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Opinion

govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_22-cv-02418-1

U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland · 2026-04-07

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:52:04

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND  
 
 * 
WILSON & WILSON, INC. d/b/a * 
WILSON|WILSON, et al., * 
 * 
Plaintiffs, * 
 * Civ. No. MJM-22-2418 
 v. * 
 * 
PONTIAC DRYWALL SYSTEMS, INC. * 
d/b/a PDSI CONTRACTORS, * 
 * 
Defendants. * 
 *      
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
   
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff Wiley & Wilson, Inc., d/b/a Wiley|Wilson (“WW”), initiate d this civil action 
against defendant Pontiac Drywall Systems Inc., d/b/a PDSI Contractors (“PDSI”). PDSI retained 
the law firm of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP (the “Law Firm”) as its representation. 
This matter is before the Court on two contes ted motions filed by the Law Firm—a Motion for 
Leave to Withdraw as Counsel of Record, ECF No. 72, and a Motion for Leave to File Defense 
Counsel’s Reply Under Seal and Ex Parte, ECF No. 76. These motions are fully briefed, and no 
hearing is necessary to resolve them. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons set forth 
below, the Court shall grant both motions. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On the recommendation of its prior counsel in this matter, in February 2023, PDSI 
contacted the Law Firm to discuss its legal services and fees. ECF No. 74-1 (Travis Aff.), ¶ 9; ECF 
No. 75 (Law Firm Reply) at 3.               
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    Following this agreement, the Law Firm provided PDSI “an initial [budget] 
estimate” of $190,000. ECF No. 74-2 (PDSI Ex. 2); see also ECF No. 74-1, ¶¶ 10, 24; ECF No. 
74 (PDSI Opp’n) at 4; ECF No. 75 at 4. PDSI understood this to be “the maximum [the Law Firm] 
would charge for the [anticipat ed] scope of work[,]” ECF No. 74-1, ¶ 11, but recognized “that 
there could be unpredictable and unforeseen events that might increase the [b]udget,” id. ¶ 12. 
               
              
               
             
                   
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Following this second engagement agreement,
 on April 11, 2023, attorney Michael Brown 
entered his appearance as counsel on behalf of PDSI. ECF No. 19. While Brown was PDSI’s initial 
point of contact at the Law Fi rm, two other attorneys worked on the case: Nathan Hartland and 
Thuc-Doan Phan. ECF No. 74-1, ¶ 14. Hartland served as the lead  attorney and was primarily 
assisted by Phan, id., who entered her appearance on behalf of PDSI on August 7, 2023, ECF No. 
25. About a year into the Law Firm’s representation of PDSI, Brown indicated that Hartland would 
need to be replaced as the lead attorney, as he  “was not a good fit for [t he matter].” ECF No. 74-
1, ¶ 15. PDSI’s case was then transitioned from Hartland and Phan to attorneys Matthew Sturtz 
and Joel Jordan, id. ¶ 16, who entered their appearances on behalf of PDSI on April 23, 2024, ECF 
Nos. 37 & 38. 
               
             
              PDSI has failed to make any 
payment on the Law Firm’s out
standing invoices since January 2025. ECF No. 72-2 (Law Firm 
Ex. A); ECF No. 72-3 (Law Firm Ex. B). Upon wr iting to PDSI to communicate its intent to 
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withdraw as its counsel, the Law Firm expressed that there “now exists irreconcilable differences 
between [it and PDSI] that would make it impossible for [the Law Firm] to continue on as counsel 
in this matter.” ECF No. 72-3 (Law Firm Ex. B).  
As of January 5, 2026, PDSI has paid the Law Firm $380,733.19 in legal fees and expenses 
related to this matter. ECF No. 74-1, ¶ 19. PDSI a sserts that it “is not aware of any unpredictable 
or unforeseen events that have occurred in th[e ] case that would account fo r the . . . extra legal 
expenses charged by . . . [the Law Firm],” and th at it “cannot afford to retain new counsel.” Id. ¶ 
20. 
On December 23, 2025, the Law Firm moved to withdraw its appear ance as counsel for 
PDSI. ECF No. 72. PDSI responde d in opposition, ECF No. 74, and th e Law Firm subsequently 
replied, ECF No. 75. The Law Firm filed a motion for leave to file its reply brief under seal and ex 
parte. ECF No. 76. Again, PDSI responded in opposition, ECF No. 77, and the Law Firm 
subsequently replied, ECF No. 78. 
II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE REPLY UNDER SEAL AND EX PARTE 
In its motion seeking leave to file its reply under seal and ex parte, the Law Firm points 
out that its reply in support of its motion to withdraw contains information concerning its attorney-
client relationship with PDSI that does not affect the underlying merits of the case and could place 
PDSI at a disadvantage in this litigation. ECF No. 76, ¶ 3. The Law Firm asserts that “[t]here are 
no alternatives to fi ling under seal and ex parte that would provide suffi cient protection to the 
interests of PDSI and . . . [the Law Firm].” Id. ¶ 5.  
In “limited opposition” to the Law Firm’s sealing motion, PDSI argues that the Law Firm’s 
failure to file a memorandum in support of its motion to withdraw violated Local Rule 105.11, and 
that the Law Firm now seeks to file a reply memorandum in support of its motion to withdraw 
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despite never previously fili ng any supporting memorandum. ECF No. 77 at 1. This argument 
needlessly elevates form over substance and is summarily rejected. The Law Firm was able to state 
concisely its reasons supporting its withdrawal without any substantive need for a separate 
memorandum. To be certain, the Law Firm’s failu re to place its reasons for withdrawal in a 
separate memorandum did not prejudice PDSI in any way.  
Although it does not oppose sealing the Law Fi rm’s reply, PDSI que stions whether the 
Law Firm has satisfied Local Rule 105.11, which requires a party to provide “proposed reasons 
supported by specific factual representations to justify the sealing” and “an explanation why 
alternatives to sealing would not provide sufficient protection.” ECF No. 77 at 4. The Court finds 
that the Law Firm’s reasons are adequate to justify sealing.  
Accordingly, the Law Firm’s sealing motion shall be granted. 
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL 
A. Standard of Review 
Local Rule 101.2 provides the following: 
[The] appearance of counsel [repre senting a corporation] may be 
withdrawn only with leave of cour t and if (1) appearance of other 
counsel has been entered, or (2 ) withdrawing counsel files a 
certificate stating (a) the name a nd last known address of both the 
client and the resident agent or other responsible person or persons 
for that client, and (b) that the wr itten notice has been mailed to or 
otherwise served upon the client at least seven (7) days previously 
advising the client of counsel’s proposed withdrawal and notifying 
it that it must have new counsel enter an appearance or be subject to 
the dismissal of its claims and/or default judgment on claims against 
it. 
Loc. R. 101.2(b). If no new counsel enters an appearance within thirty days of the filing of a motion 
to withdraw, “the Court may take such action, if any, that it deems appropriate, including granting 
the motion to withdraw and dismissing any affirmative claim for relief asserted by the party and/or 
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directing the party to show cause  why a default should not be ente red on claims asserted against 
it.” Id. 
“The Local Rules also adopt Maryland’s Rules of Professional Conduct, . . . which impose 
additional limitations on withdrawal.” Remsnyder v. MBA Mortg. Servs., Inc. , Civ. No. CCB-19-
492, 2023 WL 7166353, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 31, 2023) (citing Loc. R. 704 (D. Md. 2025)). 
According to the state’s rules,  
an attorney may withdraw from representing a client if: 
(1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect 
on the interests of the client; 
(2) the client persists in a course  of action involving the attorney’s 
services that the attorney reasonably believes is criminal or 
fraudulent; 
(3) the client has used the attorney’s services to perpetrate a crime or 
fraud; 
(4) the client insists upon action or inaction that the attorney 
considers repugnant or with which the attorney has a fundamental 
disagreement; 
(5) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the attorney 
regarding the attorney’s services  and has been given reasonable 
warning that the attorney will w ithdraw unless the obligation is 
fulfilled; 
(6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden 
on the attorney or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the 
client; or 
(7) other good cause for withdrawal exists. 
Md. Rule 19-301.16(b). “[F]ailure to satisfy one of the [above] subparts is not fatal to [a counsel’s 
withdrawal] motion.” Remsnyder, 2023 WL 7166353 at *3 n.3. Additionally, 
[c]omments 7 and 8 to [Rule 19-301 .16(b)] are . . . relevant. They 
state: 
[7] A lawyer may withdraw from representation in some 
circumstances. The lawyer has the option to withdraw if it can be 
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accomplished without material ad verse effect on the client’s 
interests . . . . 
[8] A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms 
of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement 
concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting the 
objectives of the representation. 
Al-Sabah v. Agbodjogbe, Civ. No. ELH-17-730, 2019 WL 1472585, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 3, 2019) 
(quoting Md. Rule 19-301.16, cmts. 7 & 8). 
When evaluating a motion for withdrawal, courts must “consider the potential prejudice to 
all parties involved and the potent ial disruption to the administration of just ice from attorney 
withdrawal. If there is an impending trial or ot her key proceeding, failure to pay fees may not 
justify withdrawal.” Abbott v. Gordon, Civ. No. DKC 09-0372, 2010 WL 4183334, at *3 (D. Md. 
Oct. 25, 2010) (citation omitted). “The court may nevertheless order an attorney to continue 
representation notwithstanding a showing of good cau se for withdrawal.” Remsnyder, 2023 WL 
7166353, at *2 (citing Md. Rule 19-301.16(c)). At bottom, a motion to wit hdraw is committed to 
the district court’s discretion. Id. at 1 (citation omitted). 
B. Analysis 
The Law Firm’s motion to w ithdraw satisfies the require ments of Local Rule 101.2. The 
Law Firm argues, inter alia, that the Court should grant its motion to withdraw because PDSI 
failed to pay fees as required under the engagement agreement,      
                 
              
            Th e Law Firm also argues that P DSI’s failure 
to pay fees, coupled with its negative portrayal of the Law Firm to the Court, has caused irreparable 
damage to the attorney-client relationship such that withdrawal is necessary. ECF No. 75 at 2, 14. 
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PDSI counters that it has fulfilled its financia l obligations to the Law Firm by paying it over 
$380,000, which is twice as much as the Law Firm estimated its legal serv ices would cost. ECF 
No. 74 at 11–12. PDSI also stresses that it cannot affo rd to retain new counsel in this matter and 
thus granting the Law Firm’s motion would be a “great miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 15. 
Maryland’s Rules of Professional Conduct allow for attorney withdrawal where “the client 
fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the attorney regarding the attorney’s services and has 
been given reasonable warning that the attorney will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled[,]” 
and where “the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the attorney or 
has been rendered unreasonably di fficult by the client.” Md. Ru le 19-301.16(b)(5)–(6). “Courts 
routinely permit attorney withdrawal where clients fail to pay fees in accordance with the terms of 
engagement.” Abbott, 2010 WL 4183334, at *2 (citing cases). “Where a client’s failure to pay fees 
is accompanied by other manifestations of deterioration in the attorney-client relationship, the 
justification for withdrawal increases.” Id. at *3. 
The circumstances here weigh strongly in favor of allowing the Law Firm to withdraw. 
                 
                  
               
                   
              PDSI   
              , and suggests in its  
opposition brief that it will not make additional payments for the Law Firm’s representation in this 
case. ECF No. 74 at 12–13. Thus, PDSI has failed to fulfill obligations to the Law Firm regarding 
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its services and “has been given reasonable warning that the [Law Firm] will withdraw unless the 
obligation is fulfilled[.]” Md. Rule 19-301.16(b)(5).  
PDSI’s accusations—that the Law Firm used this matter “as a trai ning experience for 
younger associates,” ECF No. 74 at 11, treated PDSI as though it had an “open checkbook,” id. at 
13, and misled PDSI regarding the $190,000 budge t estimate, ECF No. 74-1, ¶ 11—support the 
Law Firm’s contention that the attorney-client relationship has irreparably broken down. PDSI’s 
insistence that it has a “good wo rking relationship” with the Law Firm is not borne out by the 
record and does not outweigh th e circumstances supporting withdr awal. ECF No. 74 at 14.  In 
sum, “the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the [Law Firm] [and] 
has been rendered unreasonably difficult by [PDSI.]” Md. Rule 19-301.16(b)(6). The Court will 
not require the Law Firm to co ntinue representation of PDSI under these circum stances or to 
provide its services for free.  
The Court acknowledges that the Law Firm’s withdrawal may burden PDSI by requiring 
it to obtain new counsel, but the Law Firm’s withdrawal will not have a “material adverse effect” 
on PDSI’s interests. See Md. Rule 19-301.16(b)(1). A trial date has not yet been set in this case, 
nor is there any other key procee ding presently scheduled in the case. PDSI has been afforded a 
reasonable period of time to obtain new counsel. Therefore, the La w Firm will be permitted to 
withdraw. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Law Firm’s Mo tion for Leave to Wit hdraw as Counsel of 
Record (ECF No. 72) and Motion for Leave to File Defense Counsel’s Reply Under Seal and Ex 
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Parte (ECF No. 76) are GRANTED. PDSI is directed to have new counsel enter their appearance 
no later than May 7, 2026.1 
A separate Order will issue. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
Date      Matthew J. Maddox      
United States District Judge 
 
1 The Court understands that counsel who filed responses in opposition to the Law Firm’s motions 
on PDSI’s has entered his appearance for this limited pur pose. If counsel is retained to represent PDSI in 
the underlying litigation, he shall promptly notify the Court. 
April 7, 2026
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