govinfo:USCOURTS-nynd-6_23-cv-01464-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
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VANESSA COLANGELO, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
-v- 6:23-CV-1464 (DNH/ML) 
 
HAMILTON COLLEGE, 
 
Defendant. 
 
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APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL: 
 
WARD ARCURI LAW FIRM ZACHARY C. OREN, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 Genessee Street, Suite 1201 
Utica, NY 13501 
 
FESTINE NELSON LLP KATHRYN M. FESTINE, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
258 Genessee Street, Suite 307 
Utica, NY 13502 
 
BOND SCHOENECK & KING, COLLIN M. CARR, ESQ.1 
PLLC SUZANNE M. MESSER, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Defendants JONATHAN B. FELLOWS, ESQ. 
One Lincoln Center 
Syracuse, NY 13202 
 
 
DAVID N. HURD 
United States District Judge 
 
1 Collin Michael Carr is listed as lead attorney in this matter but is also shown on the docket as 
an attorney in Syracuse University’s Office of University Counsel. While no notice of withdrawal 
was filed in this matter, the Clerk is directed to terminate this attorney from the case. 
 

 
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DECISION and ORDER 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 21, 2023, plaintiff Vanessa Colangelo (“Colangelo”) filed this 
employment discrimination action against defendants Hamilton College 
(“Hamilton”), Karen Leach, Roger Wakeman, Lucy Burke, Nathan Goodale, 
Jeff Landry, Lisa Magnarelli, Terry Martinez, Adina Mujic, Joe Shelley, 
Steve Stemkoski, Caz Ullem, and David Wippman alleging violations of her 
rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the 
New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”).2 See Compl., Dkt. No. 1. 
On August 29, 2025, Hamilton moved for summary judgment. Hamilton’s 
Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. No. 64. That motion has been fully briefed and will be 
considered on the basis of the submissions and without oral argument. Dkt. 
Nos. 1, 64, 77, 81. 
II. BACKGROUND 
On August 10, 2015, plaintiff, a female, was hired by Hamilton as the 
Assistant Director of Visual Communications. Pl.’s Reply to Def’s SOMF, 
Dkt. No. 77-20 ¶¶ 69–71. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in 
 
2 The parties have stipulated to the dismissal of defendants Karen Leach, Roger Wakeman, 
Lucy Burke, Nathan Goodale, Jeff Landry, Lisa Magnarelli, Terry Martinez, Adina Mujic, Joe 
Shelly, Steve Stemkoski, Caz Ullem, and David Wippman (collectively the “Individua l Defendants”), 
which was approved, leaving Hamilton as the sole remaining defendant. Dkt. Nos. 19, 23. 

 
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March 2020, plaintiff worked from home without incident and was never 
disciplined by defendant throughout her employment for her work 
performance. Id. ¶¶ 72, 75, 77. Thereafter, Colangelo became pregnant and 
notified Hamilton of her pregnancy in April of 2021. Id. ¶¶ 78–79. On July 
7, 2021, Hamilton announced they would be implementing a mandatory 
COVID-19 vaccination policy (the “Policy”) under which all employees were 
required to receive the COVID-19 vaccination by August 26, 2021, and that 
employees who believed they qualified for a medical or religious exemption 
could contacted Human Resources (“HR”). Id. ¶ 80; see also Colangelo Aff., 
Dkt. No. 77-1 at 16–18.3 This July 7, 2021 announcement of the Policy did 
not state that the deadline for submitting accommodation requests was 
August 2, 2021. Id. ¶ 80–81; Dkt. No. 77-1 at 16–18. On July 13, 2021, 
plaintiff sent an e-mail to Hamilton’s HR director, Stephen Stemkoski 
(“Stemkoski”) regarding the Policy. Id. ¶ 82. Notably, plaintiff contends that 
Stemkoski only wanted to speak with the plaintiff by phone. Id. ¶ 83. 
On July 28, 2021, plaintiff discovered that Hamilton had apparently 
imposed an August 2, 2021 deadline for submitting accommodation requests. 
Id. ¶ 84; see also Leach Decl. Ex. B, Dkt. No. 64-3 at 2–3. This left Colangelo 
with three days to both prepare and submit an accommodation request. Id. 
 
3 Pagination corresponds with CM/ECF headers. 

 
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¶¶ 85–87. On August 2, 2021, plaintiff was informed by her physician that 
he would not write a doctor’s note on her behalf in support of medical 
accommodation. Id. ¶ 88. 
The next day, plaintiff called Karen Leach (“Leach”), Hamilton’s Vice 
President of Administration and Finance. Id. ¶ 90. It was Colangelo’s 
preference to continue working from home until she went on maternity leave, 
after which she intended to obtain the vaccine and return to campus. Id. 
During this call, plaintiff told Leach that her immediate supervisor supported 
her desire for an accommodation.4 Id. ¶ 91. And plaintiff argues that Leach 
was “receptive of this reasonable request […] because she told [plaintiff] it 
was reasonable.” Id. ¶ 92. Leach advised Colangelo to write a letter to 
Hamilton’s COVID-19 Task Force Committee (the “Committee”) detailing 
what their discussion. Id. ¶ 93. 
The following day, plaintiff emailed Leach her request for medical 
accommodation. Id. ¶ 94. This request was routed to Stemkoski, who then 
informed plaintiff by phone on August 17, 2021 that the Committee had 
denied her request. Id. ¶ 101–03. During this call, Stemkoski told plaintiff 
that “President Wippman is not making any accommodations for anyone for 
 
4 Plaintiff’s supervisor, Melissa Richards (“Richards”), approved plaintiff’s request for an 
accommodation. Pl.’s Rep. to Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 97–98. In addition, plaintiff argues that Hamilton’s 
President was also supportive of her accommodation and that in his deposition “he acknow ledged 
that both Melissa Richards and himself approved of [p]laintiff’s request for an accommodation. Id. ¶ 
99. 

 
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the mandatory vaccination policy and that Plaintiff would have to get 
vaccinated.” Id. ¶ 104. 
In response to defendant’s denial, Colangelo decided to pursue 
accommodation on religious grounds instead. Id. ¶ 105. Plaintiff did not 
initially request religious accommodation under the Policy because she 
believed her medical accommodation request would be granted. Id. 
Nonetheless, plaintiff’ asserts she held a sincere religious belief that medical 
treatment be as minimally invasive as possible. Id. ¶¶ 107, 121. On August 
19, 2021, plaintiff received a certificate from a church and completed 
defendant’s religious accommodation form, which required supporting 
documentation. Id. ¶ 106. Colangelo then submitted this request to 
Stemkoski by way of two separate emails dated August 20, 2021 and August 
22, 2021. Id. ¶ 106. 
On August 24, 2021, Stemkoski called plaintiff to inform her that her 
request for religious accommodation was also denied as untimely. Id. ¶ 111. 
The following day, plaintiff’s employment at Hamilton was terminated. Id. ¶ 
11. She contends that Hamilton’s denials of her medical and religious 
accommodation requests were not made in writing, that her termination was 
never put in writing, and that she was not provided an opportunity to go 
before the Committee with respect to her requests –– an opportunity she 
contends was provided to other applicants. Id. ¶¶ 112–116. 

 
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In support of her discrimination claims, Colangelo points to certain 
comparator employees at Hamilton who were accommodated on other medical 
grounds and asserts that, aside from her own submission, every other request 
for accommodation that was submitted to the Committee on medical grounds 
was granted. Id. ¶¶ 127–28. First, comparator employee EE55 was 
accommodated after submitting a doctor’s note citing allergies but no greater 
factual detail than plaintiff’s submission included. Id. ¶¶ 130–31. EE5 was 
permitted to work from home thereafter. Id. ¶ 132. Comparator EE6 was 
also accommodated by defendant when they submitted a doctor’s note citing a 
hip replacement and were permitted to delay their vaccination until after 
they received hip surgery. Id. ¶¶ 133–35. Next, comparator EE9 submitted a 
successful medical accommodation request to the Committee. Id. ¶¶ 136–37. 
As to that employee, plaintiff takes issue with defendant’s failure to produce 
any doctor’s notes supportive of that request for medical accommodation. Id. 
Plaintiff has also detailed certain comparator employees who sought 
religious accommodation under the Policy. Id. ¶ 139. Colangelo asserts that 
five comparators successfully obtained a religious accommodation from the 
Policy, while only one other employee aside from plaintiff was denied. Id. ¶¶ 
139–40. Even further, plaintiff argues that the only other employee who was 
 
5 Plaintiff refers to the comparator employees using pseudonyms, e.g., EE5, EE6, EE9. 

 
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denied a religious accommodation, EE1, was unsuccessful only because he 
failed to appear before the Committee “to discuss his religious beliefs.” Id. ¶ 
141. Conversely, while other employees who succeeded in obtaining a 
religious accommodation were permitted to meet with the Committee, 
plaintiff was not. Id. ¶ 142. 
Colangelo’s twelve-count action against Hamilton brings claims for: 1) 
discriminatory discharge on the basis of sex and/or pregnancy in violation of 
Title VII; 2) failure to accommodate on the basis of sex and/or pregnancy in 
violation of Title VII; 3) retaliatory discharge on the basis of sex and/or 
pregnancy in violation of Title VII; 4) discriminatory discharge on the basis of 
religion in violation of Title VII; 5) failure to accommodate on the basis of 
religion in violation of Title VII; 6) retaliatory discharge on the basis of 
religion in violation of Title VII; 7) discriminatory discharge on the basis of 
sex and/or pregnancy in violation of the NYSHRL; 8) failure to accommodate 
on the basis of pregnancy in violation of the NYSHRL; 9) retaliatory 
discharge on the basis of sex and/or pregnancy in violation of the NYSHRL; 
10) discriminatory discharge on the basis of religion in violation of the 
NYSHRL; 11) failure to accommodate on the basis of religion in violation of 
the NYSHRL; 12) retaliatory discharge on the basis of religion in violation of 
the NYSHRL. Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 10–21. 
III. LEGAL STANDARD 

 
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 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56, summary judgment is 
proper where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “A genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence 
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 
party.” McCutcheon v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 62 F.4th 674, 686 (2d Cir. 2023) 
(quoting Nick’s Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107, 113 
(2d Cir. 2017)). 
 A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the 
governing law.” Hilton v. Wright, 928 F. Supp. 2d 530, 544 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “In 
reviewing the motion, the district court must ‘draw all reasonable inferences 
against the party whose motion is under consideration.’” Lake v. 
HealthAlliance Hosp. Broadway Campus, 738 F. Supp. 3d 208, 215 (N.D.N.Y. 
2024) (quoting Williams v. MTA Bus Co., 44 F.4th 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2022)). 
But “[a] question of material fact does not exist merely because plaintiff 
disagrees with the deposition testimony and documentary evidence produced 
by defendant[s].” Turner v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 3d 123, 131 
(E.D.N.Y. 2023) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48). 
 After a moving party carries its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent 
then “must provide more than conclusory allegations … and show more than 

 
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some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” See Vista Food Exch., Inc. 
v. Comercial De Alimentos Sanchez S De R L De C.V., 147 F.4th 73, 85 (2d 
Cir. 2025) (quoting Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 101 (2d 
Cir. 20210)). Instead, “[t]he non-moving party ‘must come forward with 
specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material 
fact.’” Murrell v. Moscicki, 790 F. Supp. 3d 213, 220 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (quoting 
Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011)). “Indeed, ‘the 
mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not 
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the 
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.’” Campbell v. 
Belgard, 765 F. Supp. 3d 234, 241 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (quoting Anderson, 477 
U.S. at 247–48). 
 “In sum, the ultimate test ‘is whether the evidence can reasonably support 
a verdict in plaintiff’s favor.’” Waltman v. United Servs., Inc., 635 F. Supp. 3d 
86, 98–99 (D. Conn. 2022) (quoting James v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 233 F.3d 149, 
157 (2d Cir. 2000)). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a 
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue 
for trial.” Waltman, 635 F. Supp. 3d at 99 (quoting Baez v. JetBlue Airways 
Corp., 793 F.3d 269, 274 (2d Cir. 2015)). 
 
 

 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
 Hamilton has moved for summary judgment, arguing that: 1) plaintiff’s 
Title VII and NYSHRL pregnancy and religious discrimination claims must 
be dismissed because she cannot demonstrate either disparate treatment or a 
disparate impact under the Policy; 2) plaintiff’s Title VII and NYSHRL 
failure to accommodate claims premised on her pregnancy must be dismissed 
because, aside from the fact that the Policy was implemented for a “non-
pretextual, legitimate, non-discriminatory reason[,]” she cannot prove she 
was treated less favorably than non-pregnant employees; 3) plaintiff’s Title 
VII and NYSHRL failure to accommodate claims on the basis of her religion 
should be denied because plaintiff’s request was untimely and, even if it were 
timely, there is substantial evidence that the request was not made in good 
faith based upon sincerely held beliefs; 4) plaintiff’s Title VII and NYSHRL 
retaliation claims should be dismissed because plaintiff cannot show that 
retaliation was the but-for cause of the adverse action she suffered. Def.’s 
Mem., Dkt. No. 64-31 at 8–28. 
 Plaintiff opposes defendant’s motion in all respects, arguing that: 1) she 
has established a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge on the basis of 
pregnancy in violation of Title VII and the NYSHRL and disputes Hamilton’s 
contentions that she was neither qualified for her position at the time of 
termination nor able to demonstrate that her discharge gives rise to an 

 
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inference of discriminatory intent; 2) she has made a prima facie disparate 
impact claim for pregnancy discrimination by showing that all pregnant 
women who sought accommodation under the Policy were denied while others 
were not; 3) she has established a prima face case of failure to accommodate 
on the basis of pregnancy because Hamilton did accommodate others who 
were similarly situated; 4) defendant’s Policy was not the pretextual basis for 
plaintiff’s termination; 5) she has made a prima facie case of discriminatory 
discharge on the basis of religion and defendant has failed to demonstrate 
that she either lacked a sincerely held religious belief or that her request for 
religious believe was untimely; 6) they have sufficiently demonstrated that 
defendant failed to provide a religious accommodation; and 7) defendant 
retaliated against her for requesting an accommodation. Pl.’s Reply Brief, 
Dkt. No. 77-21 at 6–35. 
Before addressing the parties’ substantive arguments, however, the Court 
notes that plaintiff has also raised an issue in their response to defendant’s 
statement of material facts (“SOMF”). Specifically, plaintiff has called into 
question whether Hamilton properly filed their two supporting declarations 
in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (“§ 1746”). See Pl.’s Reply to Def.’s 
SOMF, Dkt. No. 77-20 ¶ 1; see also Leach Decl., Dkt. No. 64-1, Stemkoski 
Decl., Dkt. No. 64-7. Accordingly, in her response to defendant’s SOMF, 
plaintiff has denied the great majority of facts set forth by Hamilton on the 

 
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basis of these deficient declarations. The Court is now faced with 
determining whether Hamilton’s SOMF, insofar as it relies upon the 
declarations of now-terminated defendants Karen Leach (“Leach”) and Steve 
Stemkoski (“Stemkoski”), can properly be considered in support of their 
motion. 
Plaintiff contends that neither the Leach nor Stemkoski declarations were 
“executed under penalty of perjury and do not indicate where they are 
signed.” See Pl.’s Reply to Def.’s SOMF, Dkt. No. 77-20 ¶ 1. Hamilton did not 
address this issue in their reply briefing. See Reply Brief, Dkt. No. 81. 
“[§] 1746 provides that an unsworn matter may be treated as sworn, 
provided that it is “prove[n] by the unsworn declaration, certificate, 
verification, or statement, in writing of such person which is subscribed by 
him, as true under penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially the … form” 
of the model declaration provided.” In re World Trade Center Disaster Site 
Litig., 722 F.3d 483, 488 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
1746) (emphasis in original); see also LaBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, 
L.L.P. v. Worsham, 185 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that Ҥ 1746 allows 
for unsworn declarations to be submitted to a court if it “is subscribed by [the 
declarant], as true under penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially the 
following form: ... ‘I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of 
perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is 

 
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true and correct. Executed on (date). (Signature).’”); see also Hawke v. ADK 
Aquatics LLC, 2026 WL 538931 at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2026) (“To be 
admissible in a summary judgment proceeding, an affidavit must be sworn 
to,” or, alternatively, a declaration made under penalty of perjury.”) 
“Parsing the declaration provided in the statute reveals its substantive 
elements: the declarant must (1) ‘declare (or certify, verify, or state),’ (2) 
‘under penalty of perjury,’ (3) that the matter sworn to is ‘true and correct.’” 
In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, 722 F.3d at 488. Even 
substituting “subject to punishment” in for “under penalty of perjury” has 
been held to be a “substantial departure from the substance of the 
declaration provided for in § 1746, and thus, does not comply with the 
statute. Id.; see also Davis v. Grant, 2 at *1, n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2019) (“The 
Second Circuit has held that the absence of the ‘under the penalty of perjury’ 
language constitutes a substantial departure from § 1746.”); see also LeBouef, 
Lamb, Greene, & MacRae, L.L.P., 185 F.3d at 65–66 (reversing summary 
judgment granted to plaintiff where district court excluded defendant’s 
unsworn letter which “substantially” complied with the requirements of § 
1746, because it included the language “[u]nder penalty of perjury, I make 
the statements contained herein,” and was signed and dated, even though it 
did not include language that the contents of the letter were “true and 
correct”); Stair v. Calhoun, 2015 WL 1966345, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2015) 

 
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(finding that pro se plaintiff’s unsworn declaration that did not include the 
language “true under penalty of perjury” did not meet the requirements of § 
1746 because “[i]nclusion of the language ‘under penalty of perjury’ is an 
integral requirement of the statute.”) (cleaned up); Ed-George v. Burns, 2009 
WL 2957796, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2009) (finding that although § 1746 
“requires only that a declaration [ ] ‘substantially’” conform with its 
requirements, the words “under penalty of perjury” are “expressly required” 
because without them “it is far from clear to the court that [the] [p]laintiff 
fully appreciates the consequences, or is impressed with the solemnity of his 
declaration”) (cleaned up). 
Indeed, the “[i]nclusion of language of the language ‘under penalty of 
perjury’ is an integral requirement of the statute for the very reason that it 
impresses upon the declarant the specific punishment to which he or she is 
subjected for certifying to false statements.” And “as the Fifth Circuit has 
observed, omission of the phrase ‘under penalty of perjury’ would ‘allow[] the 
affiant to circumvent the penalties for perjury in signing onto intentional 
falsehoods.’” In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, 722 F.3d at 
488 (quoting Nissho-Iwai Am. Corp. v. Kline, 845 F.2d 1300, 1306 (5th Cir. 
1988)). The Second Circuit has also held that, under § 1746, it is required 
“that a certification of the truth of the matter be expressly made under 

 
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penalty of perjury” and that “[a]ny other result would be contrary to the plain 
language of the statute and the objective sought to be advanced by it.” Id. 
Notably, when deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court may 
review the entire record, including the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and any other evidence on file to 
determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c)(3). But Rule 56 does not “impose an obligation on a district court to 
perform an independent review of the record to find proof of a factual 
dispute.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 288 F.3d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 
2002) (collecting cases). Further, Local Rule 56.1(a) requires that the SOMF 
shall set forth “a short and concise statement of each material fact about 
which the moving party contends there exists no genuine issue” and that 
“[e]ach fact listed shall set forth a specific citation to the record where the 
fact is established.” See N.D.N.Y. L.R. 56.1(a). The moving party’s failure “to 
submit an accurate and complete Statement of Material Facts shall result in 
a denial of the motion.” Id. 
Upon review, certain key requirements set forth supra are not present in 
defendant’s declarations. While the Leach and Stemkoski declarations state 
that they are made “pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746” and are signed and dated 
by the declarant, they do not declare, certify, verify, or state under penalty of 
perjury that the matter sworn to is true and correct. See Leach Decl., Dkt. 

 
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No. 64-1; see also Stemkoski Decl., Dkt. No. 64-7. Nor has defendant shed 
any light as to the absence of the required elements for declarations in their 
briefing for this Court’s consideration. See Reply Brief, Dkt. No. 81. 
Accordingly, the Leach and Stemkoski declarations will not be considered. 
Given that a significant portion of the defendant’s SOMF cites only to the 
declarations that the Court will not take into consideration, defendant has 
failed to meet their burden under Rule 56(c) and their motion must be 
dismissed pursuant to the Local Rules. And even if the Court were to accept 
Hamilton’s declarations, it still finds that plaintiff tends to show genuine 
issues of material fact as to her claims. 
While the Court will not delve into the record to evaluate each of plaintiff’s 
claims or highlight each genuine issue of material fact that exists, plaintiff’s 
filings do tend to show genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether, 
under the Policy, pregnant employees seeking accommodations for medical 
reasons were treated differently than non-pregnant employees. As stated 
supra, Hamilton seeks to dismiss plaintiff’s pregnancy discrimination and 
failure to accommodate claims under Title VII and the NYSHRL, asserting 
that Colangelo fails to provide any direct evidence to show Hamilton acted 
with discriminatory motive in denying her accommodation request or any 
indirect evidence of their discriminatory intent. Defendant asserts that 
Colangelo has neither carried her burden to show she was qualified for her 

 
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position at the time of her termination nor met her burden of showing that 
Hamilton lacked a “non-pretextual, legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for 
terminating [p]laintiff’s employment.” Def.’s Mem., Dkt. No. 64-31 at 11–19. 
Defendant also contends that plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Policy 
had an adverse impact on pregnant employees. In Hamilton’s view, 1) they 
implemented a legitimate, non-discriminatory Policy; 2) when plaintiff failed 
to obtain the COVID-19 vaccine by August 26, 2021 as was required under 
the Policy, she was no longer qualified for employment; and 3) plaintiff’s 
employment was properly terminated for failing to comply with the Policy. 
See generally id. 
Plaintiff has alleged that she was treated less favorably than other non-
pregnant co-workers when she sought accommodation until completing her 
pregnancy. Supra. She asserts that other, non-pregnant employees seeking 
accommodations for medical reasons succeeded in doing so with nothing more 
than a doctor’s note in support of their request. Id 
 “‘In 1978, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’ [(“PDA”)], 
which amended Title VII to protect employees from pregnancy 
discrimination.” Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944 F.3d 97, 103 n. 2 (2d Cir. 2019) 
(quoting Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 212 (2015)). “The 
[PDA] makes clear that Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination 
applies to discrimination based on pregnancy.” Id. (quoting Young, 575 U.S. 

 
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at 210). Under the PDA, employers must “treat women affected by 
pregnancy … the same for all employment-related purposes … as other 
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” 
Young, 575 U.S. at 210 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). Thus, under the PDA 
“it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related conditions less favorably than 
other medical conditions.” LaBarbera v. NYU Winthrop Hospital, 527 F. 
Supp. 3d 275, 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Legg v. Ulster Cty, 802 F.3d 67, 
72 (2d Cir. 2016)) (cleaned up). 
 Colangelo asserts that defendant granted every other request to non-
pregnant employees for an accommodation on medical grounds aside from 
hers. Pl.’s Reply to Def.’s SOMF ¶ 127–28. In support, plaintiff points to 
multiple comparator employees who obtained an accommodation from 
defendant. Id. ¶¶ 130–136. While plaintiff did not submit a doctor’s note in 
support of her request for medical accommodation, plaintiff asserts that 
comparator employee EE9 was granted an accommodation without defendant 
ever producing a doctor’s note in discovery in support of that employee’s 
request. Id. ¶¶ 113, 138. Although defendant argues that employees were 
required to complete a medical exemption request form and provide 
documentation from a medical provider in support of their request, Colangelo 
asserts that Hamilton failed to provide her with all of the necessary 
paperwork to make an exemption request. Id. ¶ 13. 

 
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 In addition, while defendant contends that the deadline for employees to 
submit their requests for accommodation was August 7, 2021, plaintiff has 
provided facts to suggest both that there was broad confusion surrounding 
the actual deadline to submit an accommodation request and that other 
employees were granted additional time to submit such request while her 
request was denied as untimely. Def.’s SOMF ¶ 10; Pl.’s Reply to Def.’s 
SOMF ¶¶ 10, 53; see also Stemkoski Dep., Dkt. No. 77-6 at 59:1–61:12. With 
respect to plaintiff’s religious discrimination claims, she has alleged that at 
least one comparator employee, EE12, was granted accommodation despite 
also submitting an untimely request. Id. ¶¶ 10, 64, 139, 148–150. There 
also appear to be factual issues between the parties as to whether plaintiff 
held a sincerely held religious belief in support of her religious exemption 
request. 
 Plaintiff has also introduced certain Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) guidance which advises that pregnant employees may 
be entitled to “job modifications, including telework” and that “[e]mployers 
should ensure that supervisors, managers, and human resources personnel 
know how to handle such requests to avoid disparate treatment in violation 
of Title VII.” See e.g., Pl’s Opp’n. Mem., Dkt. No. 77-21 at 10; see also EEOC 
Guidance, Dkt. No. 77-22 at 38–39, 50–51. 

 
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 Nonetheless, defendant has not met their burden under Rule 56, and their 
SOMF does not comply with the Local Rules in this District. For that reason, 
their motion will be denied. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the issues set forth in 
Hamilton’s motion have not been adequately briefed for the Court to rule on 
the merits of the motion. 
Therefore, it is 
ORDERED that 
1. Hamilton’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 64) is DENIED; 
The Clerk of the Court is further directed to terminate the pending motion 
and update the case caption as directed above. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dated: June 12, 2026 
 Utica, New York. 

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