govinfo:USCOURTS-mnd-0_12-cr-00074-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
       MEMORANDUM OF LAW AND   
   Plaintiff,         ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
       COMPASSIONATE RELEASE 
v.     
       Criminal File No. 12-74 (MJD) 
DEAN E. WILKENS, 
 
Katharine T. Buzicky, Assistant United States Attorney, Counsel for Plaintiff.  
Dean E. Wilkens, pro se. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This matter is before the Court on Wilkens’s Motion for Compassionate 
Release, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).  For the reasons addressed below, this 
motion is denied. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The underlying facts involved Wilkens abusing three of his wife’s 
grandchildren. Wilkens lived on the Red Lake Indian Reservation with his wife, 
Judith Jourdain. (PSR ¶¶ 5–9.) Wilkens and his wife obtained physical custody of 
her three grandchildren starting in December 2008. (PSR ¶ 6.) One of the 
grandchildren told a school counselor that Wilken was sexually abusing her. 
(PSR ¶ 7.) The children were then removed from the home and were 
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subsequently examined and interviewed. (PSR ¶¶ 8–10.) The interviews revealed 
that Wilkens had sexually abused the children.  
In February 2012, Wilkens was charged with three counts of aggravated 
sexual abuse of minor children. (Doc. 1.) In May 2010, the government issued a 
superseding indictment to add two additional counts against Wilkens, one for 
aggravated sexual abuse and one for abusive sexual conduct. (Doc. 30.) Count 5, 
abusive sexual conduct, was subsequently dismissed. (Doc. 55.) 
On July 24, 2012, a jury returned a guilty verdict for Wilkens on all four 
counts of aggravated sexual abuse. (Doc. 62.) This Court then sentenced Wilkens 
to 360 months on each of the four counts, to be served concurrently. (Doc. 76.) 
Wilkens appealed his conviction, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. See United 
States v. Wilkens, 742 F.3d 354, 357 (8th Cir. 2014). He subsequently filed a 
motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and a motion for a new trial, 
both of which this Court denied. (Docs. 101, 112, 124, 128.)   The Court denied 
Wilkins a certificate of appealability.  (Doc. 112.)  Wilkins appealed to the Eighth 
Circuit and applied for a certificate of appealability.  The Eighth Circuit denied 
the certificate of appealability and dismissed Watkins’ appeal.  (Doc. 122.) 
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Wilkens is currently serving his sentence at Oxford FCI and is set to be 
released in September 2036. See BOP, Find an inmate, www.bop.gov/inmateloc 
(last accessed April 29, 2026).   
III. DISCUSSION  
Wilkens makes three claims for compassionate release. First, he claims that 
there is an “unwarranted national disparity” between his prison sentence and 
sentences for other sex offenses. Wilkens notes that the average length of 
imprisonment for sex crimes is 222 months and the median length is 216 months. 
(Id. at 3–4.) Further, Wilkens argues that he received a “trial penalty” when he 
was sentenced to 360 months. (Id. at 11–12.)  
Second, Wilkens claims he is experiencing a “serious deterioration in 
physical or mental health because of the aging process.” (Id. at 7.) Wilkens notes 
that he suffers from sleep apnea, high blood pressure, chest pains, bad knees, 
high cholesterol, and other medical issues. (Id. at 7.) 
Third, Wilkens asserts that the “extremely restrictive conditions required 
by the COVID-19 pandemic” warrants his compassionate release. (Id. at 8.) 
Specifically, Wilkens notes that the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in lockdowns 
for weeks and months at a time, he does not get a shower daily, the food is cold, 
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he is deprived of medical treatment and supplies, there are insufficient cleaning 
solutions available, his recreation time has been affected, and his visits from 
family and friends are restricted. (Id. at 8–9.) 
A. Legal Framework  
The court may, upon a defendant’s motion following exhaustion of 
administrative remedies or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request 
by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier,  
reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of 
probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does 
not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of 
imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 
3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that--(i)  
extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . .  
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy 
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.  
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 lists various 
circumstances to find that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a 
reduction in prison sentence. Relevant here, “extraordinary and compelling 
circumstances” can occur when the defendant is suffering from deteriorating 
physical or mental health because of the aging process, the age of the defendant, 
and circumstances where the defendant is serving an unusually long prison 
sentence and there has been a change in the law. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b).  
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B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies  
Before the Court will consider a defendant’s claim to reduce his prison 
sentence, the claims must first be presented to the BOP.  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); 
United States v. Houck, 2 F.4th 1082, 1084 (8th Cir. 2021).  Claims not first 
presented to the BOP must be dismissed without prejudice because the 
exhaustion requirement is a “mandatory claim processing rule.”  Id. 
Here, Wilkens has presented evidence that he first raised his claims with 
the BOP. Wilkens filed an Initial Request to FCI-Oxford Warden. (Doc. 130 at 4–
5.)  Wilkens indicates that BOP did not respond and that this Court then has 
jurisdiction over the question. (Id.)  
The government agrees that Wilkens’ properly raised his request to the 
BOP and that his motion is ripe for adjudication. (Doc. 136 at 5.) Therefore, the 
Court will consider that this motion is properly before the Court.  
C. Compassionate Release  
None of Wilkens’s reasons satisfy his burden to state “extraordinary and 
compelling” circumstances that comport with the statute.  See United States v. 
Avalos Banderas, 39 F.4th 1059, 1062 (8th Cir. 2022) (stating that “the inmate 
bears the burden to establish that compassionate release is warranted and the 
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district court is not required to investigate possible avenues for relief or to 
develop the record in support of a motion”) (citation omitted). 
1.  Disparity in Sentencing 
Wilkens argues that a reduced sentence is warranted because his 360- 
month sentence would have been substantially lower if he were sentenced today, 
there is a significant sentencing disparity in similarly situated individuals, and 
that he received a “trial penalty.” (Doc. 129 at 4–5.)  
First, to the extent that Defendant frames the grounds for compassionate 
release as a challenge to his underlying sentence, including the sentence imposed 
as a “trial penalty,” such argument is precluded by Eighth Circuit case law. See 
United States v. Crandall, 25 F.4th 582, 586 (8th Cir. 2022) (holding that 
defendant could not “avoid the restrictions of the post-conviction relief statute by 
resorting to a request for compassionate release instead”) (citation omitted); 
United States v. Mallett, No. CR 17-264(3) (DWF), 2023 WL 4203155, at *2 (D. 
Minn. June 27, 2023). Wilkens has previously filed a motion under § 2255 to 
Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, which the Court denied on March 14, 
2016. (Doc. 112.)   
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 Second, if Defendant seeks to invoke the “unusually long sentence” 
argument as permitted by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)1, this argument also fails. 
Under section 1B1.13(b)(6), those who received an “unusually long” sentence  
may be candidates for a reduced sentence if they have served at least 10 years of 
the sentence and a change in the law has occurred that would generate a “gross 
disparity” between the sentence imposed and one likely to be imposed at the 
time the motion is filed. These circumstances do not apply to Wilkens.  
 Wilkens did not receive an unusually long sentence. While the Sentencing 
Guidelines do not define what an unusually long sentence is, the Eighth Circuit 
finds that an “unusually long” sentence “must be determined in the context of a 
particular defendant and his offense conduct.” United States v. Rodriguez-
Mendez, 168 F.4th 1123, 1126 (8th Cir. 2026).  Here, Wilkens was convicted of 
four counts of aggravated sexual abuse. His sentence carried a mandatory 
minimum sentence of 30 years, and his Guidelines range included the possibility 
 
1 The Court acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court is currently 
considering the validity of § 1B1.13(b)(6). See Carter v. United States, S. Ct. No. 
24-860; Rutherford v. United States, S. Ct. No. 24-820. The Court does not intend 
to speculate as to how the Supreme Court will rule on this issue and instead 
makes its current judgment based on the state of Eighth Circuit case law. 
Depending on the outcome, the Supreme Court’s decision on this matter may 
permit Wilkens to submit a subsequent motion for compassionate release.  
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of life in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c). His sentence then, which was the 
mandatory minimum, is not “unusually long” in any sense. See e.g., United 
States v. McGruder, 2024 WL 3176237 at *1 (D. Minn. June 26, 2024) (finding that 
a mandatory life sentence for murdering a four-year old in aid of racketeering is 
not “unusually long”, “it is the norm.”); United States v. Garretson, 2024 WL 
3567407 at *6 (W.D. Ark. July 29, 2024) (denying compassionate release to 
defendant serving life in prison for sexually abusing children where “life was the 
Guideline sentence in this case.”). Further, as is discussed further below, the 
particularly horrific facts underlying the offense conduct warrants a sentence of 
30 years.  
 Moreover, there has been no change in the law to justify a reduction in 
sentence under § 1B1.13(b)(6). As it stands, the mandatory minimum sentence for 
aggravated sexual abuse remains 30 years – or 360 months – in prison. See 18 
U.S.C. § 2241(c). As the Court in McGruder points out, if the relevant law has not 
changed, “there is obviously no ‘gross disparity’ between [the defendant’s] 
sentence and the sentence that would be imposed today.” 2024 WL 3176237 at *1.  
 
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2. Medical Issues  
Wilkens asserts that he is experiencing a “serious deterioration in physical  
or mental health because of the aging process,” including by suffering from sleep 
apnea, high blood pressure, chest pains, bad knees, and high cholesterol. (Doc. 
129 at 7.)  
The United States Sentencing Guidelines define in pertinent part 
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” due to medical condition of the 
defendant as: 
(ii) The defendant is— 
 
(I) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition, 
 
(II) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive 
impairment, or 
 
(III) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health 
because of the aging process,  
 
that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide 
self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from 
which he or she is not expected to recover. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).  
 Based on Wilkens’s medical exhibits, the Court does not dispute that 
Wilkens is suffering from ailments common among aging adults. (See Doc. 130 at 
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7–8.)  However, such claims fail to evidence the type of “serious deterioration” in 
Wilkens’s physical health that has “substantially diminish[ed]” his ability to 
provide self-care. In fact, it appears from Wilkens’s provided documents that he 
is receiving medical treatment and has access to medical supplies to help his 
sleep apnea and high blood pressure. (See id.) 
 Further, as the Government points out, Wilkens’s own exhibits 
demonstrate that he is currently leading an active life in prison. He has taken 
courses, served as a tutor and teaching assistant, and participated in various 
walking and running clubs. (See Doc. 130 at 35–50.) These active activities only 
further indicate that while Wilkens may be experiencing symptoms of the natural 
aging process, Wilkens’s health does not present the type of “extraordinary and 
compelling” reasons to warrant compassionate release.  
3. COVID-19 Prison Conditions  
Wilkens claims that the conditions in prison following the COVID-19  
pandemic warrant his compassionate release. (Doc. 129 at 8–11.) As stated above, 
Wilkens indicates that the “restrictive conditions” required by the COVID-19 
pandemic has resulted in changes in frequent lockdowns, inadequate medical 
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treatment, inadequate access to medical/cleaning supplies, limits on recreation, 
and reduced access to visits from family and loved ones. (Id. at 8–9.) 
However, as a matter of law, prison conditions, policies, and programs 
that affect a large number of inmates are not “a particularized reason” for an 
individual Defendant’s early release.  See United States v. Catano-Morales, No. 
18-cr-242 (ADM/TNL), 2022 WL 3647878, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2022) (noting 
that prison conditions “affect all inmates and are not a particularized reason for 
[a defendant’s] release”) (citations omitted).  As the Government notes, 
Defendant’s proper vehicle to seek relief is through a civil suit, if he wishes to 
challenge the conditions of his confinement.  (Doc. 136 at 11–12 (citations 
omitted).)  Accordingly, on the record before it, the Court denies Defendant’s 
motion for early release on this basis.   
D. Wilkens is a Danger to the Community 
The Court must deny a sentence reduction unless it determines a 
defendant “is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the 
community.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a)(2).  The Court finds that the seriousness of 
Wilkens’s underlying offense demonstrates his continued danger to children.  
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In evaluating danger, the Court must consider “that [the defendant] did 
not commit his crimes using brute force alone. Instead, he was able to use his 
authority in the household and influence as a father figure to gain his victims’ 
compliance.” See United States v. Garretson, No. 2:16-CR-20029, 2024 WL 
3567407, at *7 (W.D. Ark. July 29, 2024). This is the exact circumstance here, 
where Wilkens was convicted of sexually abusing children that were entrusted to 
his care. He took advantage of his position to victimize his wife’s grandchildren, 
and they suffered considerable harm from his actions. (See e.g., PSR ¶ 61 (noting 
that one of the victims was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and 
required medication).) The Court imposed a sentence of 360 months to reflect the 
severe nature and circumstances of the offense.  
Further, Wilkens’ argues that he “poses no threat to anyone” due to his age 
of 73 years old. However, this Court is not convinced by this argument and is 
instead persuaded by the reasoning of the District of Nevada in United States v. 
Mortensen, where the Court denied a 70-year-old defendant’s motion for 
compassionate release based on his conviction for the offense of trading child 
pornography and attempting to solicit teenagers online. See No. 
211CR00095JADCWH, 2020 WL 2549970, at *2 (D. Nev. May 19, 2020). The Court 
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noted that “[t]he predatory nature of this conduct by a man (then) in his late 
fifties cannot be overlooked and suggests that he remains a danger to the 
community.” Id. Similarly here, Wilkens committed the underlying offenses in 
his 50s and the Court cannot overlook the danger he remains to the community.  
E. Section 3553(a) Factors 
The 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors also weigh against granting this motion.  
The sentence the Court gave Defendant of 360 months, where the guidelines 
provided for life in prison, was the statutory mandatory minimum sentence that 
provided just punishment for the offense, reflected the seriousness of the offense, 
and promoted respect for the law.  
As stated above, the horrific circumstances of Wilkens’s crime weigh 
heavily against his release. Wilkens sexually abused children in his care over the 
course of several years. Any reduction in his criminal sentence would create a 
risk for other children to be abused by Wilkens.  
  
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IV.  ORDER 
Based upon the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that Wilkens’s Motion For Compassionate Release Under 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(1)(A) [Doc. 129] is DENIED. 
Date: May 1, 2026   
       s/Michael J. Davis     
       Michael J. Davis 
       United States District Court 
 
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