govinfo:USCOURTS-paed-2_17-cr-00599-4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : CRIMINAL ACTION 
 : 
 v. : 
 : 
HUGH D. WYATT : NO. 17-599-3 
 
ORDER-MEMORANDUM 
 AND NOW , this 5th day of Novem ber, 2025, upon consideration of Defendant Hugh 
Wyatt’s pro se Motion for Early Termination of Supervised Release (Docket No. 225), the 
Government’s opposition to that Motion, and input from the United States Probation Office, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED. However, Probation’s recommendation that 
Defendant be moved from the Low/Moderate Risk caseload to the Low Risk caseload is 
APPROVED. 
 On November 16, 2018, Defendant pled guilty pursuant to a n agreement under Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) (a “C- plea agreement”) to Counts 7, 8, and 9 of a 
Superseding Indictment, each of which charged him with distribution of fentanyl, and aiding and 
abetting, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Among the provisions 
in t he guilty plea agreement is a waiver of Defendant’s rights to appeal or bring a collateral 
challenge to his conviction or sentence. On March 26, 2019, this Court sentenced Defendant to a 
90-month term of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $300 special assessment. 
Supervised release commenced on April 21, 2023, and is thus due to expire in approximately six 
months, on April 20, 2026. 
Defendant’s supervised release thus far has been without incident. The probation office 
has classified him as a low/moderate risk, which requires only bi-monthly visits with his probation 
officer. According to Defendant, he has maintained steady employment wit h the Southeastern 

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Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (“ SEPTA”), has remained arr est-free and maintained a 
“prosocial” lifestyle, and has demonstrated a commitment to rehabilitation and reintegration into 
the community. (Def.’s Mem. at 1.) The probation office reports that Defendant has maintained 
a stable residence, has remained employed, has paid his special assessment in full, has had no new 
arrests, and has consistently tested negative for drug and alcohol use. 
Based on his positive adjustment to supervised release, Defendant has moved for early 
termination of his supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), which grants us discretion 
to terminate a term of supervised release if we are “satisfied that such action is warranted by the 
conduct of the defendant . . . and the interest of justice,” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). In exercising our 
discretion, we consider certain factors laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including: 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the defendant ’s 
history and characteristics; (2) the need to afford adequate 
deterrence to criminal conduct, protect the public from further 
crimes of the defendant, and provide him with needed educational 
or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment 
in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentence and 
sentencing range established for the defendant ’s crimes; (4) 
pertinent policy statements issued by the United States Sentenc ing 
Commission; (5) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities 
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty 
of similar conduct; and (6) the need to provide restitution to any 
victims of the offense. 
 
United States v. Melvin, 978 F.3d 49, 52 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Davies, 746 F. 
App’x 86, 88-89 (3d Cir. 2018)). At the same time, we “are not required to make specific findings 
of fact with respect to each of these factors; rather, ‘ a statement that [ we have] considered the 
statutory factors is sufficient.’” Id. at 52-53 (quoting United States v. Gammarano, 321 F.3d 311, 
315-16 (2d Cir. 2003)). Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has 
stated that “[g]enerally, early termination of supervised release under § 3583(e)(1) will be proper 
only when the [court] is satisfied that new or unforeseen circumstances warrant it.” Id. at 53 (first 

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alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). The defendant always bears “the burden of 
establishing that early termination of his supervised release is merited.” United States v. Allston, 
Crim. A. No. 99-409, 2021 WL 4262315, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2021) ( citing United States v. 
McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
The Government opposes early termination of Defendant’s supervised release on two 
grounds. First, it contends that Defendant waived the right to seek early termination in his guilty 
plea agreement. Second, it argues that the § 3553(a) factors do not support early termination. The 
United States Probation Office also opposes early termination. 
A. Waiver 
Defendant’s Guilty Plea Agreement contains the following waiver: 
If the Court accepts the recommendation of the parties and imposes the sentence 
[set forth in the] agreement, the government agrees that it will not file any appeal 
of the sentence in this case, and the defendant agrees that he voluntarily and 
expressly waives all rights to appeal or collaterally attack the defendant ’s 
conviction, sentence, or any other matter relating to this prosecution , whether 
such a right to appeal or collateral attack arises under 18 U.S.C. § 3742, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, or any other provision of law. As part of this knowing 
and voluntary waiver of the right to appeal or collaterally attack the conviction and 
sentence, the defendant expressly waives the right to raise on appeal or on collateral 
review any argument that (1) the statutes to which the defendant is pleading guilty 
are unconstitutional and (2) the admitted conduct does not fall within the scope of 
the statutes. However, the defendant retains the right to file a claim, if otherwise 
allowed by law, that an attorney who represented the defendant during the cour se 
of this criminal case provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. 
 
(Guilty Plea Agreement, Attach. A to Gov’t Mem., ¶ 13 (emphasis added).) 
In support of its argument that Defendant waived his right to file his Motion for early 
termination of supervised release, the Government points to this waiver and the decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Damon, 933 F.3d 269 (3d 
Cir. 2019). In Damon, the defendant entered into a guilty plea agreement in which he waived the 
right to file “any appeal, any collateral attack, or any other writ or motion, . . . which challenges 

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the sentence imposed by the sentencing court,” provided that that sentence was “within or below” 
the advisory Guideline range. Id. at 271 (emphasis added). In considering whether this waiver 
applied to motions for early termination of supervised release, the Third Circuit first noted its 
longstanding enforcement of waivers in guilty plea agreements and explained that such plea 
agreements are “analyzed under contract law standards.” Id. at 272-73 (citations omitted). It also 
found both that the term “sentence” in the waiver unambiguously includes a defendant’s term of 
supervised release and that the defendant’s motion for early termination of supervised release 
amounted to a “challenge” to that sentence. Id. at 273-74. It therefore held that the defendant’s 
motion for early termination of his supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) fell within 
the scope of his waiver. Id. at 275. 
The Government now c ontends that the logic of Damon similarly bars Defendant from 
seeking early termination of his supervised release. However, it does not acknowledge that the 
language of Defendant’s waiver is narrower than that in Damon, most critically because 
Defendant, unlike Damon, did not waive his right to file “any other writ or motion , . . . which 
challenges the sentence imposed.” Damon, 933 F.3d at 271. We thus conclude that Damon does 
not control the precise issue presented here, which is only whether Defendant’s more limited 
waiver of the right to appeal or collaterally attack h is sentence bars h im from filing his present 
Motion. 
We ad dressed the applicability of an almost identical appellate and collateral attack waiver 
in United States v. Crews, another case in which the defendant filed a motion for early termination 
of supervised release. Crim. A. No. 10-663-5, 2020 WL 6581430 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2020). We 
concluded in Crews that the defendant had not waived his right to bring the motion. Id. at *2. As 
we explained: 

5 
 
While [defendant] waived the right to appeal and collaterally attack his sentence in 
his Guilty Plea Agreement, he did not waive the right to file any other sort of motion 
with respect to his sentence. The instant motion does not constitute an appeal of 
[defendant’s] sentence, request reconsideration of his sentence, or ask us to reverse 
or vacate any part of his sentence. We therefore conclude that the instant Motion 
for early termination of supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) does 
not constitute an appeal or collateral attack of [defendant’s] sentence, which would 
be covered by the appellate waiver and, accordingly, we conclude that [defendant] 
did not waive his right to bring the instant Motion in his Guilty Plea Agreement. 
 
Id. at *2. Other “[c]ourts distinguishing Damon have [similarly] held that motions for early 
termination of supervised release are neither appeals nor collateral attacks of the underlying 
sentence” and thus, are not barred by appellate and collateral attack waivers. United States v. 
Tarboro, Crim. A. No. 08-323-01, 2023 WL 3821812, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2023) ; see United 
States v. Mabry, 528 F. Supp. 3d 349, 353-56 (E.D. Pa. 2021); United States v. Fluellen, Crim. A. 
No. 09-497-1, 2022 WL 309159, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2022); United States v. Pearson, Crim. A. 
No. 04- 433, 2024 WL 1936226, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 2024) . But see United States v. 
Wadlington, Crim. A. No. 12-457-2, 2022 WL 206173, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2022) (concluding 
that identical waiver barred motion for early termination); United States v. Ball, Crim. A. No. 05-
56-10, 2021 WL 51461, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2021). In accordance with our prior decision in 
Crews and the decisions of the other courts reaching the same conclusion, and in the absence of 
any argument from the Government as to why the precise limited waiver at issue here prohibits 
Defendant’s Motion, we conclude that Defendant’s appellate and collateral attack waiver does not 
bar his Motion for Early Termination of Supervised Release. 
B. § 3553(a) Factors 
 The Government argues in the alternative that Defendant has not met his burden of proving 
that the relevant § 3553(a) factors support early termination. As noted above, in seeking early 
termination, Defendant points to his steady employment with SEPTA, his recent compliance with 

6 
 
both the law and the terms of his supervised release, and his “prosocial lifestyle, demonstrating 
rehabilitation and responsibility.” (Def.’s Mem. at 2.) He ultimately argues that his “exemplary 
compliance [with the terms of supervised release], demonstrated rehabilitation, and the absence of 
any public safety concerns” support early termination. (Def.’s Mot. at 1.) 
However, upon consideration of the § 3553(a) factors , we are not convinced that the 
interests of justice support early termination. We commend Defendant for his positive adjustment 
to supervision and reintegration into his community, but compliance with the terms of supervised 
release is merely what is expected during supervision and does not alone support a bid for early 
termination. Defendant’s crimes in this case involved the distribution of fentanyl, a particularly 
potent opioid, which has caused many overdose deaths in Philadelphia. Specifically, on three 
different dates in June of 2017, he knowingly facilitated the sale of a total of 36 grams of fentanyl 
disguised as heroin to undercover federal agents. (11/16/18 Hr’g Tr., Docket No. 229, at 14-17.) 
At sentencing, Defendant faced an advisory Guideline range of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment 
because he had four prior felony convictions for possession with intent to distribute controlled 
substances and thus qualified as a Career Offender. His 90-month sentence pursuant to his C-plea 
agreement was a significant reduction from his advisory Guideline range. 
The nature and circumstances of Defendant’s fentanyl crimes, his prior history of drug 
crimes, and the comparative leniency of his sentence of imprisonment all weigh against early 
termination. The probation office also opposes early termination, stating, inter alia, that 
Defendant’s classification as a Career Offender makes Defendant ineligible for early termination 
under local policy. Moreover, Defendant has presented no new or unforeseen circumstances that 
would provide a rationale for cutting short his supervisory term. Indeed, his positive record under 
minimal supervision signals to us that he is thriving under supervision and leads us to conclude 

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that maintaining supervision for the limited time remaining will encourage his continued progress 
without being punitive. We also believe that the existing sentence remains appropriate to avoid 
sentencing disparities with other individuals who have been found guilty of similar conduct, all of 
whom necessarily faced a three -year mandatory minimum term of supervised release. See 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). 
For all of the foregoing reasons, we deny Defendant’s Motion for Early Termination of 
Supervised Release, rejecting the Government’s argument that Defendant has waived his right to 
file the Motion, but exercising our discretion, upon consideration of the relevant § 3553(a) factors, 
to conclude that the Motion fails on its merits. At the same time, the probation office has advised 
us that it recommends moving Defendant from the Low/Moderate Supervision caseload to the Low 
Risk caseload for the remainder of Defendant’s term of supervision to align with Defendant’s 
reduced risk to reoffend, and we approve that recommendation. 
 BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 /s/ John R. Padova, J. 
 ____________________________ 
 John R. Padova, J. 

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