govinfo:USCOURTS-pawd-2_21-cr-00394-1

- 1 - 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 vs. 
 
DEVELL CHRISTIAN, 
 Defendant. 
)
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
 
2:21-cr-394-1 
MEMORANDUM ORDER 
 Pennsylvania state troopers suspected that Defendant Devell Christian was 
selling drugs based on visual survei llance of what looked like a drug transaction in 
the parking lot of a hotel. They executed a traffic stop on Mr. Christian after he drove 
away from the hotel, had a K9 dog do an exterior sniff of the vehicle, and eventually 
obtained a warrant to search the car. Drugs were found. Mr. Christian now moves 
to suppress the drugs (ECF 157). Based on the evidence adduced at the suppression 
hearing and warrant, the Court finds that the officers’ actio ns were lawful. So the 
motion will be denied. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 On June 10, 2021, Pennsylvania State Trooper Wiskeman and Corporal Isoldi 
were conducting surveillance of the Super 8 hotel in New Stanton, P ennsylvania. 
This was because of a tip by a housekeeper who saw drug paraphernalia in one of the 
hotel rooms. ECF 171 at 10:14. New Stanton has many hotels off the interstate and 
is a known centralized hub for drug trafficking because of connecting highways and 
a Greyhound Station serving buses going to and from the Bronx , Newark, Camden, 
and Philadelphia. Id. at 12:1–13. Trooper Wiskeman testified that in his experience, 
he has conducted a drug arrest at every hotel in the New Stanton area. Id. 
 On the day of the stop involving Mr. Christian, Corporal Isoldi was conducting 
undercover surveillance in an unmarked car in the parking lot at the Super 8, and 
Trooper Wiskeman was positioned in a marked car at a nearby credit union. Corporal 

- 2 - 
 
Isoldi made the relevant observations, which he communicated over radio in real time 
to Trooper Wiskeman. ECF 171 at 11:19–14. 
Corporal Isoldi was watching the Super 8 when he saw a woman at a nearby 
Fairfield Marriott exit and then reenter t hat hotel while on a FaceTime video call. 
Id. at 13:15–21. He started watching her. Twenty minutes later, Corporal Isoldi 
radioed Trooper Wiskeman that a white Chevrolet Malibu entered the Fairfield 
parking lot. Id. at 13:22–25. The woman who was originally observed FaceTiming 
placed a large red bag into the trunk of the Malibu. Id. at 14:2–8. The woman closed 
the trunk and then sat in the passenger side of the Malibu for about a minute and a 
half before returning to the hotel. Id. at 14: 7–8. The Malibu then left the parking 
lot. Id. at 14:11–12. Again, all of this was relayed by Corporal Isoldi to Trooper 
Wiskeman. Id. at 13:10–25, 14:1–23. 
 During this interaction, Trooper Wiskeman ran the Malibu’s license plate, and 
he learned that the vehicle had been stopped in the Jonestown area (near 
Philadelphia) about a month earlier, with a report of officers finding bulk currency in 
the car. Although this didn’t result in any arrests or charges, based on his training 
and experience, Trooper Wiskeman believed that the bulk currency meant that Mr. 
Christian and the other occupant were probably stopped right before they intended 
to buy drugs. Id. at 15:5–11. 
 After the Malibu left the Fairfield parking lot, Corporal Isoldi told Trooper 
Wiskeman over the radio that the windows of the Malibu were heavily tinted and 
there was a tinted license plate cover obstructing the license plate. Id. at 15:14–20. 
Heavily tinted windows and license plate obstruction are violations of Pennsylvania 
traffic laws. Id. at 16:9 –16. So once the Malibu turned onto the road, Trooper 
Wiskeman came from behind his spot at the nearby credit union and started following 
the Malibu. The driver of the Malibu then appeared to observe Trooper Wiskeman 
and quickly turned into the New Stanton Park and Ride bus area. Id. at 1–3. 

- 3 - 
 
 Mr. Christian was the driver of the Malibu, and he exited the car as Trooper 
Wiskeman pulled up near it. Id. at 20:4–7. Trooper Wiskeman then exited his vehicle 
and informed Mr. Christian that he was conducting a traffic stop. Id. at 20:7–9. Mr. 
Christian’s exiting his vehicle raised suspicion because based on Trooper Wiskeman’s 
knowledge, training, and experience, individuals will exit vehicles when they are 
attempting to distance themselves from items that may be concealed in the vehicle. 
Id. at 20:17–24. 
 Trooper Wiskeman asked Mr. Christian about his travel, and Mr. Christian 
told Trooper Wiskeman that he had just left the Fairfi eld where he had met his 
girlfriend. Id. at 21:7–9. Mr. Christian said that he was going to the nearby Citizens 
Bank for some cash to give to his girlfriend and then planned to return home. Id. at 
21:9–12. Trooper Wiskeman asked Mr. Christian about his girlfriend’s hotel and her 
last name, but Mr. Christian could n’t provide that basic information. Id. at 21:12–
14. Mr. Christian did say that he had just returned to the Pittsburgh area from the 
Bronx and that his girlfriend had just returned from New Jersey and was staying at 
the Fairfield. Id. at 21: 15– 17. Mr. Christian told Trooper Wiskeman that his 
girlfriend drove a rental car from New Jersey to the Pittsburgh area. Id. at 21:17. 
Mr. Christian said that there was no rental car in the parking lot because she had 
returned it. Id. at 21:21–22. But he also didn’t know how she got back to t he hotel 
after returning the rental car. Id. Trooper Wiskeman said that Mr. Christian had a 
defensive posture during their conversation, but was not acting aggressive or being 
uncooperative. Id. at 22:1–3. Trooper Wiskeman also testified that Mr. Christian’s 
carotid artery was “vigorously pulsating,” which he took as a sign of nervousness. Id. 
at 22:5–6. 
 Trooper Wiskeman was also suspicious about why Mr. Christian was going to 
Citizens Bank. Id. at 23:10–15. Trooper Wiskeman knew that the Citizens Bank 
parking lot and the Park and Ride parking lot where Mr. Christian had parked do 

- 4 - 
 
not share a conjoining parking lo t. Id. at 23:14–20. The Citizens Bank has its own 
parking lot, so Mr. Christian parking in the Park and Ride lot raised Trooper 
Wiskeman’s suspicion. Id. at 23:22–24:15. 
 After Trooper Wiskeman ’s initial conversation with Mr. Christian, he asked 
Mr. Christian if he could search Mr. Christian’s vehicle. Id. at 25:24–25; 26:1–4. Mr. 
Christian said no . Id. at 25:24 –25, 26:1 –3. Trooper Wiskeman then told Mr. 
Christian he would call a K9 dog to come to the traffic stop. Id. at 26:2– 3. Mr. 
Christian called his attorney. Id. at 26:6–10. The attorney attempted to persuade 
Trooper Wiskeman to release Mr. Chr istian from the traffic stop. Id. Trooper 
Wiskeman explained to Mr. Christian that he was welcome to leave while the dog 
conducted the sniff search. Id. at 26: 11–14. If the dog “alerted to the vehicle,” then 
it would be towed to police barracks, and he would apply for a search warrant. Id. 
at 26:13–18. At that point, Mr. Christian walked away and appeared to take an Uber 
away from the area, and left the Malibu behind. Id. at 26:19–24. 
 T he K9 officer and dog eventually arrived about 50 minutes later, and the dog 
was alerted to drugs in the vehicle. Id. at 29:10–16; Gov’t Ex. 1 at 50:00-51:45. So 
the officer s towed the vehicle, and Trooper Wiskeman applied for and obtained a 
search warrant and searched the vehicle. ECF 171 at 29:17 –24. Drugs were 
recovered during the search. Id. at 29:23–24. 
DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS 
 Mr. Christian offers four grounds for suppression: (1) officers initiated the 
traffic stop without reasonable suspicion; (2) officers unlawfully extended the traffic 
stop when they employed a K9 dog to sniff for drugs; (3) the search warrant affidavit 
lacked probable cause; and (4) Mr. Christian did not consent to the vehicle search. 
ECF 157. The Court addresses each argument, in turn. 
 

- 5 - 
 
I. Trooper Wiskeman had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic 
stop. 
The vehicle code violations were enough to give Trooper Wiskeman reasonable 
suspicion for the traffic stop. 
A law enforcement officer may initiate a traffic stop when he has reasonable 
suspicion that an individual has violated a law. United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 
F.3d 392, 39 9–400 (3d Cir. 2006) . “[A]n officer ’s Fourth Amendment burden of 
production is to (1) identify the ordinance or statute that he believed had been 
violated, and (2) provide specific, articulable facts that support an objective 
determination of whether any officer could have possessed reasonable suspicion of 
the alleged infraction. As long as both prongs are met, an officer ’s subjective 
understanding of the law at issue would not be relevant to the court’s determination.” 
Id. 
At the suppression hearing, Trooper Wiskeman credibly testified that he 
observed Mr. Christian ’s vehicle in violation of two Pennsylvania traffic laws: the 
Malibu had heavy window tinting and a tinted license plate cover that obstructed 
Trooper Wiskeman’s view of the license plate. ECF 171 at 15:14–20. And the dash-
cam footage of the traffic stop confirmed as much. Gov ’t Ex. 1. The Pennsylvania 
vehicle code prohibits dark window tinting that obstructs the view inside a vehicle 
and license plate obstruction. 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 4 524(e)(1); 1332(b)(3); United 
States v. Stewart, 92 F.4th 461, 465 (3d Cir. 2024). Trooper Wiskeman therefore had 
reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. 
II. Trooper Wiskeman had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop and 
employ a dog search. 
The next question is whether Trooper Wiskeman had reasonable suspicion to 
extend the stop from its original purpose ( vehicle violations) to then get the K9 dog. 
He did. 

- 6 - 
 
A traffic stop may last only as long as reasonably necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350, 354 (2015) 
(“Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer 
than is necessary to effec tuate that purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends 
when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are —or reasonably should have been —
completed.” (cleaned up)). A “traffic stop may last as long as needed to address the 
traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns.” 
United States v. Wilson, 960 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). These related 
inquiries include “checking the driver’ s license, determining whether there are 
outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration 
and proof of insurance.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355. 
“To prolong the stop past this time needed to address the traf fic violation, the 
officer must have —at the moment the stop is extended —reasonable, articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity separate from the traffic violation. ” United States v. 
Romero, 559 F. Supp. 3d 437, 447 (W.D. Pa. 2021) (Ranjan, J.) (cleaned up ). The 
Court must then decide whether the stop was extended at all — this is known as the 
“Rodriguez moment.” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018). If the 
stop was extended, then, the Court assesses whether the facts available to the officer 
at that moment were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that criminal 
activity was afoot. Id. 
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause . It 
requires “more than a mere hunch” and “only a particularized and objective basis for 
suspecting criminal activity.” Id. at 183 (cleaned up). “ In assessing reasonable 
suspicion, three themes must remain front and center: (1) reasonable suspicion must 
always be evaluated under the totality of the ci rcumstances; (2) when assessing the 
totality of the circumstances, courts recognize the particular ability of law 
enforcement officers, based on training and experience, to make inferences from and 

- 7 - 
 
deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude 
an untrained person; and (3) reasonable suspicion cannot be defeated by a so- called 
‘divide-and-conquer’ analysis, whereby each arguably suspicious factor is viewed in 
isolation and plausible, innocent explanations are offered for each.” Romero, 559 F. 
Supp. 3d at 447 (quoting Green, 897 F.3d at 183) (cleaned up). 
Applying these principles, Trooper Wiskeman had reasonable suspicion to 
extend the stop even from the earliest possible Rodriguez moment. That moment was 
when Mr. Christian exited the vehicle upon being pulled over. But before that point, 
as Trooper Wiskeman credibly testified, he had reasonable suspicion that Mr. 
Christian might be involved in drug trafficking activity. For example, when Trooper 
Wiskeman ran the Malibu’s license plate (before the stop), he learned that the vehicle 
had been stopped in the Jonestown area six weeks earlier and officers reported that 
Mr. Christian was in the vehicle and had bulk currency in a book bag, which suggests 
that the occupants could purchase narcotics. ECF 171 at 15:5–11. Also before the 
stop, Corporal Isoldi had relayed to him that a woman at the hotel put something in 
the trunk of the Malibu, sat in the passenger seat, and then exited the vehicl e—
suggestive of a drug transaction. Id. at 14:7–8. 
And then once the traffic stop commenced, the red flags increased within 
seconds. Trooper Wiskeman testified that Mr. Christian exited the vehicle —
something common with individuals who are attempting to distance themselves from 
contacts in the vehicle —and Mr. Christian was unable to answer basic questions 
about the woman he referred to as his girlfriend. Id. at 20:17–24, 21:21–22. Trooper 
Wiskeman also observed that Mr. Christian’s carotid artery was “vigorously 
pulsating,” which Trooper Wiskeman has observed in nervous individuals. Id. at 
22:5–8. This, together, was reasonable suspicion of drug activity, sufficient to extend 
the stop to call the dog for an exterior sniff. 

- 8 - 
 
True, it took about 50 minutes for the K9 officer and dog to arrive on scene 
(though Mr. Christian had already left). But that does not render the stop 
unconstitutional. Prolonging a stop is only a constitutional problem when the officer 
lacks reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop beyond the initial traffic-code violation, 
or when property is seized beyond a reasonable time. 
Here, the trooper had reasonable suspicio n of possible drug activity almost 
immediately, and that warranted ex tending the stop and calling for the dog . See 
United States v. Wilson, 960 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2020) (finding that officer did not 
impermissibly prolong a traffic stop wherein he deve loped reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity while questioning driver and passengers and subsequently 
extending the traffic stop); see also United States v. Garner, 961 F.3d 264, 271 (3d 
Cir. 2020) (“We hold Trooper Ramirez had reasonable suspicion to e xtend the stop 
based on information he obtained during the first few minutes of the traffic stop and 
before he engaged in any unrelated investigation. So no unlawful extension of the 
traffic stop ever occurred.”) 
And the 50 -minute wait for the K9 officer and dog to arrive was not an 
unreasonable delay and did not offend the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. 
Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 738 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that 80–minute delay between seizure 
and “olfactory inspection” of defendant’s luggage did not render search unreasonable, 
absent any indicia of lack of diligence by police officers ); United States v. Johnson , 
742 F. App’x 616, 621–22 (3d Cir. 2018) (“We likewise reject Johnson’s argument that 
the officers could have expedited the start of the dog sniff, which did not occur until 
twenty-five minutes after Iggy arrived, and more than one hour after the stop.”).
 
Consider too that Mr. Christian had left the scene w hile the troopers waited 
for the dog. ECF 171 at 26:11–25; 27:1–3. This is significant in two respects. First, 
because he left, that lessened any urgency of getting the dog on scene, making the 50-
minute delay more reasonable. Second, by leaving and basically abandoning the car, 

- 9 - 
 
Mr. Christian waived any right to invoke a Rodriguez -based argument. See 
Rodriquez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015) (remanding to the Eighth Circuit 
whether the prolonged detention of a motorist, that is, a person rather than a person’s 
property, was supported by reasonable suspicion). 
In sum, Trooper Wiskeman had the requisite reasonable suspicion of drug 
activity before he extended the stop. The duration and scope of the traffic stop were 
lawful. 
III. There was sufficient probable cause in the search-warrant affidavit. 
After the dog alerted to drugs, the officers had the vehicle towed to the 
barracks, and then they applied for a search warrant to search the interior. Mr. 
Christian argues that the search warrant affidavit submitted by law enforcement did 
not contain sufficient probable cause. ECF 157 at 2. The Court finds that it did. 
“[A] reviewing court may not conduct a de novo review of the magistrate judge’s 
determination of probable cause.” United States v. Whitner , 219 F.3d 289, 296 (3d 
Cir. 2000). Instead, the “reviewing court must determine only that the magistrate 
judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to uphold the 
warrant.” Id. (cleaned up). Reviewing courts should give a magistrate judge’s finding 
of probable cause “great deference.” Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). “A 
magistrate judge may find probable cause when, viewing the totality of the 
circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will 
be found in a particular place.” United States v. Hodge, 246 F .3d 301, 305 (3d Cir. 
2001) (cleaned up). 
The search-warrant affidavit contained sufficient evidence to support probable 
cause of drugs in the vehicle. The affidavit includes , among other facts , a detailed 
summary of Trooper Wiskeman’s background, trainin g, and experience related to 
drug trafficking; the surveillance on the day of the traffic stop when the officers saw 
a woman place a bag into Mr. Christian’s trunk in a hotel parking lot; the vehicle 

- 10 - 
 
inquiry Trooper Wiskeman ran before the traffic stop th at revealed that Mr. 
Christian’s vehicle had been stopped a month prior and officers uncovered bulk 
currency; Mr. Christian’s being unable to answer certain questions about his alleged 
girlfriend; and the police dog being alerted to contraband. ECF 157-1. 
Based on the totality of these facts, the Court finds that the magistrate had a 
substantial basis to find probable cause based on the evidence proffered in the search-
warrant affidavit. 
IV. Mr. Christian’s lack of consent to the vehicle search is immaterial. 
Finally, Mr. Christian argues that evidence from the vehicle search should be 
suppressed because Mr. Christian never consented to the search. ECF 157 at 2. 
Mr. Christian does not specify whether he refers to the dog sniff or the execution of 
the search warrant. Either way, the Court has, as noted above, concluded that the 
search warrant affidavit is supported by sufficient probable cause and that the dog 
sniff search was not a product of an illegal stop. So Mr. Christian’s consent didn’t 
matter. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the above reasons, the Court DENIES Mr. Christian’s motion to suppress 
(ECF 157). 
 
DATE: June 12, 2026 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ J. Nicholas Ranjan 
United States District Judge 

Passage view · GavelSight