govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_25-cv-02482-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
FREESTATE JUSTICE, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
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Civil Action No. GLR-25-2482 
 
 
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 MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission and Andrea Lucas’ (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to 
Dismiss (ECF No. 24). The Motion is ripe for disposition, and no hearing is necessary. See 
Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2025). For the reasons outlined below, the Court will grant 
Defendants’ Motion. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background1 
Plaintiff FreeState Justice (“FreeState”) brings this action for declaratory and 
injunctive relief against Defendants Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“Commission” or “EEOC”) and Andrea Lucas, in her official capacity as Chair of the 
Commission. (Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1). 2 FreeState is a legal -services nonprofit 
 
1 Unless otherwise noted, the Court takes the following facts from the Complaint 
(ECF No. 1) and accepts them as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 
2 Citations to the page numbers refer to the pagination assigned by the Court’s Case 
Management/Electronic Case Files (“CM/ECF”) system. 

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organization, headquartered in Baltimore, Maryland, that provides free legal services, 
legislative advocacy, education, and outreach programs for LGBTQ+ individuals. (Id. 
¶ 15). Specifically, one of its core services is “helping clients who have experienced 
discrimination in employment, housing, or healthcare file discrimination charges to address 
and remedy that discrimination.” (Id. ¶ 100). 
On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14168. (Compl. ¶ 62 
(citing 90 Fed.Reg. 8,615 (Jan. 20, 2025))). The Executive Order declares it is the policy 
of the United States to recognize two sexes, male and female. (Id. ¶ 63). The Order instructs 
federal agencies to “enforce laws governing sex-based rights, protections, opportunities, 
and accommodations to protect men and women as biologically distinct sexes.” (Id. ¶ 65 
(quoting Executive Order 14168 § 3(b))). 
In response to this Order, on January 28, 2025, EEOC Chair Lucas announced that 
the EEOC was “returning to its mission of protecting women from sexual harassment and 
sex-based discrimination in the workplace by rolling back the Biden administration’s 
gender identity agenda.” (Id. ¶¶ 66, 66 n.16). Lucas further identified several actions that 
the Commission had taken consistent with the Order, including: (1) ending the use of the 
‘X’ gender marker during the charge intake process; and (2) removing ‘Mx.’ from the list 
of prefix options and any materials that promote gender ideology. (Id. ¶ 67). 
About two days later, on or around January 30, 2025, FreeState alleges that the 
Commission ceased processing charges related to sexual orientation and gender-identity 
discrimination, including harassment. (Id. ¶ 77). At this time, the EEOC has resumed 
processing charges of gender-identity discrimination that occur during “hiring, firing, and 

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promotion.” (Id. ¶¶ 81, 81 n.59). The Commission has not, however, resumed processing 
charges alleging harassment or retaliation based on gender-identity. (Id. ¶¶ 82, 82 n.60). 
Moreover, on May 28, 2025, the Commission sent a memorandum to directors of 
state and local Fair Employment Practices Agencies (“FEPAs”), 3 informing them that the 
EEOC would no longer reimburse FEPAs for processing or investigating charges related 
to gender identity. (Id. ¶¶ 86, 86 n.62, 91). 
In so doing, FreeState contends that the Commission’s new policy of selectively 
investigating gender identity charges (the “Policy”) prevents transgender workers from 
fully participating in the Commission’s “charge-investigation process and availing 
themselves of Title VII’s protections against discrimination.” (Id. ¶¶ 76, 95, 98). As a 
result, FreeState now advises its transgender clients to file discrimination charges with the 
Maryland Commission on Civil Rights (“MCCR”), the state FEPA, rather than the EEOC. 
(Id. ¶ 105). But, according to FreeState, the MCCR is not an equal substitute for the 
EEOC’s process, as the MCCR charge-investigation process takes longer than the EEOC’s, 
“and the investigation process tends not to yield the same results as does the EEOC 
process.” (Id. ¶ 108). As such, FreeState further alleges that the EEOC’s Policy curtails its 
ability to address workplace discrimination claims—a core service —for its transgender 
clients. (Id. ¶ 115). 
More specifically, FreeState asserts that the Policy: (1) deprives it and its clients of 
 
3 FEPAs are responsible for enforcing their own state and local employment -
discrimination laws. (Compl. ¶ 52, ECF No. 1). The EEOC contracts with FEPAs to help 
fulfill its enforcement responsibilities. (Id.). 

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information “they would be entitled to receive from the EEOC, including employer 
position statements and supporting documentation during the charge investigation process” 
(id. ¶ 117); (2) requires clients to file multiple charges of discrimination with separate 
agencies (id. ¶ 118); (3) requires FreeState to devote additional time and resources to 
maintain separate investigations (id. ¶ 120); and (4) makes it difficult for FreeState to 
provide comprehensive guidance to its clients (id. ¶ 121). 
B. Procedural History 
On July 29, 2025, FreeState filed a Complaint against Defendants, alleging six 
violations of Title VII (Count I); the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Clause (Count II); 
and the Administrative Procedure Act (Counts III–VI). (Id. ¶¶ 134–92). FreeState seeks a 
declaratory judgment that Defendants’ Policy is unlawful and unconstitutional. (Id. at 40). 
Additionally, FreeState seeks vacatur of the Policy and permanent injunctive relief 
enjoining Defendants from implementing the Policy, as well as costs and reasonable 
attorneys’ fees. (Id.). 
On October 15, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 24). 
FreeState filed an Opposition on November 10, 2025 (ECF No. 26), and Defendants filed 
a Reply on November 24, 2025 (ECF No. 28). Defendants filed a Notice of Supplemental 
Authority on November 26, 2025 (ECF No. 29), and FreeState filed a Response to 
Defendants’ Notice on December 4, 2025 (ECF No. 30). 

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II. DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review 
 A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the Court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter 
of a complaint. Such a challenge can be facial, asserting that the facts as pled fail to 
establish jurisdiction, or factual, disputing the pleadings themselves and arguing that other 
facts demonstrate that no jurisdiction exists. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 270 (4th 
Cir. 2017) (quoting Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009)). For a facial 
challenge, “the plaintiff is ‘afforded the same procedural protection as she would receive 
under a Rule 12(b)(6) consideration.’” Id. (quoting Kerns, 585 F.3d at 192). When a party 
brings a factual challenge, “the presumption of truthfulness normally accorded a 
complaint’s allegations does not apply.” Id. (quoting Kerns, 585 F.3d at 192). Here, 
Defendants bring a facial challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of standing. (See Defs.’ 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss [“Mot.”] at 15–27, ECF No. 24-1). 
 The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to “test[] the sufficiency of a complaint,” 
not to “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of 
defenses.” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Edwards v. City 
of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). A complaint fails to state a claim if it 
does not contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), or does not “state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 
statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Though the plaintiff is 
not required to forecast evidence to prove the elements of the claim, the complaint must 
allege sufficient facts to establish each element. See Goss v. Bank of Am., N.A. , 917 
F.Supp.2d 445, 449 (D.Md. 2013) (quoting Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th 
Cir. 2012)), aff’d, 546 F.App’x 165 (4th Cir. 2013). 
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must examine the complaint as a 
whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual 
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 
268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 
2005) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). But the court need not accept 
unsupported or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, see 
United Black Firefighters of Norfolk v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979) (finding 
dismissal of complaint proper because plaintiffs’ “conclusory allegations” of 
discrimination were unsupported by “reference to particular acts, practices, or policies”), 
or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 
B. Analysis 
FreeState argues they are entitled to a permanent injunction and declaratory relief 
on multiple constitutional and statutory grounds. (See Compl. at 40). Before turning to the 

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merits of their arguments, the Court will first address the Commission’s standing challenge. 
(Mot. at 15–27). 
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts 
to “cases” and “controversies,” so plaintiffs in federal civil actions must demonstrate 
standing “for each claim [they] seek[] to press.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 
332, 335 (2006); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The “irreducible 
constitutional minimum” requirements of standing consist of three elements: (1) the 
plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”; (2) the injury must be fairly traceable to 
the actions of the defendant; and (3) it must be “likely” that the injury will be “redressed 
by a favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (citations omitted). 
A judicially cognizable injury “requires, among other things,” that the “dispute is 
traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Raines v. 
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997) (citation modified). Challenges to the Executive Branch’s 
“arrest or prosecution policies” seldom qualify. United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 677 
(2023). The Court begins and ends its inquiry here. 
At the outset, Defendants contend that FreeState lacks standing to challenge the 
Commission’s discretionary enforcement decisions when FreeState itself was “neither 
prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.” (Mot. at 17 (quoting Texas, 599 U.S. at 674)). 
In support of this argument, Defendants cite to the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Texas, which this Court finds instructive. 599 U.S. 670 (2023). Like this case, 
United States v. Texas concerned federal agency action in response to a new 
administration’s shifting priorities. See 599 U.S. at 673. There, two states—Louisiana and 

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Texas—sued the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) for implementing new 
immigration enforcement guidelines that “prioritize[d] the arrest and removal from the 
United States of noncitizens who [were] suspected terrorists or dangerous criminals, or 
who . . . unlawfully entered the country . . . recently.” Id. According to the States, DHS’s 
new guidelines violated federal statutes that required the Department to “arrest more 
criminal noncitizens pending their removal.” Id. As such, Texas and Louisiana asked the 
“Federal Judiciary to order the Department to alter its arrest policy” accordingly. Id. at 676. 
Declining this invitation, the Supreme Court reasoned that the “Executive Branch—not the 
Judiciary— makes arrests and prosecutes offenses on behalf of the United States.” Id. at 
679. And because of this, “the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute 
discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.” Id. (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 693 (1974)).4 
 
4 To be sure, the Supreme Court explained certain circumstances under which courts 
may entertain a claim of the sort alleged by FreeState: 
 
First, the Court has adjudicated selective -prosecution claims 
under the Equal Protection Clause. In those cases, however, a 
party typically seeks to prevent his or her own prosecution, not 
to mandate additional prosecution against other possible 
defendants. Second, . . . the standing analysis might differ 
when Congress elevates de facto injuries to the status of legally 
cognizable injuries redressable by a federal court . . . . Third, 
the standing calculus might change if the Executive Branch 
wholly abandoned its statutory responsibilities to make arrests 
or bring prosecutions . . . . Fourth, a challenge to an Executive 
Branch policy that involves both the Executive Branch’s arrest 
or prosecution priorities and the . . . provision of legal benefits 
or legal status could lead to a different standing 
analysis . . . . Fifth, policies governing the continued detention 
of noncitizens who have already been arrested arguably might 

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FreeState attempts to distinguish this case from Texas by pointing out that the policy 
at issue in Texas did not “categorically toss[] out certain charges.” (Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. 
Dismiss at 25, ECF No. 26). Even so, the Texas Court made clear that “federal courts are 
‘not the proper forum for resolving claims that the Executive Branch’ should ‘bring more’ 
investigations and enforcement actions.” Cross v. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 
810 F.Supp.3d 88, 95 (D.D.C. 2025) (quoting Texas, 599 U.S. at 680). 
While deeply troubling, the Court agrees with Defendants that the EEOC’s decision 
to alter its investigations of gender identity discrimination claims constitutes a 
discretionary decision over which the Court lacks authority to review. (See Mot. at 18); 
Cross, 810 F.Supp.3d at 97–98 (“Agency enforcement discretion applies across the board, 
not just when the courts agree with agency decisions.”). In Cross v. United States Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia faced a nearly identical challenge to the Commission’s new enforcement policy 
in the wake of President Trump’s Executive Orders and reached the same conclusion. See 
810 F.Supp.3d at 95–98 (finding that plaintiff lacked standing to assert challenge against 
EEOC’s new policy to stop investigating disparate-impact claims because such decision 
was discretionary). This Court agrees with the analysis of our sister court in Cross and will 
adopt its reasoning herein. Accordingly, the Court finds that FreeState lacks standing to 
 
raise a different standing question than arrest or prosecution 
policies. 
 
United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 681–83 (2023) (internal citations omitted). None of 
those scenarios are present in this case. 

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pursue its claims and will dismiss this case, without prejudice, for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF 
No. 24). A separate Order follows. 
Entered this 12th day of June, 2026. 
 /s/ 
George L. Russell, III 
Chief United States District Judge 

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