaintiff’s rights under the Second, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution; Count III alleges bystander liability under §
1983 against Defendant McDowell; Counts IV and V allege false arrest and false imprisonment
under Maryland law; Count VI alleges assault and battery under Maryland law; Count VII alleges
malicious prosecution by Defendant Jeffry under Maryland law; Count VIII alleges that Defendant
Jeffry violated Plaintiff’s rights under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights;
and Count IX alleges aiding and abetting liabi lity under Articles 24 and 26 against Defendant
McDowell. See Compl. ¶¶ 24–77.
On June 16, 2025, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)
or, alternatively, a motion for summary judgmen t under Rule 56. ECF No. 5. Plaintiff filed a
response in opposition to Defendants’ motion co mbined with a cross-motion for summary
judgment. ECF No. 14. Defendants filed a response in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion and reply
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in further support of their motion. ECF No. 18. Plaintiff did not f ile a reply in support of her
motion.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may seek dismissal
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” To survive the challenge, the non-
moving party must have pleaded facts demonstrating “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Lokhova v. Halper, 995 F.3d 134, 141 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)). A plausible claim for relief is more than merely conceivable or speculative. See Holloway
v. Maryland, 32 F.4th 293, 299 (4th Cir. 2022). The allega tions must show there is “more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump,
961 F.3d 635, 648 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)).
When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the cour t must accept the alle gations as true and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader. Williams v. Kincaid, 45 F.4th 759, 765, 777
(4th Cir. 2022). But the court does not accept “legal conclusions couched as facts or unwarranted
inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” U.S. ex rel. Taylor v. Boyko , 39 F.4th 177,
189 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharms. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451,
455 (4th Cir. 2013)). Merely reciting a claim’s elements “and supporting them by conclusory
statements does not meet the required standard.” Sheppard v. Visitors of Va. State Univ., 993 F.3d
230, 234 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. City of Buena Vista, 917 F.3d 206, 212
(4th Cir. 2019)). The court “does not resolve contests surrounding facts, the merits of a claim, or
the applicability of defenses.” Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Tobey v.
Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 387 (4th Cir. 2013)).
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Typically, the court’s review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is limited to the complaint and
documents attached to the complaint and incorporated by reference. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
12(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). The court also may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts and
matters of public record and consider documents “integral to and explicitly relied on in the
complaint” when their authenticity is not disputed. Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l, Ltd. , 780
F.3d 597, 606–07 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Am. Chiropractic Ass’n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367
F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004)); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). When the parties present and the
court considers other matters beyond the pleadings on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must treat
the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56, and “[a]ll parties must be given a
reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinen t to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(d).
B. Rule 56
Summary judgment is appropriate when the m oving party establishes that “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To meet its burden, the party must identify “particular parts of materials in
the record” in support of its position. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)( A). Then, “[t]o avoid summary
judgment, the opposing party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Perkins v. Int’l Paper Co. , 936 F.3d 196, 205 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute of fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The
opposing party must identify more than a “scintilla of evidence” in support of its position to defeat
the motion for summary judgment. Id. at 252. The court “should not weigh the evidence.” Perkins,
936 F.3d at 205 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). However, if “the record taken as a whole
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could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” then summary judgment is
appropriate. Id. (quoting Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra, Inc. , 947 F.2d 115, 119 (4th
Cir. 1991)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). In ruling on a motion
for summary judgment, this Court “view[s] the facts and in ferences drawn from the facts in the
light most favorable to . . . the nonmoving party.” Perkins, 936 F.3d at 205 (quoting Evans v.
Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 958 (4th Cir. 1996)).
When both parties file motions for summary judgment, “the role of the court is to ‘rule on
each party’s motion on an individu al and separate basis, determining, in each case, whether a
judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard.” Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau
of Greater Md., Inc. , 923 F. Supp. 720, 729 (D. Md. 1996) (quoting Towne Mgmt. Corp. v.
Hartford Acc. And Indem. Co., 627 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D. Md. 1985)). In other words, “the court
must evaluate each party’s motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all
reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Id. (quoting Mingus
Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
“Rule 56(d) mandates that summary judgment be denied when the nonmovant ‘has not had
the opportunity to discover information that is essential to h[er] opposition.” Pisano v. Strach, 743
F.3d 927, 931 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “T o obtain Rule 56(d) relief, the non-moving
party must show how discovery ‘could possibly create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient .
. . to survive summary judgment, or otherwise affect the court’s analysis.’” Collington v.
Maryland, Civ. No. GJH-20-966, 2021 WL 3172275, at *7 (D. Md. July 26, 2021) (quoting
Poindexter v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp., 792 F.3d 406, 411 (4th Cir. 2015)). Generally, the non-
moving party must make this showing “through the filing of a Rule 56(d) affidavit that outlines
the need for discovery and what additional fact s litigants hope to uncover through discovery to
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properly defeat su mmary judgment.” Dave & Buster’s, Inc. v. White Flint Mall, LLLP , 616 F.
App’x 552, 561 (4th Cir. 2015); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Even without such an affidavit,
however, a district court may not grant summary judgment “when it otherwise has ‘fair notice of .
. . potential dispute[s] as to the sufficiency of the summary judgment record.’” Shaw v. Foreman,
59 F.4th 121, 128 (4th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). Therefore, “a Rule 56(d) affidavit may not be
necessary[]” “where ‘the nonmoving party’s objecti ons before the district court serve[] as the
functional equivalent[.]’” Dave & Buster’s , 616 F. App’x at 561 (quoting Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty
Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244–45 (4th Cir. 2002)).
Defendants’ motion, which seeks summary judgment und er Rule 56 in th e alternative to
dismissal under Rule 12(b), provides Plaintiff sufficient notice that the Court may consider matters
outside the pleadings and decide th e motion under a Rule 56 standard. See Laughlin v. Metro.
Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260–61 (4th Cir. 1998). Specifically, Defendants attach
to their motion several video recordings contai ning footage from their BWCs, which collectively
depict the entirety of Defendant Jeffry’s investigation and Plaintiff’s encounter with Defendants,
including her arrest and transportation to the Towson precinct. In resp onse, Plaintiff does not
provide any Rule 56(d) affidav it specifying a need for discover y in order to oppose Defendant’s
request for summary judgment, and she does not dispute the authenticity or accuracy of the BWC
footage supplied by Defendants. To the contrary, Plaintiff attaches the same video exhibits to her
response, in addition to several other documents outside the pleadings, including her own affidavit
addressing the facts of the case and court documen ts, in opposition to Defendants’ motion and in
support of her own cross-motion for summary judgment. In her brief, Plaintiff does request
additional discovery, but, for reasons explained in Parts III.A.1, 2 infra, Plaintiff fails to show how
the discovery she seeks “could possibly ‘create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient for [her]
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to survive summary judgment,’ or otherwise affect the court’s analysis[,]” in this case. Poindexter,
792 F.3d at 411 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)).
The Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff ha s articulated a need fo r discovery to oppose
summary judgment. Because notice was given, and because resolution of Defendants’ motion
requires the Court to look beyond the allegations in the Complaint to undi sputed matters outside
the pleadings, the Court shall treat Defendants’ motion as one for summary judgment.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Counts I Through III
In Counts I through III of the Complaint, Pl aintiff asserts claims for damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against both Defendants for alleged vi olations of federal constitutional rights. “To
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States was violated, and (2 ) that the alleged viol ation was committed by a
‘person acting under the color of state law.’” Gaines v. Balt. Police Dep’t , 657 F. Supp. 3d 708,
748 (D. Md. 2023) (citations omitted).
In their motion, Defendants assert qualified im munity as a defense to Plaintiff’s federal
constitutional claims. ECF No. 5-1 at 11–13. “In recognition of the complex task[s] performed by
law enforcement officials,” Taylor v. Farmer, 13 F.3d 117, 120 (4th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted),
the doctrine of qualified immunity was devised to “shield[] officers from civil liability so long as
their conduct ‘does not violate clea rly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021) (quoting
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). Plaintif f opposes Defendants’ assertion of
qualified immunity. See ECF No. 14 at 21–24.
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“Qualified immunity is ‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.’”
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237 (citation omitted). Therefor e, the Supreme Court has “emphasized that
qualified immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of a litigation.”
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982)). Indeed, a “qualified immunity defense may be determined on a motion for summary
judgment, even when asserted before discovery.” Poole v. Cnty., No. 3:15-CV-00309-FDW-DCK,
2016 WL 4267792, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 11, 2016) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). Qualified
immunity operates on a standard of “objective reasonableness,” the “salient question” being
“whether ‘the state of the law’ at the time of the events at issue gave the officer ‘fair warning’ that
his alleged treatment of the plaintiff was unconstitutional.” Est. of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc.,
54 F. Supp. 3d 409, 420 (D. Md. 2014) (quoting Jones v. Buchanan , 325 F.3d 520, 531 (4th Cir.
2003)). The doctrine applies “unless the official ’s conduct violated a clearly established
constitutional right.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640).The qualified
immunity inquiry begins “by determining ‘the precise right’ at issue.” Tarashuk v. Givens, 53 F.4th
154, 162–63 (4th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). He re, the Complaint states that Defendants
“violated Plaintiff’s clearly established rights at the time under the Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments[.]”2 Compl. ¶¶ 27, 33. However, for purposes of a qualified immunity analysis, the
Court must avoid defining the right at such “a high level of generality.” City of Escondido, Cal. v.

2 In her opposition brief, Plaintiff makes passing re ferences to the Fifth Amendment. ECF No. 14
at 12, 22. These references are in error. First, it is well-established that “[a] plaintiff may not amend her
complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.” Barclay White Skanska, Inc. v.
Battelle Mem’l Inst., 262 F. App’x 556, 563 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co.,
382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004)). Second, the Fifth Amendment is enforceable against federal officers
but not officers acting under color of state law, like Defendants. See Dutton v. Montgomery Cnty.,
Maryland, Civ. No. DKC 2008-3504, 2009 WL 2496844, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 11, 2009), aff’d, 368 F. App’x
362 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522, 542 (1987)).
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Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 42 (2019) (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018)). The
Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have emphasized that “[c]ourts must take care to define the
right at an ‘appropriate level of specificity.’” Thompson v. Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 98 (4th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)). The Court construes the Complaint to assert
the following rights: (1) the right to be free from arrest, detention, and imprisonment in the absence
of probable cause; (2) the right against seizure of a lawfully owned firearm during an arrest; and
(3) the right to be free from painful handcuffing and from placement in the back of a police vehicle
for post-arrest transport, notwithstanding a preexisting back condition. Each of these rights is
sufficiently specific to proceed with a qualified immunity inquiry.
Following the identification of the precise rights at issue, the Court must determine whether
there was “a violation of a constitutional right” and whether “that right [was] ‘clearly established’
at the time of the alleged violation.” Campbell v. Florian, 972 F.3d 385, 392 (4th Cir. 2020), as
amended (Aug. 28, 2020) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). Only one of these questions must
be resolved in favor of Defendants for qualified immunity to apply. “If [an officer] did not violate
any right, [they are] hardly in need of any immun ity and the analysis ends right then and there.”
Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Abney v. Coe, 493 F.3d 412, 415 (4th
Cir. 2007)). And “even if a court finds or assumes that [an officer] viol ated an individual’s
constitutional rights, the offic[er] is entitled to immunity so long as [they] did not violate clearly
established law.” Barrett v. Pae Gov’t Servs., Inc. , 975 F.3d 416, 429 (4th Cir. 2020). The Court
has discretion in deciding which question should be addressed first. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236,
242 (stating that district court judg es may address these two questions in “the order . . . that will
best facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of [a] case”).
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“To determine if the right in question was clearly established,” courts in the Fourth Circuit
“first look to cases from the Supreme Court, [the Fourth Circuit] Court of Appeals, or the highest
court of the state in which the action arose.” Thompson v. Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 98 (4th Cir. 2017).
“In the absence of ‘directly on- point, binding authority,’ courts may also consider whether ‘the
right was clearly established based on general constitutional principles or a consensus of
persuasive authority.’” Id. (quoting Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr. , 855 F.3d 533, 543 (4th Cir.
2017)).
1. Counts I and II: Unreasonable Arrest
In Counts I and II of the Compla int, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her rights
under the Fourth Amendment by arresting and de taining her and seizin g her firearm without
probable cause. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 27, 33. The Fourth Ame ndment protects “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. “[T]he arrest of a pers on is quintessentially a seizure.” Torres
v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 312 (2021) (citation omitted). For an arrest to be “reasonable” for Fourth
Amendment purposes, it must be supported by probable cause. Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279,
290 (4th Cir. 2001). Thus, binding precedent recognizes “a clearly established Fourth Amendment
right to be arrested only upon probable cause . . . .” Id.
“[A] police officer may lawfully arrest an individual in a public place without a warrant if
the officer has probable cause to believe that th e individual has committe d, is committing, or is
about to commit a crime.” United States v. Dickey-Bey, 393 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted). “Probable cause is ‘defined in terms of facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a
prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.’” Id.
(quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975)). “[S]ufficien t probability, not certainty, is
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the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797,
804 (1971). Therefore, probable cause “is a flexible, common-sense standard” that does not require
an officer’s belief that a suspect committed a crime to “be correct or more likely true than false”;
“[a] ‘practical, nontechnical’ probability that [a crime was committed] is all that is required.” Texas
v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (citation omitted). This standard does not require proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance of the evidence, see United States v.
Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 600 (4th Cir. 2004) (citations om itted), nor does it require “the same
type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support a
conviction[,]” Sennett v. United States , 667 F.3d 531, 535 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972)). “Reasonable law enforcement officers are not required to . .
. resolve every doubt about a su spect’s guilt before probab le cause is established.” Wadkins v.
Arnold, 214 F.3d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 2000) (citation modified); see also Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942
F.2d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting Krause v. Bennett , 887 F.2d 362, 371 (2d Cir. 1989))
(“[P]robable cause does not require an officer to be certain that subsequent prosecution of the
arrestee will be successful.”).
Probable cause for an arrest “is determined by the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ . . . either
known personally to th e arresting officer, co mmunicated to him by one or more of his fellow
officers, or a combination of both.” United States v. Ashley, 490 F. App’x 512, 513 (4th Cir. 2012)
(citations omitted). The question is whether this information, “v iewed from the standpoint of an
objectively reasonable police officer, amount[s] to” probable cause to believe the arrestee
committed a crime. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (quoting Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)). Whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest under an
established set of facts “is ultimately a question of law.” Madison v. Harford Cnty., Civ. No. MJG-
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12-1120, 2013 WL 4008859, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 2, 2013); see also Middleton v. Koushall, Civ.
No. ELH-20-3536, 2024 WL 1967816, at *34 (D. Md. May 3, 2024) (citing United States v. Allen,
631 F.3d 164, 171 (4th Cir. 2011)) (“Whether there was probable cause for an arrest is a question
of law.”); Abdulkhalik v. City of San Diego, No. 08CV1515-MMA (NLS), 2009 WL 4282004, at
*4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2009) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985)) (“[W]hether a
reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed to justify [an] arrest is essentially a
legal question.”); Sample v. Telles, Civ. No. 03-1064 BB/KBM, 2004 WL 7337685, at *2 (D.N.M.
July 1, 2004) (citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227–28 (1991)) (“The question of whether a
reasonable police officer could have believed he had probable cause is one of law.”). The question
should only proceed to the jury where there is a genuine dispute of material fact about what the
officer knew before effecting the arrest. See R.M.B. v. Bedford Cnty. (Va.) Sch. Bd., 169 F. Supp.
3d 647, 654 (W.D. Va. 2016) (citation omitted) (“Where, as here, there are no material disputes of
fact, ‘the court determines as a matter of law whether [the fact s] amount to probable cause.’”);
Abdulkhalik, 2009 WL 4282004, at *4 (citing Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th
Cir. 1993)); Sample, 2004 WL 7337685, at *2 (citing Guffey v. Wyatt, 18 F.3d 869, 871, 873 (10th
Cir. 1994)).
Here, in connection with her arrest, Plaintiff was charged with first-degree and second-
degree assault, in violation of Maryland Criminal Law §§ 3-202 and 3-203, respectively. See ECF
Nos. 14-2 & 14-3. The former section, a felony charge, provides that “[a] person may not commit
an assault with a firearm,” Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-202(b)(2), (c), while the latter, a
misdemeanor charge, provides that “a person may not com mit an assault,” id. § 3-203(a), (b).
Under Maryland law, an assault “of the intent to frighten variety” is “def ined as the doing of an
act that places the victim in apprehension of immediate bodily harm with the intent to cause such
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apprehension.” Harris v. State, 728 A.2d 180, 184 (Md. 1999) (citation modified). Because
Defendant Jeffry did not have an arrest warrant and was not present for the alleged assault, the
arrest would have only been lawful under the Fourth Amendment if probable cause supported a
belief that Plaintiff commi tted first-degree assault. See Dickey-Bey, 393 F.3d at 453 n.2
(warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor is lawful only if the misdemeanor is “committed in the
officer’s presence[]”).
The entirety of Defendant Jeffry’s investigation was captured clearly by her BWC, and the
footage from both Defendants’ BWCs is attached to both parties’ motions as video exhibits. See
ECF Nos. 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 5-5. The Court finds that it may properly consider this footage in assessing
Defendants’ qualified immunity defense for multiple reasons. The Complaint itself acknowledges
that Defendants’ BWCs capture d the entire investigation, Comp l. ¶ 22, and Plaintiff neither
contests the authenticity of the BWC video exhibits attached to Defendants’ motions nor disputes
the accuracy of the events depicted in them. In response to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff does not
provide any Rule 56(d) affidavi t specifying a need fo r discovery to contest Defendants’ video
evidence that her arrest was supported by probable cause. In her opposition brief, Plaintiff asserts
that she is entitled to discovery of the BWC footage of Defendant Jeffry’s full conversation with
her supervisor regarding probable cause, as well as of Defendant Jeffr y’s travel from Walgreens
to Agnew’s residence, before her investigatio n, ECF No. 14 at 29, but such footage would be
immaterial and far from “essent ial to [Plaintiff’s] opposition.” Pisano, 743 F.3d at 931 (citation
omitted). Probable cause is determined through a standard of objective reasonableness based on
the information known to the offi cer—not the officer’s own subjective asse ssment of probable
cause. See Graham v. Gagnon, 831 F.3d 176, 185 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Gray,
137 F.3d 765, 769 (4th Cir. 1998)) (“Because probable cause is an objective test, we examine the
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facts within the knowledge of a rresting officers to determine wh ether they provide a probability
on which reasonable and prudent persons would act; we do not examine the subjective beliefs of
the arresting officers to determine whether they thought that the facts constituted probable cause.”).
The complete scope of relevant information known to Defendants before Plaintiff was arrested and
her firearm was seized is captured in the BWC footage of Defendant Jeffry’s investigation, which
both parties have cited as vide o exhibits. Any conversation De fendant Jeffry had with her
supervisor would play no role in the analysis and could not possibly create a genuine dispute as to
whether probable cause supported Plaintiff’s arrest. What, if any, views either Defendant
expressed before the challenged seizures is immaterial to the question of whether the seizures were
supported by probable cause.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, there is no genuine dispute that Defendants had
probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had committed firs t-degree assault. Through her
investigation of the incident, Defendant Jeffry l earned that Plaintiff possessed a firearm and held
it and threatened to use it against Agnew when he approached her vehicle. Although Agnew
reported that Plaintiff held what appeared to be a taser in her left hand that she pointed in his
direction, and that he did not see a gun, ECF No. 5-3 at 01: 10–01:13, Plaintiff admitted to
Defendant Jeffry that she at least tried to “ma[ke] sure” Agnew saw the firearm in her right hand,
ECF No. 5-3 at 02:48–02:51. Plaintiff disputed portions of Agnew’s account, stating that she does
not own a taser and did not point anything at him, but her admission to taking up a firearm in her
right hand as Agnew approached intending that he see it is adequate to support a reasonable belief
that she used this weapon with the intent to place Agnew in apprehen sion of immediate bodily
harm. See ECF No. 5-2 at 08:59–09:01; ECF No. 5-3 at 02:08–02:14; ECF No. 14-4 at 3; ECF No.
14-5 at 4. Agnew reported to Defendant Jeffry that when he approached Plaintiff’s vehicle, she
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threatened to “put some bullets in [him,]” and, thereafter, he backed away from her vehicle while
putting his hands up. ECF No. 5-2 at 02:26–02:43.3 This report was more than sufficient to support
a reasonable belief that Agnew was aware of Plaintiff’s threat to shoot him and that Plaintiff’s
conduct placed Agnew in fear of being shot. In summary, it had been reported to Defendant Jeffry
that Plaintiff held a firearm with the intention that Agnew see it, had the apparent ability to cause
Agnew physical harm through use of the weapon, made a threatening statement sufficient to place
Agnew in apprehension of immediate harm, and intended to cause such apprehension. See ECF
No. 5-2 at 02:26–02:36; ECF No. 5-3 at 01:10– 01:13, 02:48–02:51. The fact s Defendant Jeffry
gathered about Plaintiff’s conduct a ligned with first-degree assault, see Rogers, 249 F.3d at 290,
and supported a “‘practical, nontec hnical’ probability” that Plaintiff had committed this crime,
Brown, 460 U.S. at 742.
Although allegations in the Complaint and st atements made on the BWC footage reflect
some degree of hesitation or am bivalence in Defendant Jeffry about charging Plaintiff with first-
degree assault in light of the competing accounts, see Compl. ¶ 20; ECF No. 5-3 at 05:44–06:03,
07:19–07:30, “probable cause is an objective standard,” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S.
48, 54 n.2 (2018), that does not turn on “the subjective beliefs of the arresting officers[,]” Smith v.
Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 2017). “Whether probable cause exists in a particular situation
. . . always turns on two factors in combination: the suspect’s conduct as known to the officer, and
the contours of the offense thought to be committed by that conduct.” Rogers, 249 F.3d at 290.
And the facts known to the office r are “viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable
police officer.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 56–57. Even vi ewing the facts in the in stant case in the light

3 In her statement of probable cause, Defendant Jeffry stated, based on her observation of the scene,
that if Plaintiff held her firearm toward the passe nger-side floorboard as she claimed, “Agnew would not
have . . . report[ed] seeing a weapon in [her] hand.” ECF No. 14-4 at 3. But, considering Plaintiff’s verbal
threat to shoot Agnew, he did not need to see the weapon to be placed in fear of immediate bodily harm.
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most favorable to Plaintiff, an objectively reasonable officer aw are of the information known to
Defendants could believe that Plaintiff committed first-degree assault by holding a firearm to place
Agnew “in apprehension of immediate bodily harm with the intent to caus e such apprehension.”
Harris, 728 A.2d at 184; see also Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-202(b)(2), (c). Defendants were
not “required to . . . resolve every doubt about [Plaintiff’s] guilt before” deciding that probable
cause existed to make an arrest. Brown, 460 U.S. at 730 (citation omitted). Moreover, because
probable cause is a “flexible” standard, Defenda nts were allowed to reassess any initial
impressions they had about Plaint iff and Agnew’s competing accounts, so long as the facts they
obtained supported a reasonable belief that Plaintiff committed a felony. Wadkins, 214 F.3d at 541
(citation modified); see also Dukore v. District of Columbia, 799 F.3d 1137, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(“The essence of probable cause is making close judgment calls based on of tentimes conflicting
information.”).4
The facts known to Defendant Jeffry supported probable cause to arrest Plaintiff; therefore,
the arrest was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It is also well establ ished that “if police
officers have probable cause to arre st, they may search suspects inci dent to that arrest to remove
any weapons that the arrestee may use.” United States v. Peebles , Crim. No. SAG-22-320, 2023
WL 6541250, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 5, 2023) (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338–39 (2009));
see also Brathwaite v. Georgiades, Civ. No. ABA-23-277, 2024 WL 5107230, at *8 (D. Md. Dec.

4 Plaintiff contends that probable cause for her arrest was lacking because she told Defendants she
was acting in self-defense when Agnew approached her car in a threatening manner. See ECF No. 14 at 16–
18, 24. But, by Agnew’s account, he did not present any threat to Plaintiff. According to Agnew, his genitals
were not exposed to Plaintiff when he answered the door, and when he approached Plaintiff’s vehicle, he
had his hands up in a non-threatening manner. ECF No. 5-2 at 01:30–02:32. “A police officer faced with
conflicting facts . . . does not necessarily lack probable cause for arrest simply because one party insists
that her version of the facts is correct—even if that party claims at the time that she acted in self-defense.”
McCoy v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, Civ. No. 15-398, 2016 WL 2992528, at *17 (E.D. La. May 24,
2016), aff’d, 714 F. App’x 322 (5th Cir. 2017).
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12, 2024), aff’d, No. 24-2230, 2025 WL 2437834 (4th Cir. Aug. 25, 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-
894, 2026 WL 795230 (2026) (granting defendants summary judgment on Fourth Amendment and
Article 26 claims for seizure of firearm where de fendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff).
Because Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights not to
be arrested and not to have her weapon seized without probable cause, Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity from any Fourth Amendment claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on
Plaintiff’s arrest and the seizure of her gun.
2. Counts I and II: Excessive Use of Force
In addition to challenging the probable cause in support of her arrest in Counts I and II,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants used excessive force against her in connection with her arrest.
Compl. ¶¶ 27, 33. The only apparent use of force by Defendants involved handcuffing her, which
Plaintiff contends was ti ght to the point of caus ing pain, and placing he r in the backseat of
Defendant Jeffry’s police vehicl e, the combination of which Plaintiff alleges aggravated
preexisting back injuries. Id. ¶¶ 16, 27, 33.
“[T]he Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from using force that is ‘excessive’ or
not ‘reasonable’ in the course of making an arrest.” Meyers v. Balt. Cnty., 713 F.3d 723, 732 (4th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). Cla ims of excessive force in
connection with an arrest are “properly anal yzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective
reasonableness’ standard,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 388, which “require s a careful balancing of the
nature and quality of the intrusion on the indi vidual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the
countervailing governmental interests at stake[,]” Est. of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Vill. of
Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, 899 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Smith v. Ray , 781 F.3d 95, 101 (4th Cir.
2015)). “Whether an officer’s actions . . . were objectively reasonabl e is ‘a pure question of law’
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for the court to determine.” Caraway v. City of Pineville, 111 F.4th 369, 381 (4th Cir. 2024); see
also Armstrong v. Hutcheson, 80 F.4th 508, 514 (4th Cir. 2023) (“ [I]n Fourth Amendment cases,
objective reasonableness is not a jury question—it is a question of law.”). Factors the court should
consider include (1) “the severity of the crime at issue”; (2) “the extent to which the suspect poses
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others”; and (3) “whether [the suspect] is
actively resisting arrest or attemp ting to evade arrest by flight.” Armstrong, 810 F.3d at 899
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). “In considering the re asonableness of an officer’s actions,
[courts] must consider the facts at the mome nt that the challenged force was employed.” Smith ,
781 F.3d at 101 (citing Henry, 652 F.3d at 531). But the court must also view the use of force “in
full context, with an eye to ward the proportionality of the force in light of all the
circumstances.” Armstrong, 810 F.3d at 899 (quoting Smith, 781 F.3d at 101).
Here, Plaintiff claims she experienced severe pain during her arrest and that her “tight”
handcuffing and transportation in the “cramped” backseat of Jeffry’s police vehicle exacerbated a
preexisting back condition for which she had recently had surgery. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 27, 33. It is well
known that “[h]andcuffing [of an arrestee’s] hands behind h[er] back . . . [is] a routine police
procedure[,]” Royster v. Nichols, 698 F.3d 681, 691–92 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Dunn v. Denk, 79
F.3d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1996)), “that ‘inevitably involves some use of force[.]’” Gilcher v. Smith,
No. 1:23-CV-00192-MR, 2024 WL 5112753, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 13, 2024) (quoting Wertish v.
Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir. 2006)). “[A] st andard procedure such as handcuffing
would rarely constitute excessive force where the officers were justified, as here, in effecting the
underlying arrest.” Brown v. Gilmore , 278 F.3d 362, 369 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Part III.A.1
supra (finding that Plaintiff’s arrest was justified by probable cause that she committed first-degree
assault).
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In an unpublished decision issued in June 2023, the Fourth Circuit determined that there is
no “robust consensus” that such conduct is “a clearly establis hed violation of the Fourth
Amendment[.]” Schoonover v. Clay Cnty. Sheriff's Dep’t, No. 20-1680, 2023 WL 4026091, at *6
(4th Cir. June 15, 2023) (quoting Jackson v. Lubelan, 657 F. App’x 497, 502 (6th Cir. 2016)).5 In
Schoonover, plaintiff-appellant Schoonover, whose le ft arm is amputate d, brought a Fourth
Amendment excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two deputy sheriffs. He alleged
that the deputies “used excessive force when they handcuffed his right wrist to his right ankle
during his arrest for several minor traffic violations.” Id. at *1. The district court found that the
deputies were protected by qualified immunity. Id. On appeal, Schoonover argued that the district
court erred because his “right not to be handc uffed wrist-to-ankle was clearly established.” Id. at
*4. In support, he relied on Sixth an d Eighth Circuit cases in which officers were made aware of
plaintiffs’ pre-existing injuries but nevertheless handcuffed them in ways likely to exacerbate those
injuries. Id. at *4–5. Schoonover also cited out-of-circuit district court decisions suggesting that
officers must consider know n injuries when handcuffing a non-threatening individual. Id. at *5.
The Fourth Circuit rejected these arguments and concluded that the district court cases did not
establish a “robust consensus” that Schoonover’s asserted right was clearly established. Id. at *5–
6. To the contrary, the court noted that other circuits have reached the opposite conclusion by
granting qualified immunity to officers who caused injury during handcuffing even when “aware
of the [arrestee’s] preexisting injury or complaints of pain or discomfort.” Id. at *6.

5 But see Gilcher, 2024 WL 5112753, at *6 (quoting Karn v. PTS of Am., LLC , 590 F. Supp. 3d
780, 819–20 (D. Md. 2022) (assessing Fourteenth Amendment excessive fo rce claims and finding that
“‘[u]nduly tight handcuffing’ . . . can constitute excessive force if the plaintiff is injured from the
handcuffing, and the defendant [officer] ignored the plaintiff’s complaints about the handcuffs”). This Court
cannot rely upon a finite set of district court decisions alone in determining whether there is a “clear” or
“robust” consensus among courts for purposes of a qualified immunity analysis. See Thompson, 878 F.3d
at 98; Schoonover, 2023 WL 4026091, at *6.
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Here, as noted supra, Plaintiff’s encounter with Defe ndants is captured in BWC footage
cited as video exhibits in both parties’ motions. See ECF Nos. 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 5-5. The Court finds
that it may properly consider th ese exhibits because, collectively, they depict the entirety of
Defendants’ conduct during their encounter with Plaintiff, including her arrest, handcuffing, and
transportation to the Towson precinct, as well as all relevant interactions preceding these events.
In response, Plaintiff does not dispute the authenticity of the BWC footage or the accuracy of the
events depicted therein. Nor does she provide a ny Rule 56(d) affidavit specifying a need for
discovery to dispute the events de picted in the video exhibits. Plaintiff does, however, argue that
the footage “does not capture [her] physical pain, emotional distress, or the full scope of the force
inflicted during handcuffing and transportation. ” ECF No. 14 at 9. She argues that “additional
discovery” is needed “to more full y develop the evidentiary record.” Id. Further, Plaintiff asks
“that the Court not rely solely on Defendants’ selected BWC clips to determine the nature and
degree of force used, or the extent of her injuries and pain [and] suffering.” Id.
The Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff ha s articulated a need fo r discovery to oppose
Defendants’ qualified immunity defense to her excessive force claims. What force Defendant
Jeffry used in placing handcuffs on Plaintiff, guiding her to the backseat of the police vehicle, and
transporting her to the precinct is fully depicted in Defendants’ video exhibits. Even if the BWC
footage does not depict the physical pain and emotional distress Plaintiff experienced, the Court
may proceed by “adopting . . . [P]laintiff’s version of the[se] facts[,]” to the extent her version of
events is not refuted or contradicted by the video evidence. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378
(2007)). In other words, the Court will assume, as Plaintiff states in her Complaint and affidavit,
that her handcuffs were tight enough to cause “great pain and agony to her wrists and back when
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coupled with . . . having to bend and be seated inside [Defendant Jeffry’s] cramped police car after
recent back surgeries.” Compl. ¶¶ 16, 68; see also ECF No. 14-1, ¶ 23.
Even assuming Plaintiffs’ asserted facts about her pain and injuries to be true, she fails to
establish that Defendants’ use of force in connection with her arre st violated clearly established
law. Considering the first Graham factor, the alleged crime of first-degree assault is a fairly serious
offense involving criminal use of a weapon and, therefore, may reasonably call for greater physical
restraint and use of force to effect an arrest than would be appropriate for a minor offense. See
Kopf v. Skyrm , 993 F.2d 374, 379 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[M]ore force may be reasonably used in
apprehending a violent criminal than a jaywalker.”); Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1198 (11th
Cir. 2002) (“[M]ore force is appropriate for a mo re serious offense and le ss force is appropriate
for a less serious one[.]”). As to the second and third Graham factors, viewed objectively, Plaintiff
did not pose an immediate threat to the safety of any officers, did not threaten the officers or anyone
else, did not resist arrest, and did not attempt to flee. See ECF Nos. 5-4 & 5-5. At all relevant times,
Plaintiff promptly complied with the officers’ instructions . Her conduct suggested that a high
degree of force was not necessary to effect her arrest. And the video evidence confirms that a high
degree of force was not used in connection with the arrest. At no point while being handcuffed did
Plaintiff give any indication, whet her verbally or non-verbally, that she was in pain or that the
handcuffs were too tight. Defendant Jeffry then guided Plaintiff as she took a seat in the backseat
of Defendant Jeffry’s police vehicle. At that point, Plaintiff stated, “This is so uncomfortable,” id.
at 09:21–09:24, but gave no indication that she was in pain or that either the handcuffs or the
backseat was what caused the degree of pain she now claims she experienced at the time. Based
on these facts, it cannot be said that Defendant Je ffry’s use of force in connection with the arrest
was objectively unreasonable.
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During the subsequent ten-minute ride to th e precinct, Plaintiff expressed pain and
discomfort in her back twice and referenced her pre-existing back condition on one of those
occasions. After riding for approximately three a nd a half minutes, Plaintiff stated, “oh my god,
and my back,” although the rest of her statement is inaudible from the BWC footage. Id. at 14:02–
14:06. Defendant Jeffry responded that she was trying to get Plaintiff to th e precinct quickly, to
which Plaintiff replied, “that’s oka y,” and Defendant Jeffry apologized. Id. at 14:06–14:08.
Approximately five minutes later, Plaintiff stated calmly, “I have rods in my back, these handcuffs
is tearing [them] up.” Id. at 19:28–19:33. Defendant Jeffry did not respond to this statement. They
reached the precinct approximately two minutes later, at which point Plaintiff thanked Defendant
Jeffry “for being kind to [her],” and Defendant Jeffry replied “of course.” Id. at 22:13–22:17. After
exiting the vehicle, the BWC footage shows Plai ntiff walking unassisted into the precinct and
sitting and removing her shoes, shoelaces, and be lt without any apparent issue or expression of
pain or discomfort. Id. at 22:25–22:57, 23:43–25:11, 25:35–25:44, 25:56–26:11, 26:56–27:16. As
explained supra, at the time of these events, there was neither binding precedent in this Circuit nor
a “robust consensus” among other ci rcuits establishing that a pol ice officer violates clearly
established law by “injuring an individual during handcuffing, even when the officer was aware
of the individual’s preexisti ng injury or complaints of pain or discomfort.” Schoonover , No. 20-
1680, 2023 WL 4026091, at *6. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claims.6

6 It is not entirely clear, but, in addition to th e Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff may be invoking her
right against excessive force under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Compl. ¶¶
27, 33. The Fourteenth Amendment, in relevant part, prohibits any state deprivation “of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Ingraham v. Wright , 430 U.S.
651, 672 (1977). The Due Process Clause “protects pretrial detainees from ‘governmental action’ that is
not ‘rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose’ or that is ‘excessive in relation to
that purpose.’” Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 608–09 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson,
576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015)). To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must generally show that “the use of force
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3. Counts I and II: Second Amendment Violation
In Counts I and II of the Compla int, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her rights
under the Second Amendment by seizi ng her firearm in connection wi th her arrest. Compl. ¶ 23.
The Second Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to [l awfully] keep and bear Arms.”
U.S. CONST. amend. II. “The right to ‘bear arms’ . . . in cludes a right to carry firearms in public
for self-defense.” United States v. Jackson, 152 F.4th 564, 568 (4th Cir. 2025) (citing N.Y. State
Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2022)). However, “the right secured by the
Second Amendment is not unlimited.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
Plaintiff fails to cite any binding authority that clearly established her right not to have her
firearm seized in conne ction with her arrest. 7 Courts have found that “s eizure of one particular
firearm d[oes] not [necessarily] interfere with [a n individual’s] Second Amendment interests[.]”
Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee , 751 F.3d 542, 571 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Fairbanks v.

was deliberate— i.e., purposeful or knowing”—and “that the force used was objectively unreasonable.”
Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396–97; see also Dilworth v. Adams, 841 F.3d 246, 255 (4th Cir. 2016).
To the extent that Plaintiff’s excessive force claims are based upon her handcuffing and placement
in Defendant Jeffry’s police vehicle, they are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment because the
use of force was in connection with an arrest. See Graham , 490 U.S. at 395 (“All claims that law
enforcement officers have used excessi ve force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its
‘reasonableness’ standard[.]”).
However, Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Jeffry “violated [her rights] when she forced
[Plaintiff] to be transported in the confines of a ve ry small cabin area of her police vehicle, causing an
exacerbation of Plaintiff’s pre-existing back injuries resulting from trauma and recent surgeries.” Compl. ¶
68. To the extent Plaintiff intends for this allegation to support a Fourteenth Amendment claim of excessive
force while in pretrial detention, the Court again finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
The video evidence does not depict any objectively unreasonable conduct by either Defendant. Moreover,
Plaintiff identifies no authority clearly establishing an arrestee’s right, based upon preexisting back injuries,
not to be transported in the backseat of a police vehicle while handcuffed, and the Court is unaware of any
such authority from the Fourth Circuit or the Supreme Court or any consensus on this issue among other
circuits. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on a ny Fourteenth Amendment
excessive force claim based on her transportation to the Towson precinct.
7 Insofar as Plaintiff asserts a more specific right under the Second Amendment not to have her
firearm seized when arrested without probable cause, th at right was not violated. As explained in Part
III.A.1 supra, Plaintiff’s arrest was supported by probable cause.
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O’Hagan, 255 F. Supp. 3d 239, 245 (D. Mass. 2017) (citation omitted) (“The Second Amendment
is not implicated by the seizure of individual firearms.”); Garcha v. City of Beacon, 351 F. Supp.
2d 213, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[T]he ‘ri ght to bear arms’ is not a ri ght to hold some particular
gun.”). The Supreme Co urt’s holding in Bruen that law-abiding citizens have a right to carry
firearms for self-defense, 597 U.S. at 9, did not disturb its holding in Heller that “the right secured
by the Second Amendment is . . . not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever[,]” 554
U.S. at 626. Consistent with that understanding, the Eighth Circuit “has held that even the unlawful
retention of specific firearms [by law enforc ement] does not violate the Second Amendment,
because the seizure of one firear m does not prohibit the owner fr om retaining or acquiring other
firearms.” Rodgers v. Knight, 781 F.3d 932, 941–42 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Walters v. Wolf, 660
F.3d 307, 317–18 (8th Cir. 2011)). Yet, as acknowle dged by the Seventh Circuit, “[w]hether and
to what extent the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess a particular gun . .
. is an issue that is just beginning to receive judicial attention.” Sutterfield , 751 F.3d at 571. This
Court is unaware of any decision from the Fourth Circuit or the Supreme Court squarely addressing
whether the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess a particular firearm and
not to have it seized in connection with an a rrest. Because Plaintiff cites no such authority,
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from any § 1983 claim asserting that right.8
4. Count III: Bystander Liability
Count III of the Complaint asserts a claim against Defendant McDowell for bystander
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff al leges that Defendant McDowell violated her
constitutional rights when he “ordered/commanded, endorsed, aided and abetted, co-Defendant

8 To the extent that Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ seizure of her weapon in connection with her
arrest violated her right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Compl. ¶¶ 27, 33, she fails to
identify any binding precedent that clearly established such a right. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity from any due process claim based on the seizure of her firearm.
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Jeffry to arrest Plaintiff without probable cause for [first- and second-degree] assault[,]” and when
he failed to uphold his “affirmative duty to inte rvene and protect the constitutional rights of
Plaintiff from infringement by co-Defendant Jeffry[.]” Compl. ¶¶ 36, 38, 41.
“The concept of bystander liability is prem ised on a law officer’s duty to uphold the law
and protect the public from illegal act s, regardless of who commits them.” Randall v. Prince
George’s Cnty., 302 F.3d 188, 203 (4th Cir. 2002). “To succeed on a theory of bystander liability,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that a law-enforcement officer ‘(1) [knew] that a fellow officer [was]
violating an individual’s constitutional rights; (2) ha[d] a reasona ble opportunity to prevent the
harm; and (3) cho[se] not to act.’” Stevenson v. City of Seat Pleasant, 743 F.3d 411, 417 (4th Cir.
2014) (quoting Randall, 302 F.3d at 204).
As discussed supra, there is no genuine dispute that Defendant Jeffry did not violate any
of Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional right s, and, therefore, she is entitled to qualified
immunity from Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. In the absence of any underlying violation of clearly
established law, Defendant McDowell is entitl ed to qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s § 1983
bystander liability claim.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity as to all of Plaintiff’s federal claims. Therefore, as to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims,
Defendants’ motion shall be granted and Plaintiff’s motion shall be denied.
B. Counts IV Through IX
In Counts IV through IX of the Complaint, Plaintiff brings various Maryland constitutional
and common law claims against Defendants. Becau se all parties are resi dents of Maryland, the
Court lacks original jurisdiction of Plaintiff’s state-law claims. A district court may exercise
supplemental jurisdiction of claims for which it lacks original jurisdiction if those claims “are so
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