govinfo:USCOURTS-kyed-5_26-cv-00087-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
LEXINGTON 
 
TRIPLE R FARMS, LLC, 
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR, et al.,  
 
Defendants. 
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No. 5:26-CV-00087-REW-MAS 
 
 
OPINION & ORDER 
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Plaintiff Triple R Farms, LLC (“Triple R”) filed a motion for preliminary and permanent 
injunctive relief under Rule 65, seeking to enjoin the Department of L abor’s ongoing 
administrative adjudication against the farm, including an administrative hearing that is currently 
scheduled for September 16, 2026.  See DE 8.  Defendants, United States Department of Labor 
(“DOL”); Keith E. Sonderling, 1 in his official capacity as Secretary of DOL; and Andrew B. 
Rogers, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division (“WHD”)  
responded in opposition.  See DE 19.  The Court held an evidentiary hearing to take any proof 
supplementary to the written record. See DE 27.  The hearing only addressed the preliminary 
injunction, given the parties ’ request to hold in abeyance all other proceedings and deadline s 
pending the Supreme Court ’s ruling in U.S. Dep’ t of Lab. v. Sun Valley Orchards, LLC  (“Sun 
Valley”), No. 25-966, 2026 WL 1127242 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2026).  See DE 24; DE 25.   
Triple R subsequently notified the Court that it had moved for a continuance in the 
underlying administrative proceeding and suggested that the continuance, if granted, could obviate 
 
1 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Acting Secretary of Labor Keith E. Sonderling is automatically 
substituted for former Secretary of Labor Lori Chavez-DeRemer. 
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the need for the Court to rule on the present motion.  See DE 29.  At present, however, the schedule 
remains set, and the matter is ripe for review.2  Because Plaintiff fails to clearly show a likelihood 
of success on the merits of its  constitutional claims and thus also fails to demonstrate irreparable 
injury, the Court DENIES DE 8.  
I. Background  
a. Procedural and Factual Background  
 Triple R Farms, LLC is a family-owned tobacco farm owned and operated by David and 
Debbie Ross in Berry, Kentucky.  See DE 8-2 at 1-2.  Triple R employs temporary seasonal  
workers through the H-2A visa program to assist in harvesting the farm’s tobacco crop.  See id. at 
2.  In December 2021, DOL investigators visited Triple R to conduct a routine audit.  See id. at 3.  
On January 10, 2023, a DOL inspector emailed Debbie, in response to her  inquiry regarding the 
status of the audit, to set up a meeting.  See id. at 4.  During the meeting, DOL informed the Rosses 
that their farm had violated multiple H-2A regulations.  See id.  On February 21, 2023, DOL mailed 
the Rosses a Determination Notice finalizing the charges and imposing $27,718.43 in back wages 
and $42,331.50 in civil monetary penalties.  See id.; see also DE 8-4 at 1.  The charges stem from 
various alleged wage-related, recordkeeping, housing, and transportation violations.  See DE 8-4 
at 8-11.   
 Triple R contested the Determination Notice and requested a formal hearing on the matter 
pursuant to § 29 C.F.R. 501.33.  See DE 8-5.  In 2024, the case was assigned to DOL ALJ Willow 
Eden Fort.  See DE 8-9 at 3.  Triple R moved to dismiss the proceeding, claiming that the DOL’s 
 
2 The Court considered Monticello Banking Co. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 6:23-CV-00148-KKC, 
2023 WL 5983829, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 14, 2023).  Unlike here, that case involved a prospective rule, not 
yet in effect, and subject to a circuit split on funding propriety and a certiorari grant.  The decision viewed 
the merits as in equipoise and the schedule was such that an ultimate resolving decision would likely 
precede the expected rule implementation.  These distinctions make the case inapplicable here, in the 
Court’s view, as a matter of merits and of process.  
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delay in initiating the case violated agency regulations and that the proceeding deprived Triple R 
of due process.  See DE 8-8.  ALJ Fort denied the motion.  See DE 8-9 at 7.  On August 6, 2025, 
Triple R moved for a jury trial, see DE 8-12, which ALJ Fort subsequently denied on December 
22, 2025, see DE 8-13.  On January 30, 2026, Triple R moved to certify for interlocutory review 
by the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) the question of whether it is entitled to a jury trial 
in an Article III court.  See DE 8-14 at 3.  On February 20, 2026, ALJ Fort denied that request.  
See id. at 5.  On February 12, 2026, ALJ Fort issued a second amended prehearing scheduling 
order, establishing various prehearing deadlines and setting the hearing for September 16, 2026.  
See DE 8-15 at 2.   
 On March 12, 2026, Triple R filed the instant suit and moved for injunctive relief, claiming 
that DOL’s H-2A enforcement procedures violate Article III and the Seventh Amendment.  See 
DE 8; DE 21.  Triple R seeks to enjoin DOL ’s ongoing administrative adjudication against the 
farm, including the administrative hearing that is currently scheduled for September 16, 2026.  See 
DE 8.  The Court instituted a briefing schedule , see DE 16, and conducted a prompt and plenary 
hearing, see DE 27. 
b. Statutory and Regulatory Framework 
 Congress established the modern framework for regulation of immigration into the United 
States, including provisions for the admission of permanent and temporary foreign workers , 
through its enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.  See Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”), Pub. L. No. 82 –414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1101, et seq.).  The INA included the formation of the H–2 visa program  to handle 
employment of foreign workers for agricultural and non- agricultural jobs.  8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(15)(H)(ii).  Later, Congress amended the INA by enacting the Immigration Reform and 
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Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”)  and splitting the H –2 visa regime  into the H –2A and H –2B 
programs.  See Pub. L. No. 99–603, § 301(a), 100 Stat. 3359, 3411 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a)-(b)).  The H-2A program governs the admission of agricultural workers, and 
the H-2B program governs admission of non-agricultural workers.   
 The INA provides temporary work authorization for foreign agricultural workers under the 
H-2A program.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a); § 1184(c)(1).   The H-2A program permits 
employers to temporarily hire  ( textually, “import”) foreign workers upon DOL certification, 
prompted by the employer’s petition, that “(A) there are not sufficient workers who are able, 
willing, and qualified, and who will be available at the time and place needed, to perform the labor 
or services involved in the petitioner” and “(B) the employment of the alien in such labor or 
services will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States 
similarly employed.”  8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1)(A) –(B).  Indeed, the certification serves the stated 
policies of the INA, that “a nonimmigrant alien worker not be admitted to fill a particular 
temporary job opportunity unless no qualified U.S. worker is available to fill the job opportunity, 
and unless the employment of the foreign worker will not adversely affect the wages or working 
conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers.”  20 C.F.R. § 655.0(a).  The labor e ffect hinges 
on comparable wages and conditions in the market, and the Secretary establishes the level “below 
which similarly employed U.S. workers would be adversely affected[.]” See id.  at (a)(2).  
Temporary worker pay and conditions must meet this standard to assure comparability and protect 
the domestic labor market, per the regulation.  See also Garcia-Celestino v. Ruiz Harvesting, Inc., 
843 F.3d 1276, 1284–86 (11th Cir. 2016) (“By requiring that the ‘employer’ provide these baseline 
benefits, the regulations ensure that foreign workers will not appear more attractive to the 
‘employer’ than domestic workers, thus avoiding any adverse effects for domestic workers.”). 
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 Congress directed the Secretary of Labor  to promulgate regulations that would set the 
parameters of the program, particularly for temporary workers coming “ to perform agricultural 
labor or services.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)).  Pursuant to these regulations, prospective 
employers must first offer the job to and recruit workers in the United States.  20 C.F.R. § 655.121.  
Further, the employer must offer domestic workers “no less than the same benefits, wages, and 
working conditions that the employer is offering, intends to offer, or will provide to H -2A 
workers.”  20 C.F.R. § 655.122(a).  The employer may  submit an Application for Temporary 
Employment Certification (an “H-2A Application”) to the Department of Labor (“DOL”) only if 
suitable domestic workers do not respond to positive recruitment.  See generally  8 U.S.C. § 
1188(a), (c)(3)(A). 
 Before submitting an Application for Temporary Employment Certification, an “employer 
must submit a completed job order.”  20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(1).  The job order lists the “[j]ob 
qualifications and requirements[,]” 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(b), and “[m]inimum benefits, wages, and 
working conditions[,]”  20 C.F.R. § 655.122(c).   The packages must match the wage and condition 
requirements of the statute and regulations.  See 20 C.F.R. § 655.1305(b), (e), (g).   
 The Secretary of Labor is “authorized to take such actions, including imposing appropriate 
penalties and seeking appropriate injunctive relief and specific performance of contractual 
obligations, as may be necessary to assure employer compliance with terms  and conditions of 
employment” of the H-2A program.  8 U.S.C. § 1188(g) (2); 29 C.F.R. § 501.1.  The Secretary 
may also initiate administrative proceedings as necessary, or alternatively may petition “any 
appropriate District Court of the United States” for injunctive relief, or “specific performance of 
contractual obligations.”  29 C.F.R. § 501.16.  The Department ’s Wage and Hour Division 
Administrator investigates possible H -2A violations.  If the Administrator determines violations 
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occurred, it may recover back wages, debar the employer from receiving future H -2A labor 
certifications, and impose civil money penalties.  29 C.F.R. §§ 501.15, 501.16(a)(1), 501.19(a), 
501.20(a).  The Administrator may also impose civil monetary penalties for “each violation of the 
work contract, or the obligations imposed by 8 U.S.C. § 1188, 20 C.F.R. part 655.”  29 C.F.R. § 
501.19(a).  “In determining the amount of penalty to be assessed for each violation, the 
Administrator shall consider the type of violation committed and other relevant factors.”  29 C.F.R. 
§ 501.19(b). 
 To institute administrative proceedings, the Administrator issues a written determination 
explaining the Wage and Hour Division’s findings and imposes any sanctions and remedies.  29 
C.F.R. §§ 501.31, 501.32.  An employer can request an administrative hearing before an ALJ to 
test the Administrator’s determination.  29 C.F.R. §§ 501.33(a), 501.34, 501.35.  The Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure are generally applicable to litigation before the ALJ. In proceedings before the 
United States Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges, “[t]he Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (FRCP) apply in any situation not provided for or controlled by these rules, or a 
governing statute, regulation, or executive order.”  29 C.F.R. § 18.10(a).  The ALJ will prepare a 
decision on the issues referred by the Administrator.  29 C.F.R. § 501.41(a).  Any party wishing 
review of the ALJ decision can petition the ARB.  29 C.F.R. § 501.42(a).  An avenue for deferential 
APA review then exists in federal court.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 706; see also Sussex Eng’g, Ltd. v. 
Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1087 (6th Cir. 1987).    
II. Legal Standard  
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 empowers federal courts to enter preliminary 
injunctions in appropriate cases.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a).  The purpose of a preliminary injunction 
generally is to preserve the status quo pending a trial on the merits.  See S. Glazer’s Distributors 
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of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844, 848 (6th Cir. 2017).  Practically, because 
a preliminary injunction happens, if at all, before the parties have developed the record, the movant 
is “not required to prove his case in full at a preliminary injunction hearing.”  Certified Restoration 
Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 2007).  Still, courts 
must approach any such request with care.  A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, 
one never awarded as of right.  Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 376 (2008); 
Platt v. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline of Ohio Supreme Ct., 769 F.3d 447, 453 (6th 
Cir. 2014) (preliminary injunctions are “extraordinary and drastic” remedies).  The burden is 
always on the movant to justify the request.  See Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 978 
F.3d 378, 385 (6th Cir. 2020).   
 Access to this extraordinary remedy turns on assessment of four equitable factors: “(1) 
whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would 
suffer irreparable injury absent the injunction; (3) whether the injunction would cause substantial 
harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of an injunction.”  
Hargett, 978 F.3d at 385.  These factors are not prerequisites and are meant instead to be balanced 
and assessed together.  See id.; Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 
573 (6th Cir. 2002).  The first two factors are the most integral.  “If the plaintiff has ‘no likelihood 
of success on the merits,’ there is nothing left to balance and the plaintiff’s request for a preliminary 
injunction must fail regardless of its showing on the other factors.”  See PCC Airfoils, LLC v. 
Daugherty, No. 25-3794, 2026 WL 1396626, at *2 (6th Cir. May 19, 2026) (quoting Higuchi Int’l 
Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 103 F.4th 400, 409 (6th Cir. 2024)).  Likewise, a court must reject a 
plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction if it fails to show any risk of irreparable injury.  See 
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id. (citing Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Mich. Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100, 105 (6th Cir. 1982)).3  The 
Supreme Court reconfirmed the elements and the requirement that the movant “must make a clear 
showing” as to the rubric’s components.  See Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 144 S. Ct. 1570, 1576 
(2024).  Here, Triple R has not shown a clear entitlement to the extraordinary relief sought.  Winter, 
129 S. Ct. at 376.   
III. Analysis  
a. Likelihood of Success on the Merits  
 To establish a strong likelihood of success on the merits, “[i]t is ordinarily sufficient if the 
plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful as 
to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for m ore deliberative investigation.”  Stryker 
Emp. Co., LLC v. Abbas, 60 F.4th 372, 385 (6th Cir. 2023).  Reaching that bar “requires a showing 
greater than the one necessary to create a genuine issue of fact, but less than the one necessary to 
show a preponderance.”  Clark v. A&L Homecare and Training Ctr., 68 F.4th 1003, 1011 (6th Cir. 
2023).  In doing so, the plaintiff need not “establish his right to an injunction wholly without 
doubt,” nor “prove his case in full.”  Parents Defending Educ. v. Olentangy Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ., 684 F. Supp. 3d 684, 693 (S.D. Ohio 2023) (citing Certified Restoration, 511 F.3d at 542).  
And although no single factor controls, “a finding that there is simply no likelihood of success on 
the merits is normally fatal.”  Stryker, 60 F.4th at 385.   
 
3 The rules of evidence do not fully apply in the injunction context.  Given the preliminary and summary 
nature of the inquiry, a court may consider hearsay and other proof not formally admissible.  See J.P. 
Morgan Sec. LLC v. Logsdon, No. 3:22- CV-14-BJB, 2022 WL 179606, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 18, 2022) 
(noting that “a long line of authority in this Circuit” supports “trial judges . . . resting temporary injunctive 
relief on evidence that would not be admissible at trial” and collecting cases); see also In re DeLorean 
Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1230 n.4 (6th Cir. 1985).  Here, the Court has considered the testimony at the 
hearing as well as the proof submitted by the parties in the briefing.  The questions here are largely legal 
ones.   
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 Against this backdrop, the sole merits issue triggering the “likelihood of success” factor is 
whether DOL’s administrative proceedings infringe upon Triple R ’s alleged entitlement to an 
Article III forum and (relatedly, in context) a jury trial.  See DE 8-1 at 18-27.  Article III provides 
that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”  U.S. CONST. Art. III.  
Congress may not validly confer the federal government ’s “judicial Power” on entities outside 
Article III.  See Stern v. Marshall , 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011).  The Court must define what 
“success” means in this context.  Whether a defendant is entitled to an Article III jury trial involves 
a twofold inquiry: (1) whether the action implicates Article III and , secondarily, the Seventh 
Amendment (requiring an assessment of  the cause of action and, more importantly, the remedy 
sought); and, if so, (2) whether the public rights doctrine  applies to reframe or supersede the 
analysis.  SEC v. Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. 2117, 2127 (2024).  
 As to Article III, the Constitution reserves to the judiciary “any matter which, from its 
nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law.”  See id. at 2134 (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. 
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 284 (1856)).  A court normally queries whether 
a suit concerns “ the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at 
Westminster in 1789.”  See id . at 2132 (quoting Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609).  If so, the matter 
presumptively is within Article III.   
 The Seventh Amendment, invoking related analysis, provides that, “[i]n Suits at common 
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VII.  To determine whether an action implicates the Seventh 
Amendment, courts must first compare the action at issue to “18th-century actions brought in the 
courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity.”   Tull v. United States, 107 
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S. Ct. 1831, 1835 (1987) (citing Pernell v. Southall Realty , 94 S. Ct. 1723, 1731 (1974); Dairy 
Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 82 S. Ct. 894, 899 (1962)).  Next, courts must then identify  whether the 
remedy sought is legal or equitable.  Id. at 1835-36 (citing Curtis v. Loether, 94 S. Ct. 1005, 1007 
(1974); Ross v. Bernhard, 90 S. Ct. 733, 740  (1970)).  Where the claims involved are “legal in 
nature” and seek remedies traditionally provided by courts of law rather than courts of equity, the 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial attaches.  See Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. at 2120.  If the action 
satisfies this threshold inquiry—thus appearing to fall within Article III and potentially the Seventh 
Amendment—the Court proceeds to consider whether the “public rights” doctrine nevertheless 
excepts the matter from the ambit of Article III.  See id.  at 2127.  Jarkesy acknowledged and 
detailed “the distinctive areas involving governmental prerogatives ” resolvable “outside of an 
Article III court.”  See id.   
 Triple R argues that the enforcement proceedings at issue implicate Article III and the 
Seventh Amendment, under the framework articulated in SEC  v. Jarkesy.  Specifically, Triple R 
contends that the Secretary’s action to enforce the job order is, by its terms and nature, an action 
for breach of an employment contract, a recognized cause of action at common law .  Further, the 
monetary penalties sought by DOL are punitive in nature because they are “designed to punish or 
deter” wrongdoing and therefore constitute the type of relief traditionally awards by courts of law.  
See DE 8-1 at 26 (quoting Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. at 2129).  Triple R further maintains that the back  
pay remedy sought by DOL serves to “impose liability in the nature of a damages award.”  See id.  
According to Triple R, the back pay award sought here is therefore properly characterized as legal 
relief akin to compensatory damages rather than equitable restitution.  See id . at 26- 27 ( citing 
Waldrop v. S. Co. Servs., Inc., 24 F.3d 152, 158- 59 (11th Cir. 1994)).  On these bases, Triple R 
posits that DOL ’s enforcement proceedings involve claims from common law and remedies 
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traditionally recognized as legal in nature, thereby triggering the requirements of Article III and 
the protection of the Seventh Amendment.  See id. at 27.   
 In Jarkesy, the Supreme Court considered whether the SEC ’s use of administrative 
proceedings to assess civil monetary penalties for alleged securities fraud violated the respondents’ 
right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.  144 S. Ct. at 2127.  The Supreme Court applied 
the two-part test from Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 2796 (1989) and found 
that “[t]he SEC’s antifraud provisions replicate common law fraud, and it is well established that 
common law claims must be heard by a jury.”  Id.  The Court noted that the SEC’s fraud provisions 
“target the same basic conduct as common law fraud, employ the same terms of art, and operate 
pursuant to similar legal principles,” and thus, these actions involve a matter of private right that 
Congress could not withdraw “‘from judicial cognizance.’”  Id. at 2136 (citations omitted) (quoting 
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609).  As to the second prong, the Court explained that the SEC sought civil 
penalties, which constituted a “prototypical common law remedy.”  Id. at 2129.  Thus, the Court 
concluded that the  claims were essentially akin to “common law fraud” claims, importing 
“common law soil” with them, and thereby implicating, perforce, the Seventh Amendment.  Id. at 
2137.      
 The Government trains its argument not on the nature of enforcement or remedy but instead 
on the “public rights” exception to that analysis, as recognized by Jarkesy.  The Supreme Court 
cited, as an exception to the preceding rubric, the “distinctive areas involving governmental 
prerogatives” removed from the Article III and Seventh Amendment spheres.  Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. 
at 2120.  The Court here agrees that the enforcement action in this case implicates Congress’s 
plenary power to regulate permission and conditions for alien entry into the United Stat es.  As 
such, adjudication of this public right may properly fall to a non-Article III, non-jury process. 
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 The “class of cases ” concerning “public rights” are matters that “historically could have 
been determined exclusively by [the executive and legislative ] branches.”  Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. at 
2132 (quoting Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2610) .  The Supreme Court’s examples include  recovery of 
collected government revenue, tariff imposition, relations with Indian tribes, administration of 
public lands, and the granting of public benefits to veterans, pensioners, and respecting patents.  
See id. at 2133-34.  Critical to this case, the Supreme Court also referenced  Congress’s “plenary 
power over immigration,” citing the power to “prohibit immigration by certain classes of persons 
and enforce those prohibitions with administrative penalties assessed without a jury.”  Id.  at 2132-
33. 
That area of authority resolves this case.  Indeed, history demonstrates that Congress has  
consistently treated the opportunity for an alien to enter or remain in the country as a privilege 
subject to executive control rather than a private right requiring adjudication by Article III courts.  
In 1798, Congress enacted the Alien Friends Act and the Alien Enemies Act.  The Alien Friends 
Act, which remained in force until 1800, authorized the President to order from the United States 
any alien he deemed “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States[.]”  Act of June 25, 
1798, ch. 58., 1 Stat. 570.  Likewise, the Alien Enemies Act, which remains in effect today, at least 
in part, empowers the President, under specific circumstances, to “apprehen[d], restrai[n], secur[e], 
and remov[e]” citizens of hostile foreign nations.  Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577; see 50 
U.S.C. § 21.  These founding- era statutes reflect the ubiquitous understanding that enforcement 
actions concerning the admission, exclusion, and continued presence of noncitizens, including 
foreign workers, fit squarely within that class of cases concerning “public rights” that “historically 
could have been determined exclusively by [the executive and legislative] branches.”  See Jarkesy, 
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144 S. Ct. at 2120; see also Crowell v. Benson, 52 S. Ct. 285, 292 (1932) (listing immigration as 
an issue concerning public rights). 
 Triple R resists designation of the present action as one concerning “public rights .”  
Instead, Triple R claims that DOL’s allegations—which involve purported violations of  minimum 
job order requirements —seek to enforce an employer ’s contractual obligation to its employees  
through the imposition of civil penalties and back pay, thus implicating Triple R’s private rights 
and Article III adjudication .4  See DE 8-1 at 20-22.  This  contention focuses on the means of 
enforcement while overlooking the source and nature of the underlying matter being regulated.   
 
4 Triple R relied centrally on Sun Valley Orchards, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 148 F.4th 121 (3rd Cir. 2025) 
in its main brief, but stressed it less at the hearing.  That likely is owing to the prompt certiorari grant issued 
by the Supreme Court.  See U.S. Dep’t of Lab. v. Sun Valley Orchards, LLC, No. 25-966, 2026 WL 1127242 
(U.S. Apr. 27, 2026) .  This Court carefully reviewed  Sun Valley in light of the twinned arguments and 
public rights discussion.   Sun Valley cabined the immigration public right to “admission and exclusion of 
aliens” and found the H-2A labor certification process to be distinct from that area.   148 F.4th at 130-31.  
Instead, in Sun Valley’s view, the compensation and certification rules under enforcement address issues of 
employment law, not immigration.   See id. at 131.  To this Court, Sun Valley  improperly split the H-2A 
program into pieces and then viewed those pieces in isolation.  It is true that a required wage or 
compensation rate could be viewed, without context, as merely an employment or contractual 
concern.  However, that relationship (between impor ting employer and alien worker) can arise, in this 
milieu, only because Congress has implemented an integrated scheme leveraging its immigration authority 
to a) address a demonstrated domestic agricultural need but b) do so under controls that prevent other harm 
from the temporary presence of alien workers.  The certification and pay/condition requirements don’t 
simply benefit the admitted workers.  Rather, they assure that the group Congress chose to admit 
temporarily is entering to meet an actual need and that, in doing so, that group will not inflict labor harm 
by being present and working in or subject to sub-market conditions.  This surely is Congress regulating 
whether, why, and for what duration, and under what circumstances a worker may enter, all things that, in 
this Court’s view, implicate the plenary power of Congress to regulate the admission of aliens and the 
conditions and obligations related to same.   With all due respect to Sun Valley, its analysis throttles an 
authority the Supreme Court has otherwise called “absolute,” “plenary,” and as embracing “every 
conceivable aspect of” the “right to bring aliens into the United States,” including “particular restrictions 
on the coming in of al iens.”  Indeed, the extent of Sun Valley’s departure from settled Supreme Court 
precedent is further illustrated by the numerous district courts outside the Third Circuit that have declined 
to adopt its reasoning.  See Butler Amusements, Inc. v. U. S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 24-1042, 2025 WL 2457687 
(D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2025), appeal dismissed, (D.C. Cir. Mar. 12, 2026);  see also C.S. Lawn & Landscape, 
Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 23-cv-1533, 2026 WL 820976 (D. D. C. Mar. 25., 2026), appeal filed , No. 
26-5114 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 10, 2026) ; Del Valle Fresh, Inc. v. DOL, No. 25- cv-03721-BHH, 20 26 WL 
1001726 (D. S. C. Mar. 11, 2026); Frank’s Nursery, LLC v. Walsh, No. CV H-21-3485, 2022 WL 2757373 
(S.D. Tex. July 14, 2022).  Sun Valley does not bind, nor persuade, this Court.  
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 Congress has long authorized executive officials to impose monetary penalties on persons 
that violate the conditions or regulations governing the admission of noncitizens into the United 
States, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld those proceedings.  In  Oceanic Steam 
Navigation Company v. Stranahan, the Supreme Court upheld a statute authorizing the Secretary 
of Commerce and Labor to assess monetary penalties against carriers that  transported aliens 
afflicted with certain medical conditions into the United States.  29 S. Ct. 671, 672-73 (1909).  
Fines resulted when the carrier failed in its statutory obligation to identify prohibited passengers 
through a pre-passage competent medical examination, thus carrying to the United States persons 
not physically qualified to enter.  Rejecting the argument that the assessment of such penalties 
required the exercise of judicial power, the Court emphasized Congress’s “absolute power . . . over 
the right to bring aliens into the United States.”  Id.  at 677.  Such power —here extending to 
regulation of a third party charged with screening the alien before passage to America —
encompassed, in the words of Oceanic Steam , the greatest of possible reach: “But over no 
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete .[]”  Id. at 676.  Indeed: 
“As the authority of Congress over the right to bring aliens into the United States embraces every 
conceivable aspect of that subject ,” then its decision to vest regulatory power administratively  
squares with the Constitution, such authority being the “sole measure by which its validity is to be 
determined by the courts.”  See id.   
 The Supreme Court later reinforced its holding two decades later in Lloyd Sabaudo Societa 
Anonima Per Azioni v. Elting, 53 S. Ct. 167 (1932).  The case again involved fines against carriers 
that had failed to effect competent pre-passage alien medical screening, and the entry prohibitions 
missed included contagious diseases and conditions that would negatively impact an alien’s ability 
to work.  See id. at 169.   There, the Court noted that under the Constitution, “control of the 
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admission of aliens is committed exclusively to Congress, and, in the exercise of that control, it 
may lawfully impose appropriate obligations, sanction their enforcement by reasonable money 
penalties, and invest in administrative officials the power to impose and enforce them.”  Lloyd 
Sabaudo, 53 S. Ct. at 170.  As it had in Oceanic Steam , the Lloyd Sabaudo Court called the 
administrative enforcement scheme “incident to the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to 
control the admission of aliens[.]”  See id. at 170.  The Court summarized:   
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States, control of the admission of 
aliens is committed exclusively to Congress, and, in the exercise of that control, it 
may lawfully impose appropriate obligations, sanction their enforcement by 
reasonable mo ney penalties, and invest in administrative officials the power to 
impose and enforce them.  
 
Lloyd Sabaudo, 53 S. Ct. at 170.   
 Triple R argues that t he principle  set forth in Oceanic Steam, and affirmed in Lloyd 
Sabaudo, has “nothing in common with fines imposed based on working conditions at a farm.”  
See DE 8-1 at 24.  This is reductive and misses the true mark.  The statute upheld in Oceanic Steam 
regulated the conduct of carriers  responsible for ensuring that entering aliens satis fied the 
conditions that Congress had attached to entry.  See Oceanic Steam, 29 S. Ct.  at 674, 677.  There, 
the Supreme Court explicitly endorsed the executive branch ’s authority to impose monetary 
liability on carriers that failed to screen competently, thus missing prohibitions on entry.    See id. 
at 676.   
The H-2A program operates with similar dynamics.  Congress has conditioned the privilege 
of importing foreign workers on compliance with specified labor and employment requirements , 
premised on demonstrated conditions, all designed to meet a verified domestic agricultural need 
without injuring the domestic labor market.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1188(g) (2); see also 29 C.F.R. § 501.1.  
No one suggests Congress is required to or that any person has a right to import a non- immigrant 
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alien to do temporary agricultural work.  Instead, Congress set up a system to extend the privilege 
of temporary worker importation, but only when the need actually exists and when the remedy 
(i.e., operation under the required working and other conditions) will not harm domestic workers.  
The penalties at issue therefore do not attach foundationally to an employer ’s contractual 
obligation to its employees.  Instead, they attach to the conduct of employers that have sought the 
required certification and have bound themselves to adhere to the responsibilities of program 
participation.
5  Simply put, this is part of Congress’s “exercise of that control” over the admission 
of aliens.   
Oceanic Steam and Lloyd Sabaudo target means of assuring the physical condition of aliens 
entering the country, protecting the United States from persons carrying certain diseases or, later, 
having an inability to work.  The H -2A program targets the means of assuring the condition of 
aliens while temporarily meeting an agricultural need within the United States, granting the 
employer the privilege but protecting the United States from the risk of workers that would, by 
presence and circumstance, undercut and harm the domestic labor market.  The harms addressed 
are not identical, but given Congress’s “plenary,” nay “absolute” power over alien admission, then 
 
5 It is interesting to the Court that Triple R, in reply, refers to Wong Wing v. United States , 163 U.S. 228 
(1896) as authority that “cuts the legs out from under the government’s theory in this case.”  The idea, one 
infers, is that Wong Wing drew a line between alien exclusion and criminal prosecution and punishment of 
an alien (or perhaps others).  From this, Triple R derives that Wong Wing would bar a Congressional scheme 
that administratively imposes fines for the violation of an immigration -related duty.  Triple R says Wong 
Wing would bar, e.g., a fine likened to confiscating property.  DE 23, at 21.  The problem is that Oceanic 
Steam directly addressed and rejected Wong Wing’s impact on the fine scheme there at issue:  
The contention that because the exaction which the statute authorizes the Secretary of 
Commerce and Labor to impose is a penalty, therefore its enforcement is necessarily 
governed by the rules controlling in the prosecution of criminal offenses, is clearly without 
merit, and is not open to discussion. 
Oceanic Steam, 214 U.S. at 337–38  (rejecting Wong Wing as impactful to scheme) .  The Court does not 
view Wong Wing as foreclosing a civil penalty in this case. 
 
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surely rules designed to assure the justification for entry and to guard against the calculated harm 
of temporary presence fall within  Congress’s power, as an immigration incident,  to “impose 
appropriate obligations, sanction their enforcement by reasonable monetary penalties, and invest 
in administrative officials the power to impose and enforce them.”  Lloyd Sabaudo, 53 S. Ct. at 
170.  Rules designed to assure that Congress’s expectations about and protections regarding alien 
entry are met—whether as a matter of domestic health or domestic economic risk —fall within the 
same capacious power long recognized as typifying the public right of regulating immigration.  
The “public rights” conclusion eliminates Triple R’s chances of success in this case.   
 A final note.  During the evidentiary hearing, Triple R cited as supportive authority on 
injunction procedure the Sixth Circuit’ s recent unpublished decision in KALSHI EX LLC v. 
Matthew T. Schuler, et al., No. 26-3196, 2026 WL 1295806, at *7 (6th Cir. Apr. 24, 2026).  First, 
Triple R did not make this argument, which hinges on In re Delorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223 
(6th Cir. 1985), in its main brief.  Second, in KALSHIEX, the Court, unpublished, stated its 
misgivings about the In re DeLorean  “weaker showing” both in light of Winter’s requirement of 
demonstrable likely success and in the context of  a challenge to a duly -enacted statute.  See 
KALSHIEX, No. 26-3196, 2026 WL 1295806, at *6-7.   Simply put, given Jarkesy’s “public rights” 
recognition and the clarity of the Supreme Court’s essentially unqualified views on immigration 
power, the Court sees no basis for treating Jarkesy as signaling a success likelihood.  Indeed, the 
Sixth Circuit recently called immigration “just such an example of a matter concerning public 
rights” and rejected any impact from Jarkesy on that analysis—“ Jarkesy clearly does not implicate 
immigration adjudication.”  Elgebaly v Garland, 109 F.4th 426, 437-38 (6th Cir. 2024).  Even the 
diluted approach of In re Delorean would not help Triple R in this scenario, and the Court eschews 
the invitation to employ it against a duly-enacted federal statute.      
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b. Irreparable Harm  
 Preliminary injunctions in constitutional cases often turn on the likelihood of success on 
the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.  Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2012).  
But this general rule does not do away with the “indispensable” prerequisite of showing a 
likelihood of immediate and irreparable harm.  D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Schs., 942 F.3d 324, 326–27 
(6th Cir. 2019).  If a plaintiff is not facing imminent and irreparable injury, then there is no need 
for a court to grant relief at t he start of a lawsuit, as opposed to at the end of the lawsuit.  See id. 
at 27.  A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show that irreparable injury is not merely 
“possible” but that it is “likely,” absent an injunction.  See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 375-76.  The Sixth 
Circuit has held that a party ’s injury is “irreparable” when its losses are “unrecoverable,” 
Commonwealth v. Biden, 57 F.4th 545, 556 (6th Cir. 2023); the injury is “not fully compensable 
by money damages,” Overstreet , 305 F.3d at  578; and when the nature of the loss would make 
damages “difficult to calculate,” such as “ competitive losses and losses of customer goodwill,” 
Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 973 F.2d 507, 511 (6th Cir. 1992). 
 Triple R a rgues that it will suffer irreparable harm because DOL ’s enforcement 
proceedings violate its right to adjudication in an Article III court and Seventh Amendment right 
to a trial by jury.  See DE 8-1 at 27-28.  Further, as to tangible harm, Triple R notes that it “does 
not have unlimited resources to defend itself against DOL ’s allegations, and every day that it 
spends defending itself in DOL’s unconstitutional agency courts dissipates its resources.”  See id. 
at 28-29.   
 It is true that “if it is found that a constitutional right is being threatened or impaired, a 
finding of irreparable injury is mandated.”  ACLU of Kentucky v. McCreary Cnty., 354 F.3d 438, 
445 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 2689 (1976)), aff’d sub nom. McCreary 
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Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).  By that same token,  “[T]he first factor of the four -
factor preliminary injunction inquiry—whether the plaintiff shows a substantial likelihood of 
succeeding on the merits —should be addressed first insofar as a successful showing on the first 
factor mandates a successful showing on the second factor —whether the plaintiff will suffer 
irreparable harm.”  See id .  The Court has already found that Triple R failed to demonstrate a 
likelihood of success on the merits.  Accordingly, Triple R cannot rely on an alleged constitutional 
violation to establish irreparable harm, nor can it manufacture such harm through the costs 
allegedly attendant to that violation.
6  See, e.g., Overstreet , 305 F.3d at 578 (denying plaintiff ’s 
argument that he is entitled to presumption of irreparable harm absent showing of likelihood of 
success on the merits).  Both arguments depend upon a likely constitutional violation, which Triple 
R has failed to establish.   
 Although the preliminary injunction inquiry requires the Court to balance multiple factors, 
“a finding that there is no likelihood of irreparable harm . . . or no likelihood of success on the 
merits . . . is usually fatal.”  Ecolab, Inc. v. Shanklin, No. 3:23-CV-215-CHB, 2023 WL 4360286, 
at *4 (W.D. Ky. June 20, 2023) (quoting CLT Logistics v. River W. Brands, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 
1064 (E.D. Mich. 2011)).  Here, Triple R has failed to clear both hurdles and the Court need not 
address the remaining injunction factors.  A proper consideration of these primary factors alone 
requires denial of the requested injunctive relief. 
 
 
6 The Court notes two additional observations in response to Triple R’s allegations regarding litigation costs 
and liability exposure.  First, “[m]ere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not 
constitute irreparable injury.”  F.T.C. v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 101 S. Ct. 488, 495 (1980) 
(quoting Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 94 S. Ct. 1028, 1040 (1974)).  Second, any 
injury Triple R suffers by participating in the ALJ proceedings , as to adjudication result, is not beyond 
redress; the appellate process provides an adequate mechanism to remedy any merits error that may occur.  
See 29 C.F.R. § 501.42; 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also Sussex, 825 F.2d at 1087. 
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IV. Conclusion  
 At bottom, Triple R ’s central arguments isolate single feature s of the broader  H-2A 
regulatory scheme while disregarding the framework as a whole.  Whatever resemblance the 
remedies may bear to traditional legal relief, the proceedings themselves arise from Congress ’s 
exercise and implementation  of its immigration authority, an area in which Congress has no rival..  
Triple R’s injunction showing suffers critical lacunae at the first two Rule 65 factors.  Given 
the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff h as not clearly shown a likelihood of success (and thus has 
not shown a likely constitutional injury), the Court sees no need to vet the remainder of the test.  
The Court rejects the Rule 65 showing and DENIES DE 8. 
This the 13th day of June, 2026. 
  
 
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