govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_25-cv-01636-4

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
CORY STALLINGS, 
 
 P l a i n t i f f , 
 
v. 
 
SOUTHWESTERN ILLINOIS 
COLLEGE, 
 
 D e f e n d a n t . 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge: 
 This matter is before the Court sua sponte. As set forth below, pro se Plaintiff Cory 
Stallings has failed to comply with this Court’s orders or to prosecute his case. 
Accordingly, it shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
On April 13, 2026, Defendant Southwestern Illinois College (SWIC) filed a motion 
to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summa ry judgment. (Doc. 36). Stallings’s response 
was due May 15, 2026. SDIL-LR 7.1(b)(1)(A); F ED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). When no response had 
been received by May 20, 2026, this Court ordered Plaintiff Cory Stallings to show cause 
on or before June 3, 2026, why the Court shou ld not consider the motion uncontested.1 
(Doc. 38). Stallings was warned that a failure to respond to the Court’s order could result 
in sanctions or dismissal of his action. Id. 
 
1 Alternatively, Stallings could have filed his response by that date to satisfy the show-cause order. 
(Doc. 38). Page ID
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Then, on May 27, 2026, Stallings failed to appear for a video scheduling 
conference.2 (Doc. 39). On May 28, 2026, the Court ex tended the show-cause deadline to 
June 10, 2026, and ordered Stallings both to addr ess his failure to respond to the motion 
to dismiss and to explain his absence at the scheduling conference. (Doc. 43). He was 
“once again warn[ed] . . . that a failure to comply with the show cause order may result 
in the dismissal of his case with prejudice.” June 10 has come and gone, but Stallings has 
not filed a response. 
Pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a Court may 
dismiss an action for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or comply with a court order. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). A dismissal under this rule operates as an adjudication on the merits. 
Id. Here, Stallings is proceeding pro se, and the Court is mindful of the difficulties he faces 
in doing so. But those difficulties do not excuse him from communicating with the Court 
or from complying with Court orders. “Once a party invokes the judicial system by filing 
a lawsuit, it must abide by the rules of the court; a party can not decide for itself when it 
feels like pressing its action an d when it feels like taking a break because ‘[t]rial judges 
have a responsibility to litigants to keep their court calendars as current as humanly 
possible.’” GCIU Employer Retirement Fund v. Chi. Trib. Co. , 8 F.3d 1195, 1198–99 
(7th Cir. 1993) (alteration in original) (quoting Kagan v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. , 795 F.2d 
601, 608 (7th Cir. 1986)). 
 
2 He also submitted two filings that same day: a “N otice to the Court Regardin g Late Receipt of Filings” 
(Doc. 41), and a putative “Motion for Order to Show Ca use” (Doc. 42). In response to the first filing, the 
Court extended the deadline to show cause. (Doc. 43). The Court denied the motion in Stallings’s second 
filing, which was baseless and appeared to reflect a misunderstanding of litigation procedures. Id. Page ID
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Because Stallings has failed to comply wi th this Court’s orders and failed to 
prosecute this matter, this action is DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); see generally James v. McDonald’s Corp ., 417 F.3d 672, 681 (7th Cir. 
2005). The case is CLOSED, and the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment 
accordingly. 
NOTICE 
If Stallings wishes to contest this Order, he has two options. He can ask the Seventh 
Circuit to review the Order, or he can first ask the undersigned to reconsider the Order 
before appealing to the Seventh Circuit. 
If Stallings chooses to go st raight to the Seventh Circuit, he must file a notice of 
appeal within 30 days from the entry of judgment or order appealed from. FED. R. APP. P. 
4(a)(1)(A). The deadline can be extended for a short time only if Stallings files a motion 
showing excusable neglect or good caus e for missing the deadline and asking for an 
extension of time. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)(A), (C). See also Sherman v. Quinn , 668 F.3d 421, 
424 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining the good cause and excusable neglect standards ); 
Abuelyaman v. Illinois State Univ. , 667 F.3d 800, 807 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining the 
excusable neglect standard). 
On the other hand, if Stallings wants to start with the undersigned, he should file 
a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The 
motion must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the entry of judgment, and the 
deadline cannot be extended. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e); 6(b)(2). The motion must also comply 
with Rule 7(b)(1) and state with sufficient particularity the reasons that the Court should Page ID
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reconsider the judgment. Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 707 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Blue v. 
Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 698 F.3d 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2012) (“To prevail on a Rule 59(e) 
motion to amend judgment, a party must clearly establish (1) that the court committed a 
manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence precluded entry of 
judgment.”). 
So long as the Rule 59(e) motion is in proper form and timely submitted, the 30-
day clock for filing a notice of appeal will be stopped. F ED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). The clock 
will start anew once the undersigned rules on the Rule 59(e) motion. F ED. R. APP. P. 
4(a)(1)(A), (a)(4), (a)(4)(B)(ii). To be clear, if the Rule 59(e) motion is filed outside the 28-
day deadline or “completely devoid of substance,” the motion will not stop the clock for 
filing a notice of appeal; it will expire 30 days from the entry of judgment. Carlson v. CSX 
Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 826 (7th Cir. 2014); Martinez v. Trainor, 556 F.2d 818, 819–20 (7th 
Cir. 1977). Again, this deadline can be extend ed only on a written motion by Stallings 
showing excusable neglect or good cause. 
The Court has one more bit of instruction regarding the appeals process. If 
Stallings chooses to appeal to the Seventh Circuit, he can do so by filing a notice of appeal 
in this Court. F
ED. R. APP. P. 3(a). The current cost of filing an appeal with the Seventh 
Circuit is $605.00. The filing fee is due at the time the notice of appeal is filed. FED. R. APP. 
P. 3(e). If Stallings cannot afford to pay the entire filing fee up front, he must file a motion 
for leave to appeal in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C). The IFP motion 
must set forth the issues Stallin gs plans to present on appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 
24(a)(1)(C). If he is allowed to proceed IFP on appeal, he will be assessed an initial partial Page ID
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filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He will then be required to make monthly payments 
until the entire filing fee is paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 12, 2026
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge Page ID
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