govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-1_22-cr-00405-0

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
CAMDEN VICINAGE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
v. 
JAMES JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
HONORABLE KAREN M. WILLIAMS 
Criminal No. 22-cr-405 (KMW) 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER 
WILLIAMS, United States District Judge. 
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendant James Johnson’s (“Defendant”) 
Motion for Early Termination of Supervised Release (“Motion,” Dkt. No. 10) pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) ; t he Government ’s opposition (Gov’t Opp., Dkt. No. 12) thereto; and 
Defendant’s reply ( “Reply,” Dkt. No. 13). The Court has considered the parties’ submissions 
without oral argument pursuant to L.Civ.R. 78.1(b). 
For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion will be DENIED. 
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant’s underlying convictions arise from his participation, at age nineteen, in a series 
of violent armed robberies committed by members of a Brooklyn street gang known as Criminals 
Getting Paid ( “CGP”). (Motion at 2; Gov’t Opp. at 1.) In February 1998, Defendant and others 
robbed the New Clarkson Luncheonette in Brooklyn, New York. (Gov’t Opp. at 1-2 (citing United 
States v. Ozem Thomas, et al. , Crim. No. 98 -860 (“E.D.N.Y .”), Dkt. Nos. 426 at 3; 519 at 3 -4).) 
During the robbery, Defendant held a firearm to a store employee ’s head while other participants 
took money from the cash register and a Lotto machine. (Id.) As Defendant and the others fled, the PageID: <pageID>
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store owner pursued them. (Id.) Defendant then turned, pointed his firearm, and shot the owner in 
the stomach. (Id.) The victim was hospitalized and died twelve days later. (Id.) 
Defendant was charged in the Eastern District of New York with conspiracy to commit 
Hobbs Act robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, unlawful use of a firearm during a crime of violence, and 
murder through the use of a firearm. (Gov’t Opp. at 2 (citing E.D.N.Y . Dkt. No. 127).) The criminal 
proceedings that followed were lengthy and included two trials, multiple appeals, resentencings, a 
motion for reduction of sentence, and several motions for compassionate release. ( Id. (citing 
E.D.N.Y . Dkt. No. 519 at 2 -6); Motion at 2, Dkt. No. 10.) Following his first trial, Defendant 
received an aggregate sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment. (Motion at 2, Dkt. No. 10.) After the 
Second Circuit vacated his conviction and he was retried, Defendant was again convicted and 
received a life sentence. (Id.) The matter was later remanded for resentencing, and on October 13, 
2011, Judge Allyne R. Ross imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty -five years’ imprisonment, 
to be followed by five years of supervised release. (Id.) Defendant was also ordered to pay a $400 
special assessment and $79,500 in restitution. (Id.) 
On December 3, 2021, Judge Ross granted Defendant’s third motion for compassionate 
release. (Gov’t Opp. at 2 (citing E.D.N.Y . Dkt. No. 528); Motion at 2, Dkt. No. 10.) The court 
reduced Defendant’s custodial sentence to time served, while leaving intact the five -year term of 
supervised release and the restitution obligation. ( Motion at 2; Gov’t Opp. at 2.) Defendant was 
released from Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) custody on December 6, 2021, at which time his term 
of supervised release began. (Gov’t Opp. at 2; Motion at 2.) Jurisdiction over his supervision was 
later transferred to this District. (Motion at 3; see Order Transferring Jurisdiction, Dkt. No. 1.) 
Defendant has now served the substantial majority of his five -year term of supervised 
release. In support of early termination, Defendant emphasizes that he has maintained stable PageID: <pageID>
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employment, including employment at Ocean Casino Resort in Atlantic City; has supported his 
family; has purchased a vehicle; has made restitution payments; and has generally complied with 
the conditions of supervision. (Motion at 3, 6-8.) Defendant further contends continued supervision 
is unnecessary, consumes limited Probation resources, and restricts his ability to pursue out -of-
state employment and relocation opportunities, including the possibility of moving to a lower-cost 
state. (Id. at 3, 7-8; Reply at 3-4.) Defendant also notes that his restitution obligation will remain 
enforceable regardless of whether supervised release is terminated. (Reply at 3.) 
The record also reflects, however, that Defendant’s performance on supervision has not 
been without issue. In July 2023, Probation notified the Court that Defendant had not made 
restitution payments for a significant period following his release. ( Report on Individual Under 
Supervision, Dkt. No. 8; Gov ’t Opp. at 2.) Defendant explains that this resulted from a lapse in 
communication and that, once his obligation was clarified and he was given instructions for 
payment, he began making payments and has not mi ssed one since. (Reply at 2-3.) In May 2025, 
Defendant admitted to Probation that he had used marijuana, in violation of the standard condition 
prohibiting unlawful controlled-substance use. (Report on Individual Under Supervision, Dkt. No. 
9; Gov’t Opp. at 2-3.) Probation recommended that no formal action be taken with respect to that 
violation. (Id.; Gov’t Opp. at 3.) 
Defendant filed the present motion on February 17, 2026, after completing approximately 
fifty months of his sixty-month term of supervised release. (Motion at 1, 5.) The Government filed 
opposition on March 20, 2026, arguing that early termination is not warranted in light of the 
seriousness of the underlying offense, Defendant’s prison disciplinary history, his restitution -
payment lapse, his marijuana use while on supervision, and the absence of concrete changed 
circumstances justifying early termination. ( Gov’t Opp. at 3-6.) Defendant filed a reply on April PageID: <pageID>
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3, 2026, arguing that his conduct demonstrates genuine rehabilitation, that the Government gives 
insufficient weight to his successful reentry, and that continued supervision serves no meaningful 
purpose. (Reply at 1-4.) His term of supervised release is scheduled to expire on December 6, 
2026. (Motion at 1; Gov’t Opp. at 2.) 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
A district court may terminate a term of supervised release after the defendant has 
completed at least one year of supervision if, after considering the applicable factors set forth in 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the defendant’s conduct and the 
interest of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). In evaluating a motion for early termination, courts 
consider the factors set forth in §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B) -(D), (a)(4)-(7), including: the nature and 
circumstances of the offe nse; the defendant ’s history and characteristics ; the need to afford 
adequate deterrence and protect the public; the applicable sentencing range and policy statements; 
the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and the need to provide restitution to victims. 
Id. 
The Third Circuit has explained that “[t]he expansive phrases ‘conduct of the defendant ’ 
and ‘interest of justice’ make clear that a district court enjoys discretion to consider a wide range 
of circumstances when determining whether to grant early termination. ” United States v. Melvin, 
978 F.3d 49, 52 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Emmett, 749 F.3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
Although a court must consider the applicable § 3553(a) factors, it is not required to make specific 
findings as to each factor, and a statement that the court has considered the statutory factors is 
generally sufficient. Id. at 52-53. 
The Third Circuit has further held that a defendant seeking early termination need not 
demonstrate “exceptional, extraordinary, new, or unforeseen circumstances” to obtain relief under PageID: <pageID>
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§ 3583(e)(1). Id. at 53. Nevertheless, because a sentence originally imposed is presumed to be 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to satisfy the purposes of sentencing, courts generally 
expect that some change in circumstances or other justification will support a request to terminate 
supervision before the expiration of the term originally imposed. See id. Ultimately, whether to 
grant early termination rests within the sound discretion of the district court after consideration of 
the relevant statutory factors and the particular circumstances of the case. 
III. DISCUSSION 
a. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense 
The Court first considers the nature and circumstances of the offense and Defendant’s 
history and characteristics. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). There is no dispute that Defendant has 
made significant progress since his release from custody. The Court recognizes and commends his 
efforts to reintegrate into society, maintain employment, support his family, and live a law-abiding 
life. Nevertheless, the seriousness of the underlying offense remains a substantial consideration 
under § 3553(a). 
As discussed above, Defendant participated in a series of violent armed robberies 
committed by members of a Brooklyn street gang. During one such robbery, Defendant shot a 
pursuing store owner, who later died from his injuries. (Gov ’t Opp . at 1 -2.) The resulting 
convictions ultimately led to a lengthy term of imprisonment and a five -year term of supervised 
release. Although Defendant has now completed most of that supervision term, the Court cannot 
ignore the gravity of the conduct that gave rise to the sentence in the first instance. 
The Court also notes that the supervision term presently at issue was imposed after 
extensive litigation, multiple resentencings, and, ultimately, a grant of compassionate release that 
reduced Defendant’s sentence to time served while leaving intact the five-year term of supervised PageID: <pageID>
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release. The Court is mindful that the sentencing court determined that a five -year period of 
supervision remained appropriate even after reducing Defendant’s custodial sentence. While that 
determination does not foreclose early termination, it weighs against modifying the sentence 
absent a persuasive showing that doing so is warranted. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the nature and circumstances of the offense weigh against 
early termination. 
b. Defendant’s Conduct While on Supervised Release 
The Court next considers Defendant’s conduct while on supervised release. Defendant’s 
performance on supervision has been largely positive. Since his release in December 2021, he has 
maintained stable employment, supported his family, made restitution payments, and avoided new 
criminal conduct. (Motion at 3, 6-10.) The Court agrees that these accomplishments reflect genuine 
effort and meaningful rehabilitation. 
At the same time, Defendant’s supervision record has not been entirely without incident. 
In July 2023, Probation notified the Court that Defendant had failed to make restitution payments 
for a substantial period following his release. ( Dkt. No. 8.) Defendant explains that the lapse 
stemmed from confusion regarding payment procedures and the transition among multiple 
probation officers. (Reply at 2-3.) The Court accepts that explanation and notes that Defendant has 
since made consistent payments. In addition, Defendant admitted to marijuana use in May 2025, 
in violation of the conditions of supervised release. (Dkt. No. 9.) Probation recommended that no 
formal action be taken, and the Court does not view that violation as particularly serious standing 
alone. Nevertheless, it remains part of the supervision record. 
The Court therefore agrees with Defendant that his overall performance on supervision has 
been commendable. However, the Court is not persuaded that his conduct is so exceptional as to PageID: <pageID>
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warrant early termination. As courts within this District have repeatedly recognized, compliance 
with the conditions of supervision, maintaining employment, and making restitution payments are 
expected aspects of successful supervision. See, e.g., United States v. DePaula , No. 16 -CR-474 
(ES), 2025 WL 1296234, at *2 (D.N.J. May 5, 2025); United States v. Santoro, No. 21-76, 2022 
WL 37471, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2022). While Defendant’s conduct weighs in favor of the Motion, 
the Court finds that it does so only modestly. 
c. The Interests of Justice and the Remaining Term of Supervision 
Finally, the Court considers whether early termination would be warranted in the interests 
of justice. Defendant argues that continued supervision unnecessarily restricts his freedom of 
movement, limits potential employment opportunities, and impedes his ability to relocate to a 
lower-cost state. ( Motion at 3; Reply at 3 -4.) The Court does not discount those concerns. 
Supervised release necessarily imposes obligations and restrictions that do not apply to individuals 
who have completed their sentences. 
However, the Court finds that Defendant has not identified a sufficiently concrete hardship 
that would justify shortening the supervision term imposed by the sentencing court. Although he 
references potential employment and relocation opportunities, he has not identified a specific job 
offer th at has been lost because of supervision, nor has he demonstrated that Probation has 
prevented him from pursuing legitimate employment or relocation requests. The Court therefore 
finds that the asserted burdens of supervision are largely prospective and speculative. 
The Court is likewise unpersuaded that the interests of justice require modification of the 
sentence at this late stage. Defendant correctly notes that extraordinary or unforeseen 
circumstances are not required under § 3583(e)(1). See Melvin, 978 F.3d at 53. Nevertheless, the PageID: <pageID> PageID: <pageID>

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