govinfo:USCOURTS-tnwd-2_23-cv-02739-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
WESTERN DIVISION 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
TRINIKA MCFARLAND, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. Case No. 2:23-cv-02739-BCL-atc 
 
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATE 
SERVICES, 
 
Defendant. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 42) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Before the Court is Defendant Federal Express Corporation’s (“FedEx”) Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Doc. 35. In its Motion (Doc. 35), Defendant seeks judgment on the grounds 
that (1) Plaintiff’s claims are time barred and (2) Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of 
discrimination and retaliation. Doc. 35. Plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, did not file a 
response in opposition to the Motion. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS FedEx’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 35). 
BACKGROUND 
 A. Plaintiff Trinika McFarland was a longtime worker at FedEx, having started 
working for Defendant in 1999. Doc. 1-2 at 4. Plaintiff worked as a Ramp Agent and is an African-
American woman and is a homosexual. Id. On January 12, 2022, Plaintiff and a coworker, Andrew 
Christopher, got into an altercation, which Plaintiff claims was verbal. Doc. 1-2 at 5; Doc. 35-2 at 
2. Following this interaction, Mr. Christopher accused Plaintiff of pushing him . Id. at 3. Mr. 
Christopher filed a workplace violence complaint a gainst Plaintiff following the altercation. Id. 

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Despite knowing of Mr. Christopher’s complaint, Plaintiff did not file a complaint against Mr. 
Christopher or make any report following the altercation. Id. 
 Following this, Defendant conducted an investigation into the altercation, placing Plaintiff 
on paid suspension for three weeks. Id. The investigation compiled a written statement from both 
Plaintiff and Mr. Christopher and received statements from two witnesses of the event. Id. at 4. 
Both witnesses corroborated Mr. Christopher’s allegation that Plaintiff shoved him. Id. On 
February 2, 2022, Plaintiff received a letter demoting her from Ramp Agent to Material Handler 
given a violation of Defendant’s Acceptable Conduct Policy. Id. at 5. 
 Plaintiff pursued a review through Defendant’s three-tiered review process for disciplinary 
actions, challenging the letter and demotion through all three steps. Id. At each level, the 
appropriate decision makers were given the results of the investigation. Id. At Step 1, Plaintiff’s 
appeal was denied and the decision to demote her was upheld. Id. at 5-6. At Step 2, Plaintiff first 
alluded to race, stating that she believed that she was treated unfairly because Mr. Chrisopher is a 
“white male” and that as a result “it was automatically assumed that his words are true.” Id. at 6. 
Plaintiff’s statement did not mention discrimination based on her sexual orientation. Id. At Step 2, 
the demotion and warning letter were again upheld. Id. Given Plaintiff’s mention of race at Step 
2, an internal investigation was conducted on Plaintiff’s behalf. Id. at 7. Plaintiff then continued to 
Step 3, where the appeals board modified her disciplinary action and altered her demotion to 
termination based on the fact that two witnesses corroborated Mr. Christopher’s claim that Plaintiff 
shoved him and that such actions “normally result in termination.” Id. 
 Plaintiff was formally terminated on April 18, 2022, for violation of Defendant’s 
Acceptable Conduct Policy. Id. at 2. Plaintiff then filed her original discrimination charge with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Tennessee Human Rights Commission in 

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July 2022. Id. Plaintiff’s initial charge of discrimination was premised only on race, but she later 
amended it to include an allegation of discrimination based on sex. Id. 
 B. Plaintiff later filed suit in the Circuit Court of Shelby County, Tennessee on 
October 11, 2023. Doc. 1-2 at 2. Defendant removed this case on November 20, 2023. Doc. 1. 
 In her complaint, Plaintiff claims “a continuing series of discriminatory conduct against 
her because of her race, sexual orientation, and acts by the Defendant in retaliation of Plaintiff 
complaining of said discrimination.” Doc. 1 -2 at 3. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges six counts: (1) 
violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, TCA § 4-21-401; (2) violation of the Tennessee 
Public Protection Act, TCA § 50-1-304; (3) violation of Tennessee Common Law Retaliatory 
Discharge; (4) violation of Due Process and Equal Protection under the Tennessee Constitution ; 
(5) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Title VII); and (6) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Id. at 
6-10. 
 Chief Judge Sheryl Lipman was initially assigned to the case, before entering a notice of 
recusal. Docs. 3, 7. The case was then transferred to Judge Mark Norris, who likewise recused 
Docs. 8, 10. The case then transferred to Judge Samuel Mays. Doc. 12. Defendant filed this Motion 
for Summary Judgment on January 20, 2026. Doc. 35. Plaintiff did not respond to the motion. On 
April 15, 2026, this case was transferred to the undersigned. Doc. 36. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 a court “shall grant summary judgment if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” “There is no genuine issue for trial when the record as a whole” —
including “the pleadings, the discovery and the disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits”—
“could not lead a rational trier of fact t o find for the non-moving party.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 

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F.3d 462, 471 (6th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In resolving a motion for 
summary judgment, a court must consider the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the nonmoving party. Id. 
ANALYSIS 
I. With the exception of the Title VII claim, Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. 
Defendant argues that, except for Plaintiff’s claim under Title VII, all of Plaintiff’s claims 
are time-barred under the six-month limitation period contained in her employment contract with 
Defendant. Doc. 35-1 at 2; Doc. 35-3 at 59 (“To the extent the law allows an employee to bring 
legal action against Federal Express Corporation, I agree to bring that complaint within the time 
prescribed by law or 6 months from the date of the event forming the basis of my lawsuit , 
whichever expires first.”). Plaintiff did in fact file her lawsuit more than six months after she was 
terminated: Plaintiff was terminated on April 18, 2022, and she filed her complaint on October 11, 
2023. Doc. 1-2 at 2. 
The six-month time limit to which Plaintiff agreed in her contract is legally effective. The 
Supreme out of the United States has explained that, in “the absence of a controlling statute to the 
contrary, a provision in a contract may validly limit, between the parties, the time for bringing an 
action … to less than that prescribed in the general statute of limitation, provided the shorter period 
itself shall be a reasonable period.” Ord. United Com. Travelers Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 608 
(1947). And a six-month limitations period has been held reasonable and, thus, capable of limiting 
the time in which a plaintiff may bring an action that otherwise would not be time -barred. See 
Thurman v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 397 F.3d 352, 355-56, 358 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal 
based on contract provision imposing six month limitation); Tompkins v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 
2:09CV02073-JPM-DKV, 2010 WL 1780232, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 30, 2010) (“[S]ix months 

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was enough time for Plaintiff to learn of his discharge, investigate the circumstances of that event, 
and file a complaint.”). 
But there are two complicating factors here. First, Plaintiff has asserted a variety of claims 
under Tennessee law —and whether parties may contractually shorten a statute of limitations 
would appear to be a question properly answered by the State creating the underlying rights and 
governing those contracts. 1 Here, that is Tennessee. But Tennessee courts have borrowed the 
federal law in cases involving Tennessee claims, albeit in unpublished cases. See Skaan v. Federal 
Express Corp., 2012 WL 6212891, at *9 (Tenn. App. 2012) (common law claims); Evans v. FedEx 
Exp., 2014 WL 309351 (Tenn. App. 2014) (Tennessee Human Rights Act). Those Tennessee cases 
and Tennessee’s public policy supporting upholding contracts lead to the conclusion that the best 
Erie guess is that the Tennessee Supreme Court would hold that parties may shorten the statute of 
limitations by contract. 
But, there is a second wrinkle: Several of Plaintiff’s claims are statutory. The Sixth Circuit 
has held that when a rights-creating statute comes with its own, specific limitations period, parties 
may not shorten it by contract. The Sixth Circuit so held in a case involving Title VII claims, see 
Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F.3d 824 (6th Cir. 2019), but if you accept the rule there 
is no good reason for limiting the rule itself to Title VII. That does not matter for Plaintiff’s claim 
under Section 1981, because the Sixth Circuit has held that parties can by contract shorten the time 
period for bringing such claims. See Thurman, 397 F.3d 352. And it does not matter for the claim 
asserting a violation of due process and equal protection under the Tennessee constitution, because 
 
1 In older, more formalistic days, statutes of limitations were deemed procedural and thus governed by the 
law of the forum, at least in the conceptually related choice of law context. But for better or worse, such questions are 
answered less formalistically now and, in any event, the question posed here concerns not only the statute of limitations 
but also the substantive law of contract (and its limits). But if all that is wrong, it means only that the paragraph in 
the text is simply unnecessary because the whole issue can be answered by the federal law discussed in the paragraphs 
that sandwich this one. 

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those rights do not come packaged with guaranteed limitations periods, or even any limitations 
periods at all. And, somewhat surprisingly, the result is similar under the Tennessee Human Rights 
Act, where the only on -point Tennessee authority has allowed contractual shortening of the 
limitations period and Plaintiff—having declined to respond to the Motion—has offered no reason 
to doubt that the Tennessee Supreme Court would come out the same way. See Evans v. FedEx 
Exp., 2014 WL 309351 (Tenn. App. 2014) (Tennessee Human Rights Act) ; accord Tomkins v. 
Federal Express Corp. , 2010 WL 1780232 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (s o concluding, but without 
recognizing that state law does or even might govern). Finally, given that conclusion, the same 
rule applies to the Tennessee Public Protection Act, which likewise does not have “an internal 
statute of limitations.” Boone v. Town of Collierville , 593 S.W. 3d 156, 163 (Tenn. App. 2019) 
(treating the TPPA and THRA similarly for limitations purposes). 
 The upshot is that, after application of the contractual limitations period, Plaintiff’s claim 
under Title VII is all that remains. 
II. Plaintiff’s discrimination claim fails as a matter of law. 
A. Although Plaintiff’s complaint is far from clear, she at one point in the background 
section alleges that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sexual orientation. Doc. 1 at 
3. There appears to be nothing in the record supporting any such claim; indeed, Plaintiff testified 
during her deposition that she did not know how her sexual orientation related to her claims. Doc. 
53-3 at 47. And, as Defendant notes and Plaintiff admits (Doc. 53-3 at 12), Plaintiff did not present 
any claim based on sexual orientation to the EEOC, and so has failed to exhaust any claim based 
directly on sexual orientation. See Russ v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 720 Fed.Appx. 229, 
236 (6th Cir. 2017). Thus, any claim of discrimination premised distinctly on sexual orientation 
necessarily fails. 

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B. In any event, Plaintiff’s claim of discrimination—clearly on race, perhaps based on 
sex (and through that reference, perhaps sexual orientation under the rule imposed in Bostock) 
even though Plaintiff does not mention it in her Title VII claim—fails as a matter of law.2 Where, 
as here, there is no direct evidence of discrimination, a discrimination claim in violation of Title 
VII is governed by the McDonnell Douglas framework, under which “the plaintiff must [first] 
make a prima facie showing that the defendant acted with a discriminatory motive.” Ames v. Ohio 
Dep’t of Youth Services , 605 U.S. 303, 306 (2025); see generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973). To do so, the plaintiff must show that she: (1) is a member 
of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; 
and (4) that similarly-situated persons not in the protected class were treated differently. Thurman 
v. Yellow Freight Sys. Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1166 (6th Cir.1996). “If the plaintiff clears that hurdle, 
the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the employee’s rejection.” Ames, 605 U.S. at 308 -09. “Finally, if the employer articulates such a 
justification, the plaintiff must then have a fair opportunity to show that the stated justification was 
in fact pretext f or discrimination.” Id. at 309. “A plaintiff may succeed under the McDonnell 
Douglas framework either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely 
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is 
unworthy of credence.” Id. FedEx does not dispute that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class, 
that she was qualified for the job, or that the termination of Plaintiff amounted to an adverse 
employment action. 
 
2 Plaintiff does mention discrimination on the basis of disability, but that reference appears to have no 
relevance whatsoever to this case. Doc. 1-2 at 9. 

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Even still, Plaintiff has not shown that similarly situated persons not in her protected class 
(or here, classes) were treated differently. “To establish that a non -protected employee is an 
appropriate comparator, ‘the plaintiff [must] demonstrate that he . . . is similarly -situated to the 
non-protected employee in all relevant respects.” Dickens v. Interstate Brands Corp. , 384 
Fed.Appx. 465, 468 (6th Cir. 2010) (emphasis omitted). 
In her complaint, Plaintiff suggests Mr. Christopher as a comparator , but for Title VII 
purposes he does not qualify as a comparator as a matter of law. Doc. 1-2 at 5-6. “In the disciplinary 
context, [the Sixth Circuit] has held that requires that the plaintiff and the proposed comparator 
has engaged in acts of ‘comparable seriousness.’” Dickens v. Interstate Brands Corp. , 384 F. 
App’x 465, 468 (6th Cir. 2010). And here, Plaintiff was not similarly situated: Two witnesses told 
Defendant that Plaintiff shoved Mr. Christopher, resulting in a workplace violence complaint; no 
one claims that Mr. Christopher shoved Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s claim thus fails under the McDonnell 
Douglas framework. Moreover, because Plaintiff chose not to respond to the summary judgment 
motion, her discrimination claim fails for the additional reason that she has not identified evidence 
that would allow a reasonable jury to find that Defendant’s proffered explanation for her 
termination—that she shoved a coworker—was pretext. See Ames, 605 U.S. at 308-09. 
III. Plaintiff’s Title VII claim of retaliation also fails as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff claims that she was retaliated against for “engaging in [the] protected activity of 
complaining about her workplace assault.” Doc. 1-2 at 9. To make out a prima facie claim of 
retaliation under Title VII, Plaintiff must show that 1) she engaged in a protected activity, 2) 
Defendant was aware of the exercise of such protected activity, 3) Defendant took an action that 
was materially adverse to her, and 4) a causal connection existed between the protected activity 
and the materially adverse action. Wingo v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co. , 815 F. App'x 43, 46 (6th Cir. 

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2020). “If a plaintiff establish a prima facie case, then the burden of production shifts to the 
defendant to provide a legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for its actions.” Id. “If the defendant does 
so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reasons … were a pretext for 
retaliation.” Id. 
Plaintiff claims that she partook in protected activity, namely the “activity of complaining 
about her workplace assault.” Doc. 1 -2 at 9. Her claim fails because there is no evidence that a 
causal connection existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse action, thus 
failing to plead a prima facie case of retaliation pursuant to Title VII. In her deposition, Plaintiff 
testified that she “felt like the more steps I was taking and especially once [] EEOC got involved, 
then they terminated m e,” and that other employees told her not “to take it to Step 3” of 
Defendant’s internal process “because most likely you will end up being terminated.” Doc. 35-3 
at 45. But “temporal proximity alone is generally not enough to establish the prima facie element 
of causation.” Wingo, 815 Fed. Appx. at 46 ; see also Alexander v. Univ. of Memphis , 2021 WL 
2579973 (6th Cir. June 7, 2021) ( “ [T]emporal proximity alone cannot prove pretext.”). And 
beyond that, Plaintiff’s statement expresses only a feeling and a warning from unknown sources 
that is not itself suggestive of pretext—not evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude 
that Defendant terminated Plaintiff due to protected activity , as opposed to the fact that two 
witnesses stated that she shoved her coworker. Thus, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim also fails as a 
matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Doc. 35. The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 12th day of June, 2026. 

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s/ Brian C. Lea 
 BRIAN C. LEA 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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