govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_17-cr-30090-2

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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
TEREZE L. FENDERSON, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
McGLYNN, District Judge: 
Pending before the Court is a pro se Motion for Compassionate Release (Doc. 
148) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) filed by Defendant Tereze L. Fenderson. 
The Government filed a Response opposing the Motion (Doc. 159), and Fenderson 
filed a Reply (Doc. 161). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In October 2018, Fenderson pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a 
firearm (Count I), attempted retaliation against a witness (Count III), and 
discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count IV). (Docs. 
45, 64). In March 2019, the Court (Reagan, J.) sentenced Fenderson to 80 months’ 
imprisonment on Counts I and III, to be served concurrently, and 120 months’ 
imprisonment on Count IV, to be served consecutively to Counts I and III. (Docs. 99, 
101). The Court also imposed a consecutive 12 months’ imprisonment pursuant to the 
sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3147, for a total sentence of 212 months’ Page ID
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imprisonment, followed by 5 years of supervised release.1 (Id.). He is currently 
incarcerated at Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) Yazoo City Low II with a 
projected release date of August 5, 2033. See Find an Inmate, Fed. Bureau of Prison, 
https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited June 9, 2026) (search BOP Register 
Number 13802-025 in “Find by Number”). Fenderson unsuccessfully moved for 
compassionate release on February 12, 2023, and for a sentence reduction on January 
26, 2024. (Docs. 116, 124, 130, 133, 147). 
On September 22, 2025, Fenderson filed the instant motion, seeking 
compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). (Doc. 148). In support 
of his Motion, Fenderson states that “due to medical issues . . . he will need specialized 
treatment for the rest of his life.” (Id., p. 1). He also cites denial of his FSA time 
credits, family circumstances, unusually harsh prison conditions, U.S.S.G. §§ 
1B1.13(b)(5), and rehabilitation. (Id., p. 1–2). The government opposes the 
Defendant’s Motion, arguing that Fenderson did not demonstrate extraordinary and 
compelling reasons to justify compassionate release. (Doc. 161). 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Prior to the passage of the First Step Act, a defendant seeking compassionate 
release first had to request it from the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). See 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2018). The First Step Act of 2018 modified that provision 
to allow incarcerated defendants to seek compassionate release from a court, on their 
own motion, after exhausting administrative rights to appeal a failure of the BOP to 
 
1 Fenderson was also fined $750, ordered to pay $8,926 in restitution, and ordered to pay a $300 special 
assessment. Page ID
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bring a motion on their behalf, or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a 
request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier. See id. 
After such a motion is filed, either by the director of the BOP or by a defendant, 
the Court may reduce the term of imprisonment after considering the factors set forth 
in section 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable upon a finding that “extraordinary 
and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is 
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”2 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 
The Sentencing Commission’s policy statements establish that the Court may 
consider: (1) the medical circumstances of the defendant; (2) the age of the defendant 
(over 65); (3) family circumstances of the defendant; (4) the defendant is a victim of 
physical or sexual abuse while in custody; and (5) other reasons. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual § 1B1.13 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2023) (hereinafter “Sent’g 
guidelines”). Other reasons include “any other circumstances or combination of 
circumstances that, when considered by themselves or together with any of the 
reasons described in paragraphs (1) through (4), are similar in gravity to those 
described in paragraphs (1) through (4).” Id. There is also a sixth category for 
defendants who have served unusually long sentences. Id. If an inmate can show that 
one of the eligibility criteria is applicable, a court may reduce a sentence if doing so 
would be appropriate under the statutory sentencing factors described in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a). Id. § 1B1.13(a) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). Finally, a court must determine 
 
2 The applicable policy statement can be found at § 1B1.13 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2023). Page ID
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that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the 
community as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) and that the reduction “is consistent 
with this policy statement.” Id. § 1B1.13(a)(2)–(3). 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “[t]he movant bears the 
burden of establishing ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ that warrant a 
sentence reduction.” United States v. Newton, 996 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 2021). 
District courts have broad discretion in determining whether the movant established 
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” under the statute. See United States v. Gunn, 
980 F.3d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 2020). 
ANALYSIS 
I. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
Fenderson requested that the Court appoint counsel, arguing that an 
appointed federal public defender will be able to obtain necessary medical records 
and other records which support Fenderson’s Motion. (Doc. 148, pp. 5–6). District 
courts have discretion to appoint counsel for prisoners seeking post-judgment relief, 
but prisoners possess no entitlement to appointed counsel, including in proceedings 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). See United States v. Blake, 986 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 
2021). Here, the government provided recent medical records detailing Fenderson's 
condition. (See Doc. 159, Exs. A and B). Further, this Court does not believe the 
legal issues in this case to be sufficiently complex to warrant the appointment of 
counsel and that Fenderson has proven competent to represent himself. See United 
States v. Scott, 850 Fed. Appx. 449, 452 (7th Cir. 2021) (district court did not abuse 
its discretion when denying appointment of counsel where there were no complex Page ID
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legal issues raised on a motion for compassionate release). Accordingly, this Court 
denies Fenderson's request for appointment of counsel. 
II. EXTRAORDINARY AND COMPELLING REASONS 
Fenderson bears the burden of establishing that extraordinary and compelling 
reasons warrant a reduction in his sentence. See Newton, 996 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 
2021). He has not met that burden here. 
Fenderson principally argues that his medical conditions constitute 
extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release. He asserts that the 
BOP is unable to adequately manage his chronic kidney disease, asthma, sleep apnea 
requiring use of a CPAP machine, and various dental conditions, placing him at 
heightened risk of serious deterioration in health. (Doc. 148, pp. 8–12). Section 
1B1.13(b)(1)(C) applies only where a defendant requires long-term or specialized 
medical care that is not being provided and, without which, the defendant faces a 
serious risk of deterioration or death. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C). 
The record does not support that conclusion. The government has provided 
medical records showing that the BOP is actively monitoring and treating 
Fenderson’s conditions. (See Doc. 159, Exs. A and B). He receives routine monitoring 
for stage-three chronic kidney disease, has access to prescribed medications, uses an 
inhaler for asthma, and has been issued a CPAP machine for sleep apnea. (Id.). 
Although chronic kidney disease is a serious diagnosis, Fenderson’s condition is 
neither terminal nor rapidly progressing, and well-managed chronic conditions do not 
constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. See United States v. Page ID
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Staake, No. 17-30063, 2024 WL 4182915, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2024); United States 
v. White, No. 20-32, 2023 WL 3072821, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 2023). 
Beyond his medical claims, Fenderson invokes the “other reasons” provision of 
section 1B1.13(b)(5), arguing primarily that the “sheer length” of his sentence 
warrants relief. (Doc. 148, pp. 13–15). The Court is unpersuaded. Under the statute, 
if a defendant identifies a reason that is similar in gravity to the circumstances laid 
out in 1B1.13(b)(1)–(4), compassionate release may be warranted. Compassionate 
release, however, is not a vehicle for resentencing, nor does it permit a court to revisit 
sentencing determinations simply because a defendant believes the sentence is 
excessive. See Rutherford v. United States, Nos. 24–820 and 24–860, 2026 WL 
1485535, at *10 (U.S. May 28, 2026). In this regard, the Court agrees with the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning that the circumstances identified in sections 1B1.13(b)(1)–(4) are 
best understood as conditions that arise after sentencing, rather than factors known 
or foreseeable at the time sentence was imposed. See United States v. Bryant, No. 24-
3093, 2025 WL 2026172, at *5 (9th Cir. 2025). Nothing Fenderson identifies under 
the “other reasons” provision rises to a level similar in gravity to the enumerated 
categories, nor has there been a change in the law post-sentencing that would qualify 
as a condition arising after sentencing. His sentence was lawfully imposed under the 
advisory Guidelines and reflected the seriousness of the offense conduct. Nor does 
section 1B1.13(b)(6) apply; Fenderson has not served 10 years of his sentence, and he 
has identified no intervening change in the law that would create a gross sentencing 
disparity if he were sentenced today. Page ID
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As for Fenderson’s remaining arguments, including his claims regarding First 
Step Act time credits, family circumstances, harsh conditions of confinement, and 
rehabilitation, the Court concludes that none provides a basis for relief. That 
Fenderson committed a crime that makes him ineligible for First Step Act time 
credits is not a basis for compassionate relief because it is not unusual—it puts him 
in the same place as all others convicted of the same offense. See Rutherford v. United 
States, 146 S. Ct. 1320, 1330 (2026) (“‘extraordinary and compelling’ reasons for 
compassionate release are those that are especially unusual and convincing.”). His 
asserted family circumstances do not satisfy the policy statement’s requirements 
because he has not shown that any family member is incapacitated or that he is the 
only available caregiver. See United States v. Romano, 707 F. Supp. 3d 233, 237–238 
(E.D.N.Y. 2023). Complaints about conditions of confinement likewise fall outside the 
scope of section 3582(c)(1)(A). See United States v. Ramirez, No. 08-cr-746-15, 2023 
WL 2078442, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 2023). 
Finally, although the Court has read the glowing letters written in support of 
Fenderson and does not discount Fenderson’s expressions of remorse or his efforts 
toward rehabilitation, rehabilitation alone cannot constitute an extraordinary and 
compelling reason for release. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). Because the Court is not 
persuaded by Fenderson’s other arguments, they too do not rise to the level of 
extraordinary and compelling reasons. Fenderson has not demonstrated 
extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a reduction in his sentence and 
therefore release is not appropriate at this time. Page ID
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III. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(A) FACTORS 
Even if extraordinary and compelling reasons existed, the Court may deny 
relief if the § 3553(a) factors do not support a sentence reduction. See United States 
v. Suarez, No. 20-CR-03570-BAS-1, 2023 WL 7713580, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2023). 
Those factors include: “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence to reflect 
the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and otherwise accomplish 
the aims of the criminal justice system; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the 
advisory Guidelines range; (5) pertinent policy statements; (6) the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (7) the need to provide restitution to 
victims.” Romano, 707 F. Supp. 3d at 235. 
This Court agrees with the government’s argument that Fenderson’s offense 
conduct and criminal history weigh heavily against release. (Doc. 159, pp. 22–23). At 
age 25, Fenderson pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter after shooting an 
individual in the neck and was returned to custody shortly after being paroled. (Doc. 
97, ¶ 70). He later pled guilty to unlawful possession with intent to deliver cannabis 
and a probation violation. (Id., ¶ 74). His arrest history includes aggravated assault 
involving a firearm other drug and violent offenses. (Id., ¶¶ 81, 83). The Court also 
considers the nature of the instant offenses, including felon in possession of a firearm, 
attempted retaliation against a witness, and discharging a firearm during a crime of 
violence, which underscore the danger he poses to the community. Additionally, 
Fenderson has had multiple disciplinary infractions during his incarceration. (Doc. 
159, Ex. C). Page ID
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Despite Fenderson’s assertions of rehabilitation, this Court remains concerned 
about recidivism. The BOP has determined that he is a medium risk to recidivate. 
(See Doc. 159, Ex. D). The Court noted that “given the criminal history he has, he is 
likely to recidivate.” (Doc. 106, p. 34). This Court weighed these same considerations 
in denying Fenderson’s prior motions and does so again here. Given the substantial 
portion of the sentence that remains, the seriousness of the offense, and the need to 
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C), the 
section 3553(a) factors do not support a sentence reduction. 
For the reasons set forth herein, Tereze L. Fenderson’s Motion for 
Compassionate Release is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: June 12, 2026 
 
 
 
 
 STEPHEN P. McGLYNN 
 U.S. District Judge Page ID
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