govinfo:USCOURTS-paed-2_10-cr-00620-32

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CRIMINAL NO. 
vs. 
REGINALD STEPHENS 10-620-5 
MEMORANDUM 
STENGEL,J. April 23, 2018 
On December 6, 2012 a jury convicted Reginald Stephens of three counts of drug-
related charges and two charges arising under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act ("RICO"). On November 14, 2013, Stephens was sentenced to 300 
months' imprisonment and five years' supervised release, with a $2,000 fine and a $500 
special assessment. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Stephens' 
conviction and sentence. U.S. v. Stephens, 612 Fed. Appx. 107 (3d Cir. 2015). Defendant 
filed a timely pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or 
correct his conviction and sentence 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. No. 896.) On April 18, 2016, the government filed a 
response in opposition (Doc. No. 921) and on May 31, 2016 petitioner filed a reply (Doc. 
No. 932). For the reasons discussed below, petitioner's motion is denied in its entirety 
without an evidentiary hearing. 
I. Background 
The pertinent factual background is summarized by the Third Circuit's opinion 
addressing the appeal of Stephens' co-conspirator, Ramel Moten: 
Moten was a leader of a violent gang known as the "Harlem Boys" or "Young Hit 
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Men" that sold narcotics for nine years in the Bartram Village Housing 
Development ("Bartram Village") located in Southwest Philadelphia. From about 
October 2001 through approximately October 6, 2010, the Harlem Boys controlled 
the illegal drug trade in Bartram Village, and, for most of that time, Terrance 
Hamm ran the street-level operations of the enterprise, which trafficked in crack 
cocaine, marijuana, and prescription drugs. Hamm would obtain bulk quantities of 
drugs from various sources of supply, prepare the drugs for sale, and distribute 
them himself and through a network of street-level drug dealers. He and his co­
conspirators used their residences and other houses or apartments located in or 
near Bartram Village to store, cook, package, and sell crack cocaine, and to store 
drug proceeds, firearms, and ammunition. 
Around April 2007, after several search warrants were executed in Bartram 
Village, Hamm stepped back from his involvement in the organization's criminal 
activity. After that, Moten became the leader of the Harlem Boys. Hamm, 
however, later resumed his drug trafficking activities and continued to obtain, 
supply, and sell crack in and around Bartram Village. 
Even before assuming a leadership role, Moten was a supplier and distributor of 
illegal narcotics and a gunman for the enterprise. He committed acts of violence 
with other members of the enterprise to protect their turf and frequently provided 
firearms to his co-conspirators for use in robberies, assaults, and other 
crimes. Merrell Hobbs, Reginald Stephens, Bryan Hill, Warren Stokes, Hikeem 
Torrence, Omar Roane, Damon Turner, Allen Parker, Tayale Shelton, Shyheem 
Davis, and Anthony Freeman, were also distributors of illegal narcotics and 
gunmen for the enterprise. Khalil Allen, Andre Tiller, Kareem Pittman, and Carol 
Miles were distributors of illegal narcotics. Terrance Hamm's brother Charles was 
a supplier of cocaine to the enterprise and a distributor of illegal narcotics; he also 
was responsible for the New Jersey drug sales of the enterprise. Kareem Pittman, 
Melika Parker, and Roneisha Scott maintained premises used by the enterprise to 
manufacture, package, store, and sell drugs, and to store guns. 
Members of the enterprise committed, attempted, and threatened to commit acts of 
violence, including murder, assault, and robbery, to protect and expand the 
enterprise's operations. While some acts of violence occurred prior to April 2007, 
the violence intensified in the years following Terrance Hamm's reduced role and 
Moten's elevated role in the gang. 
U.S v. Moten, 617 Fed. Appx. 186, 188-89 (3d Cir. 2015). Stephens was charged in the 
89-count superseding indictment with the following charges: conspiracy to participate in 
a racketeering enterprise (count 1) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); conspiracy to 
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distribute 280 grams of cocaine base (crack) and marijuana (count 2) in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(l)(A), 84l(b)(l)(D), and 846; carjacking (count 4) in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2119; carrying and using a firearm during a violent crime (count 5) in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); possession with the intent to distribute marijuana (count 13) in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(l) and (b)(l)(D); and possession with the intent to 
distribute cocaine base (crack) (counts 19 and 20) in violation of21 U.S.C. §§ 84l(a)(l) 
and (b )(1 )(C). 1 
II. Standard of Review 
"Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by which 
federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or sentences that are allegedly in 
violation of the Constitution." Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 
2002). Section 2255 permits a prisoner sentenced by a federal court to move the court 
that imposed the sentence to "vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence" where: (1) the 
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the 
court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence; (3) the sentence was in excess of 
the maximum authorized by law; or ( 4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral 
attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 
Section 2255(b) provides the procedure for reviewing the motion: 
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case 
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no 
relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served 
upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing 
thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact 
1 Counts 4 and 5 were dismissed before trial as barred by the statute of limitations. 
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and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court 
finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, 
or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law 
or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has 
been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional 
rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment 
vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and 
set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or 
resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence 
as may appear appropriate. 
28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). 
The district court is given discretion in determining whether to hold an evidentiary 
hearing on a prisoner's motion under§ 2255. See Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Forte, 
865 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1989); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255, R. 8(a). In exercising that 
discretion, the court must decide whether the prisoner's claims, if proven, would entitle 
him to relief and then consider whether an evidentiary hearing is needed to determine the 
truth of the allegations. See Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 20 F.3d 572, 574 
(3d. Cir. 1994). Accordingly, a district court may summarily dismiss a motion brought 
under§ 2255 without a hearing where the "motion, files, and records, 'show conclusively 
that the movant is not entitled to relief."' United States v. Nahodil, 36 F.3d 323, 326 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 41-42 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also 
Forte, 865 F.2d at 62. 
Mr. Stephens has filed this motion pro se. Pro se pleadings are traditionally 
construed quite liberally. However, a prose petitioner is not excused from the duty to 
prove a "set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Haines v. 
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972). 
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III. Discussion 
Petitioner argues that he is entitled to relief under§ 2255 based on trial counsel's 
alleged ineffectiveness. Specifically, petitioner argues that trial counsel incorrectly 
informed him that he would be classified as a career offender, and that as a result he was 
facing a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years, regardless of whether he decided 
to enter a plea or go to trial. Based on this misinformation, petitioner chose to proceed to 
trial rather than plead guilty. For the reasons discussed below, I find that petitioner is 
unable to demonstrate prejudice, and his petition is dismissed without an evidentiary 
hearing. 
The two-part standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), 
"supplies the standard for addressing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." 
United States v. Smack, 347 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687). "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that 
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 
Under the two-part inquiry, "[f]irst, the defendant must show that counsel's performance 
was deficient," that is, "that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." Id. at 687-88. The measure for counsel's performance under the first 
prong of Strickland is "whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the 
circumstances" including "prevailing professional norms." Id. "Second, the defendant 
must show that [counsel's] deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687. 
The defendant must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
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counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
Id. at 694. 
Because a§ 2255 petitioner cannot prevail unless he satisfies both prongs of the 
Strickland test, the Third Circuit has recognized that it is often appropriate for a 
reviewing court to consider the second part of the test, the prejudice to the defendant 
based on the "assumed deficient 
conduct of counsel," first. If the petitioner has not shown 
that he would have been better off if the alleged errors had not been made, it is 
unnecessary to consider whether his counsel's performance was actually deficient. See 
McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159, 170 (3d Cir. 1993). In Strickland, the Supreme 
Court advised: 
A court need not determine whether counsel's performance 
was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the 
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of 
an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel's 
performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness 
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we 
expect will often be so, that course should be followed. 
Courts should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not 
become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire 
criminal justice system suffers as a result. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
The Sixth Amendment right 
to effective counsel extends to the plea process. Hill 
v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-7 (1985); Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948) 
("Prior to trial an accused is entitled to rely upon his counsel to make an independent 
examination of the facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws involved and then to offer his 
informed opinion as to what plea should be entered."). A petitioner has a valid Sixth 
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Amendment claim where counsel's advice is "so incorrect and so insufficient that it 
undermined [the defendant's] ability to make an intelligent decision about whether to 
accept the [plea] offer." Day, 969 F.2d at 43. "[T]he Third Circuit has held that 
'familiarity with the structure and basic content of the [Sentencing] Guidelines (including 
the definition and implications of career offender status) has become a necessity for 
counsel who seek to give effective representation."' U.S. v. Cobb, 110 F. Supp. 3d 591, 
597 (E.D.Pa. 2015) (citing Day, 969 F.2d at 43). 
Petitioner argues that defense counsel improperly advised him that he was 
classified as a "career offender" and that as a result he was subject to a twenty-year 
mandatory minimum sentence regardless of whether he pleaded guilty or went to trial. 
Based on this incorrect information, petitioner states he chose to forgo a favorable plea 
agreement and instead proceeded to trial. In support of this argument, petitioner cites 
defense counsel's testimony from his sentencing: 
I'd like to tell you a little quick story, Judge, about the fact that but for a mistaken 
impression on the part of the government that Reginald Stephens may never have 
been part of this trial. 
When in the early days of the indictment having been returned and working our 
way towards the case, it was the government's position that Mr. Stephens was a 
career offender, which was reasonable on their part because I thought he was a 
career offender, because he had those two AG assault cases in his background. 
And this case, if a conviction resulted, would make him a career offender. 
But, credit Mr. Petrarca with finding out one of his two AG assault cases actually 
took place after the last of his offenses, Count 20, that offense actually took place 
after Count 20 had been committed, and so Mr. Petrarca informed all of us that 
Mr. Stephens was not a career offender. 
Judge, when we were deciding upon whether to go to trial or work out a plea, you 
know, we were being told by the government, look, your guy is a career offender 
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and we start with a 20-year mando. That was wrong. It wasn't deliberate on the 
part of the government. They weren't trying to mislead us. But they were wrong. 
If my client knew that he was not a career offender and his mando was just ten 
years, you know, we may never have had Mr. Stephens as part of this trial. 
(Sent. Tr. at P. 45-46.) 
It is undisputed that defense counsel incorrectly advised petitioner that he 
qualified as a "career offender." However, it is also undisputed that petitioner's 
sentencing guideline range was 360 months to life imprisonment, regardless of whether 
he pleaded guilty or proceeded to trial. For the reasons discussed below, I find that 
petitioner fails to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland and his petition is dismissed. 
These facts closely parallel those in Cobb, supra, and a brief discussion of the 
court's analysis is warranted. In that case, the petitioner sought to have his sentence 
vacated, set aside, or corrected pursuant to U.S.C. § 2255. It was undisputed that defense 
counsel improperly advised the defendant that he qualified as a career offender. Id. at 
597. Specifically, the defendant believed that his guideline range was 360 months to life 
imprisonment 
(based on his career offender status), when it was actually only 130 to 162 
months if he proceeded to trial and 100 to 125 months if he pleaded guilty. Id. at 598. 
With respect to the first prong under Strickland, the court concluded that "'petitioner was 
seriously misled about his sentence exposure when the likelihood of his conviction was 
overwhelming,' and so this fact alone is sufficient to show that counsel's performance 
was deficient." Id. (citing Day, 969 F .2d at 44 ). 
The court in Cobb then moved onto the prejudice inquiry, which required an initial 
determination ofwhether "an individual [can] be prejudiced by the mistaken belief that 
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his sentencing exposure was higher than it was in reality[.]" Id. at 598 (emphasis in 
original). The answer was yes. Relying in part on the Third Circuit's decision in Day, the 
court noted, 
[K]nowledge of the comparative sentence exposure between standing trial and 
accepting a plea offer will often be crucial to the decision whether to plead guilty. 
It is the comparative sentence exposure, of course, that makes the difference, and 
in that sense, it is not dispositive whether a defendant's sentencing exposure is 
higher or lower than he believes-because either way that belief may cause him to 
make a decision he would not have made otherwise that ultimately places him in a 
worse position than the alternative. 
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). The court noted that where a defendant 
believes he is facing a minimum of 360 months in prison "even ifhe pled [sic] guilty and 
received the benefits of acceptance of responsibility ... it is not difficult to understand 
why Petitioner-or another defendant in his situation-might have believed he had little 
to lose by proceeding to trial." Id. at 598-99. 
Having concluded that petitioner could, theoretically, be prejudiced, the court in 
Cobb then went on to analyze whether petitioner actually suffered prejudice. To establish 
prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate that ( 1) he would have pleaded guilty had he 
known his true sentence exposure and (2) he would have received a lesser sentence had 
he pleaded guilty. Id. With respect to the first element, the petitioner stated that he would 
have "definitely pled [sic] guilty ... instead of rolling the dice at trial." Id. at 599. 
Acknowledging that this statement was self-serving, the court nonetheless concluded that 
it was reasonable and believable under the circumstances. Id. 
The court then concluded that there was 
a reasonable probability that petitioner 
would have received a lesser sentence had he pleaded guilty reasoning, "[h]ad petitioner 
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pled [sic] guilty without a plea agreement, his sentence range would have been, at worst, 
100 to 125 months due to the decrease in offense levels granted for acceptance of 
responsibility." Id. at 600-01. Even though the court also granted the government's 
request for an upward variance at sentencing, this did not preclude a finding of prejudice 
because it remained "reasonably probable that [defendant's] sentence would have been 
shorter" if he pleaded guilty. Id. at 601 (emphasis in original). "Even if the difference in 
sentencing would have been very small-a few months, for example-Petitioner would 
be prejudiced, because 'any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment 
significance."' Id. at 600-01 (citing Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001)). 
Therefore, petitioner demonstrated prejudice under Strickland and was entitled to relief 
under§ 2255. 
In this case, it is undisputed that defense counsel initially advised petitioner that he 
was a career offender based upon his prior record. 2 I find, however, that petitioner is 
2 The Government acknowledges that both the Government and defense counsel originally 
believed petitioner qualified as a career offender. The government disputes that defense counsel 
was ineffective because counsel later advised petitioner that he faced a ten-year mandatory 
minimum (not twenty) and that counsel urged petitioner to plead guilty. The government 
includes three exhibits demonstrating that defense counsel's testimony at sentencing was an 
"unfortunate misstatement." Exhibit A is a letter from defense counsel to petitioner dated 
November 3, 2011, where counsel advised petitioner that he was facing two ten-year mandatory 
minimum sentences that must run consecutively and also informed petitioner of his option to 
cooperate and enter into a plea deal. Exhibit Bis a second letter from defense counsel to 
petitioner dated March 27, 2012, where counsel advised petitioner 
that counts four and five were 
dismissed, and petitioner was now facing a mandatory ten-year sentence. Counsel again asked if 
petitioner was interested in a plea. Exhibit C is a memorandum to the file prepared by defense 
counsel stating he "urged (petitioner] to consider an open plea," but that petitioner was 
"demanding a trial." Based on these documents, the Government argues that defense counsel 
merely misspoke at sentencing and that petitioner was aware both of his correct true sentencing 
exposure and about the opportunity to enter into a guilty plea. 
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unable to demonstrate prejudice and his petition is dismissed. 
Petitioner states, "[h]ad it not been for counsel directing Petitioner to proceed to 
trial based on his evidence that there was no benefit in pleading because of a career 
offender status, Petitioner would not have passed up the opportunity to enter a plea 
agreement that would have resulted in lowering his sentence." (Doc. No. 896 at 12.) 
Although the Third Circuit does not require objective 
evidence that the petitioner would 
have pleaded guilty, and even though the self-serving statement in Cobb, supra, was 
sufficient, these facts are distinguishable. It is undisputed that petitioner decided to go to 
trial because he believed he faced a sentence of 360 months up to life imprisonment 
regardless of whether he pleaded guilty or went to trial. It is also undisputed that, even if 
petitioner decided to enter a plea and was afforded a three-point reduction for acceptance 
of responsibility, his guideline range remained unchanged at 360 months to life 
In his reply, petitioner includes an additional letter from defense counsel dated September 9, 
2013. This letter, which was prepared subsequent to those exhibits discussed above, states that 
petitioner was facing a ten-year mandatory sentence, and goes on to note as follows: 
[ 
w ]hat hurts though is that you are a career offender for sentencing purposes. The 
combination of two prior crimes of violence and the drug distribution conviction in this 
case makes you a career offender. The significance of that is that you automatically jump 
into criminal history category VI. So, at sentencing, we need not be as concerned about 
the mandatory as we must be about the projected Guideline Sentence. 
(Doc. No. 932 at Ex. 1.) 
It is well-established that "a defendant has the right to make a reasonably informed decision 
whether to accept a plea offer." Day, 969 F.2d at 43. The court in Day 
explained, "[k]nowledge 
of the comparative sentence exposure between standing trial and accepting a plea offer will often 
be crucial to the decision whether to plead guilty." Id. The Day court concluded that if a 
defendant is "seriously misled about his sentence exposure when the likelihood of his conviction 
was overwhelming," his counsel was ineffective. Id. at 44. Here, as recently as September 9, 
2013, petitioner was incorrectly advised that he was a career offender. Accepting the petitioner's 
factual allegations as true, I am unable to conclusively determine that trial counsel was not 
ineffective. However, because I conclusively find that petitioner is unable to demonstrate 
prejudice, discussed infra, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted and the petition is dismissed. 
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imprisonment. It is unreasonable to conclude that petitioner would have pleaded guilty 
had he known his true sentencing exposure because his exposure was unchanged. 
Therefore, petitioner cannot demonstrate that he would have pleaded guilty and not gone 
to trial but for counsel's alleged ineffective assistance. 
For these same reasons, petitioner is also unable to demonstrate that had he 
pleaded guilty he would have received a lesser sentence. Petitioner's sentencing guideline 
range was based on an offense level of 40 and a criminal history category of VI. (Pre­
Sentencing Report,~ 313.) Had petitioner entered into a guilty plea, he is correct that he 
would have received a three point reduction pursuant to U.S. S. G. § 3E1.1 (a) and (b ), and 
his offense level would have been reduced to 37. However, petitioner's criminal history 
would have remained at level VI. Importantly, these numbers yield the same sentencing 
guideline range of 360 months to life imprisonment. It is therefore not possible that 
petitioner's sentence would have been shorter had he pleaded guilty. Cf. Cobb, 110 F. 
Supp. at 600-01. 
IV. Conclusion 
I find that petitioner's claim is meritless and is dismissed without an evidentiary 
hearing. No certificate of appealability shall issue in this case because Mr. Stephens has 
failed to "demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of 
the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 
(2000). 
An appropriate Order follows. 
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