govinfo:USCOURTS-kywd-1_25-cr-00014-1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
BOWLING GREEN DIVISION 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-CR-00014-GNS-HBB 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF 
 
v. 
 
CHAD L. DELUCENAY DEFENDANT 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Objection (DN 47) to the Magistrate Judge’s 
Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendations (DN 46) . The m atter is ripe for 
adjudication. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 After discovering that child sexual material was downloaded to a cloud storage account 
belonging to Defendant Chad L. Delucenay (“Delucenay”), Kentucky State Police (“KSP”) 
obtained a search warrant for Delaney’s residence. (R. & R. 2, DN 46). KSP and Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) agents executed the search. (R. & R. 2). Delucenay, who was home 
at the time, was escorted to an unmarked government vehicle for an interview by KSP Detective 
Adam Hutchison (“Detective Hutchinson”) and DHS Special Agent Chamberlain . (R. & R. 2). 
That interview was audio recorded. (R. & R. 2). 
 The investigators began the interview by asking for identifying information and discussing 
why they were there, but they did not specifically question Delucenay about any illegal activity. 
(R. & R. 3). Around fourteen minutes into the interview, Delucenay was advised of his rights and 
agreed to waive his rights and continued to speak with investigators. (R. & R. 3-4). Delucenay 
then made a series of incriminating statements. (R. & R. 5-10). PageID #:
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Delucenay was charged with two counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, a single count 
of distribution of child pornography , and a single count of possession of child pornography. (R. 
& R. 1). Delucenay moved to suppress incriminating statements he made to law enforcement 
offices during questioning. ( Def.’s Mot. Suppress, DN 20). After an evidentiary hearing, the 
Magistrate Judge recommended that the motion be denied. (R. & R. 1-2, 21). Delucenay objects. 
(Def.’s Obj., DN 47). 
IV. DISCUSSION 
District courts review a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation of disposition on a 
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), (B); United 
States v. Curtis , 237 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2004). Delucenay objects to the Report and 
Recommendation (“R. & R.”) on four different grounds. (Def.’s Obj. 1-7). 
A. Previous Arguments 
First, Delucenay “adopts and incorporates as if set forth fully herein his Memorandum of 
Law in Support of Motion to Suppress Statements” and “specifically objects to any determination 
that is contrary to the arguments asserted therein.” (Def.’s Obj. 1). “That statement, however, 
does not constitute a ‘specific written objection to the proposed findings and recommendations’ as 
required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).” United States v. Chaplin, No. 1:16-CR-00001-GNS, 2017 
WL 1365226, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 7, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Edwards 
v. Niagara Credit Sols., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2008)), aff’d on other grounds, 
584 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2009); Manigaulte v. C. W. Post of Long Island Univ. , 659 F. Supp. 2d 
367, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[W]hen a party makes only conclusory or general objections, or 
simply reiterates his original arguments, the Court reviews the Report and Recommendation only PageID #:
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for clear error.” (citation omitted))). Having reviewed the remainder of the R. & R. for clear error, 
the Court finds none. 
B. Pre-Miranda Confession 
Delucenay objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that he had not confessed before 
being read his Miranda rights. (Def.’s Obj. 2). Prior to the issuance of the R. & R. , however, 
“Delucenay [did] not assert that he made any manner of confession prior to the rights advisement,” 
as noted by the Magistrate Judge. ( R. & R. 14; see Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Suppress, DN 45). 
“Parties cannot ‘raise at the district court stage new arguments or issues that were not presented ’ 
before the magistrate judge’s final R&R.” Meddaugh v. Gateway Fin. Serv., 601 F. Supp. 3d 210, 
213 (E.D. Mich. 2022) (quoting Murr v. United States , 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) ). 
Thus, Delucenay may not now contend that he made pre-Miranda confessions. 
C. Knowing Waiver of Miranda Rights 
Delucenay argues that the government failed to prove that he knowingly and intelligently 
waived his Miranda rights. (Def.’s Obj. 4). Such a “waiver must have been made with a full 
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to 
abandon it. ” Moran v. Burbine , 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). “The determination includes 
consideration of the suspect’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence and 
whether the suspect has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth 
Amendment rights, and the consequences of waving them.” (R. & R. 15 (citing Fare v. Michael 
C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)). 
Delucenay first takes issue with the R. & R. ’s characterization of his mental abilities. 
Delucenay argues that that the Magistrate Judge discounted the testimony of Dr. Eric Y. Drogin 
(“Dr. Drogin”), a “clinical and forensic psychologist ,” specifically his statement that Delucenay PageID #:
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“was found consistently to have problems tantamount to a learning disability, and was found to 
have scores that tended to rest in the range of borderline intellectual functioning, what we referred 
to back then as borderline mental retardation.” (Def.’s Obj 4 (quoting Suppression Hr’g Tr. vol. 
2, at 8:15-20, DN 37)). The R. & R. stated that Delucenay “believes his diagnoses of schizophrenia 
and what he characterizes as ‘borderline mental retardation’ demonstrate limitations in his abilities 
to think and understand complex issues,” which is merely a summary of Delucenay’s argument 
and is not inconsistent with Dr. Drogin’s testimony. (R. & R. 15). 
Moreover, the Magistrate Judge considered Delucenay’s mental disabilities but noted that 
“a mental disability is only one factor in determining whether a defendant’s confession is 
voluntary” and voluntariness should be “examined ‘primarily from the perspective of the police.’” 
(R. & R. 16 (quoting United States v. Al-Cholan, 610 F.3d 945, 954 (6th Cir. 2010)) (citing United 
States v. Robinson, No. 3:13-CR-50-R, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46254, at *7-8 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 5, 
2014))). In this instance, as recognized in the R. & R. , “the audio recording of Delucenay’s 
interview corroborates the officer’s perception that Delucenay had sufficient intelligence to 
understand the nature and waiver of his rights.” (R. & R. 17). 
Delucenay next argues that his eager agreement to waive his Miranda rights demonstrates 
that he “did not comprehend the importance of his rights and the critical significance of a waiver.” 
(Def.’s Obj. 5). He provides no citation to any authority that demonstrates a relationship between 
voluntariness and the speed of a defendant’s waiver. (See Def.’s Obj. 5). Eagerness to cooperate 
alone does not demonstrate that any cooperation was not voluntary. As the Magistrate Judge noted, 
“[t]hroughout the interview Delucenay was articulate, appeared to understand the questions asked 
of him, and asked questions of his own to the investigators.” (R. & R. 17). The Court agrees with PageID #:
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the Magistrate Judge’s determination that Delucenay’s waiver of his rights was knowing and 
intelligent. 
D. Voluntariness of Statements 
Delucenay asserts that the government failed to prove that his statements were voluntary. 
(Def.’s Obj. 5). “Evidence that a defendant suffered, at the relevant time, from a condition or 
deficiency that impaired his cognitive or volitional capacity is never, by itself, sufficient to warrant 
the conclusion that his confession was involuntary for purposes of due process; some element of 
police coercion is always necessary.” United States v. Newman, 889 F.2d 88, 94 (6th Cir. 1989). 
“To find officials’ conduct coercive, three things must be true: The conduct was objectively 
coercive, the alleged coercion was sufficient to overbear the defendant ’s will, and the officials ’ 
actions were the crucial motivating factor in the defendant ’s decision to speak.” United States v. 
Guerrero, 168 F.4th 454, 461 (6th Cir. 2026) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
Delucenay points to Detective Hutchinson’s use of “psychological coercion ”—his 
“repeated assurances that the police were there to help [Delucenay] get help with the voices, the 
suicidal thought and the need for medication” and his establishment of “rapport” with Delucenay. 
(Def.’s Obj. 7). First, Detective Hutchinson indicated that he would try to get Delucenay the help 
he needs in response to Delucenay’s claims that he needed help, and that is not objectively 
coercive. (R. & R. 19-20). Nothing suggests “that the investigators were attempting to mislead 
Delucenay that the objective of the questioning was to determine how they could help him with 
his child pornography predilection or with his schizophrenia as opposed to investigating a crime.” 
(R. & R. 20). Moreover, “[n]either ‘mere emotionalism and confusion”, nor mere ‘trickery’ will 
alone necessarily invalidate a confession.” Ledbetter v. Edwards , 35 F.3d 1062, 1069 (6th Cir. 
1994) (quoting Hawkins v. Lynaugh, 844 F.2d 1132, 1140 (5th Cir. 1988)). Second, “an PageID #:
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investigator’s use of ‘ small talk’ before asking about criminal activity, even if an effort to build 
rapport with a suspect, is not inherently improper or coercive.” (R. & R. 19 (citing United States 
v. Loonsfoot, No. 2:20-cf-00027, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166106, at *17-18 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 16, 
2021))). Delucenay insists that “[t]he psychological impact of Detective Hutchinson’s subtle 
coercion must be considered,” but the Magistrate Judge did consider this. (R. & R. 21). The Court 
agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the use of seemingly standard law enforcement 
questioning tactics did not overbear Delucenay’s will, even if he was more susceptible to the se 
tactics. (R. & R. 21).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Objection (DN 
47) is OVERRULED, the Magistrate Judge’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Recommendation (DN 46) is ACCEPTED AND ADOPTED IN ITS ENTIRETY , and 
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (DN 20) is DENIED.
cc: counsel of record
June 15, 2026 PageID #:
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