govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-8_26-cv-00244-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
 : 
DANIEL E. RUFFIN 
 : 
 
 v. : Civil Action No. DKC 26-244 
 
 : 
CITY OF MOUNT RAINIER, MARYLAND 
 : 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 Presently pending and ready for resolution in this employment 
law case is the motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for 
summary judgment filed by the City of Mount Rainier (“Mount 
Rainier” or “Defendant”). (ECF No. 8). Some of the issues have 
been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed 
necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the 
motion will be treated as a motion to dismiss and will be granted 
as to the federal claims. The state law claims will be held in 
abeyance and may be remanded to state court unless Plaintiff amends 
to plead an adequate federal claim. 
I. Background 
A. Factual Background
1 
Daniel Ruffin “is an African American male over the age of 
40” who worked as a police officer in the Mount Rainier Police 
 
1 The facts herein are as alleged in the complaint or as 
provided in undisputedly authentic documents that are integral to 
the complaint. 

2 
 
Department (“MRPD”) for more than ten years. (ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 1, 9). 
Mr. Ruffin served as President of the Fraternal Order of Police 
(“FOP”) in Mount Rainier and “regularly engaged in . . . union 
activity,” such as “advocat[ing] for officer pay, benefits, 
safety, and working conditions.” (Id. ¶¶ 10–11). His advocacy 
included “[o]pposing discriminatory pay practices” and “[r]aising 
concerns about officer treatment.” (Id. ¶ 43). Prior to the 
period at issue in this case, he had “no sustained disciplinary 
findings.” (Id. ¶ 2). 
In the period between May and June 2025, Mr. Ruffin “helped 
organize a vote of no confidence in [Mount Rainier] City Manager 
Kourosh Kamali.”
2 (Id. ¶ 12). The FOP formally expressed the vote 
of no confidence in a letter (“No Confidence Letter”) transmitted 
to the City Council on June 12, in which its members lamented Mr. 
Kamali’s “pattern of retaliation, discrimination, harassment, and 
fostering [of] a toxic workplace culture within the Police 
Department.” (ECF No. 8-5, at 2). 
Less than twenty-four hours after the vote of no confidence 
became public,
 Mr. Ruffin “was suspended and placed on 
 
2 The City Manager of Mount Rainier is the “Chief 
Administrative Officer of the City, responsible to the Mayor and 
Council for the administration of all City affairs.” City Manager, 
Mount Rainier, Md., https://www.mountrainiermd.org/212/City-
Manager [https://perma.cc/C3PC-TMX6]. 
 

3 
 
administrative leave.” (ECF No. 4 ¶ 13). He alleges this 
suspension was “without pay,” (id. ¶ 51), whereas the letter 
suspending Mr. Ruffin (“Suspension Letter”) stated that he was 
suspended “with pay,” (ECF No. 8-4, at 2). The Suspension Letter 
did not cite Mr. Ruffin’s involvement in the vote of no confidence 
as the reason for his suspension. Instead, it cited a recent Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) complaint filed by a 
former MRPD officer alleging that Mr. Ruffin was “aware of an 
improper sexual relationship between” that former officer and 
another individual, “took no action to intervene, engaged in 
actions that furthered the improper relationship, and later 
engaged in retaliatory activities intended to force [the former 
officer] out of the Department.” (Id.). An attorney for Mount 
Rainier later reiterated this reason. (ECF No. 4 ¶ 16). Mr. 
Ruffin alleges that “this explanation was false,” (id. ¶ 17), and 
he “received no written charges, no notice, no Internal Affairs 
case number, and no opportunity to respond, contrary to Maryland 
law,” (id. ¶ 14). Mr. Ruffin would remain on administrative leave 
during the pendency of the investigation. (See id. ¶ 51). 
The timing of what followed the suspension is unclear. On 
Mr. Ruffin’s telling, at some later time, “investigators . . . 
requested [Mr. Ruffin’s] personnel file,” but there was allegedly 
“no EEOC or related complaint . . . present.” (Id. ¶ 18). The 

4 
 
file instead contained a letter terminating Mr. Ruffin 
(“Termination Letter”) and documents alleging violations of Mount 
Rainier’s secondary employment policy that supposedly “arose after 
[he] was suspended.” (Id. ¶ 19). He alleges that the Termination 
Letter was “inserted . . . into [his] file without service or 
process.” (Id. ¶ 24). Finally, he contends that MRPD Chief Perez 
“claimed that the suspension was actually due to this secondary-
employment allegation,” too. (Id. ¶ 20). 
The Termination Letter itself was dated October 9, 2025, and 
states that it was sent via “First Class Mail and Electronic Mail” 
to Mr. Ruffin. (ECF No. 8-10, at 2). It explained that Mr. Ruffin 
was terminated for “violat[ing] numerous City of Mount Rainier 
policies by working secondary employment with Anne Arundel 
Community College repeatedly while on duty as a police officer 
with the City of Mount Rainier Police Department, and by regularly 
clocking in as if [he] w[as] working []on those dates.” (Id.). 
It further provided that Mr. Ruffin could “elect a trial board” to 
review the termination, but that if he did not do so by October 
17, 2025, his termination would take effect. (Id.). Lastly, it 
purported to include a copy of the investigation report, and it 
was signed by Mr. Kamali, the City Manager. (Id.). 
Reflecting on his suspension and subsequent termination, Mr. 
Ruffin alleges that “[n]on-Black and younger officers with 

5 
 
multiple sustained Investigative Affairs findings,” of a similar 
or more severe nature, “were never suspended, never placed on 
leave, and were given preferential treatment.” (ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 22, 
31, 36). 
Mr. Ruffin filed a charge with the EEOC alleging “hostile 
work environment, harassment, discrimination, retaliation, lack of 
due process, and disparate treatment.” (Id. ¶ 6). The EEOC issued 
a right-to-sue letter on October 7, 2025. (Id. ¶ 7). 
B. Procedural Background 
On December 1, 2025, Plaintiff Mr. Ruffin filed a complaint 
in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland, against 
Defendant Mount Rainier. He asserts the following seven counts: 
race discrimination under the Maryland Fair Employment Practices 
Act (“MFEPA”), Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-601 et seq., and 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e et seq. (Count I); age discrimination under the MFEPA and 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 
et seq. (Count II); retaliation under the MFEPA, the Maryland 
Police Accountability Act (“MPAA”), Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 
3-101 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III); hostile work 
environment under the MFEPA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IV); 
procedural and substantive due process violations under Articles 
19 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and 42 U.S.C. § 

6 
 
1983 (Count V); wrongful constructive termination (Count VI); and 
violation of the MPAA, brought under both the MPAA and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (Count VII). (ECF No. 4). Defendant removed the case to 
this court on January 21, 2026. (ECF No. 1). 
Defendant then moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for 
summary judgment on the complaint on February 25. (ECF No. 8). 
Plaintiff responded on March 23, (ECF No. 11), and Defendant 
replied on March 31, (ECF No. 12). 
II. Defendant’s Motion 
As a threshold matter, the court must determine how to analyze 
Defendant’s motion. Defendant moves to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim or, in the alternative, for summary judgment and 
attaches numerous exhibits. “‘A motion styled in this manner 
implicates the court’s discretion under Rule 12(d)’ . . . to 
determine whether to accept evidence outside the pleadings, and 
thus convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion.” Coleman 
v. Calvert County, No. 15-cv-920-GJH, 2016 WL 5335477, at *3 (D.Md. 
Sep. 22, 2016) (quoting McCray v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., No. 11-
cv-3732-ELH, 2013 WL 210186, at *15 (D.Md. Jan. 16, 2013), aff’d 
in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 741 F.3d 480 (4
th Cir. 
2014)) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d); McCray, 2013 WL 210186, at *16). 
Two requirements must be met before converting a motion to 
dismiss into one for summary judgment: (1) actual notice to the 

7 
 
nonmovant that the conversion may occur, and (2) reasonable 
opportunity for discovery. See Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th 
Cir. 1985). The first requirement is met when the movant styles 
its motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment in the 
alternative. Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 
253, 260 (4
th Cir. 1998). Here, as noted, Defendant styled its 
motion as a “Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative[,] for 
Summary Judgment.” (ECF No. 8, at 1). 
The second requirement is met for a prediscovery motion when 
the nonmovant fails to “file an affidavit or declaration pursuant 
to Rule 56(d) . . . explaining why, ‘for specified reasons, it 
cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition,’ without 
needed discovery.” Sager v. Hous. Comm’n of Anne Arundel Cnty., 
855 F.Supp.2d 524, 542–43 & 543 n.26 (D.Md. 2012) (quoting 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d)) (citing Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain 
Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244–45 (4
th Cir. 2002)); see also Harrods, 302 
F.3d at 244 (“[T]he failure to file an affidavit under Rule [56(d)] 
is itself sufficient grounds to reject a claim that the opportunity 
for discovery was inadequate.” (quoting Evans v. Techs. 
Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th Cir. 1996))). But 
“[w]hen the nonmoving party, through no fault of its own, has had 
little or no opportunity to conduct discovery, and when fact-
intensive issues, such as intent, are involved, courts have not 

8 
 
always insisted on a Rule [56(d)] affidavit if the nonmoving party 
has adequately informed the district court that the motion is pre-
mature and that more discovery is necessary.” Harrods, 302 F.3d 
at 244 (citing First Chi. Int’l v. United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 
1380–81 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Hellstrom v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans 
Affs., 201 F.3d 94, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2000); Farmer v. Brennan, 81 
F.3d 1444, 1449–50 (7th Cir. 1996); Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 
1214 n.3 (11th Cir. 1992)). 
Here, although Plaintiff did not file a Rule 56(d) affidavit 
explaining why further discovery is necessary, he has done enough 
to avoid conversion. Because the case is at an early stage, 
Plaintiff has had little to no opportunity to conduct discovery. 
Moreover, the employment claims he brings turn on fact-intensive 
questions of discriminatory intent. And his response in opposition 
explicitly resists conversion for lack of a reasonable opportunity 
to conduct discovery, identifying various depositions and 
categories of documents he deems necessary to contest Defendant’s 
arguments. (ECF No. 11, at 21–22). Although not as specific as 
it should be, Plaintiff’s response suffices. His objection 
“serve[s] as the functional equivalent of an affidavit” and 
“adequately inform[s] the . . . court that the motion is pre-
mature and that more discovery is necessary.” Harrods, 302 F.3d 
at 244–45 (citation modified). 

9 
 
Defendant’s motion will therefore be treated as one to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim. 
III. Standard of Review 
A motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the 
sufficiency of the complaint. Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 
464 F.3d 480, 483 (4 th Cir. 2006). The court “must accept the 
complaint’s factual allegations as true and construe the facts in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Barnett v. Inova 
Health Care Servs., 125 F.4th 465, 469 (4
th Cir. 2025) (citing 
Barbour v. Garland, 105 F.4th 579, 589 (4 th Cir. 2024)). 
Ordinarily, a plaintiff’s complaint must only satisfy the standard 
of Rule 8(a)(2), which requires a “short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer 
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has 
alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). A Rule 8(a)(2) “showing” requires 
“stat[ing] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has 
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that defendant 

10 
 
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 
295, 299–300 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 
IV. Analysis 
Plaintiff’s factually sparse complaint asserts seven counts 
under a variety of federal and state laws. He fails to state a 
federal claim, and supplemental jurisdiction over his state claims 
is therefore unwarranted. Should Plaintiff choose not to file an 
amended complaint, his federal claims will be dismissed with 
prejudice, and his state claims will be remanded. 
A. Federal Claims 
1. Title VII and ADEA Claims (Counts I & II) 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against him on 
the basis of race and age in violation of Title VII and the ADEA 
when it suspended and then terminated him. These statutes make it 
unlawful for an employer “to discharge . . . or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment[] 
because of such individual’s race” or age. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). 
“Absent direct evidence, the elements of a prima facie case 
of discrimination under Title VII are: (1) membership in a 
protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse 
employment action; and (4) different treatment from similarly 

11 
 
situated employees outside the protected class.” Coleman v. Md. 
Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (italics added), 
aff’d sub nom. on other grounds, Coleman v. Ct. of Appeals of Md., 
566 U.S. 30 (2012). A prima facie discrimination case under the 
ADEA shares substantially the same elements, with the 
specification that the protected class is individuals at least 
forty years of age. See Westmoreland v. TWC Admin. LLC, 924 F.3d 
718, 725 (4
th Cir. 2019); 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). A plaintiff need not 
“plead facts that constitute a prima facie case in order to survive 
a motion to dismiss,” Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190 (italics added) 
(citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–15 (2002)); 
instead, he “can survive a motion to dismiss a Title VII [or ADEA] 
claim if he simply presents allegations sufficient to reasonably 
infer a prima facie case of discrimination,” Niederberger v. 
Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc., No. 23-cv-2759-JKB, 2024 WL 2866609, at 
*3 (D.Md. June 6, 2024) (italics added) (quoting Walton v. 
Greensville Corr. Ctr., No. 14-cv-628, 2015 WL 2452451, at *10 
(E.D.Va. May 21, 2015)). See also Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190–91 
(assessing whether the plaintiff plausibly alleged elements of a 
prima facie case); accord Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 
F.3d 49, 54 (1
st Cir. 2013) (“[T]he elements of a prima facie case 
may be used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the 
claim.” (italics added)); Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 

12 
 
297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The facts alleged must give plausible 
support to the reduced requirements that arise under McDonnell 
Douglas in the initial phase of a Title VII [or ADEA] 
litigation.”). Because Plaintiff offers no suggestion of direct 
evidence of race or age discrimination, the question is whether he 
alleges facts from which a prima facie case can reasonably be 
inferred. 
Assuming that both the suspension and termination constituted 
adverse actions, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s race and age 
discrimination claims each fail for the same two reasons: (1) he 
was not satisfactorily performing his job given the EEOC charge 
implicating him at the time of his suspension and the secondary 
employment violations discovered before his termination, and (2) 
he does not sufficiently identify a comparator. (ECF No. 8-1, at 
12–13, 15–16). Only the second argument is persuasive. First, 
Defendant improperly collapses its legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason into Plaintiff’s satisfactory job performance. The offense 
a defendant cites as the reason for a plaintiff’s discipline “is 
most appropriately viewed as relevant to the analysis of whether 
there is a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse 
employment action, not whether the plaintiff had satisfactory job 
performance.” Rorie v. Bd. of Educ., 653 F.Supp.3d 217, 231 (D.Md. 
2023) (citing Moore v. City of Charlotte, 754 F.2d 1100, 1106 (4
th 

13 
 
Cir. 1985)). Thus, the EEOC charge and supposed secondary 
employment violations are legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons 
that have no bearing on the satisfactory job performance element 
and no place in a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis of a prima facie case. 
Rather, a plaintiff’s allegation “of satisfactory performance 
prior to the incident[s] in question is sufficient.” Id. Here, 
Plaintiff alleges that he had “an exemplary record and no sustained 
disciplinary findings” during his ten-year tenure prior to his 
suspension and termination. (ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 2, 9). That is enough. 
Second, however, Defendant is correct that Plaintiff has 
failed to identify a valid comparator. As Judge Gallagher has 
explained: 
The fourth element of a prima facie claim may 
be shown based “on a comparison to the 
treatment of similarly situated co-workers of 
different races or genders, if those 
colleagues were treated more favorably under 
similar circumstances.” Booth[ v. Cnty. 
Exec.], 186 F.Supp.3d [479,] 486 [(D.Md. 
2016)] (citing Lightner v. City of Wilmington, 
N.C., 545 F.3d 260, 265 (4
th Cir. 2008)). A 
comparator should be similarly situated in all 
relevant aspects. Sawyers v. United Parcel 
Serv., 946 F.Supp.2d 432, 442 n.2 (D.Md. 
2013). “Such a showing would include evidence 
that the employees ‘dealt with the same 
supervisor, [were] subject to the same 
standards and . . . engaged in the same conduct 
without such differentiating or mitigating 
circumstances that would distinguish their 
conduct or the employer’s treatment of them 
for it.’” Johnson[ v. Balt. City Police 
Dep’t, No. 12-cv-2519-ELH], 2014 WL 1281602, 
at *19 [(D.Md. Mar. 27, 2014)] (quoting 

14 
 
Haywood v. Locke, 387 F.App’x 355, 359 (4 th 
Cir. 2010)). 
 
Jacques v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, No. 21-cv-2682-SAG, 2022 WL 
1061980, at *4 (italics added); see also Glanville v. Mayor & City 
Council of Balt., No. 23-cv-3395-EA, 2025 WL 1359218, at *5 (D.Md. 
May 9, 2025). In Jacques, Judge Gallagher concluded that the 
plaintiff’s allegations were conclusory because they failed to 
“describe—even anonymously—any comparator’s job titles, 
responsibilities, or supervisors,” nor did they provide any 
“information on the substance of the allegations against 
comparators” or “explain how these allegations are analogous to 
those made against Plaintiff.” Id. at *5. 
Plaintiff’s allegations here suffer from precisely the same 
deficiencies. He alleges in conclusory fashion that “[n]on-Black 
employees with more serious or sustained misconduct records were 
not suspended, removed from duty, or subjected to similar 
treatment,” and that “Defendant treated younger, less-qualified 
officers more favorably, provided them opportunities denied 
Plaintiff, and declined to discipline younger officers for similar 
or more serious conduct.” (ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 31, 36). He fails to 
identify these non-Black or younger employees’ job titles, 
responsibilities, or supervisors, provide information on the 
substance of their misconduct other than his conclusion that it 
was more serious, or explain how their misconduct is analogous to 

15 
 
his. Therefore, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that the 
comparators are similarly situated to him and received more 
favorable treatment. “Absent such support, the complaint’s 
allegations of race [and age] discrimination do not rise above 
speculation.” Coleman, 626 F.3d at 191. Counts I & II will be 
dismissed. 
2. Section 1983 Claims (Counts III–V, VII) 
Plaintiff asserts claims under § 1983 in Counts III 
(retaliation), IV (hostile work environment), V (procedural due 
process), and VII (violation of the MPAA). These claims fail at 
the threshold due to § 1983’s particular pleading requirements. 
Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . 
. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in 
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Any plaintiff seeking to state a 
claim under § 1983 must therefore satisfy two elements: (1) 
deprivation of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution or federal 
law, (2) by a person acting under color of state law. See Mentavlos 
v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4
th Cir. 2001). 

16 
 
When the alleged deprivation occurred at the hands of 
municipal officials, the plaintiff may pursue a § 1983 claim in 
either or both of the following ways. First, he may sue the 
municipality itself, which is a “person” under § 1983. Monell v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). A municipality 
may not be held liable on a respondeat superior theory, but rather 
“only for its own illegal acts.” Owens v. Balt. City State’s 
Att’ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Monell, 436 
U.S. at 691; Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)). 
Accordingly, the plaintiff must identify an official policy or 
custom of the municipality that led to the deprivation. See Hunter 
v. Town of Mocksville, 897 F.3d 538, 554 (4
th Cir. 2018). There 
are at least four ways to demonstrate a municipal policy or custom: 
“(1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or 
regulation; (2) through the decisions of a person with final 
decisionmaking authority; (3) through an omission, such as a 
failure to properly train officers, that ‘manifest[s] deliberate 
indifference to the rights of citizens;’ or (4) through a practice 
that is so ‘persistent and widespread’ as to constitute a ‘custom 
or usage with the force of law.’” Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 
471 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Carter v. 
Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 217 (4th Cir. 1999)). 

17 
 
 The other way the plaintiff can pursue a § 1983 claim is to 
name the responsible municipal official(s) as defendant(s). To do 
so, the plaintiff must sue the municipal official in his or her 
personal capacity but need not “establish a connection to 
governmental ‘policy or custom.’” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 
(1991) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166–67 (1985)). 
Plaintiff ostensibly chose the first route because he named 
only the City of Mount Rainier as a defendant. But he entirely 
fails to allege any official policy or custom. For example, he 
does not identify who suspended or terminated him, nor does he 
allege whether that person had final decisionmaking authority. 
Instead, he alleges passively that he “was suspended,” (ECF No. 4 
¶ 13), and “was [later] constructively terminated as a result of 
Defendant’s actions,” (id. ¶ 26). Defendant is a municipality 
that only acts through its officials; thus, Plaintiff’s reference 
to “Defendant’s actions” is unilluminating. And, unless Plaintiff 
remedies that pleading deficiency by clearly and precisely 
identifying who, acting for Mount Rainier, violated his rights, it 
is not possible to assess the merits of Defendant’s other arguments 
on these claims. 
As Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under either theory 
of liability, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendant will be 
dismissed. Plaintiff will have the opportunity to amend his 

18 
 
complaint to allege a policy or custom by Defendant and/or to name 
the officials in their personal capacity who were responsible for 
the alleged § 1983 violations. 
B. State Claims 
When all federal claims are dismissed, remand of the state 
claims may be the proper course. Waybright v. Frederick County, 
528 F.3d 199, 209 (4th Cir. 2008) (“With all [the] federal questions 
gone, there may be the authority to keep [this case] in federal 
court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(a) and 1441(c) (2000), but there is 
no good reason to do so.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). At this early 
juncture, Plaintiff’s failure to allege a viable federal claim 
counsels against the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over 
his remaining state claims. Before effectuating the remand, 
however, the court will provide Plaintiff twenty-one (21) days to 
file a robust amended complaint that asserts a valid federal claim. 
If Plaintiff opts not to amend within twenty-one days, then the 
court will issue an order dismissing his deficient federal claims 
with prejudice. The court will then remand his state claims but 
delay the remand for thirty days to give the parties an opportunity 
to move to stay the remand pending appeal. Forty Six Hundred LLC 
v. Cadence Educ., LLC, 15 F.4th 70, 81 (1
st Cir. 2021) (explaining 
that when a district court decides to remand “in a removed case 
and the remand order is appealable, the district court may wish to 

19 
 
avoid immediately certifying the remand order and returning the 
case file to the state court until it believes” the risk of needing 
to retrieve the state claims due to reversal on appeal “has 
abated”); Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 641 
(2009) (holding that a remand order is appealable if it is based 
on the court’s decision to decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction). 
V. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss or, 
in the alternative, for summary judgment will be granted in part 
(as to the federal claims) and deferred in part (as to the state 
law claims). A separate order will follow. 
 
 /s/ 
 DEBORAH K. CHASANOW 
 United States District Judge 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Passage view · GavelSight