govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-3_25-cv-00353-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
DEVIN BUTTS, et al.,
Plaintiff,
V.
NORTHMONT CITY SCH.
BD. OFEDUC., efa/.,
Defendants.

Judge Walter H. Rice
Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
ORDER SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART SECOND MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT OF PLAINTIFFS DEVIN BUTTS,
AUSTIN BAKER, IAN BLOUCH, CALEB HARP, AND DAVID PAUL (DOC. #26),
OVERRULING AS MOOT PLAINTIFFS' FIRST MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMENDED COMPLAINT (DOC. #21) AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS OF DEFENDANT MATTHEW ROBERT HUNT (DOC. #18); MOTIONS
FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS OF DEFENDANTS
NORTHMONT CIT>' SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, ANTHONY THOMAS,
AND SARAH ZATIK (DOC. #15) IS SUSTAINED AS TO CLAIMS THREE AND
EIGHT, OVERRULED AS TO CLAIMS ONE AND TWO, AND OVERRULED AS
MOOT AS TO CLAIM FOUR; PLAINTIFFS' SECOND PROPOSED FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT (DOC. #26-1) SHALL BE FILED WITHIN SEVEN (7)DAYS
OF ENTRY; DEFENDANT HUNT AND THE NORTHMONT DEFENDANTS SHALL
ANSWER, MOVE, OR OTHERWISE RESPOND TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN
TWENT»'-ONE (21) DAYS THEREAFTER; PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS THREE AND
EIGHT ARE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; JUDGMENT SHALL ULTIMATELY
ENTER IN FAVOR OF THE NORTHMONT DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST
PLAINTIFFS ON CLAIMS THREE AND EIGHT
Before the Court are the: Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings of
Defendant Northmont City Schools Board of Education ("Board"), Anthony
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Thomas, and Sarah Zatik (collectively "Northmont Defendants") (Northmont
Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, Doc. #15); Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings of Defendant Matthew Robert Hunt (Hunt Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings, Doc. #18); First Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint of
Plaintiffs Devin Butts, Austin Baker, lan Blouch, David Paul, (First Motion to
Amend, Doc. #21); and Second Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint of
Plaintiffs Butts, Baker, Blouch, Caleb Harp, and Paul (Second Motion to Amend,
Doc. #26). For the reasons set forth below. Plaintiffs' First Motion to Amend and
Hunt's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings are OVERRULED AS MOOT, the
Northmont Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is SUSTAINED IN PART,
OVERRULED IN PART, AND OVERRULED AS MOOT IN PART, and Plaintiffs'
Second Motion to Amend is SUSTAINED IN PART AND OVERRULED IN PART
I. Factual Background
As Hunt's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and the Northmont
Defendants' Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings arise under Rule 12(c),
and the main argument by the Northmont Defendants in their opposition to the
First and Second Motions to Amend is that the amended complaints could not
survive a renewed Rule 12 motion, the Court treats as true all well-pleaded factual
allegations in the Original and proposed Amended Complaints. Ashcroft v. Iqbal.
556 U. S. 662, 678 (2009). Plaintiffs allege that, when Defendant Zatik, then the
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Superintendent of Northmont City Schools ("District"), hired Defendant Hunt as a
bus driver for the District in 2012, she did so without reviewing his personnel files
from two districts where he had worked previously and had been the subject of
complaints of sexual misconduct with minors. (Orig. Compl., Doc. #1, PAGEID 2, fl
3). Nonetheless, Hunt served as a District Bus Driver from 2012 through 2025,
prior to being arrested and indicted on eighty-two counts of sexual misconduct.
{Id. at 11111-2). "On October 23, 2021, [current] Superintendent Anthony Thomas
received a detailed email explicitly describing Hunt's pattern of grooming
students. Thomas failed to investigate or remove Hunt from student contact. " {Id.
at PAGEID 2-3, fl 4).
Hunt sexually assaulted Plaintiffs Baker and Blouch in 2013, Paul in 2017,
and Butts in 2025, only four days prior to his arrest. (Doc. #1, PAGEID 3, fllT 6-9).
Plaintiffs further allege that Hunt groomed Baker, Paul, and Blouch over a number
of years; yet, despite repeated warnings of misconduct before and during Hunt's
employment, the District took no action and, in fact, regularly released Baker and
Butts from class under a "work permit" program, ostensibly to "perform[] 'work'
for Hunt's private business. Hunt Pipe Organ Services. " [Id. at PAGEID 6-11, fl 22-
42).
Plaintiffs filed suit on October 22, 2025, raising the following: Claim One,
Violation of Title IX against the District (Doc. #1, PAGEID 11-13, flll 43-51); Claim
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Two, Violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the Northmont Defendants (id. at
PAGEID 13-15, ^ 52-60); Claim Three, Negligent, Hiring, Supervision, and
Retention, also against the Northmont Defendants [id. at PAGEID 15-17, IIfl 61-70);
Claim Four, Failure to Report as required under Ohio law, against the District
Board of Education ("Board") and Defendants District Employees Does I through
V (id. at PAGEID 18-19, flll 71-79); Claims Five through Seven, Assault and Battery,
Civil Liability for Criminal Acts, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,
respectively, all against Hunt {id. at PAGEID 19-22, ^ 80-92); and Claim Eight,
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, against the Northmont Defendants. [Id.
at PAGEID 22-23, 1I1T 93-97).
On December 4, 2025, the Northmont Defendants filed an Amended Answer
(Doc. #14) and Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. #15). In the
latter, they argue that all federal claims raised by Plaintiffs Baker, Blouch, and Paul
are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, as they all graduated from
Northmont High School in 2016, the most recent incident of alleged misconduct
occurred in 2017, and the latest incident of misconduct occurred when each of
them was at least 18 years old. {Id. at PAGEID 120-21, citing Doc. #1, PAGEID 3, ^\
7-9; Doc. #14, PAGEID 103, flll 7-9). As the statute of limitations is two years from
the time the Plaintiffs turned 18, "the statute of limitations for the claims of Baker,
Paul, and Blouch expired between 2018 and 2019. There is no plausible reading of
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the allegations in their complaint that would suggest their Title IX claims were
timely filed in 2025. " (/£/. at PAGEID 121, citing OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2305. 10(A),
2305. 16, 3109. 01; Pryor v. Ohio State Univ., 139 F. 4th 536, 540-41 (6th Cir. 2025)).
The Northmont Defendants argue that this Court and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit have consistently held that the applicable statute of
limitations for Title IX claims is governed by Ohio's statute of limitations for
personal injury, which is two years. {Id. at PAGEID 122-23, citing Owens v. Okure,
488 U. S. 235, 237 (1989); Pryor, 139 F. 4th at 541 n. 1; Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint
Vocational Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc., 926 F. 2d 505, 510 (6th Cir. 1991); Harris v. Bd. of
Educ., 798 F. Supp. 1331, 1342 (S. D. Ohio 1992) (Smith, J. )). The Northmont
Defendants conclude that, because "it can readily be determined from the face of
the complaint that the Title IX claims of Baker, Paul, and Blouch are barred by the
statute of limitations!, ]" Claim One must be dismissed. {Id. at PAGEID 123). The
Northmont Defendants argue that Claim Two is similarly time-barred, because the
statute of limitations for a 42 U. S. C. § 1983 claim is also two years. (Id. at PAEID
123-25, quoting Owens. 488 U. S. at 249-50; citing Wf/son v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261,
280 (1985); Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478, 485 (1980); OHIO REV. CODE §
2305. 10(A)).
As to the remaining claims, the Northmont Defendants claim that there is
no "common nucleus of operative fact" between the state law claims of Plaintiffs
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Baker, Blouch, and Paul and the state and federal law claims of Plaintiff Butts,
since the injury to Plaintiff Butts happened in 2025. The Northmont Defendants
further assert principles of "comity, judicial economy, convenience, and fairness"
weigh against allowing Plaintiffs Baker, Blouch, and Paul to pursue their state law
claims alongside Plaintiff Butts. (Doc. #15, PAGEID 126-27, quoting FirstEnergy
Corp. v. Pircio, 524 F. Supp. 3d 732, 744 (N. D. Ohio 2021); citing 28 U. S. C. § 1367;
PinneyDock& Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 196 F. 3d 617, 620-21 (6th Cir.
1999)). Consequently, they request that the Court refrain from exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs Baker, Blouch, and Paul's remaining state
law claims against Defendant Hunt. (Id. at PAGEID 125-26, quoting Kubala v.
Smith, 984 F. 3d 1132, 1137 (6th Cir. 2021)).
Northmont Defendants argue that, if the Court were to maintain jurisdiction
over the state law claims, Claims Three and Eight, Negligent Hiring, Supervision,
and Retention, and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, respectively, are
barred by political subdivision immunity. (Doc. #15, PAGEID 127, 129).
Specifically, they contend that "[t]he operation of a school bussing [s/c\ system
has been determined to be a governmental function" and, thus, the Northmont
Defendants are presumptively immune from suit on claims regarding their hiring,
supervision, and retention of Defendant Hunt. {Id. at PAGEID 127, citing OHIO REV.
CODE § 2744. 02(A); McConnell v. Dudley, 158 Ohio St. 3d 388, 2019-0hio-4740).
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They argue that, because "there is no monetization attached" to District bus
service, "and it is not a service normally engaged in by nongovernmental
entities!, ]" all aspects of the District's bus service must be considered a
governmental, rather than proprietary, function. {Id. at PAGEID 128 (collecting
cases)). Moreover, the Northmont Defendants argue that none of the exceptions
to political subdivision liability applies; thus, they conclude. Claims Three and
Eight are barred as matters of law. {Id. at PAGEID 127-29, quoting OHIO REV. CODE
§§2744. 02(B), 2744. 03(A)(6)).
Finally, as to Claim Four, Failure to Report, the Northmont Defendants
argue that the statute "creates a personal duty for school employees\. o report
suspected abuse. It creates the risk of direct and personal civil liability for those
individuals who fait to meet that duty. The statute does not, however, provide for
a duty of a school district or school boards report. " (Id. at PAGEID 129-30
(emphasis added), quoting OHIO REV. CODE §2151. 421(A)(1)(b), (M)). The
Northmont Defendants assert that, because there is neither a duty for the Board to
report suspected abuse, nor civil liability for Board members for failing to report,
Claim Four is barred against the District as a matter of law. {Id. at PAGEID 130,
citing Doe v. Adkins, 2021-0hio-3389, 178 N. E. Sd 947 (4th Dist. )). In light of the
above, the Northmont Defendants argue that the only claims that should be
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allowed to proceed against it are Claims One and Two by Plaintiff Butts alone.
(Id.}.
On December 19, 2025, Defendant Hunt also moved for judgment on the
pleadings. (Doc. #18). Therein, he argues that Claims Five, Six, and Seven,
brought against him alone, are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations as
to Plaintiffs Baker, Blouch, and Paul. (Id. at PAGEID 144-45, citing Saalim v.
Walmart, Inc., 97 F. 4th 995, 1013 (6th Cir. 2025); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2305. 111,
2307. 60; Weidman v. Hildebrant, 178 Ohio St. 3d 3, 2024-0hio3931, KIT 26-27; Burks
v. Dayton Pub. Sch. Bd. ofEduc., 2023-0hio-1227, fl 50, 212 N. E. 3d 1197 (2d
Dist. )).
Plaintiffs did not file memoranda contrathe Hunt or Northmont Motions;
rather, on January 16, 2026, they filed a Motion for Leave to File their First
Amended Complaint ("First Amended Complaint 1"). Therein, Plaintiffs seek to
add as an additional Plaintiff a Caleb Harp, "a former Northmont student who was
sexually abused by Defendant Hunt beginning in 2020. " (Doc. #21, PAGEID 162).
They argue that the modified allegations address accrual and statute of limitations
issues with respect to Claims One, Two, Five, Six, and Seven. [Id., citing Snyder-
Hill v. Ohio St. Univ., 48 F. 4th 686 (6th Cir. 2022); OHIO REV. CODE § 2305. 111 (A)(1),
(C)).
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On February 3, 2026, prior to the Court ruling on the First Motion,
Defendant Hunt filed an Amended Answer to First Amended Complaint 1 (Doc.
#23). However, the Northmont Defendants filed a memorandum contra, arguing
that, in First Amended Complaint 1, Plaintiffs Baker, Blouch, and Paul have failed
to allege new facts that would allow the claims to survive a renewed Rule 12
motion. (Memo. in Opp., Doc. #24, PAGEID 224). Specifically, the Northmont
Defendants claim that those three Plaintiffs:
[D]o not plead any facts to suggest that the abuse they allege they
suffered at the hands of Hunt occurred less than two years before
they filed their original complaint. They do not plead any facts to
suggest that they did not know or understand that they had been
abused at the hands of Hunt at the time it occurred. They do not
plead any facts to suggest that the Northmont defendants destroyed
evidence, hid records from them, denied ordinary public records
requests or did anything else that would have precluded them from
discovering alleged Title IX violations with a reasonable
investigation.
(Id. at PAGEID 225). The Northmont Defendants further assert that the bases of
Plaintiffs Baker, Blouch, and Paul's claims arise out of the Northmont Defendants'
alleged failure to review Hunt's personnel files prior to hiring him, to investigate
reports of suspected abuse by Hunt, and to follow up on observations by District
employees of "Hunt with students at the bus garage after hours[. ]" (Id.).
However, those Plaintiffs:
[D]o not point to any new allegation of fact in their proposed
amended complaint that would not have been as equally available to
them as it was to the Northmont [D]efendants. The fact that these
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three plaintiffs did not understand those facts to equal a federal
cause of action against the Northmont [DJefendants until Hunt's
arrest and the adverse publicity arising therefrom does not save their
claims from the statute of limitations.
[Id. at PAGEID 225-26 (emphasis in original)).
As to the details of First Amended Complaint 1, the Northmont Defendants
argue that putative Plaintiff Harp should not be joined in the case, as his claims do
not share a common nucleus of operative fact with Plaintiffs Blouch, Baker, and
Paul, and, at any rate, Harp's claims against the Northmont Defendants are also
barred by the statute of limitations. (Doc. #24, PAGEID 228-29 n. 2). Moreover, the
Northmont Defendants argue that the facts underpinning the Title IX claims were
either within Plaintiffs' personal knowledge or readily discoverable through public
records requests long before the statute of limitations ran. Consequently, they
conclude. Plaintiffs' argument that they could not have been aware of Defendant
Hunt's prior employment history until an investigation by Cox Media Group Ohio,
Inc., turned up the personnel records in 2025 cannot operate to save Plaintiffs
Blouch, Baker, and Paul's claims against the Northmont Defendants. (Id. at
PAGEID 231-33, citing OHIO REV. CODE § 149. 43; State ex rel. Nat'l Broadcasting Co.
v. City of Cleveland, 38 Ohio St. Sd 79, 83 (1988); First Amended Complaint 1, Doc.
#21-1, PAGEID 169, 173, 174, 175, 177, 189-90, ^ 3, 20, 26, 30, 36, 88).
In Reply, Plaintiffs argue that the new allegations demonstrate both that
they could not have been reasonably aware of their claims against the Northmont
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Defendants until 2025, and that there was a continuous pattern from 2019 through
2024 of District employees being made aware of Defendant Hunt's sexual
misconduct with students, but refusing to investigate the reports and, instead,
promoting him within the District. (Doc. #25, PAGEID 239, citing Doc. #21-1,
PAGEID 176, 177-79, 180-83, ITfl 32, 34, 36-42, 47-56). They claim that Plaintiff
Harp's joinder is proper "because his claims arise from the same institutional
course of conduct and share common questions of law and fact[. ]" {Id. at PAGEID
240, citing FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(D).
Plaintiffs assert that the Northmont Defendants have used the improper
start time for the statute of limitations; the injury causing a Title IX claim to accrue
is "the school's actions or inactions, not the actions of the person who abused the
plaintiff. " (Doc. #25, PAGEID 240-41 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting
Snyder-Hill, 48 F. 4th at 702). Specifically, they argue that "Plaintiffs did not know
and had no reason to know that Northmont had received multiple reports of
Hunt's sexual abuse of students from the Bother family. Tucker Rother directly,
and Bonnie Hill, and that Northmont had dismissed those reports and taken no
action. " [Id. at PAGEID 241, citing Doc. #21-1, PAGEID 180, 184, 1IU 47-48, 63-64).
Moreover, they claim that Plaintiffs, as groomed and molested teenagers, had no
duty to file public records requests or otherwise investigate the District when the
District continued to employ Hunt and trust children around him. (Id. at PAGEID
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242, citing Doc. #21-1, PAGEID 177-78, 180, 111136, 38, 47-48). Moreover, they claim
that the issue of "when Plaintiffs discovered Northmont's misconduct is a
question of fact that cannot be resolved at this [Rule 12] stage. " {Id. at PAGEID
245-46 (emphasis in original), quoting Garrett v. Ohio State Univ., 60 F. 4th 359,
367 (6th Cir. 2023)).
Plaintiffs argue that the Northmont Defendants mischaracterize the
allegations in First Amended Complaint 1 by treating the complained-of sexual
assaults as discrete events, rather than a continuous pattern of behavior by
Defendant Hunt to which the Northmont Defendants were deliberately indifferent.
(Doc. #25, PAGEID 246-48, citing Doc. #21-1, PAGEID 173, 174-75, 175-76, m 19-22,
26-28, 30-34). They claim that they have plausibly alleged that the Northmont
Defendants' decisions to hire and continue to employ Defendant Hunt were
sufficient to produce colorable Title IX and 42 U. S. C. § 1983 claims, since
"adequate scrutiny of an applicant's background would lead a reasonable
policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to
hire the applicant would be the deprivation of a third party's federally protected
right. " {Id. at PAGEID 248, quoting Bd. ofCnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v.
Brown, 520 U. S. 397, 41 1 (1997)). Plaintiffs allege that the Northmont Defendants
undertook no review of Defendant Hunt's personnel files, despite having ready
access to them, before hiring him "into a position involving direct, unsupervised
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access to vulnerable populations where the applicant's file contained evidence of
the precise misconduct at issue. " {Id. at PAGEID 249). They assert that the
Northmont Defendants' "failure to conduct even that minimal screening, under
these circumstances, is not mere negligence; it is deliberate indifference to a
known category of risk so obvious that the failure to act can fairly be said to
constitute a policy. " {let).
Plaintiffs further argue that the above failure by Northmont Defendants was
part of a continuous and "broad policy of deliberate indifference" that makes their
Title IX claim timely and actionable. (Doc. #25, PAGEID 249-50, citing Snyder-Hill,
48 F. 4th at 703-04; Doc. #21-1, PAGEID 173, 176, 177, flfl 22, 32-33, 35). Similarly,
they claim that the Northmont Defendants' decision to employ Defendant Hunt in
a position that gave him unfettered access to minors constituted a "state-created
danger" that can form the basis of a 42 U. S. C. § 1983 claim. [Id. at PAGEID 250-
51, citing Cnty. of Sacramento y. Lewis. 523 U. S. 833, 849 (1998), abrogated on
other grounds by Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194 (2001); Kallstrom v. City of
Columbus, 136 F. 3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir. 1998)). In sum, Plaintiffs argue that First
Amended Complaint 1 "alleges ongoing deliberate indifference during ongoing
abuse, a deliberately indifferent hiring decision by a final policymaker, a pre-
assault heightened-risk policy, and affirmative state-created danger. Plaintiffs
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assert that these allegations, accepted as true, state viable Title IX and § 1983
claims for Baker, Paul, and Blouch. " {Id. at PAGEID 252).
Before the Court could rule on the First Motion, Plaintiffs filed a Second
Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint, incorporating all the arguments
raised in the First Motion and Reply. (Second Motion to Amend, Doc. #26,
PAGEID 259). The new Proposed First Amended Complaint ("First Amended
Complaint 2"), in addition to having all the new allegations added in First
Amended Complaint 1, "adds Tri-County North Local School District Board of
Education[("Tri-County Board")], Superintendent William Derringer, Principal
Douglas Dunham, and Transportation Supervisor Carl Walters as defendants."
(/c/. ). Plaintiffs also add a state law failure to report claim against Defendants
Derringer, Dunham, and Walters, and a claim under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against
Defendants Tri-County Board and Derringer. (Id. at PAGEID 260). In their
memorandum contra the Second Motion to Amend, the Northmont Defendants
only incorporated by reference their arguments raised in opposition to the First
Motion to Amend. (Memo. in Opp., Doc. #27, PAGEID 319-20). Plaintiffs did not
file a reply, and the time for doing so has expired. S. D. OHIO Civ. R. 7. 2(a)(2).
The matters are now ripe for decision.
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II. Legal Standards
A. Leave to Amend
As two Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings are currently pending (Docs.
#15, 18), Plaintiffs "may amend [their] pleading only with the opposing party's
written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when
justice so requires. " FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2); see also Conrad v. U. S. Bank Nat'l
Ass'n, 391 F. Supp. 3d 780, 784 n. 1 (S. D. Ohio 2019) (Black, J. ) (Rule 15(a) "does
not allow a party to file an amended pleading, without first seeking leave of court,
in response to a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). "). The
Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit have repeatedly directed district courts to be
liberal in granting leave. Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178, 182 (1962); Janikowski v.
Bendix Corp., 823 F. 2d 945, 951 (6th Cir. 1987). However, a court should deny
leave "if the amendment is brought in bad faith, for dilatory purposes, results in
undue delay or prejudice to the opposing party, or would be futile. " Crawford v.
Roane, 53 F. 3d 750, 753 (6th Cir. 1995). "An amendment is futile when, after
including the proposed changes, the complaint still could not withstand a Rule
12[] motion to dismiss. " Skatemore, Inc. v. Whitmer, 40 F.4th 727, 737 (6th Cir
2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
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B. Judgment on the Pleadings
"A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c) generally follows the same rules as a motion to dismiss the
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). " Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass'n, 958 F. 3d 470,
480 (6th Cir. 2020). Rule 8(a) provides that a complaint must contain "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. " The
complaint must provide the defendant with "fair notice of what the . . . claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests. " Twombly, 550 U. S. at 555 (2007) (quoting
Conleyv. Gibson. 355 U. S. 41, 47 (1957)). Rule 12(c), like Rule 12(b)(6), allows a
party to move for dismissal of a complaint on the basis that it "fail[s] to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. " FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). The moving party
"has the burden of showing that the [opposing party] has failed to adequately
state a claim for relief. " DirecTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F. 3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007),
citing Carver v. Bunch, 946 F. 2d 451, 454-55 (6th Cir. 1991). The purpose of a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "is to allow a defendant to test whether, as a matter of
law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief even if everything alleged in the
complaint is true. " Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F. 2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993). In ruling on
the motion, the Court must "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, accept its [well-pleaded] allegations as true, and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff. " Treesh, 487 F. 3d at 476.
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Nevertheless, to survive a Rule 12(c) motion, the complaint must contain
"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. " Twombly, 550
U. S. at 570. Unless the facts alleged show that the plaintiff's claim crosses "the
line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed. " Id.
Although this standard does not require "detailed factual allegations, " it does
require more than "labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. " Id. at 555. "Rule 8 .. . does not unlock
the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions."
Iqbal, 556 U. S. at 678-79. Legal conclusions "must be supported by well-pleaded
factual allegations" that "plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief. " Id. at 679.
III. Analysis
A. Defendant Hunt's Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(Doc. #18)
As discussed above. Defendant Hunt did not oppose the First Motion or
Second Motion to Amend. Rather, he filed an Answer to the First Amended
Complaint 1. (Doc. #23). Because the allegations against Defendant Hunt in the
First Amended Complaint 2 have superseded those in the original Complaint that
were the subject of Hunt's Motion for Judgment on the Pleading (Doc. #18), that
Motion is OVERRULED AS MOOT.
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B. Northmont Defendants Rule 12(c) Motion for Partial Judgment on
the Pleadings (Doc. #15) and Plaintiffs' Rule 15 Motions to Amend
(Docs. #21, 26)
1. Claims One and Two
The Northmont Defendants oppose Plaintiffs' First and Second Motions to
Amend on the grounds that the proposed amended claims in those documents
cannot survive a renewed Rule 12(c) Motion and, thus, leave to amend is futile.
(Doc. #24, PAGEID 227-28; Doc. #27, PAGEID 319-20). Consequently, the Court
analyzes the Northmont Defendants' Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings and Plaintiffs' First and Second Motions to Amend together.
As to Claims One (Title IX) and Two (42 U. S. C. § 1983), the Northmont
Defendants posit-and Plaintiffs do not dispute-that the applicable statute of
limitations is the Ohio personal injury statute, which "provides that any claim for
bodily injury shall be brought within two years after the cause of action accrued.
OHIO REV. CODE § 2305. 10(A); see also Pryor, 139 F.4th at 539 (reaffirming that "the
most analogous statute of limitations for Title IX claims is the forum state's
limitations oeriod for personal-injury actions. "). The Northmont Defendants argue
that, because some of the alleged abuse by Defendant Hunt occurred when they
were minors. Plaintiffs Baker, Blouch, and Paul's claims accrued, and the statute
of limitations began to run, on their respective eighteenth birthdays. (Doc. #15,
PAGEID 121-22; see also Pryor, 139 F. 4th at 540-41, citing OHIO REV. CODE § 2305. 16
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(personal-injury claim of a minor in Ohio does not accrue until the injured turns
eighteen)). Plaintiffs, however, argue that "a Title IX deliberate-indifference claim
does not accrue until a plaintiff knows or has reason to know that the institution
injured him or her, not when the underlying abuse occurs. " (Doc. #21, PAGEID
164 (internal quotation marks omitted), citing Snyder-Hill, 48 F. 4th at 703-04).
Plaintiffs argue that the Northmont Defendants mischaracterize the
gravamen of Claims One and Two. (Doc. #25, PAGEID 240-41 ). Plaintiffs assert
that, contrary to the Northmont Defendants' contention that the Claims arise from
Defendant Hunt's misconduct while employed by the District (Doc. #15, PAGEID
120-21), those Claims actually arise from an alleged pattern of deliberate
indifference by the Northmont Defendants through their failure to do even a
cursory review of Defendant Hunt's personnel files and ignoring the repeated
reports from individuals that Defendant Hunt was sexually abusing students.
(Doc. #25, PAGEID 241-42). Plaintiffs argue that, because they were not aware of
Northmont Defendants! misconduct until 2025, their claims against those
Defendants did not accrue until then. (Id. at PAGEID 241-45, citing Snyder-Hill, 48
F. 4th at 707; Chapman v. Seuffert, 713 F. Supp. 3d 425, 439 (N. D. Ohio 2024)).
Statute of limitations questions are rarely resolved at the Rule 12 stage,
especially when the accrual date is subject to dispute. Am. Premier Underwriters,
Inc. v. Nat'IR. R. Passenger Corp., 839 F. 3d 458, 464 (6th Cir. 2016); Lutz v.
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Chesapeake Appalachian L. L. C., 717 F. 3d 459, 476 (6th Cir. 2013). The instant
matter is no exception. Here, Plaintiffs have chosen to proceed on a theory that
the Northmont Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the danger that
Defendant Hunt posed and the harm he caused. Plaintiffs have alleged a
continuous pattern of failure to investigate Defendant Hunt's employment history
before he was hired and when complaints were made about Defendant Hunt's
grooming and sexual misconduct between 2012 and 2025. (Doc. #26-1, PAGEID
273-74, 280-83, 1111 23-28, 50-60). Plaintiffs are correct that, unlike in Chapman.
where the plaintiffs "personally reported misconduct to school officials and
personally observed the school ignoring their complaints!, ] . .. experienc[ing] the
school's deliberate indifference firsthand because they saw it happen to their own
reports in real time[, ]" (Doc. #25, PAGEID 245, citing Chapman, 713 F. Supp. 3d at
439), "Plaintiffs [herein] never reported their abuse to Northmont. The warnings
Northmont received came from third parties including the Rather family, Tucker
Rather, and Bonnie Hill, whose identities and communications were entirely
unknown to Plaintiffs."
Plaintiffs further claim that, irrespective of the abuse they suffered by
Defendant Hunt, they (and the public) could not have been aware of the
/\fortfimontDefendants/know\edge and non-disclosure of complaints against
Defendant Hunt until Cox Media Group Ohio's report in August 2025 regarding
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Defendant Hunt's personnel files containing past misconduct prior to being hired
by the District. [Id. at PAGEID 283-85, ^\ 60-68). Plaintiffs allege that they could
not have reasonably known that the Northmont Defendants had injured them until
August 2025. As Plaintiffs correctly note, under their theory, it was at that time,
not the dates on which they turned eighteen, that the Title IX and 42 U. S. C. § 1983
claims accrued. (Id. at PAGEID 287, quoting Snyder-Hill. 48 F. 4th at 704). Indeed,
"[i[t would be unreasonable to conclude that a plaintiff's knowledge that their [sic]
//7£//V/c/t/a/corn plaint was mishandled would reveal that the [school] has a broad
de facto policy of deliberate indifference generally. " Snyder-Hill, 48 F. 4th at 704
(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As
Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint on October 22, 2025 (Doc. #1), Claims One
and Two are timely.
The Northmont Defendants' remaining arguments as to Claims One and
Two are without merit. The Northmont Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Baker,
Blouch, and Paul "had just as much access to prior and current school personnel
records as did the news media[, ]" and "that personnel records of public
employees are public records. " (Doc. #24, PAGEID 232-33). However, they cite no
authority that Defendant Hunt's alleged sexual assault of Plaintiffs put them on
notice to investigate what the Northmont Defendants knew, and the Court is
unaware of any. The arguments that Plaintiffs do not allege that the Northmont
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Defendants destroyed, concealed, or prevented access to Defendant Hunt's
employment records, or that they discouraged reporting of abuse or facilitated
Defendant Hunt's misconduct {id. at PAGEID 233-34), are strawmen. Plaintiffs are
not alleging sins of commission, as described by the Northmont Defendants, but
rather a sin of omission, to wit: deliberate indifference.
Finally, since the claims of Plaintiffs Baker, Blouch, and Paul are timely, the
Northmont Defendants' argument regarding the relation-back doctrine (Doc. #24,
PAGEID 228-29, citing In re Kent Holland Die Casting & Plaiting, Inc., 928 F. 2d
1448, 1449 (6th Cir. 1991)) is immaterial with respect to adding Harp as a plaintiff.
Moreover, the Court concludes that there is substantial overlap in the facts and
legal issues between Harp and the other Plaintiffs, making Harp's addition as a
Plaintiff proper. 1 Consequently, Plaintiffs' Second Motion to Amend is sustained,
and the Northmont Defendants' Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is
overruled, as to Claims One and Two.
2. Claims Three and Eight
In their Rule 12(c) Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, the
Northmont Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' state law Claims Three (Negligent
Hiring, Supervision, and Retention) and Eight (Negligent Infliction of Emotional
1 As Claims One and Two remain viable for all Plaintiffs, the Court does not evaluate the
Northmont Defendants' argument that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims of Plaintiffs Baker, Blouch, and Paul. (Doc. #15, PAGEID 125-
27, citing 28 U. S. C. §1367).
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Distress) are barred by political subdivision immunity, as the transportation of
students on school buses is a governmental function, rather than a proprietary
function for which no exception to immunity applies. (Doc. #15, PAGEID 127-29,
citing OHIO REV. CODE § 2744. 02(A-B); Doe v. Marlington Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 122 Ohio St. Sd 12, 2009-Ohio-t 360, 1111 n. 2; /V.A/^. ^. Cleveland Metro.
School Dist., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97195, 2012-0hio-4929, II 9 (Oct. 25, 2012);
Doe v. Dayton City Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc., 137 Ohio App. Sd 166, 170 (2d Dist.
1999)). Plaintiffs do not address this argument in either of their Motions to
Amend, and, in fact, the allegations specific to Claims Three and Eight are
identical in the original Complaint, in the First Amended Complaint 1, and in the
First Amended Complaint 2. (Doc. #1, PAGEID 15-17, 22-23, m 61-70, 93-97; Doc.
#26-1, PAGEID 294-96, 302-03, ITfl 102-11, 141-45).
Moreover, the Northmont Defendants are correct that, contrary to Plaintiffs'
allegations (Doc. #1, PAGEID 15-16, II 62; Doc. #26-1, PAGEID 294, fl 103, citing
OHIO REV. CODE § 2744. 02(B)(2)), "[b]ecause the board was required by law to
provide transportation for [students], the function of providing it was
governmental, not proprietary[. ]" Dayton City, 137 Ohio App. 3d at 170, citing
OHIO REV. CODE § 2744. 01(0(1); seea/soOwo REV. CODE §§ 3314. 09, 3327. 01,
3327. 011 (statutes requiring school districts to provide transportation for students
residing in the district). As Plaintiffs do not claim that another exception to
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political subdivision immunity applies. Claims Three and Eight would not survive
a renewed Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Second Motion to Amend is
overruled, and the Northmont Defendants' Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings is sustained, as to Claims Three and Eight.
3. Claim Four
In the original Complaint, Claim Four, failure to report suspected child
abuse, was brought against the Board and Employee Does One through Five.
(Doc. #1, PAGEID 18-19, ^ 71-79). The Northmont Defendants argue that Claim
Four, failure to report suspected child abuse, must be dismissed as against the
Board, because "[t]he statute does not.. . provide for a duty of a school district or
school board to report. Nor does the statute expressly impose civil liability on a
political subdivision for the failure to report by one of its employees. " (Doc. #15,
PAGEID 129-30, citing OHIO REV. CODE § 2151. 421; ^^//7S, 2021-0hio-3389). While
Plaintiffs do not respond to the Northmont Defendants, Claim Four in the First
Amended Complaint 2 is brought only against Employee Does One through Five.
(Doc. #26-1, PAGEID 296-98, ^ 112-20). As First Amended Complaint 2, once
filed, will render the original Complaint a nullity, the Board is no longer potentially
liable under Claim Four. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Second Motion to Amend is
sustained, and the Northmont Defendants' Motion overruled as moot, as to Claim
Four.
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IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' First Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc.
#21) is OVERRULED AS MOOT. Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Leave to Amend
(Doc. #26) is OVERRULED as to Claims Three and Eight and is SUSTAINED in all
other respects. Defendant Hunt's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc.
#19) is OVERRULED AS MOOT. The Northmont Defendants' Motion for Partial
Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. #15) is OVERRULED with respect to Claims One
and Two, SUSTAINED as to Claims Three and Eight, and OVERRULED AS MOOT
as to Claim Four. Claims Three and Eight are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and
judgment shall ultimately enter in favor of the Northmont Defendants and against
Plaintiffs on those claims. Once Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint is filed, the
following claims remain viable: Claims One and Two against all Northmont
Defendants, Claim Four against Employee Does I through V, and Claims Five
through Seven against Defendant Hunt.
Plaintiffs shall separately file First Amended Complaint 2 (Doc. #26-1 ) as
their First Amended Complaint within seven (7) days of entry. Defendant Hunt
and the Northmont Defendants shall answer, move, or otherwise respond to that
First Amended Complaint within twenty-one (21) days thereafter. Plaintiff shall
request issuance of summons against the Tri-County Defendants or file waivers of
service within fourteen (14) days of filing the First Amended Complaint.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
June 9, 2026
f r&j .-1^1. %j_t^
WALTER H. RICE, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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