govinfo:USCOURTS-nynd-5_25-cv-00515-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
 
DANIEL RIGGS, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF SYRACUSE, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 5:25-cv-515 
 (ECC/MJK) 
 
DANIEL RIGGS, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF SYRACUSE, DETECTIVE 
LEONARD BROWN, and MICHAEL DIXON, 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 5:26-cv-316 
 (ECC/MJK) 
 
Woodruff Lee Carroll, Esq., for Plaintiff 
Todd M. Long, Esq., for Defendants 
Hon. Elizabeth C. Coombe, United States District Judge: 
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff Daniel Riggs commenced an action against Defendant the City of Syracuse (the 
City) in New York state court on March 15, 2025, asserting state and federal claims for false arrest 
and malicious prosecution. See Dkt. No. 2 (Complaint). On April 28, 2025, the City removed the 
action to this Court, where it was given case number 5:25-cv-515 (Riggs I). On October 16, 2025, 
the City moved for a judgment on the pleadings dismissing the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(c). Dkt. No. 15. Plaintiff opposed the City’s motion and moved for leave to 
file an amended complaint. See Dkt. Nos. 22, 23, 24, 27. 

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Separately, on February 25, 2026, Plaintiff commenced a second action in this Court 
against the City and City employees Leonard Brown and Michael Dixon. Riggs v. City of Syracuse, 
et al., No. 5:26- cv-316 (Riggs II). The complaint in Riggs II is nearly identical to the proposed 
amended complaint Plaintiff seeks leave to file in Riggs I. 
For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint in 
Riggs I is granted, and the City’s Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied as 
moot. Further, in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency, the Court sua sponte consolidates 
Riggs I and Riggs II. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Riggs I 
1. Plaintiff’s Complaint 
Plaintiff’s Complaint generally alleges that he was arrested on February 27, 2023 and 
thereafter prosecuted, all without probable cause. See Dkt. No. 2. Plaintiff’s claims against the City 
are for (1) false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) malicious prosecution in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment; (3) common law false arrest; (4) common law malicious prosecution; 
and (5) violations of “Article One paragraph 1 and Article[ ] Twelve” of the New York State 
Constitution. See id. In response to the City’s Rule 12(c) motion, Plaintiff expressly withdrew his 
“common law false arrest claim” and clarified that he “never pleaded” a Monell claim which would 
support liability against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. No. 22-1 at 3.
1 
2. Proposed Amended Complaint 
Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint is based on the same underlying arrest and 
prosecution and seeks to add Detective Leonard Brown and Michael Dixon as Defendants. See 
 
1 Unless otherwise noted, citations to page numbers refer to the pagination generated by the 
CM/ECF system. 

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Dkt. No. 24. The proposed pleading asserts claims for (1) false arrest in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment; (2) malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (3) common 
law malicious prosecution. See id. 
B. Riggs II 
After filing the motion for leave to amend, Plaintiff commenced Riggs II, a separate plenary 
action, by filing a complaint which is virtually identical to the proposed amended complaint in 
Riggs I. See Riggs II, Dkt. No. 1. All three Defendants were served in Riggs II, and they requested 
an extension of time to respond to the complaint to “allow Plaintiff to consider voluntarily 
dismissing” Riggs II to avoid further motion practice. Riggs II , Dkt. No. 6. Defendants answered 
the complaint on May 28, 2026, Dkt. No. 10, and there presently is no application pending in Riggs 
II. 
II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 
In response to the City’s Rule 12(c) motion in Riggs I, Plaintiff moved for leave to file an 
amended complaint. Dkt. No. 23. Plaintiff asserts that the City’s motion “identified a number of 
things that needed correcting in the complaint,” which was drafted for state court, and that counsel 
hoped to resolve the case without naming the individual police officers. Dkt. No. 23- 1. The City 
opposes Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, arguing that Plaintiff has not shown good cause for 
seeking leave after the d eadline to do so in the Court’s scheduling order and that the proposed 
amendments are futile. Dkt. No. 27 at 10-16.
2 
 
2 The City also argues that Plaintiff failed to comply with this District’s Local Rules and failed to 
provide a redline showing the changes made to the C omplaint. Dkt. No. 27 at 12- 13. Given the 
brevity of both the C omplaint and the proposed amended complaint, the Court declines to deny 
the motion for leave to amend on this basis. See Wight v. BankAmerica Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 85 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (noting that a district court “enjoy[s] the discretion to excuse [a party’s] non-compliance 
with the Local Rules (which are not statutes) in the interest of justice”). 

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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) , leave to amend “shall be freely given 
when justice so requires.” See McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 
2007). Under Rule 15(a), with exceptions not relevant here, a party may amend its pleading only 
with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)-(2). A 
court may, in its discretion, deny leave to amend “for good reason, including futility, bad faith, 
undue delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. 
Hereford Ins. Co., 66 F.4th 77, 90 (2d Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). 
“Although Rule 15(a) governs the amendment of pleadings, Rule 16(b) also may limit the 
ability of a party to amend a pleading if the deadline specified in the scheduling order for 
amendment of the pleadings has passed.” Kassner v. 2nd Avenue Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 
243 (2d Cir. 2007); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified only for good cause 
and with the judge’s consent.”). Despite the “lenient standard” of Rule 15(a), a district court does 
not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend after the scheduling order’s deadline “where the 
moving party has failed to establish good cause.” Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 
326, 340 (2d Cir. 2000). The “primary consideration” in determining whether a scheduling order 
should be modified is “whether the moving party can demonstrate diligence,” but other relevant 
factors include “whether allowing the amendment of the pleading at this stage of the litigation will 
prejudice defendants.” Kassner, 496 F.3d at 244. A district court has “broad discretion in deciding 
whether good cause exists to amend the scheduling order.” Tatintsian v. Vorotyntsev , No. 16-cv-
7203, 2024 WL 4467626, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2024) (citation omitted). 
Here, the Court concludes that there is good cause for modification of the scheduling order 
to allow Plaintiff leave to file the proposed amended complaint given the unique circumstances of 
this case. The scheduling order was issued on May 29, 2025 and set a deadline of July 9, 2025 for 

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joinder of parties and amendment of pleadings. Dkt. No. 11. But the City did not file its Rule 12(c) 
motion until October 2025, after that deadline had passed. Dkt. No. 15. Thus, where Plaintiff 
moved promptly for leave to amend his complaint in response to the City’s Rule 12(c) motion, 
which was itself filed after the scheduling order’s deadline for amendment, the Court concludes 
that Plaintiff has been sufficiently diligent. See Dawkins v. Brandy Library Lounge, LLC, No. 23-
cv-207, 2023 WL 8455896, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2023) (finding good cause for the plaintiff 
to amend his complaint after the scheduling order deadline where the plaintiff was not on notice 
that the defendant intended to raise standing as an issue, the plaintiff filed the proposed amended 
complaint shortly after the Rule 12(c) motion was filed, and the defendant would not be prejudiced 
by the amendment).
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Furthermore, the Court concludes that the City will not be prejudiced by the amendment. 
Significantly, although it appears the parties have exchange d their mandatory initial disclosures, 
the parties told the Court at a telephone conference held on May 12, 2026 that no other discovery 
has been exchanged or completed. See also Dkt. No. 16 (City’s request to stay discovery and 
mediation deadlines pending resolution of its Rule 12(c) motion). There therefore will be minimal 
or no duplication of effort. Moreover, the claims Plaintiff seeks to assert against the individual 
Defendants are not facially time-barred. 
Finally, although the City argues that Plaintiff’s proposed amendments are futile, Dkt. No. 
27 at 15, the City has not established the futility of the proposed amended complaint as a matter 
of law. See Coniglio v. Cucuzza, 345 F.R.D. 372, 377-78 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (noting that the “burden 
 
3 Even if Plaintiff had not acted diligently in complying with the scheduling order, the Court 
nonetheless has discretion to grant a motion to amend in “appropriate circumstances.” See Jones 
v. Abel, No. 25-cv-779, 2026 WL 836798, at *2 -3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2026) (citations omitted). 
Here, given the lack of prejudice to the City, an d the pendency of Riggs II , the Court would 
nonetheless grant the motion to amend. 

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of proving futility rests on the party opposing the amendment”). The City’s opposition argues that 
the proposed amended complaint fails to state a claim, but its argument relies on facts that are 
alleged in the complaint but which are not found in the proposed amende d complaint. See, e.g. , 
Dkt. No. 27 at 17-18. Thus, because the City has not demonstrated the futility of the proposed 
amended complaint as a standalone pleading, the Court declines to deny the motion to amend on 
futility grounds. 
Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint in 
Riggs I. 
III. CONSOLIDATION OF RIGGS I AND RIGGS II 
Because the proposed amended complaint in Riggs I and the complaint in Riggs II are 
virtually identical, the Court sua sponte consolidates Riggs I and Riggs II for all purposes . See 
Devlin v. Transp. Commc’ns Int’l Union, 175 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that a “district 
court can consolidate related cases under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) sua sponte ”) 
(citation omitted). Consolidation is “acceptable” when “actions involving a common question of 
law or fact are pending before the court” an d is a “valuable and important tool of judicial 
administration.” Id. (citations omitted). 
In deciding to consolidate Riggs I and Riggs II, the Court has considered “both equity and 
judicial economy.” Id. Given (1) that Riggs I and Riggs II involve the same parties and causes of 
action, (2) that the proposed amended complaint being allowed in Riggs I and the complaint in 
Riggs II are virtually identical, and (3) the lack of any meaningful progress of the case in Riggs I, 
the consolidation of the two actions will result in “savings of expense and gains of efficiency” 
without “sacrifice of justice.” Id. (emphasis omitted); see also, e.g., Rapaport v. Epstein, No. 24-
cv-7439, 2025 WL 966794, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025) (determining that consolidation was 
appropriate “in the interest of efficiency and economy” where the court “granted Plaintiff leave to 

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amend certain claims in this action, and Plaintiff has been given an opportunity to elect to file 
another complaint in the Related Action”); Campbell v. Sposato, No. 15- cv-1958, 2015 WL 
3648624, at *1- 2 (E.D.N.Y. June 8, 2015) (consolidating “identical complaints [that] are 
duplicative”). 
The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to docket any future filings under the docket 
number of the lead case only, 5:25-cv-515. 
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff Daniel Riggs’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint in
Riggs I, Dkt. No. 23, is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s amended complaint, Dkt. No. 24, is accepted 
for filing as the operative pleading in Riggs I; and it is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiff Daniel Riggs is directed to serve the amended complaint in 
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and it is further 
ORDERED that Defendant the City of Syracuse’s motion for a judgment on the pleadings 
dismissing the Complaint in Riggs I, Dkt. No. 15, is DENIED as moot; and it is further 
ORDERED that Riggs I (No. 5:25- cv-515) and Riggs II (No. 5:26- cv-316) are 
CONSOLIDATED for all purposes; and it is further 
ORDERED that these consolidated actions be referred to Magistrate Judge Mitchell J. 
Katz for case management purposes. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 12, 2026 

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