govinfo:USCOURTS-txed-6_24-cv-00223-1

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No. 6:24-cv-00223 
Jerrodrick Campbell, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Chinedu Atumah et al., 
Defendants. 
O R D E R 
Plaintiff Jerrodrick Campbell, a Texas Department of Crimi-
nal Justice ( “TDCJ ”) inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pau-
peris, brought this action alleging violations of his civil rights . 
Doc. 10. The case was referred to a magistrate judge. Now before 
the court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 50) , 
the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation (Doc. 67) on 
that motion , and plaintiff’s timely filed objections (Doc. 69) . 
I. Procedural background 
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Atumah violated his Eighth 
Amendment rights by using excessive force on the Coffield Unit. 
Doc. 10 -1 at 1. He also claims that defendant McClain failed to 
intervene to protect him during the incident and that defendants 
Henslee and Enge failed to train and supervise. Id. at 1–3. Plaintiff 
also contends that he was improperly placed in restrictive housing 
and given a disciplinary case. Id. at 2. 
The magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the 
court grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dis-
miss plaintiff’s claims against defendants Atumah and McLain 
with prejudice. Doc. 67 at 35. After viewing the surveillance foot-
age of the incident and applying each of the Hudson factors, the 
magistrate judge found that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that de-
fendant Atumah acted maliciously and sadistically for the very 
purpose of causing harm. Id. at 21–22. The magistrate judge also 
determi ned that plaintiff likewise failed to show that defendant PageID #: 
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McLain failed to intervene as necessary to establish bystander li-
ability. Id. at 22–23. 
Finally, the magistrate judge determined that plaintiff’s 
claims against defendants Henslee and Enge should be dismissed 
with prejudice for the failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915A(b)(1). Id. at 35. Plaintiff filed timely objections. Doc. 6 9. 
II. Legal standards 
The court reviews the objected -to portions of a magistrate 
judge’s report and recommendation de novo. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). “Parties filing objections 
must specifically identify those findings objected to. Frivolous, 
conclusive, or general objections need not be considered by the 
district court.” Nettles v. Wainwright , 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th 
Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Douglass 
v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n , 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). 
Furthermore, a party’s entitlement to de novo review does not en-
title it to raise arguments that were not presented to the magis-
trate judge without a compelling reason . See Cupit v. Whitley , 28 
F.3d 532, 535 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1994). When there have been no 
timely objections to a report, or the objections are improper, “the 
court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face 
of the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), advisory committee’s notes 
to 1983 amendment. 
III. Factual background 
The summary judgment evidence contains surveillance foot-
age of the incident, which occurred inside a prison hallway. Doc. 
50-3. The footage depicts plaintiff striking defendant Atumah —
surreptitiously from behind —and then plaintiff continuing to 
struggle as defendant attempted to gain control and move to 
safety. Id. at 3:16 –4:00. As the magistrate judge highlighted, the 
footage shows plaintiff striking defendant with his fist several 
times. Id. at 3:16–3:30. Defendant pepper sprayed plaintiff during 
the stru ggle, to no avail, as plaintiff continued to throw punches. 
Id. at 3:24 –3:30. And though defendant was then able to place PageID #: 
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plaintiff against the wall, plaintiff continued to struggle and resist 
him. Id. at 3:31–3:40. 
Defendant placed plaintiff on his knees, as plaintiff continued 
to fight and resist him, and defendant delivered a single knee to 
plaintiff’s head. Id. at 3:40–3:44. Another officer then opened and 
ran through a gate to retrieve items that fell on the floor during 
the struggle as defendant held plaintiff down by his shoulders. Id. 
at 3:44 –46. Plaintiff continued to struggle and resist —and once 
the officer returned to the other side of the gate after retrieving 
the items, defendant let go of plaintiff and ra n through the gate. 
Id. at 3:36 –4:00. Another officer closed the gate, leaving the pris-
oners on the other side. Id. at 4:00 –4:02. 
IV. Plaintiff’s objections 
Plaintiff first “objects to the court dismissing his suit with 
prejudice,” alleging that a dismissal is an abuse of discretion. Doc. 
69 at 1. This objection, however, addresses neither the substance 
of the report nor identifies an error and is therefore overruled. 
Several of plaintiff’s objections concern his allegation that he 
“decided” to comply and stopped resisting. Id. at 1–5. He insists 
he was no longer resisting when defendant kneed him in the head. 
Plaintiff contends that he was “subdued” at this point. Id. at 2. 
In determining whether a prison official acted maliciously or 
sadistically to cause unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain 
through excessive force, courts should consider: (1) “the extent of 
the injury suffered ,” (2) “the need for the application of force ,” 
(3) “the relationship between the need and the amount of force 
used,” (4) “the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible of-
ficials ,” and (5) “any efforts made to temper the severity of a 
forceful response. ” Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U.S. 1, 7 (199 2) 
(cleaned up) . 
The surveillance footage of the incident refutes plaintiff’s al-
legations —and, ultimately, shows that the majority of the Hudson 
factors favor defendant Atumah. When video evidence blatantly 
contradicts the plaintiff’s articulation of the facts, as here, the dis-
trict court should view the facts in the light depicted by the PageID #: 
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video—rather than crediting the plaintiff’s version of the facts . 
See Hodge v. Engleman , 90 F.4th 840, 845 –46 (5th Cir. 2024). The 
video footage in this case illustrates plaintiff sneaking up behind 
defendant and violently attack ing him. Doc. 50 -3 at 3:16 –3:30. 
Though plaintiff insists that he eventually “decided” to com-
ply, the video shows his continued resistance throughout the inci-
dent. Id. at 3:16 –4:00. Plaintiff claims that defendant kneed him 
only after he chose to comply, but the video illustrates that as de-
fendant tried to hold him to the ground, plaintiff continued to 
move, resist, and struggle. Id. In fact, the footage reveals plaintiff 
attempting to raise himself up despite defendant trying to hold 
him down to the floor. Id. at 3:38–3:42. Plaintiff ’s attempts to 
break free of defendant’s control are necessarily inconsistent with 
his assertion that he was “subdued.” 
Even though defendant Atumah kneed plaintiff during the 
struggle, the evidence reveals that defendant needed to apply 
force to restore discipline and maintain safety. This court cannot 
micromanage the amount of force necessary to quash violent ac-
tions and combative prisoners. See Bryd v. Harrell , 48 F.4th 343, 
347 (5th Cir. 2022) (“The Supreme Court has told judges not to 
micro-manage the force necessary to quell such volatile situa-
tions.”). 
Here, plaintiff has not shown that defendant kneeing him one 
time was excessive —especially given that defendant faced a vio-
lent, combative prisoner. See, e.g., Jones v. Anderson , 721 F. App’x 
333, 33 5–36 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished) (finding 
no genuine issue of material fact that Anderson “did not employ 
excessive force” during a prison incident wherein “Anderson rea-
sonably perceived Jones’s actions to present a threat to Ander-
son’s safety” and “his employment of force w as necessary to re-
store discipline and mitigate such a threat.”). Contrary to plain-
tiff’s contentions, defendant did not continuously knee him and 
did not knee him only after he stopped resisting. See Doc. 50 -3 at 
3:16–4:00. PageID #: 
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The footage therefore refutes plaintiff’s factual allegations . 
The court is permitted to view the facts in the light depicted by 
the surveillance footage. See Carnaby v. City of Hou ., 636 F.3d 183, 
187 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating that court s “need not rely on the plain-
tiff’s description of the facts where the record discredits that de-
scription but should instead consider the facts in the light de-
picted by the videotape.” (cleaned up)). Plaintiff’s objection lacks 
merit. 
Plaintiff further objects to TDCJ’s use -of-force report. Doc. 
69 at 2. He claims that the report is not consistent with the video 
footage, as the report omits defendant Atumah kneeing him in the 
head. However, the magistrate judge relied on the content of the 
surveillance video in addressing all the Hudson factors—not the 
force report. See Doc. 67 at 21–22. 
Having already determined that the video shows that defend-
ant’s single -knee to plaintiff ’s head during a violent altercation 
was made in an effort to restore discipline, security, and order ra-
ther than to maliciously cause plaintiff harm, plaintiff has shown 
no genuine dispute of material fact. See Waddleton v. Rodriguez , 
750 F. App’x 248, 25 6 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished) 
(“Waddleton was in restraints, but he continued to be uncooper-
ative, resisted, and attempted to strike an officer. These ac tions 
justify the application of some force.”); see also Davis v. Cannon , 
91 F. App’x 327, 329 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (unpublished) 
(“Defendants’ actions were a continuation of their good faith ef-
fort to maintain or restore discipline following Davis’s repeated 
refusal to obey Steele’s orders.”). This objection also lacks merit. 
In his fourth objection, plaintiff asserts that he stated a claim 
against defendants Henslee and Enge. Specifically, he states that 
defendants “knew of need to train and supervise Atumah , but 
failed to do so.” Doc. 69 at 3. Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate a 
constitutional violation renders meritless his failure-to-supervise 
claims . Est. of Parker v. Miss. Dep ’t of Pub. Safety , 140 F.4th 226, 
245 (5th Cir. 2025) (“[B]ystander liability . . . require[s] . . . an 
underlying constitutional violation.” ). This objection lacks merit. PageID #: 
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Plaintiff also objects to the finding that he suffered de minimis 
injuries. He cites headaches and migraines. Doc. 69 at 4. But, as 
explained in the report, headaches and migraines —without 
more—are considered de minimis . See Lee v. Wilson , 237 F. App’x 
965, 966 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (unpublished) (affirming 
dismissal of a prisoner’s excessive force claim because the pris-
oner’s split lip and headaches were “de minimis in the context 
given that [defendant’s conduct] . . . was a reasonable attempt to 
maintain order” ). 
And even if plaintiff suffered more than de minimis injuries, 
the remaining Hudson factors heavily favor defendant Atumah. 
With respect to the second factor, the surveillance video shows an 
obvious and clear need for force. Plaintiff attacked defendant from 
behind—and continued to resist throughout the encounter. Doc. 
50-3 at 3:16 –4:00. Defendant Atumah applied a small amount of 
force to subdue an assaultive prisoner that continued to fight and 
resist. See Byrd , 48 F.4th at 347 (“Nonetheless, Harrell’s strikes 
came at the culmination of a violent encounter with a prisoner de-
termined to f ight through chemical spray and riot shields.”). 
The third factor —the relationship between the need for force 
and the amount of force used —favors defendant Atumah as well. 
Plaintiff’s violent actions posed a substantial threat to officers —
particularly to defendant —and to the security of the prison. 
Thus, the fourth factor also favors defendant. A lthough the foot-
age is relatively silent on efforts to temper the severity of the re-
sponse, the magistrate judge properly found that the footage 
shows nothing more than defendant attempting to subdue plaintiff 
after an assault and during his continued resistance. 
Finally, plaintiff “objects to the court finding that defendant 
Atumah did not act ‘maliciously or sadistically’ and that defend-
ants are entitled to qualified immunity.” Doc. 69 at 6. The central 
question for any excessive force claim under the Eighth Amend-
ment is whether the force was used in a good faith effort to restore 
discipline or used maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose 
of causing harm. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The Fifth Circuit “has PageID #: 
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held that prison official s may violate an inmate’s Eighth Amend-
ment rights when they use gratuitous force against a prisoner who 
has already been subdued.” Waddleton, 750 F. App’x at 256 
(cleaned up ). 
The surveillance footage here shows no gratuitous force. Ra-
ther, it shows an assaultive prisoner attacking defendant, necessi-
tating some force ful response . The footage depicts defendant ap-
plying a small amount of force to plaintiff —who continued to be 
uncooperative and resistant —in a good faith effort to maintain 
and restore discipline. Plaintiff has not established a genuine issue 
of material fact as to wh ether this use of force violated his Eighth 
Amendment rights . Thus, defendants are entitled to qualifi ed im-
munity. 
V. Conclusion 
Having reviewed the magistrate judge’s report and being sat-
isfied that there is no error, the court accepts its findings and rec-
ommendation s. Plaintiff’s objections (Doc. 69) are overruled. De-
fendants Atumah and McClain’s motion for summary judgment 
(Doc. 50 ) is granted. Plaintiff’s claims against defendants 
Henslee and Enge are dismissed with prejudice for the failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Any pending mo-
tions are denied as moot. 
So ordered by the court on June 12, 2026 . 
 
 J. CAMPBELL BARKER 
United States District Judge PageID #: 
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