govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-1_25-cv-24768-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLOW DA
Miami Division
Case Number: 25-24768-C1V-M 0M N0
MARK ANTHONY HAUGHTON,
all others similarly situated under 29 U.S.C. j
216(B),
Plaintiff,
V.
A.C. SCHULTES OF FLORIDA, lNC.,
Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGM ENT AND
ORDER DENYING ALL PENDING M OTIONS AS M OOT
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Stlmmal'y Judgment.
This Fair Labor Standards Act collective action was commenced by Mark Anthony Haughton.
After becoming unresponsive, Plaintiffs' counsel added Emiliano Torres and Liuvan Hernandez
as opt-in plaintiffs and substituted Mr. Torres as the representative plaintiff. Defendant filed the
tmderlying Motion for S'lmmary Judgment, arguing that no viable claim remains before the Court
as both Mr. Torres and Mr. Hernandez are time barred as a matter of law. The Court holds that the
claims asserted by the only remaining Plaintiffs are untimely and that no Plaintiff has a viable
claim to represent and prosecute this collective action. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant's
Motion for Sllmma!y Judgment.
1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant A.C. Schultes of Florida is an enterprise engaged in deep-water construction
work and is a covered çsemployer'' as detined by Section 3(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. j 203(d). Defendant employs crane operators, engineers in training, well drillers, and ptlmp
Case 1:25-cv-24768-FAM   Document 38   Entered on FLSD Docket 06/15/2026   Page 1 of 6
installers. Mr. Haughton was employed by Defendant as a well driller from Februaly 2018 thought
May 2024. As pa14 of his job, Mr. Haughton was required to first report to Defendant's location to
collect tools, a company vehicle, and/or instructions before traveling to the jobsite. He was also
required to return the company vehicle and any tools to Defendant's location prior to returning
home afler his workday.
ll. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. Haughton filed the underlying suit on October 16, 2025, alleging violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. Specifically, Mr. Haughton claimed that he worked approximately twenty-
five hours of overtime a week and was not properly compensated for the additional hotlrs spent
commuting in employer vehicles from Defendant's location to the jobsite and back. Shortly after
commencing the action, Mr. Haughton became unzesponsive and could not be located despite
repeated efforts by his counsel to contact him by telephone, email, and written cocespondence.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs moved to add Emiliano Torres and Liuvan Hernandez as opt-in plaintiffs
and to substitute Mr. Torres as the representative Plaintiff. (D.E.3O). The Court granted the Motion.
(D.E. 32).
The record reflects that Defendant gave Plaintiffs notice that Mr. Hernandez's and M.r.
Torres' claims were time barred on April 17, 2026. (D.E. 36-1). Plaintiffs moved forward with the
case, and Defendant filed the underlying Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 33) on April 30,
2026. Plaintiffs failed to respond to the motion, and as of the date of this Order, no response has
been filed. Instead, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Voltmtary Dismissal Without Prejudice (D.E. 35),
explaining that Plaintiffs wished to voluntarily dismiss this action because the applicable
limitations period expired before Mr. Torres and Mr. Hemandez filed their consents to join. The
Coul't denied that Motion, finding that voluntary dismissal was inappropriate as Defendant had
expended considerable time and incurred substantial expenses in defending the case. (D.E. 37).
Case 1:25-cv-24768-FAM   Document 38   Entered on FLSD Docket 06/15/2026   Page 2 of 6
111. LEGAL STANDARD
G&summaryjudgment is appropriate where there &is no genuine issue as to any material fact'
and the moving party is Gentitled to judgment as a ma'tter of law.''' Alabama v. North Carolina,
560 U.S. 330, 344 (2010) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). Thus, the basic issue before the Court
on a motion for stlmmary judgment is Gtwhether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to ajury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
zaxn'vlnderson v. f iberty L obby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986). The moving party has the blzrden
of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and in deciding whether the
movant has met this burden, the Court must view the movant's evidence and all factual inferences
arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121
F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997).
Local Rule 56.1(a)(1) provides that tlga) motion for summary judgment and the opposition
to it shall each be accompanied by a separate . . . Statement of Material Facts . . .'' which GEshall list
the material facts that the movant contends are genuinely not disputed.'' S.D. Fla. L.R. 56.1(a)(1).
Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(c), where the non-movant files to file a Statement of Material Facts
in Opposition, Içgall) material facts in gthe moving) party's Statement of Material Facts may be
deemed admitted.'' S.D. Fla. L.R. 56.1(c).
When considering an tmopposed motion for summary judgment, however, Gsthe district
court calmot base the entry of stunmaryjudgment on the mere fact that the motion was unopposed,
but, rather, must consider the merits of the motion.'' United States v. One Piece ofReal Property
L ocated at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1 101 (11th Cir. 2004). IiAlthough the
statements contained in (the movant'sl Statement of Material Facts are deemed admitted, gthe)
court must still review the movant's citations to the record to determine if there is, indeed, no
genuine dispute of material fact.'' Mann v. Taser 1nt 'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1303 (1 1th Cir. 2009)
Case 1:25-cv-24768-FAM   Document 38   Entered on FLSD Docket 06/15/2026   Page 3 of 6
(citing Recsc v. Herbcrt, 527 F.3d 1253, 1269 (1 1th Cir. 2008:. lElEven in arl unopposed motion,
the moving party still bears the blzrden of identifying Gthe pleadings, depositions, answers to
intenogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes
demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'' 1d (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catvett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). In other words, the movant must still show that it is entitled tojudgment
as a matter of law based on factual asselions supported by the record. See Reese, 527 F.3d at
1268-69.
IV. DISCUSSION
As Plaintiffs failed to respond to Defendant's Statement of Material Facts, the Cotu't deems
those facts as true. See S.D. Fla. L.R. 56.1(c). Moreover, Defendant has supported its Statement
of Material Facts with record evidence. As explained below, the Cotu't finds that Defendant has
shown it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because the applicable statme of
limitations bars Plaintiffs' claims. Under 29 U.S.C. j 255(a), Fair Labor Standards Act claims
generally must be brought Clwithin two years after the cause of action accrued.'' The limitation
extends to three years after the cause of action accrued if a defendant was Glwillf-ul'' in its violations
of the Act. McL aughlin v. Richlandshoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 135 (1988). A willful violation occurs
when the evidence demonstrates that lsthe employer either knew or showed recldess disregard for
the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute.'' 1d. at 133. For purposes of the
limitations period, a Fair Labor Standards Act claim accrues with every deficient paycheck the
employer issues. Knight v. Columbus, 19 F.3d 579, 58 1 (1 1th Cir. 1994).
Isparticipants in a j 216(b) collective action must affirmatively opt into the suit.'' Morgan
v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008). CGgoqpt-in plaintiffs are deemed
to commence their civil action only when they file their written consent to opt into the class action.''
Case 1:25-cv-24768-FAM   Document 38   Entered on FLSD Docket 06/15/2026   Page 4 of 6
Sec Grayson v. KMart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1 106 (1 1th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, an opt-in plaintiff
(Gmust file his mitten consent to opt into the class action prior to the expiration of the statute of
limitations on his gFair Labor Standards Actj claim.'' 16L at 1107.
The Coul't finds that * . Torres' and 511.. Helmarldez's claims are time barred under both
the 'two- and three-year limitations period described above. Mr.Torres and h4r. Hemandez
commenced their civil action on February 20, 2026, when they filed their mitten consent to join
this action. (D.E. 28). Thus, using the more generous three-year limitation period, any Fair Labor
Standards Act claim that accrued prior to February 20, 2023, is time baced.
The undisputed evidence demonstrates that neither Mr. Tozres nor Mr. Hernandez was
employed by Defendant, nor did either receive paychecks from Defendant, on or after February
20, 2023. Mr. Ton'es last worked for Defendant on October 2, 2020, and received his final
paycheck fwm Defendant on October 9, 2020. (D.E. 34-1 !! 5-6; D.E. 34-2,' D.E. 34-3 at p. 6).
Mr. Hernandez last worked for Defendant on June 8, 2022, and received his fnal paycheck from
Defendant on Jtme 17, 2022. (D.E. 34-1 !! 8-9., D.E. 34-4,. D.E. 34-6 at p. 4). Thus, M.1-. Torres
waited more than five ybars tojoin this action after receiving his final paycheck and M.1.. Hernandez
waited more than three years to join this action after receiving his final paycheck. Accordingly,
the Court finds that MT. Ton'es and Mr. Helmandez failed to timely commence their claims, and as
such, their claims are time-barred. Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the
claims asserted by Mr. Torres and Mr. Hernandez. lndeed, Plaintiffs acknowledged as such in the
Motion for Voluntary Dismissal. (D.E. 35 ! 2) (çGFollowing review of the Motion, the underlying
employment records, and f'ut'ther investigation by counsel, Plaintiffs have concluded that the
claims of these opt-in plaintiffs cannot be maintained because the applicable limitations period
expired before their consents to join were fi1ed.'').
Case 1:25-cv-24768-FAM   Document 38   Entered on FLSD Docket 06/15/2026   Page 5 of 6
The only Plaintiff to timely commence this action is Mr. Haughton. However, as discussed
above, Mr. Haughton has abandoned his claim, and the remaining Plaintiffs do not have a viable
claim against Defendant. Plaintiffs aclcnowledge the same in the Motion for Voluntm'y Dismissal.
(D.E. 35 !! 5-8). The Court therefore finds that Defendant has met its btlrden of showing that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of 1aw based on the above discussed factual assedions supported
by the record.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is
ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion for Stuumary Judgment is GM NTED. lt is further
ADJUDGED that all pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk is directed to
close the case. #
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, tlzis of June, 2026.
FED C A. MO NO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Case 1:25-cv-24768-FAM   Document 38   Entered on FLSD Docket 06/15/2026   Page 6 of 6

Passage view · GavelSight