govinfo:USCOURTS-azd-2_21-cv-01700-2

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WO 
 
 
 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 
 
 
 
 
 
Before the Court is the parties’ Stipulation for Entry of Protective Order (Doc. 53). 
The request will be denied. As advised in its preliminary order, “[a]s a general practice, 
this Court does not approve or adopt blanket, umbrella protective orders or confidentiality 
agreements, even when stipulated to by the parties.” (Doc. 7 at 3). 
 “It is well -established that the fruits of pretrial discovery are, in the absence of a 
court order to the contrary, presumptively public. Rule 26(c) authorizes a district cou rt to 
override this presumption where ‘good cause’ is shown.” San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. 
U.S. Dist. Ct. , 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). 1 But see Ctr. for 
 
1 Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
 
(1) In General. A party or any person from whom discovery is sought 
may move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending 
... The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good 
faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an 
effort to resolve the dispute without court action. The court may, for 
good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one 
or more of the following: 
 
Scott Chaverri, et al., 
 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
 
Platinum LED Lights LLC, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
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No. CV-21-01700-PHX-SPL 
 
 
ORDER 
 
 

 
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Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp ., LLC , 809 F.3d 1092 , 1101 (9th Cir. 2016) ( whether 
“compelling reasons” or merely “good cause” must be shown to limit public access and 
warrant court protection depends on the relat ionship of the document to the merits of the 
case). In order to show good cause exists to limit the public’s access to material under 
Rule 26(c), “the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or 
harm will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips v. G.M. Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 
1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples 
or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l 
Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Rather, the party seeking protection must make a “particularized showing of good cause 
with respect to [each] individual document.” San Jose Mercury News, 187 F.3d at 1102. 
 The Proposed Protective Order extends broadly to “any non -public document or 
thing, or portion of any non-public document or thing, the public disclosure of which may 
cause a Party harm.” (Doc. 53 -1 at 2). This does not meet Rule 26(c) ’s threshold . The 
proposed order does not point to any specific document that is entitled to protectio n, nor 
do the parties mak e any particularized showing that some disclosure will cause a clearly 
defined injury. See Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson , 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995); 
AGA Shareholders, LLC v. CSK Auto, Inc. , 2007 WL 4225450 (D. Ariz. Nov. 28, 2007). 
Nothing within Rule 26(c) indicates that it extends to prospective, blanket protective 
orders, and the parties have offered no authority to the contrary. Cf. Foltz v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 331 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that entering a blanket 
 
(A) forbidding the disclosure or discovery; (B) specifying terms, 
including time and place or the allocation of expenses, for the disclosure 
or discovery; (C) prescribing a discovery method other than the one 
selected by the party s eeking discovery; (D) forbidding inquiry into 
certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to 
certain matters; (E) designating the persons who may be present while 
the discovery is conducted; (F) requiring that a deposition be sealed and 
opened only on court order; (G) requiring that a trade secret or other 
confidential research, development, or commercial information not be 
revealed or be revealed only in a specified way; and (H) requiring that 
the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information in 
sealed envelopes, to be opened as the court directs. 

 
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protective order without requiring the moving party “to show that specific discovery 
documents, whether eventually filed with the court or not, contained [confidential] 
information” was an abuse of discretion under Rule 26(c)); San Jose Mercury News , 187 
F.3d at 1103 (holding that blanket protective orders “are inherently subject to challenge 
and modification, as the party resisting disclosure generally has not made a particularized 
showing of good cause with respect to any individual document”). 
 Further, no party has shown that there is an actual dispute that commands Court 
intervention and protection. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1); LRCiv 7.2. The parties remain 
free to mutually enter i nto a written agreement to facilitate the exchange of confidential 
disclosures without court approval or supervision. And, i n the event discovery mandates 
disclosure of specific, harmful, confidential material, the parties will not be precluded from 
presenting a request to the Court at that time in a manner tailored to protect the particular 
interests at hand. See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136. Accordingly, 
 IT IS ORDE RED that the Stipulation for Entry of Protective Order (Doc. 53) is 
denied. 
 Dated this 2nd day of June, 2022. 
 
 
 
Honorable Steven P. Logan 
United States District Judge 
 
 
 

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