govinfo:USCOURTS-laed-2_21-cv-01129-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
 
BILAL HANKINS * CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-1129 
 
 
 * JUDGE ELDON E. FALLON 
 
VERSUS * 
MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
 JANIS V AN MEERVELD 
KEVIN WHEELER, ET AL. 
* * * * * * * * 
 
ORDER & REASONS 
 
 Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(a) filed by Defendant the Housing Authority of New Orleans (“HANO”) . R. Doc. 
292. Plaintiff Bilal Hankins opposed the motion. R. Doc. 304. HANO replied. R. Doc. 305. Having 
considered the briefing in light of the applicable law and record facts, the Court will GRANT 
HANO’s Motion for the following reasons. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Court has outlined the facts underlying this action in several previous orders and will 
thus enumerate here only the facts relevant to the present motion. This matter arises from alleged 
constitutional violations that occurred during an investigatory stop by law enforcement officers . 
On the evening of June 13, 2020, Officers Kevin Wheeler and Ramon Pierre were working a paid 
private security detail for the Hur stville Security District (“Hurstville”). R. Doc. 22 at 4. At the 
time, Officer Wheeler was primarily employed by the Orleans Levee District, and Officer Pierre 
was primarily employed by HANO. Id. 
Hankins contends that, after an acquaintance lost her dog, he and several friends were 
driving around a New Orleans neighborhood searching for it at approximately one o’clock in the 

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morning. Id. at 2. During their search, they briefly encountered Officer Wheeler and asked him if 
he had seen a dog. Id. Suspicious of Hankin and his companions ’ activities in the neighborhood 
and explanation of their presence during the early morning hours, Officer Wheeler ran the vehicle’s 
license plate and learned that it was registered to a woman who lived approximately fifteen miles 
away. Id. Officer Wheeler then contacted Officer Pierre and the two officers conducted an 
investigatory stop of the vehicle. Although the parties dispute the details of the encounter, they 
agree that the stop lasted approximately four minutes and Hankins was not asked to exit the 
vehicle. 
Following the stop, Hankins’s mother filed complaints with HANO and other entities. As 
part of a routine investigation, HANO Sergeant Jackson reviewed the incident and determined that 
the allegations of misconduct against Officer Pierre were not sustained. See R. Doc. 304-1 at 8. 
Hankins subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Louisiana against Officer Wheeler, Officer Pierre, HANO, and the HANO supervisors 
responsible for disciplining Officer Pierre , among other parties . The HANO supervisors moved 
for summary judgment, which this Court granted. R. Doc. 218. The Fifth Circuit ultimately 
affirmed the ruling. R. Doc. 279. However, HANO itself did not join that motion and therefore 
remains a defendant to this action. 
As is relevant here, Hankins asserts Monell claims against HANO, alleging that HANO’s 
policies, patterns, or practices subjected Hankins to excessive force and unreasonable search based 
on alleged failures train, supervise, and discipline Officer Pierre. R. Doc. 22 at 29–30. 
II. PRESENT MOTION 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, HANO argues that (1) Hankins cannot establish that 
HANO’s policies, patterns, or practices subjected Hankins to a violation of his c onstitutional 

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rights; (2) HANO had no duty to supervise Officer Pierre’s secondary employment with Hurstville; 
and (3) Hankins cannot establish that HANO was deliberately indifferent to the need to train , 
supervise, or discipline Officer Pierre. R. Doc. 292- 1. Hankins opposed, arguing that genuine 
issues of material fact exist as to the constitutionality of HANO’s policies, practices, or customs 
and whether these policies were a “moving force” behind Hankins’s injury. R. Doc. 304. HANO 
replied, re-urging the same arguments presented in its original motion, and arguing that any facts 
remaining in dispute are not material. R. Doc. 305. 
III. LEGAL STANDARD 
a. Summary Judgement 
Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fa ct 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Material facts” 
are facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence 
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. “The non-movant 
cannot satisfy the summary judgment burden with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated 
assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.” King v. Goebel, No. CIV .A. 10-2708, 2012 WL 6482783 
(E.D. La. Dec. 13, 2012) (citing Little v. Liquid Air Corp. , 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
“The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact, but need not negate the elements of the non-movant's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The Court must resolve any factual controversies in favor of the 
nonmoving party, “but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have 
submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). 
IV. DISCUSSION 

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a. HANO Has No Duty to Supervise Secondary Employment 
In its opinion affirming this Court’s dismissal of Hankin’s claims against the HANO 
supervisors, the Fifth Circuit held that Louisiana law imposes no duty upon HANO to supervise 
its employee officers while they are engaged in secondary employment with a separate entity. R. 
Doc. 279 at 6–7; see also Wright v. Skate Country, Inc., 98-0217 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/12/99), 734 So. 
2d 874, 881; Brasseaux v. Town of Mamou, 99-1584 (La. 1/19/00), 752 So. 2d 815, 820 (holding 
that a municipal employer is not liable for an officer's conduct unless the officer was acting within 
the course and scope of municipal employment) ; Powers v. U.S., 783 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(holding that the fact that an officer was required to conduct himself in accordance with NOPD 
rules “did not transform his work for a private employer to employment on behalf of the city.”). In 
support of his argument that material issues of fact preclude summary judgment on his Monell 
claim against HANO for failure to supervis e Officer Pierre, Hankins relies on the deposition 
testimony of HANO Lieutenant Martin, who acknowledged at deposition that HANO d oes not 
supervise its employees while they are working for Hurstville or other entities. R. Doc. 304 at 17. 
But because HANO owes no duty to do so, HANO can have no liability for this lack of supervision. 
Accordingly, the entry of summary judgment in HANO’s favor as to Hankin’s Monell failure to 
train claim is appropriate. 
b. Hankins Cannot Establish that HANO was Deliberately Indifferent to the 
Need to Train or Discipline its Officers. 
In order to impose liability upon a government entity for a constitutional violation under § 
1983, a plaintiff must identify : (1) a policymaker; (2) an official policy or custom; and (3) a 
constitutional violation for which the policy or custom was the moving force. Monell v. Dep’t of 
Soc. Serv., 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2037 (1978). A municipality's failure to train or discipline its employees 
can rise to the level of a constitutional violation only where the plaintiff can demonstrate deliberate 

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indifference. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). Deliberate indifference is 
a stringent standard, requiring proof that the municipality disregarded a known or obvious 
consequence of its actions. Board of County Com’rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 
410 (1997). 
As to failure to tr ain, the Supreme Court has instructed that "[i]n resolving the issue of a city's 
liability, the focus must be on the adequacy of the training program in relation to the tasks the 
particular officers must perform." City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. The Court further cautioned 
that "[t]hat a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten 
liability on the city," because the officer's alleged shortcomings may result from factors unrelated 
to any deficiency in the m unicipality's training program. Id. at 390–91. Here, Hankins identifies 
no evidence of a deficient training program, no pattern of similar constitutional violations, and no 
facts demonstrating that HANO was deliberately indifferent to a known need for additional 
training. Instead, Hankins relies primarily on alleged deficiencies in Officer Pierre's conduct and 
speculation that additional training or supervision might have prevented the incident. But the 
Supreme Court has expressly rejected such reasoning, warning that virtually every plaintiff could 
identify something a municipality "could have done" to prevent an alleged constitutional violation. 
Id. at 391–92. Imposing liability on that basis would effectively impose respondeat superior 
liability upon municipalities, contrary to Monell. Id. at 392. 
The same reasoning defeats Hankins's failure to discipline claim. The record contains no 
evidence that HANO maintained a policy or custom of disregarding officer misconduct. To the 
contrary, the evidence reflects that prior allegations of insubordination against Officer Pierre 
resulted in disciplinary measures, including reprimands and suspension. See R. Doc. 291-1 at 29. 
Nor does Hankins identify any pattern of similar incidents that would have placed HANO on notice 

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of a need for additional disciplinary action. At most, Hankins challenges the adequacy of HANO's 
response to the incident underlying this litigation. However, post -incident actions cannot 
themselves establish the deliberate indifference necessary to support municipal liability. See, e.g., 
City of Okl. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) (holding that “considerably more proof than 
the single incident” is necessary to establish fault on behalf of the government and casual 
connection). To hold otherwise would invite precisely the sort of "endless exercise of second-
guessing municipal employee-training programs" that the Supreme Court cautioned against in City 
of Canton. 489 U.S.at 392. 
Here, Hankins has produced no evidence of an official policy, widespread custom, or 
pattern of similar violations that would have placed HANO on notice of a need for additional 
training or discipline. Nor has Hankins identified evidence demonstrating that any alleged 
deficiency in HANO's practices was the “moving force” behind the alleged violation of Hankins’s 
constitutional rights. Hankins thus fails to show that any genuine issue of material fact precludes 
the entry of summary judgment in HANO’s failure as to his claims for Monell failure to train and 
discipline. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, 
 IT IS ORDERED that HANO’s Motion for Summary Judgment, R. Doc. 292, is 
GRANTED. 
 New Orleans, Louisiana, this 8th day of June, 2026. 
 
 
 THE HONORABLE ELDON E. FALLON 

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