govinfo:USCOURTS-paed-2_10-cr-00420-11

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ANTWANNE WHITE 
CRIMINAL ACTION 
 
 
 
NO. 10-420-3 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 For a second time, Antwanne White, proceeding pro se, moves for compassionate release 
pursuant to the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), (c)(2). For the reasons set forth 
below, his Motion will be denied. 
 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
White is currently serving a 240-month sentence at FCI McKean after pleading guilty to 
robbery of a postal employee, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2114; using and carrying a firearm 
during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); attempted 
robbery interfering with interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); and robbery 
interfering with interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Those convictions 
flowed from a series of 2010 robberies, in which White robbed a postal employee, attempted to 
rob a convenience store in Coatesville, Pennsylvania, and successfully robbed a convenience 
store in Limerick, Pennsylvania. 
In the years since his conviction, White has filed two habeas petitions pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2255, a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(1), and his First Motion for 
Compassionate Release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), all of which have been denied. 
If his sentence is not reduced, White will remain incarcerated until January 28, 2029. 

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 LEGAL STANDARDS 
The compassionate release statute permits a court to modify an imposed term of 
imprisonment “after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are 
applicable,” only “if it finds that [] extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a 
reduction,” and if “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the 
Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). So “a motion for compassionate 
release raises three questions: (1) whether there are ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ for 
modifying an imposed term of imprisonment; (2) whether a new sentence would be consistent 
with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); and, (3) whether a new sentence would be 
consistent with any applicable policy statements.” United States v. Carter, 711 F. Supp.3d 428, 
434-35 (E.D. Pa. 2024) (citing United States v. Pawlowksi, 967 F.3d 327, 329 (3d Cir. 2020)), 
aff’d, 2024 WL 5339852 (3d Cir. Dec. 2, 2024). 
Congress delegated to the Sentencing Commission the power to promulgate “general 
policy statements regarding the sentencing modification provisions in” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A), which “shall describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling 
reasons for sentence reduction.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). Generally, the Commission’s policy 
statements are binding on courts. Cf. United States v. Rutherford, 120 F.4th 360, 375 (3d Cir. 
2024) (citing United States v. Berberena, 694 F.3d 514, 522 (3d Cir. 2012)). 
 DISCUSSION 
White cites two policy statements in his Motion, Sections 1B1.13(b)(5) and (b)(6). 
Section 1B1.13(b)(6) states: 
UNUSUALLY LONG SENTENCE .— If a defendant received an 
unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of 
imprisonment, a change in the law (other than an amendment to the 
Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be considered 

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in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and 
compelling reason, but only where such change would produce a gross 
disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be 
imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full consideration of the 
defendant’s individualized circumstances. 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). 
 Section 1B1.13(b)(5), for its part, provides that extraordinary and compelling reasons 
exist, thereby justifying compassionate release, when: 
The defendant presents any other circumstance or combination of 
circumstances that, when considered by themselves or together with any 
of the reasons described in paragraphs (1) through (4), are similar in 
gravity to those described in paragraphs (1) through (4). 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5). 
 Although White cites the two policy statements mentioned above, his Motion only argues 
that certain changes in law justify compassionate release. That argument can only be considered 
under the second subsection that White cites, Section 1B1.13(b)(6). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(c) 
(“Except as provided in subsection (b)(6), a change in the law . . . shall not be considered for 
purposes of determining whether an extraordinary and compelling reason exists . . . .”). Thus, 
the only question is whether White’s argument under Section 1B1.13(b)(6) constitutes 
extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting his release. 
 White first cites to Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), which held that a fact 
increasing a defendant’s statutory minimum sentence must be charged in the indictment and 
proven to a jury. Id. at 102. That fact here is that White’s case brandished his weapon in 
committing one of the underlying robberies, which increased the statutory minimum on that 
charge from five to seven years. But Alleyne was handed down after White’s guilty plea and 
sentencing, and Alleyne’s holding cannot be applied retroactively in the habeas context. United 

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States v. Reyes, 255 F.3d 210, 212-13 (3d Cir. 2014). “Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are 
the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or sentences 
that are allegedly in violation of the Constitution.” Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 
(3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Henderson, 858 F. App’x 466, 469 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2021); United 
States v. Escajeda, 58 F.4th 184, 187 (5th Cir. 2023) (claim that the sentence exceeded the 
statutory maximum, not cognizable in a compassionate release motion); United States v. McCall, 
56 F.4th 1048, 1058 (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (“we do not read ‘extraordinary and compelling’ 
to provide an end run around habeas.”); cf. Rutherford, 120 F.4th at 370-71 (holding that an 
amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)’s mandatory minimum, which Congress explicitly reserved to 
be nonretroactive, cannot be retroactively applied upon a motion for compassionate release). 
White also cites several amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines as changes in law that, 
he argues, constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons to justify compassionate release. 
None of them do so. According to the Sentencing Guidelines, three of the amendments that 
White cites do not apply retroactively: Amendment 820 (which changed eligibility for a three-
point reduction for acceptance of responsibility), Amendment 828 (which changed the 
enhancement for an obliterated serial number on a firearm), and 829 (which changed the 
availability of a departure for a youthful offense). Section 1B1.13(b)(6) straightforwardly 
excludes from consideration any “amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made 
retroactive.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). So, because those Amendments do not apply 
retroactively, White cannot rely on them to establish an extraordinary and compelling reason 
under Section 1B1.13(b)(6), by its own terms. 
One amendment that White cites does apply retroactively. That amendment, Amendment 
821, altered the application of “status points” in the criminal history calculation for offenders 

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who committed the instant offense while subject to another criminal sentence. If the 
Amendment were applied to White’s case now, his sentencing range (including his mandatory 
minimum for his consecutive § 924(c) term of 84 months), would total 252 to 294 months. 
However, White was sentenced to 240 months in accord with a plea agreement reached by the 
parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), a term that falls below the 
amended guideline range that White argues must apply now. The guideline which addresses 
resentencing based on retroactive guideline amendment, § 1B1.10 directs that “the court shall not 
reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and this policy 
statement to a term that is less than the minimum of the amended guideline range determined 
under subdivision (1) of this subsection.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A). Because White’s 
sentence is already shorter than the guideline range which would apply if he was sentenced today 
in accordance with Amendment 821, his sentence may not be further reduced by virtue of that 
Amendment. 
An appropriate order follows. 
BY THE COURT: 
 S/ WENDY BEETLESTONE 
 ___________________________ 
WENDY BEETLESTONE, J. 

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