govinfo:USCOURTS-laed-2_25-cv-00401-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
ALLISON BRIDGET JASPER CIVIL ACTION 
VERSUS NO. 25-401 
PLAQUEMINES PARISH 
GOVERNMENT, ET AL 
SECTION “B” (3) 
ORDER AND REASONS 
Before the Court are defendant Plaquemines  Parish Government’s ( “PPG”) Motion for 
Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 14), plaintiff Allison Bridget Jasper’s (“Jasper”) Opposition (Rec. 
Doc. 15), and PPG’s Reply (Rec. Doc. 16). Also before the Cou rt are Jasper’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 26), PPG’s Opposition (Rec. Doc. 31), and Jasper’s Reply (Rec. 
Doc. 32). For the following reasons,   
IT IS ORDERED that PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 14) on Jasper’s 
federal claims be GRANTED and that Jasper’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 26) on 
her federal claims be DENIED; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that remaining state  law claims are DISMISSED 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, by declin ing supplemental jurisdiction over same. See 28 U.S.C. § 
1367 (c)(3) (stating that a district co urt may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a 
claim if the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdictio n); see also Parker 
& Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Our general rule 
is to dismiss state law claims when the federal claims to which they are pendent are dismissed.”). 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2020, PPG’s financial resources were strained by the COVID -19 pandemic. Rec. Doc. 
14-2 at 1 . Facing a backlog of $3,029,522 in outstanding state court judgments  and the need to
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address the operational expenses of parish government, in October 2020, PPG passed Ordinance 
20-105 which instituted a program called the Judgment Settlement Process (“ JSP”) to pay and
resolve judgments against it. Id. The program allows claimants to receive a quicker payout if they 
accept a 50% reduction of the value of their judgment against PPG. Rec. Doc. 14-4 at 2.  A claimant 
can choose to opt out of the JSP and instead insist on full payment of their judgments; however, 
PPG will prioritize claimants who participate in the JSP while still acknowledging the existence 
of the debt owed to claimants who choose not to participate. Rec. Doc. 14-2.  
On April 13, 2022, the 2 5th Judicial D istrict Court rendered a judgment against PPG in 
favor of Jasper in the amount of $782,237.29. Rec. Doc. 14-2 at 2. PPG invited Jasper to participate 
in the JSP in order to expedite the payment of her judgment. Id . Jasper has declined this offer 
repeatedly. Id. Jasper states that she has outstanding medical bills in excess of $250,000.000 and 
is contracted to give her attorneys no less than 40% of the judgment award pursuant to a 
contingency fee agreement. Rec. Doc. 1 at 5. Because of these facts, Jasper states that accepting  
the JSP offer is  an impossibility because the amount she would be entitled to under the JSP is 
significantly less than her litigation expenses and the mechanics liens she has on the award. Id. 
Jasper also states that the Parish has not specified a timeframe for when the balance of her 
judgment would be paid. Id. She claims that “[i]t is only recently that [she] learnt that her wait was 
in vain and that she had zero chance of getting paid unless she participated in the Judgment 
Settlement Process.” Id. at 6. She further claims that PPG has a policy and practice of paying only 
those claimants that participate in the JSP. Id. at 6–7. However, as discussed during oral argument 
held on March 26, 2026, plaintiff’s judgment does not expire or become uncollectible, subject 
perhaps only to certification under state law every 10 years.  
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PPG states that JSP participants have been paid for the calendar years 2022 –2025, 
diminishing the number of outstanding judgment creditors  since 2020 from 36 to 11. Rec. D oc. 
14-2 at 2.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Jasper sued PPG on February 26, 2025. Rec. Doc. 1. She alleges that PPG’s policy “is to 
have people participate in the Judgement Settlement Process or not pay them at all.” Id . at 6. She 
notes that she has not been paid and that she has “zero chance” of being paid unless she becomes 
a JSP participant. Id. She brings several claims against PPG and unnamed government defendants, 
including taking her property without due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment; inflicting 
cruel and unusual punishment for refusing to pay the state court judgment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment; subjecting her to disparate treatment by refusing to pay non- JSP participants in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; a “color of law” claim pursuant to Section 1983; a civil 
conspiracy claim against PPG and unnamed government employees; negligence in their handling 
of the JSP process; tortious conduct for violating a duty to pay her. Id . at 9–27. She also requests 
punitive damages and expenses of litigation and attorneys’ fees. Id.  
On February 12, 2026, the parties attended a scheduling conference to discuss ongoing 
legal issues and prepare for trial. Rec. Doc. 23. Pursuant to that pretrial conference, the Court 
ordered Jasper to file a cross motion for summary judgment addressing only her federal 
constitutional issues rather than her state law claims. Id . Defendants were ordered to respond to 
Jasper’s motion for summary judgment, as well as to attach to their opposition affidavits 
addressing (1) settled claims, if any, that are paid without being subjected to the JSP and (2) all 
payments, if any, to non-participants of the JSP since the effective day of the ordinance 
establishing that program. Id. The Court also ordered the parties to attend an oral argument about 
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the cross motio ns for summary judgment on March 11, 2026, which the Court later moved to 
March 26, 2026. Id; see also Rec. Doc. 30. Jasper has filed her motion for summary judgment. 
Rec. Dc. 26. PPG has responded and attached to its response the requested affidavits. See Rec. 
Doc. 31. 
At the oral argument, the Court asked plaintiff’s counsel to distinguish several cases 
identified as applicable here, including the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Cooper v. Orleans Parish School Board, 99-0050 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/9/99), 742 So.2d 55, in which 
the court found no  Equal Protection violation in a school board program that established a 
hierarchy or priority system for the payment of state court tort judgments because of insufficient 
funding; and the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Ariyan  v. Sewarage & Water Board of New Orleans, 
29 F.4th 226 (5th Cir. 2022), in which the court, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Folsom v. 
City of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285 (1883), held that a government entity’s failure to timely pay a 
state court judgment does not const itute a Fifth Amendment violation.  Plaintiff’s counsel argued 
that the challenged discounts in Cooper were in increments of five or ten percent and that claimants 
had the option to choose by how much they wanted to discount their state court judgment, as 
opposed to the categorical fifty percent reduction challenged in the above -captioned matter. 
Plaintiff’s counsel also attempted to distinguish the above-captioned matter from Ariyan by aruing 
that the ordinance creating the JSP is “ completely silent” as to creditors who do not opt in and 
provides no mechanism or plan that would make payment foreseeable to that class of claimants. 
Plaintiff’s counsel also acknowledged during oral argument that no summary judgment 
evidence was introduced supporting Jasper’s causes of action or disputing PPG’s arguments. When 
confronted with PPG’s affidavits, plaintiff’s counsel could not contest the information contained 
therein or show that such infor mation was fasle. P laintiff’s counsel also conceded that Jasper ’s 
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Eighth Amendment claim should have been framed as a First Amendment retaliation claim 
and argued that the basi s fo r that claim was that PPG was in effect punishing claimants who 
exercised their First Amendment rights by refusing to pay them without participating in the JSP.  
During their argument, defense counsel highlighted that Jasper is seeking to expand the 
litigation by adding federal claims that were not included in her complaint. Defense counsel also 
argued that the point of amendment had passed and that Jasper had not shown good cause for filing 
an amended complaint. Further, defense counsel continued to highlight that Jasper had not 
introduced any evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact.  
In response to whether PPG could have considered other payment plans, defense counsel 
stated that there was no evidence in the record about this topic , nor any suggestion that 
PPG chose not to accept more reasonable alternatives. Counsel added that Ordinance 
20-105 is silent about the COV ID-19 pandemic and that the reasons justifying the JSP continue 
to be financial inability to pay full value of claims in relevant years after the pandemic’s end.   
III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, interrogatory answers, 
and admissions, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see 
also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). Material in support or opposition of a 
motion for summary judgment may be considered if it is “capable of being ‘presented in a form 
that would be admissible in evidence.’” LSR Consulting, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 835 F.3d 
530, 534 (5th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)). Courts view all 
facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non- moving party, but “refrain from making 
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credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide 
Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008). 
Where the movant bears the burden of proof, it must “demonstrate the absence of a genuine 
issue of material fact” using competent summary judgment evidence. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 
However, “where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point 
to an absence of evidence.” Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994). 
Should the movant meet its burden, the burden shifts to the non- movant, who must show by 
“competent summary judgment evidence” that there is  a genuine issue of material fact. See 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Lindsey , 16 
F.3d at 618. Accordingly, conclusory rebuttals of the pleadings are insufficient to avoid summary
judgment. Bargher v. White , 928 F.3d 439, 444 –45 (5th Cir. 2019). Additionally, “conclusory 
allegations, denials, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, speculation, and legalistic 
argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine factual  issue for 
trial.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). There is no genuine issue of 
material fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, no 
reasonable trier of fact could find for the non- moving party, thus entitling the moving party to 
judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Amedisys, 298 F.3d 434, 440 (5th Cir. 2002). 
B. Analysis
i. PPG’
 s Motion for Summary Judgment
It should be noted at the outset that there are no genuine disputes of material fact. Jasper
has not introduced into the record any evidence in support of her claims or to create a material 
factual dispute.  As established at the February 2026 pretrial conference  and March 2026 oral 
argument, Jasper had not engaged in any discovery in furtherance of her claims against PPG. 
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Jasper raises the following claims: (1) an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment; (2) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and (3) 
discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Rec. Doc. 1. The Court can 
immediately dispose of Jasper’s Eighth Amendment claim. The Eighth Amendment applies to 
punishments, and typically punishments inflicted pursuant to the criminal process. See, e.g., 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664–668 (1977). The Supreme Court has articulated a two-part 
test for determining whether a legislative act constitutes punishment: (1) whether the intention of 
the legislature was to impose punishment and, if not (2) whether the statutory scheme is so punitive 
either in purpose or  effect as to negate [the State’s] intention to deem it ‘civil.’” Smith v. Doe, 
538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003). Jasper posits in her complaint that “requiring her to give up half the face 
value of her judgment as well as waive statutory additions is a form of punishment subject to 
scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment standards” but does not develop this argument in her 
opposition to PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in her own Motion for Summary 
Judgment. See Rec. Docs. 15, 26. In fact, Further, the Eighth Amendment claim does not relate to 
a First Amendment violation . As such, PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment in seeking 
dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim is GRANTED. 
Jasper further claims a deprivation of property, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, 
because of PPG’s refusal to pay her money pursuant to the state court judgment she received. 
Rec. Doc. 1 at 9. She clarif ies that PPG deliberately withheld all payments to fo rce her to 
relinquish half the value of her state court judgment, rather than for neutral reasons. Rec. Doc. 
15 at 5. But Jasper does not provide evidence counter to PPG's financial instability . She  
conclusively states that whether PPG’s actions were “r ational, arbitrary, or coercive presents a 
classic factual dispute” but does not develop that argument with evidentiary support. Id.  
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Moreover, Jasper’s arguments are foreclosed by existing precedent . Over a century ago, 
the Supreme Court decided a similar case in Folsom v. City of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285 (1883). 
In that case, relators who had obtained state court judgments against the City of New Orleans were 
prevented from collecting on their judgments because of a new state constitution which restricted 
New Orleans’ ability to impose taxes and limited funds to the city’s existing expenses. 109 U.S. 
at 287. In rejecting the relators ’ Fourteenth Amendment challenge, the Supreme Court held that 
though the relators’ state court judgments were property, the y “cannot be said to be deprived of 
them so long as they continue an existin g liability against the city” rather than an immediate right 
to payment. Id. at 289. That principle has been consistently maintained in subsequent decisions, 
see, e.g., Minton v. St. Bernard Par. Sch. Bd., 803 F.2d 129,  132 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that a 
school board’s failure to timely pay plaintiff’s judgment is not a denial of due process because 
Folsom recognized that “the property right created by a judgment against a government entity is not 
a right to payment at a p articular time” but merely recognition of existing debt); see also Ariyan, 
Inc. v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 29 F.4th 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2022) (r ejecting 
plaintiff’s Fo urteenth Amendment claim for similar reasons). Similarly, while Jasper has an 
outstanding and valid state court judgment, she does not have a right to force PPG to 
immediately pay that judgment, but only for PPG to continue to recognize its existing debt to 
her—w hich it has. As such, PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Jasper’s Fifth Amendment 
claim is GRANTED.  
Jasper also appears to assert Equal Protection claims in violation of the Fou teenth 
Amendment. Rec. Doc. 1. She challenges the classif ication that the Ordinan ce cr eates between 
persons who participate in the JSP, and receive payment, and those who refuse to participate in the 
JSP, and do not receive any payment or a payment schedule. Id. at 6, 27. She argues that her claim 
is not about delay but instead intentional discrimination. Rec. Doc. 15 at 5. However, in opposing 
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PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Jasper has not identified a suspect class or explained 
whether the JSP or its administration infringes upon a fundamental right. Id . As such, the 
appropriate standard for reviewing discriminatory conduct is “rational basis review” which is more 
deferential to government classifications. See, e.g., Cooper v. Orleans Parish School Board, 99-
0050 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/8/99), 742 So. 2d 55.  
Jasper acknowledges that rational basis review applies, see Rec. Doc. 15 at 5, but states 
that rational basis does not permit summary judgment where “evidence supports a finding of 
intentional and disparate treatment lacking a legitimate governmental justification.” Id. However, 
there is no factual or legal support  for a finding of “intentional and disparate treatment lacking a 
legitimate governmental justification.” She relies on an allegation that she was treated differently 
without legitimate justification. But merely pointing to allegations is not sufficient in opposing 
summary judgment. See, e.g., Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 85 F.3d 253, 261 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(“The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show the existence of a genuine fact issue for trial; 
however, the nonmovant may not rest upon allegations in the pleadings to make such a showing.”). 
She has not introduced evidence — and therefore has not created a genuine dispute of material 
fact—t hat PPG’s enactment of the Ordinance and reliance on classifications between participants 
and non-participants in the program, is not rationally related to its fiscal goals .  
In fact, the program challenged here is like the  one in Cooper v. Orleans Parish School 
Board, 99-0050 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/8/99), 742 So. 2d 55, in which the court denied plaintiffs’  Equal 
Protection challenge to the Orleans Parish School B oard’s program to delay payments to certain 
state court judgment creditors because of insufficient funding. That court noted that legislation “is 
presumed to be valid, and will be sustained as long as the classification drawn by the statute is 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” 742 So. 3d at 59. The Cooper court held that it 
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could not “say that there is no rational basis for the discount categorizations related to legi timate 
government objectives.” Id. at 62.  Subs equent decisions have continually relied on Cooper in 
rejecting challenges wherein plaintiff demands a quicker payout of their state court judgment. See, 
e.g., Bennett v. City of New Orleans, No. CIV.A 03-912, 2004 WL 60316, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 9. 
2004) (applying Cooper  in stating that the City of New Orleans had a rational basis for paying 
federal court judgments before state court judgments); see also  Davis v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd.,  
No. CIV.A 04-3511, 2005 WL 2037369 (E.D. La. Aug. 18, 2005) ( applying Cooper in rejecting 
plaintiff’s assertion that the school board’s refusal to pay negotiated settlement amount unless 
plaintiff agrees to a substantial reduction of the negotiated amount  violated the Equal Protection 
Clause). Given these precedents, Jasper’s Equal Protection claim is unavailing.  
Jasper argues that relian ce on Cooper is “misplaced” because there was evidence 
showing that the defendant municipality had insufficient funds to satisfy state tort 
judgments. Rec. Doc. 26-1 at 14. However, PPG's position is based on un-rebutted relevant 
evidentiary support. See Rec. Docs. 14-3 thru 4 and 31-1 thru 3.  No support is offered to “negate 
every conceivable basis which might support” the Ordinance. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas 
Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 945 F.3d 206, 225 (5th Cir. 2019).  Though rational basis is “fact 
intensive,” it “places no affirmative evidentiary burden on the government, [but] plaintiffs may 
nonetheless negate a seemingly plausible basis for the law by adducing evidence of irrationality.” 
Id. at 225. Jasper has not shown such evidence outside of her general allegations. See, e.g., Triple 
Tee Golf, 85 F.3d at 261 (noting that the non- movant may not rest upon their own allegations in 
showing a genuine fact issue for trial).  
Per above-noted evidentiary support for reducing a backlog of outstanding state court 
judgment and meet the operational needs of the parish, the Court finds that PPG’s means of doing 
so—the JSP program—a t the very least satisfies rational basis review. Plaintiff has not shown
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that PPG’s  current program is irrational or unconstitutionally discriminatory , as 
explained by Ordinance 20-105 and PPG’s affidavits establishing why settlements are 
treated differently than state court judgments as well as differential treatment between 
participants and non-participants, see Rec. Docs. 31-1; 31-2, .  
For the reasons provided, PPG’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Jasper’s Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection claim is GRANTED. 
ii. Jasper’s Motion for Summary Judgment
 At best, rather than addressing the claims in the complaint, Jasper basically seeks 
summary judgment on claims that were not raised in the complaint, including (1) a First 
Amendment claim for denial of access to court or for retaliation for exercising her right;1 (2) a 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim based on distinction between judgment 
creditors who choose not to participate in the JSP and claimants who settle with PPG without 
obtaining a judgment; (3) any Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim based on 
infringement of her First Amendment rights; (4) a claim for unconstitutional vagueness; and (5) 
a separation of powers claim that the Ordinance usurps judicial power because it prevents the 
courts from providing enforceable judgments. See Rec. Doc. 26-1 at 3, 8, 16, 19, and 22.  
 Despite Jaspers arguments to the contrary, see Rec. Doc. 3 2, none of these claims were  
included in her complaint. Jasper argues that PPG had notice of these claims because th e parties 
1 Jasper mentions the First Amendment once in her complaint and does not put any party on notice about the specific 
claim being asserted.  
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participated in a pretrial conference wherein the Court “explicitly identified, explored, and 
expanded upon the legal and factual issues that now form the basis of [Jasper’s] Motion for 
Summary Judgment.” Rec. Doc. 32 at 4. Jasper continues that “the Court  ordered cross-motions 
for summary judgment on these very issues.” But to the extent that Jasper argues  that the Court 
expanded her legal claims and directed her to file a summary judgment motion on new claims, she 
is mistaken. In its Minute Entry for the pretrial conference, the Court “instructed the parties that 
the legal issues will be focused on plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims and not related state law 
claims.” Rec. Doc. 23. That was not an invitation to expand the legal issues under consideration, 
but to get full briefing on the federal constitutional claims that Jasper had already introduced. 
PPG argues that the newly asserted claims should be dismissed. Rec. Doc. 31 at 5. In 
support, it cites case law, including Grant v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, No. CV 22- 66, 2024 
WL 4216041 (E.D. La. Sept. 17, 2024), which held that a represented plaintiff, failing to move 
earlier to amend her complaint to assert new causes of action, forfeited the newly raised claims. 
Jasper responds that she should be allowed to amend her complaint and reurge her motion. Rec. 
Doc. 32 at 9. She cites Lewis v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 996 F. Supp. 2d 450. 458 (M.D. La. 
2014), which held that under Fifth Circuit precedent, a “district court should construe [a newly 
raised] claim as a motion to amend the complaint under Rule 15(a).” Lewis , however, cited Riley 
v. Sch. Bd. Union Par., 379 F. App’x 335, 341 (5th Cir. 2010), which recognizes that construing a
newly added claim as a motion to amend is “particularly true where, as here, the litigant is pro se 
and has not yet made any amendments to her complaint.” Other courts within this circuit have 
recognized that courts have discretion to decline to consider a claim first asserted in a motion for 
summary judgment. See, e.g., Garza v. City of La Porte, 160 F. Supp. 3d 986, 993 (S.D. Tex. 2016) 
(holding that newly added state law claims raised for first time in plaintiff’s motion for summary 
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judgment were not properly before the Court since “a party cannot use a motion for summary 
judgment to raise new claims”). 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend pleadings “shall be 
freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Rule 15 “evinces a bias in favor of 
granting leave to amend.” Matter of Southmark Corp., 88 F.3d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 1996). However, 
the decision to grant leave to amend is within the decision of the district court and is not automatic. 
Id. In deciding whether to grant leave to amend, the court may consider factors such as undue 
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the  movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies 
by amendments previously allowed undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of 
amendment. Id. at 314–15. In determining undue delay, a court may look to “whether the movant 
has explained the delay, and whether the movant knew the facts underlying the amended complaint 
at the time the complaint was filed.” Id. at 315–16. 
Jasper argues that she should be allowed to amend her complaint because “there has been 
no prior request to amend, no bad faith, and the proposed amendment is not futile, as it would 
clarify and expand factual allegations already discussed in the pretrial conference.” Rec. Doc. 32 
at 10. Notably, Jasper does not address another basis upon which a court can deny a motion for 
leave to amend: undue inexcusable delay. As stated, when rejecting a request for leave to amend, 
a court can consider whether a movant has explained its delay in moving and whether the movant 
knew of the facts underlying its amended complaint at the time its original complaint was filed. 
Matter of Southmark Corp., 88 F.3d at 315–16. The facts of this case remain as they were when 
Jasper first filed her complaint on February 26, 2025. Rec. Doc. 1. Jasper has known that 
amendment to pleadings were due no later than July 3, 2025. Rec. Doc. 11. Oral argument was 
held on March 26, 2026, and Jasper requested leave to file an amended complaint only three days 
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prior. Rec. Docs. 30, 32. Because Jasper is represented and has had ample time to file an amended 
complaint, but has not, her late request to do so constitutes undue delay and will be rejected. 
Moreover, and notwithstanding our wishes for a fairer result, it would be futile to allow the 
amendment in view of express authorities cited above th at rejected similar attacks on 
governmental efforts to achieve reasonable balance between fiscal responsibilities to maintain 
operations and yet achieve satisfaction, albeit partially, with valid claims against it. 
The lateness and futility of newly asserted federal claims require denial of plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment over such claims.  As noted earlier, supplemental jurisdiction 
over remaining state law claims is rejected, leading to dismissal without prejudice of the state 
based claims.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 31st day of March 2026 
_______________________________________ 
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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