govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-3_26-cv-03217-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
PEDRO PABLO RIZO OJEDA, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
LUIS SOTO, et al., 
 
Respondents. 
 
Civil Action No. 26-3217 (ZNQ) 
 
 
 
OPINION 
 
 
QURAISHI, District Judge 
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner’s habeas petition challenging his ongoing 
immigration detention. (ECF No. 1.) Following an order to answer, the Government filed 
responses to the petition (ECF Nos. 7, 11), to which Petitioner replied. (ECF No. 8.) Also before 
the Court are Petitioner’s motions seeking a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 2) and for 
release pending final relief in this matter. (ECF No. 9.) For the following reasons, Petitioner’s 
habeas petition shall be granted, and Petitioner shall be accorded with a bond hearing at which the 
Government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence within ten days . 
Petitioner’s motion seeking a temporary restraining order shall be denied as moot, and Petitioner’s 
motion seeking release pending final relief in this matter shall be granted. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Nicaragua who crossed the southern border of the 
Untied States without admission or inspection on or about October 29, 2021. (ECF No. 7- 2 at 2-
3.) Petitioner was taken into custody by border patrol officers shortly after crossing, and was PageID: <pageID>
processed for expedited removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). ( Id. at 3.) Petitioner was 
thereafter released on parole on November 11, 2021, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) pending 
proceedings on Petitioner’s expressed fear of return to his home country. (Id.; ECF No. 8-1 at 1.) 
Petitioner thereafter remained at liberty in the United States until March 13, 2026, when he was 
found not to have a credible fear of removal by immigration officials and was taken back into 
custody pursuant to § 1225(b)(1). (ECF No. 7-2 at 3.) Petitioner requested an immigration judge 
review the negative credible fear finding, and the immigration judge ultimately affirmed the 
negative credible fear finding, and Petitioner was issued a final expedited order of removal on 
March 20, 2026. (See ECF No. 7-7.) Petitioner “has no known criminal history.” (ECF No. 7-2 
at 3.) 
 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), habeas relief may be extended to a prisoner only when he “is 
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 
2241(c)(3). A federal court has jurisdiction over such a petition i f the petitioner is “in custody” 
and the custody is allegedly “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
In his habeas petition, Petitioner seeks to challenge both the expedited removal order issued 
against him and to challenge his ongoing detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Turning 
first to the issue of the expedited removal order, this Court’s author ity to review an expedited 
removal order and the proceedings that led to its issuance are exceedingly limited. See Castro v. PageID: <pageID>
United States, 835 F.3d 422, 430 (3d Cir. 2016) (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)). Generally, a 
district court in habeas review is expressly limited to addressing only three questions: whether the 
petitioner is an alien, whether he was ordered removed, and whether he can show he was previously 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, as a refugee, or granted asylum, without that status 
being terminated. Id. Where, as here, the petitioner admits he is not an American citizen and does 
not assert he was relevantly lawfully admitted – in this case Petitioner admits he crossed the border 
without admission or inspection and was caught shortly after – the Court’s jurisdiction is limited 
to “whether [an expedited removal order] in fact was issued and whether it rel ates to the 
petitioner.” Id. Thus, a reviewing court can only determine “whether an immigration officer 
issued that piece of paper and whether the Petitioner is the same person referred to in that order.” 
Id. at 431 (internal quotations omitted). Because Petitioner is not an American citizen, was not 
granted permanent residence or asylum, and received a final expedited removal order when the 
immigration judge affirmed his negative credible fear finding and returned his case to DHS for the 
execution of his removal order, this Court may not look beyond Petitioner’s removal order or 
address Petitioner’s claims that the procedures used for that order were improper.
1 Id.; see also 
Sangare v. Soto, No. 26-758, 2026 WL 575374, at *1-2 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2026). 
 
1 The sole exception to this rule would apply only where the petitioner has a viable basis for arguing 
that the Suspension Clause requires habeas review beyond that which is permitted by § 1252(e). 
Castro, 835 F.3d at 431; see also Osorio -Martinez v. Att’y Gen., 893 F.3d 153, 166- 67 (3d Cir. 
2018). The Suspension Clause, however, does not apply in this context of an alien who receives 
humanitarian parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A) unless that alien has entered into a special relationship 
with the United States or a particular state which creates “significant ties to this country” which 
would warrant additional procedural protections beyond those normally available to such aliens. 
Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 166- 67. Mere presence in the United States for several years after 
being paroled is insufficient to create such a relationship, instead something significantly more is 
required – such as the granting of Special Immigrant Juvenile States or s ome similar standing far 
beyond prolonged presence. Id. Petitioner has not presented any such special status in his case, 
and this Court perceives none from the record, and the Suspension Clause thus does not provide a 
greater avenue for review of his expedited removal proceedings and order. PageID: <pageID>
 
Although this Court cannot review Petitioner’s expedited removal order and proceedings, 
this Court does maintain jurisdiction to review claims related solely to the lawfulness of continued 
detention without bond pending the execution of that order. In this matter, Petitioner contends that 
his continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) is unlawful. The Government instead argues 
that he remains subject to § 1225(b)(1) in light of the circumstances of his initial detention and 
parole. As this Court has previously explained, 
Aliens who attempt to enter the United States illegally and who are 
detained shortly after making an unlawful crossing of the border are 
“treated as an applicant for admission” and are subject to the terms 
of § 1225(b)(1). Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 
103, 139-40 (2020). As the Third Circuit has explained, “[u]nder 8 
U.S.C. § 1225( b)(1) and its companion regulations, two classes of 
aliens are subject to [detention and] expedited removal [proceedings 
under § 1225(b)(1)] if an immigrati on officer determines they are 
inadmissible due to misrepresentation or lack of immigration 
papers: (1) aliens ‘arriving in the United States,’ and (2) aliens 
‘encountered within 14 days of entry without inspection and within 
100 air miles of any U.S. international land border.” Castro v. 
United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 425 (3d Cir. 
2016). Aliens subject to this provision will generally be issued an 
expedited removal order unless they indicate to immigration officers 
that they have a credible fear of persecution should they be deported, 
in which case they are referred for further proceedings regarding 
their expressed fear. Id. Aliens who are taken into custody under § 
1225(b)(1) are subject to mandatory detention throughout their 
removal and credible fear proceedings, though the Government may 
in its discretion temporarily parole such aliens into the United States 
“for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” See 
Jennings v. Rodriguez , 583 U.S. 281, 287- 88 (2018). Detention 
under the statute remains mandatory until the conclusion of the 
alien’s removal proceedings, after which an alien would have a final 
order of removal, and detention under § 1225(b)(1) ends. Id. at 300-
03. 
 
Arcos Tasigchana v. Soto, No. 25-18252, 2026 WL 266170, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2026). PageID: <pageID>
 Aliens subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) are therefore subject to 
mandatory detention throughout their removal proceedings, and are generally not entitled to 
release unless the Government chooses to parole them. Id. The parole statute, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(d)(5)(A), provides that an alien who is paroled “shall forthwith return or be returned to the 
custody from which he was paroled” and continue to be detained pursuant to the original detention 
statute. As Petitioner was caught by immigration officials shortly after crossing the border and 
was thereafter paroled, he remains properly subject to § 1225(b)(1), and is not entitled to a bond 
hearing under that statute. See Arcos Tasigchana , 2026 WL 266170 at *1- 2; see also Jennings , 
583 U.S. at 297 (until the relevant proceedings under § 1225(b) end “nothing in the statutory text 
imposes any limit on the length of detention”). 
 Although Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1), Petitioner also 
argues that his prolonged detention without bond violates his rights to Due Process. As this Court 
recently explained, 
Although aliens subject to detention under § 1225(b)(1) “have only 
those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by 
statute” and the Due Process clause does not provide for detailed 
review of those statutory proceedings, see Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 
v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) , it does not follow that 
the Due Process clause is silent as to the rights of aliens to liberty 
following prolonged detention, especially where that alien was 
previously permitted to be at liberty on parole for a considerable 
period. 
 
Courts in this District have long presumed that aliens subject 
to prolonged detention under the statute have a liberty interest in 
release from detention which requires a bond hearing. See, e.g., 
Tuser E. v. Rodriguez, 370 F. Supp. 3d 435, 442- 43 (D.N.J. 2019). 
In so doing, courts have analogized mandatory detention under 
1225(b) to the similar mandatory detention required for aliens who 
have qualifying criminal convictions under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). See 
German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 
210-13 (3d Cir. 2020). In German Santos, the Court of Appeals held 
that where an alien is subject to prolonged detention under the PageID: <pageID>
statute, that detention will eventually reach a point where it 
essentially becomes arbitrary in light of the purposes and 
presumptions underlying the statute. Id. In the context of those with 
criminal convictions subject to detention under § 1226(c), detention 
“becomes more and more suspect after five month s and in most 
cases will become “unreasonable sometime between six months and 
one year.” Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley Corr. Ctr., 169 
F.4th 418, 433- 34 (3d Cir. 2026). Once the length of detent ion 
becomes suspect, a reviewing court must consider the length of 
detention and likelihood of lengthy continued condition, the 
similarity of Petitioner’s conditions of confinement to criminal 
detention, and the Petitioner’s responsibility for the length of his 
own detention in determining whether detention has become 
arbitrary in light of the purposes of § 1226(c). German Santos, 965 
F.3d at 211. Where those factors indicate that detention has become 
arbitrary, the alien is entitled to a bond hearing at which the 
Government bears the burden of proving that further detention is 
necessary by showing that the Petitioner is a danger or flight risk by 
clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 213-14. 
 
This Court agrees that, at a certain point, detention under § 
1225(b)(1) will become so prolonged that it becomes arbitrary and 
Due Process will require a bond hearing. Tuser E., 370 F. Supp. 3d 
442-43. The question that remains, then, is at what point detention 
will become suspect. Although in the § 1226(c) context, detention 
will become arbitrary only after cresting five months, that length of 
time is based on the concept that the court can essentially presume 
that an alien convicted of qualifying crimes is a flight risk or danger 
to the community for the length of time it ordinarily would take to 
complete removal proceedings. German Santos , 965 F.3d at 209-
10. The alien’s criminal history is in that context providing the basis 
for the presumption which places a limits on his liberty interests in 
the § 1226(c) context. 
 
Aliens detained under § 1225(b)(1) are not held based on a 
criminal history [.] The statute instead relies chiefly on the 
presumption that an alien with no clear right to admission into the 
United States is a flight risk and may therefore be detained for the 
relatively limited period of time required for him to receive an 
expedited order of removal. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A). 
Such proceedings are clearly intended to be considerably shorter 
than the general removal proceedings to which criminal al iens 
already in the United States are subject under § 1226(c), and the 
presumptive basis for mandatory detention under the statute is 
considerably weaker than that applicable to criminal aliens as it is 
based solely on the lack of legal status rather than past misdeeds. It PageID: <pageID>
therefore follows that detention under § 1225(b)(1) should become 
suspect far sooner than detention under § 1226(c). 
 
Martinez Olivo v. Soto, No. 26-2122, 2026 WL 1265500, at *2-3. In light of the lesser justification 
for prolonged detention under § 1225(b)(1), this Court has found that detention in a jail -like 
detention facility for several months following a lengthy period of parole within the United States 
is sufficient to warrant the granting of a bond hearing. Id. 
Like the petitioner in Martinez Olivo, Petitioner in this matter has been detained in a jail-
like detention facility for several months after a lengthy period of parole without any evidence of 
criminality or other violations during that parole. Despite the immigration judge’s decision in 
Petitioner’s credible fear proceedings, the Government has not provided the Court clear evidence 
that Petitioner’s detention is likely to end in the near future or that Petitioner’s expedited removal 
order is likely to culminate in Petitioner’s removal in the near future , nor has the Government 
provided any evidence that Petitioner is responsible for any delays in his proceedings or in 
prolonging his own detention. In light of these facts, this Court finds that Petitioner’s detention is 
sufficiently prolonged that the presumption that his lack of status renders him a flight risk is no 
longer sufficient to satisfy Due P rocess as a basis for continued detention without bond. 
Petitioner’s continued mandatory detention without a bond hearing has therefore become 
sufficiently prolonged as to be arbitrary, and he is entitled to a bond hearing at which the 
Government bears the burden of establishing that he is a flight risk or danger to the community by 
clear and convincing evidence. German Santos, 965 F.3d at 213-14. Petitioner’s habeas petition 
shall therefore be granted, and he shall be provided such a bond hearing within ten days.
2 
 
2 Should Petitioner be granted release on bond, such a release shall not be construed as an 
admission into the United States for immigration purposes, and such release provides no legal 
status to remain in the United States which Petitioner did not already possess. Release on bond 
would also not prevent the Government from eventually taking Petitioner into custody for the PageID: <pageID>
Petitioner’s motion seeking a temporary restraining order shall be denied as moot in light of the 
granting of this relief. 
 In addition to his habeas petition and temporary restraining order motion, Petitioner has 
also filed a motion for release pending final relief in this matter pursuant to Lucas v. Hadden, 790 
F.2d 365, 367-68 (3d Cir. 1986), and its progeny. (ECF No. 9.) Under Lucas, this Court has the 
authority to grant a litigant release on bail pending final habeas relief where the petitioner raises 
“substantial constitutional claims upon which he has a high probability of success, and . . . when 
extraordinary or exceptional circumstances exist which make the grant of bail necessary to make 
the habeas remedy effective.” In re Souels , 688 F. App’x 134, 135 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 
Landano v. Rafferty, 970 F.2d 1230, 1239 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
In this matter, Petitioner presented a substantial claim for relief as he has shown that his 
continued detention without bond under § 1225(b)(1) has become so prolonged as to become 
arbitrary, and has shown a high probability of success on the merits of that claim for the reasons 
detailed above. Petitioner has additionally shown that he has been subject to extraordinary 
circumstances in his detention as the terms and conditions of his confinement of late have been 
severe – including exposure to tear gas without cause and medical and respiratory distress resulting 
from that exposure. (See ECF No. 9 at 7.) Petitioner has also reported harsh conditions including 
spoiled food, water fountains with tainted water, and a lack of sufficient hygiene products. (Id. at 
7-8.) In light of these circumstances, this Court finds that Petitioner has shown sufficient 
extraordinary circumstances to warrant a grant of release on bail pending final habeas relief. The 
 
purposes of executing a final removal order once the Government has secured a travel document 
for Petitioner. Because the Government does not contend that Petitioner is subject to detention 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), the Court need not and does not decide whether the Government has the 
authority to detain Petitioner under that statute at this time. PageID: <pageID>
Court will therefore grant Petitioner’s motion, and will order the Government to release Petitioner 
from detention under an order of supervision until such time as his bond hearing can be completed. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons expressed above, Petitioner’s habeas petition (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED, 
and Petitioner shall be provided a bond hearing at which the Government bears the burden of 
demonstrating danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence within ten days. Petitioner’s 
motions seeking a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 2) is DENIED WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE as moot, and Petitioner’s motion seeking release pending final relief (ECF No. 9) 
is GRANTED. An appropriate order follows. 
 
Date: June 15, 2026 
 s/ Zahid N. Quraishi 
 ZAHID N. QURAISHI 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE PageID: <pageID>

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