govinfo:USCOURTS-kywd-1_25-cv-00015-1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
BOWLING GREEN DIVISION 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-CV-00015-GNS-HBB 
 
 
KEVIN L. SWINCHER; and  
DAWN SWINCHER PLAINTIFFS 
 
v. 
 
FAY SERVICING, LLC et al. DEFENDANTS 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion to Remand (DN 26) and 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend (DN 30).  The motions are ripe for adjudication.  
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CLAIMS 
Plaintiffs Kevin and Dawn Swincher (collectively, “the Swinchers”) allege that Defendants 
Fay Servicing, LLC, (“Fay”) and Caliber Home Loans, Inc.  (“Caliber”) acted unlawfully and 
negligently in servicing the Swinchers’ mortgage loan.  (Compl. ¶ 1, DN 1 -1).  The Swinchers 
filed suit in Kentucky state court, and Fay removed to federal court.  (Compl; Notice Removal, 
DN 1).  The Swinchers, proceeding pro se, moved to remand.  (Pls.’ Mot. Remand, DN 11).  This 
Court denied that motion.  (Mem. Op. & Order, DN 22).  The Swinchers have now filed a renewed 
motion to remand and a motion to amend.  (Pls.’ Renewed Mot. Remand, DN 26; Pls.’ Mot. Leave 
Amend, DN 30). 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Renewed Motion to Remand 
A defendant may remove “any civil action brought in a State  court of which the district 
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).  Thus, for an 
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action to be eligible for removal, it must meet the requirements for either federal question 
jurisdiction or diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.  See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 
(2006).   
If a federal court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a case, it must remand 
the case to state court.  28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).  As the removing part y, Fay bears the burden of 
establishing the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute.  See Long v. Bando Mfg. of 
Am., Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 757 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province 
of Ont. v. City of Detroit , 874 F.2d 332, 339 (6th Cir. 1989)); Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. 
Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 40 4 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 
(1992)).  Courts strictly construe the requirements for removal jurisdiction and resolve any doubt 
of jurisdiction in favor of remand.  See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets , 313 U.S. 100, 104, 
108-09 (1941); City of Detroit, 874 F.2d at 339.   
This Court previously ruled that it may exercise jurisdiction over this case because the 
complaint presented a federal question.  (Mem. Op. & Order  3).  Plaintiffs argue that the Court 
should remand because it has amended its complaint to remove the federal question .  (Pls.’ 
Renewed Mot. Remand, DN 26).  For the purposes of this motion, the Court will assume that the 
complaint has been properly amended.  The Supreme Court has held:   
When a plaintiff amends her complaint following her suit ’s removal, a federal 
court’s jurisdiction depends on what the new complaint says.  If (as here) the 
plaintiff eliminates the federal-law claims that enabled removal, leaving only state-
law claims behind, the court’s power to decide the dispute dissolves.  With the loss 
of federal-question jurisdiction, the court loses as well its supplemental jurisdiction 
over the state claims. 
 
Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 30 (2025).  While Plaintiffs assert that all 
references to federal law have been removed  from their Proposed Amendment Complaint , this is 
not so.  Plaintiffs ask for declaratory relief under federal law, specifically “[t]hat Defendants 
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violated federal mortgage-servicing regulations, including Regulations under RESPA  (12 U.S.C. 
§ 2605; 12 C.F.R. Part 1024) [.]”  (Pls.’ Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 142(b), DN 30-1).  Therefore, a 
federal question still exists in Plaintiffs’ Proposed Amendment Complaint. 
Fay also argues that the Court has diversity jurisdiction.  To establish diversity jurisdiction 
under Section 1332, there must be complete diversity of citizenship, and the amount in controversy 
must exceed “the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 1332.  
In their Proposed Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs seek over $1.7 million in compensatory damages 
and assert that they are both citizens of Kentucky and that Defendants are all nonresidents.1  (Pls.’ 
Proposed Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12-14, 18-19, 22, 27, 131).  Thus, diversity jurisdiction also exists. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ renewed motion to remand will be denied.  
B. Motion for Leave to Amend 
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), leave to amend a complaint shall be freely granted 
when justice so requires.  In light of this liberal view, “[a] motion to amend a complaint should be 
denied if the amendment is brought in bad faith, for dilatory purp oses, results in undue delay or 
prejudice to the opposing party, or would be futile.”  Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 294 (6th Cir. 
2010) (quoting Crawford v. Roane, 53 F.3d 750, 753 (6th Cir. 1995)).  
Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend their complaint, which was intended to remove 
all references to federal law.  (Pls.’ Mot. Leave Amend 2).  Defendants did not respond to this 
motion.  Plaintiffs do not appear to seek to amend in bad faith or to delay judicial proceedings, and 
the proposed amendment does not add new claims and would not result in prejudice to Defendants.  
See Rose v. Caldwell Tanks/Caldwell 2.0, No. 3:25-CV-648-RGJ, 2025 WL 3565341, at *4 (W.D. 
 
1 Fay agrees that Defendants are not citizens of Kentucky.  (Def .’s Resp. Pls.’ Renewed Mot. 
Remand 3, DN 28). 
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Ky. Dec. 12, 2025) (“Even if [the plaintiff] is attempting to amend the complaint to defeat the 
federal court’s removal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court was presented with, and sanctioned, these 
types of amendments in Royal Canin . . . .”); Mersen USA - Midland- MI Inc. v. Graphite 
Machining Servs. & Innovations, LLC, No. 12-10961, 2012 WL 3060922, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 
26, 2012) (“Undue delay is typically found where years have passed, discovery has been 
substantially conducted, and dispositive motion deadl ines have passed.”); McLean v. Alere Inc. , 
No. 3:12-CV-566-DJH, 2015 WL 1638341, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 13, 2015) (finding no prejudice 
where plaintiff had yet to be deposed, no dispositive motions had yet been ruled on, and much 
discovery had been produced); Beydoun v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 459, 469 (6th Cir. 2017) . Though 
Plaintiffs’ Proposed Amended Complaint does not accomplish Plaintiffs’ goal of destroying 
jurisdiction, Plaintiffs’ motion will be granted. 
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion 
to Remand (DN 26) is DENIED, and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend (DN 30) is
GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (DN 30-1) is hereby filed as of record.
cc: counsel of record
April 8, 2026
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