govinfo:USCOURTS-paed-2_09-cr-00574-2

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISCTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLV ANIA 
 : 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, : 
 : 
 : 
 v. : CRIMINAL NO. 09-574-03 
 : 
CLARENCE POWELL, : 
 : 
 : 
 
MEMORANDUM 
 
KENNEY, J. June 27, 2025 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Before the Court is Defendant Clarence Powell’s pro se motion for compassionate release 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (1)(A)(i). ECF No. 309. The Government filed a response in 
opposition. ECF No. 310. Accordingly, the motion is ripe for consideration. 
Powell seeks a sentence reduction based on 2018 reforms enacted by section 403 of the 
First Step Act, which amended 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C) to eliminate the mandatory imposition of 
consecutive sentences for first-time offenders. Powell was convicted of two counts of Hobbs Act 
robbery and conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and two counts of using a firearm during a 
crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) . See ECF No. 310 at 4. Powell received a 
sentence of 697 months of imprisonment, to be served consecutively to terms imposed in two other 
cases (No. 09-86 and No. 10-418), resulting in a total sentence of 841 months—or 70 years and 1 
month. Id. at 4 -5. Powell received such a lengthy sentence largely because, at the time of his 
sentencing, each “second or subsequent conviction” of § 924(c) carried a consecutive minimum 
sentence of “not less than 25 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C) (2006). Powell’s motion is denied 
for the reasons discussed below. 

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II. BACKGROUND 
Between 2007 and 2008, Powell engaged in a series of serious offenses. See ECF 310 at 1. 
Relevant here are the armed robbery of a McDonald’s on September 12, 2007, Case No. 09-86, 
and two subsequent 2008 home invasion robberies targeting business owners , Case No. 09-574-
03. Powell was convicted first for his role in the McDonald’s robbery. On July 15, 2009, he pled 
guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and one count of using 
and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Case No. 09-
86. He was sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment, consisting of 24 months for the robbery charge 
and a mandatory consecutive term of 84 months for the § 924(c) count. Id.; ECF No. 310 at 4. 
Powell’s current motion for compassionate release relates to the subsequent conviction 
stemming from his involvement, alongside two co- defendants, in the 2008 home invasion 
robberies that targeted business owners. See ECF 309 at 6. He was convicted by a jury of 
conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) 
(Count One); two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, also under § 1951(a) (Counts Two and Four); and 
two counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c) (Counts Three and Five). ECF 310 at 4. On May 24, 2011, Powell received a total sentence 
of 697 months’ imprisonment consisting of 97 months on Counts One, Two, and Four, to run 
concurrently, followed by a mandatory consecutive sentence of 300 months on Count Three and 
an additional consecutive term of 300 months on Count Five. Id. 
These convictions were ordered to run consecutively to the 108 -month sentence Powell 
received on October 22, 2009, in Case No. 09-86. Id. at 5. He was later sentenced to an additional 
36 months in Case No. 10-418 on October 8, 2013. Id. Together, these sentences resulted in a total 
term of imprisonment of 841 months (equivalent to 70 years and 1 month). Id. 

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Powell is currently serving his seventeenth year of incarceration. ECF 309 at 6. In his 
motion, he expresses a desire for “the same opportunity all his co- defendants were given.” Id. at 
2. His co -defendants, unlike Powell , received significantly shorter sentences pursuant to plea 
agreements. See Case No. 09-00574-01, 09-00574-02. 
Powell now moves for compassionate release, a rguing that extraordinary and compelling 
circumstances warrant relief. ECF No. 309 at 15. He points to recent amendments to the § 924(c) 
mandatory minimums and contends that his current sentence is excessively long under today’s 
legal standards. Id. at 20. Powell also emphasizes his significant rehabilitation while incarcerated 
and his young age at the time of the offense as additional grounds for relief. Id. at 17. 
III. LEGAL STANDARD 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a court may reduce a term of imprisonment if it finds 
that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a sentence reduction. Such a reduction must 
be consistent with both the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s policy statements and sentencing 
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 821 (2010). Whether 
a prisoner has established an “extraordinary and compelling reason for release” is a “threshold 
question” that determines a prisoner’s eligibility for compassionate release. United States v. 
Stewart, 86 F.4th 532, 535 (3d Cir. 2023). For defendants serving unusually long sentences , the 
Sentencing Guidelines provide that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” may exist when the 
defendant has served at least ten years and is experiencing a gross disparity between the sentence 
imposed and the sentence likely to be imposed if sentenced today . U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). 
However, the Guidelines make clear that this applies only to changes “other than an amendment 
to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive,” meaning that non -retroactive 

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amendments to the Guidelines do not constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief. 
See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C at 208 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2023). 
Section 403 of the First Step Act , which took effect on December 21, 2018, amended 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c) to limit the applicability of the 25- year mandatory minimum for second or 
subsequent convictions by requiring that the later offense “occurs after a prior conviction under 
this subsection has become final.” Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403(a), 132 Stat. 5194, 5221. Congress 
expressly declined to make this amendment retroactive, providing instead that “this section shall 
apply to any offense that was committed before the date of enactment of this Act if a sentence for 
the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment.” Id. § 403(b).The Third Circuit 
addressed the non-retroactivity of § 403 of the First Step Act in United States v. Andrews, holding 
that Congress “specifically decided that the changes to the 18 U.S.C.S. § 924(c) mandator y 
minimums would not apply to people who had already been sentenced.” 12 F.4th 255, 261 (3d Cir. 
2021). 
On November 1, 2023, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 814 to its policy 
statement on compassionate release, which permits courts to consider non-retroactive changes in 
law in narrow ly defined circumstances. 88 Fed. Reg. at 28,254. The Third Circuit held that 
Amendment 814 does not abrogate Andrews in United States v. Rutherford. 120 F.4th 360 (3d Cir. 
2024). Citing Congress’s deliberate choice to make the § 924(c) amendments non-retroactive, the 
Third Circuit held that treating such changes as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for 
release would conflict with the will of Congress . Id. at 376. Congress’s decision not to apply the 
reforms retroactively cannot, at the same time, be used to justify early release, as doing so would 
create internal conflict within the statutory scheme. Id. 
 

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IV. DISCUSSION 
Powell’s motion for compassionate release is denied because he fails to satisfy his burden 
of demonstrating “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 
Powell argues that Amendment 814 to the Sentencing Guidelines abrogates the Third Circuit’s 
prior decision in Andrews. See ECF No. 309 at 8. However, in Rutherford, the Third Circuit 
reaffirmed the continuing validity of Andrews and held “the First Step Act’s change to § 924(c) 
cannot be considered in the analysis of whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances 
make a prisoner eligible for compassionate release.” Rutherford, 120 F.4th at 380. Accordingly, 
Powell’s reliance on Amendment 814 is unavailing. 
Powell also contends that the length of his sentence is “unusually long” as grounds for 
compassionate release. ECF 309 at 21. However, the duration of a sentence does not constitute 
an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release, as a sentence that was 
lawfully imposed and mandated by statute at the time of sentencing cannot by itself justify a 
reduction. See United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 838 (10th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he imposition 
of a sentence that was not only permissible but statutorily required at the time is neither an 
extraordinary nor a compelling reason to now reduce that same sentence.”); see also United 
States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569, 574 (7th Cir. 2021) (“There is nothing ‘extraordinary’ about 
leaving untouched the exact penalties that Congress prescribed.”). 
Powell also cites his age at the time of the offense and his subsequent rehabilitation as 
grounds for release. See ECF No. 309 at 22. Youth at the time of the offense is not listed as a 
basis for relief under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 and is generally accounted for at the time of sentencing. 
Moreover, under 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), rehabilitation alone cannot serve as a basis for 

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compassionate release. Courts in this Circuit have consistently rejected compassionate release 
motions grounded solely on youthful age and rehabilitation. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 
2024 WL 4793713, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2024) (holding that young age, either alone or 
combined with rehabilitation, does not satisfy the “extraordinary and compelling” standard); 
United States v. Andrews, 480 F.Supp. 3d 669, 687-88 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (“The Court is not aware 
of any cases where young age at the time of the offense and rehabilitation were found to be both 
extraordinary and compelling to warrant granting compassionate release without other reasons to 
support it.”), aff’d, 12 F.4th 255 (3d Cir. 2021). Thus, Powell’s youth at the time of the offense 
and subsequent rehabilitation do not constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting 
compassionate release. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Powell has not presented “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to reduce his sentence 
under compassionate release, as required by 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The Court therefore 
denies Powell’s motion to modify the term of his imprisonment. An appropriate Order will 
follow. 
 
 BY THE COURT: 
 /s/ Chad F. Kenney 
 _________________________ 
 CHAD F. KENNEY, JUDGE 
 
 

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