govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_23-cv-23203-0

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
1 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
VALARIE VEGA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,  
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 23-23203 
 
OPINION 
 
 
 
ARLEO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
THIS MATTER comes before the Court by way of  Plaintiff Valerie Vega’s (“Plaintiff”) 
request for review of Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Ricardy Damille’s decision regarding 
Plaintiff’s application for Supplemental Security Income Benefits (“SSI”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1383(c)(3), 423, and 405(g).  See  ECF No. 1.  For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, the 
Commissioner of Social Security’s (the “Commissioner”) decision is AFFIRMED. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 405(g).  The Commissioner’s application of the law is subject to plenary review.  See Markle v. 
Barnhart, 324 F.3d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 2003).  The Commissioner’s factual findings, however, are 
binding upon this Court if they are supported by “ substantial evidence ” in the administrative 
record.  See Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).  Substantial evidence is defined as 
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 
U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).  Stated differently, substantial evidence consists of “more than a mere 
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scintilla of evidence but may be less than a preponderance.”  McCrea v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 370 
F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004).  It is a deferential standard of review that prohibits the Court from 
“weigh[ing] the evidence or substitut[ing] its conclusions for those of the fact -finder.”  Williams 
v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Stockett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 216 F. 
Supp. 3d 440, 453 (D.N.J. 2016) (explaining that the court “must uphold” factual findings based 
on substantial evidence, “even if the court would have decided the inquiry differently” in the first 
instance (quotation marks omitted)).   
In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s 
decision, the Court must consider:  “(1) the objective medical facts; (2) the diagnoses of expert 
opinions of treating and examining physicians on subsidiary questions of fa ct; (3) subjective 
evidence of pain testified to by the Plaintiff and corroborated by family and neighbors; and (4) the 
Plaintiff’s educational background, work history, and present age.”  Holley v. Colvin, 975 F. Supp. 
2d 467, 475 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d  590 F. App’x 167 (3d Cir. 2014).  The ALJ’s analysis of the 
evidentiary record is sufficient so long as it “permit[s] [for] meaningful review.”  Jones v. Barnhart, 
364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004).  Accordingly, the ALJ does not need to have discussed  “every 
tidbit of evidence included in the record,”  Hur v. Barnhart, 94 F. App’x 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004), 
but he must have “consider[ed] all pertinent medical and non -medical evidence and ‘explain[ed] 
[any] conciliations and rejections ’” of that evidence,   Stockett , 216 F. Supp. 3d at  454 (citing 
Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 2000)).   
B. The Five-Step Disability Test 
The Social Security Act (“the Act”) defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 
which can be expected to result in death or has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous 
period of not less than 12 months.”  42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1).  To determine whether a claimant is 
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disabled under the Act, the Commissioner applies a five-step test.  See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.  The 
claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four.  See Bowen v. Yuckert , 482 U.S. 
137, 146 n.5 (1987).  The burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five.  See id. 
At step one, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is engaged in 
“substantial gainful activity.”  20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b).  Substantial 
gainful activity involves significant mental or physical activities that are “usually done for pay or 
profit, whether or not a profit is realized.”  20 C.F.R. § 416.972.  If the claimant is engaged in such 
activity, they are not “disabled” under the Act and the benefits are denied.  Bowen , 482 U.S. at 
140.  If the claimant is not engaged in such activity, the Commissioner must proceed to step two 
and determine whether the claimed impairment—or combination of impairments —is “severe.”  20 
C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii).  A “severe” impairment is one that “significantly limits [the claimant’s] 
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”  20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).  The claimant’s 
severe impairment must also last or be expected to last “for a continuous period of at least 12 
months.”  20 C.F.R. § 404.1505.  If the claimant does not have a medically determinable severe 
impairment, the benefits are denied.  See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141. 
At the third step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant’s condition is 
equivalent to a medical impairment enumerated in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1  
(“Appendix 1”).  See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d).  If the condition 
meets or equals one of the listed impairments, “the claimant is conclusively presumed to be 
disabled.”  Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141.  If not, the Commissioner proceeds to step four.  See id.  The 
Commissioner must first assess the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”) based on 
the relevant medical and other evidence included in the record.  See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945.  Once 
the claimant’s RFC is ascertained, the Commissioner then must determine whether the claimant 
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can still perform their past relevant work.  See C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e).  
If the claimant can perform their past relevant work, the claim for benefits must be denied.  See 20 
C.F.R. § 416.960(b)(3).  If not, the analysis continues to the fifth step.  
At the fifth step, the Commissioner considers whether “work exists in significant numbers 
in the national economy that [the claimant] can do, given [the claimant’s] residual functional 
capacity and vocational factors.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c)(2); see also  id. § 416.920(a)(4)(v).  The 
Commissioner may seek the assistance of a vocational expert at this step.  Plummer v. Apfel, 186 
F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted).   
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Overview 
Plaintiff filed for SSI on September 9, 2019.  See  ECF No. 5, Administrative Transcript 
(“Tr.”) at 223–28.  The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration.  See id. at 83–
87, 93–95. Plaintiff subsequently requested a hearing before an ALJ, which occurred on July 15, 
2022.  See id. at 35–59, 96–97.  Plaintiff and an impartial vocational expert testified.  See  id. at 
35–39.  Plaintiff was represented by counsel at th e hearing.  See id. at 37.  On October 21, 2022, 
the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application for benefits at the fifth step of the disability evaluation.  See 
id. at 19–29.  On October 20, 2023, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s appeal.  See id. at 1–6.  
Plaintiff then initiated the instant action.  See ECF No. 1.   
B. Plaintiff’s Medical History 
Plaintiff was born on November 2, 1979.  See Tr. at 40.  Plaintiff alleges that the onset date 
of her disability was February 1, 2019.  See id. at 60 –61.  Plaintiff completed a high school 
education and has prior work experience as a registration clerk and a room service clerk.  See id. 
at 41, 53. 
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1. Plaintiff’s Mental Impairments: Major Depressive Disorder , 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and PTSD. 
Plaintiff engaged Trinitas Regional Medical Center (“Trinitas”) for outpatient treatment of 
protracted mental health conditions  in February 2019.  See  id. at 373– 74.  Plaintiff reported 
fluctuations in mood, restlessness, nervousness in groups, and lack of concentration due to 
excessive stress.  See  id. at 380.  Notwithstanding her anxious mood and constricted affect, 
Plaintiff exhibited normal speech, good eye contact, a cooperative attitude, relevant and logical 
thought processes, and true emotional insight during her mental status examination.  See id. at 
376–77.  Accordingly, Plaintiff was diagnosed with major depressive disorder and generalized 
anxiety disorder by Advanced Practice Nurse Patrick Oledimmah (“APN Oledimmah”).  See id. 
at 380.  To mitigate Plaintiff’s symptoms, APN Oledimmah prescribed Prozac and referred 
Plaintiff for individual therapy.  See id. at 381, 405, 415–17, 591–92.  Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff 
was prescribed Vistaril to address sleep and anxiety related issues. See  id. at 384.  Plaintiff 
responded well to the medication, reporting improvement in her symptoms, mood, and affect over 
the following months.  See id. at 389–98, 429–30.  
On April 15, 2019, Plaintiff sought concurrent outpatient treatment from True Care Mental 
Health (“True Care”).  See id. at 414.  After approximately nine months, on January 25, 2020, 
Plaintiff was discharged.  See id. at 416.  On this date, Licensed Clinical Social Worker Elaina 
Bruno (“LCSW Bruno”) performed a final mental status exam  on Plaintiff.  See id. at 416–17.  
Plaintiff exhibited speech that was normal in rate and volume; her articulation was coherent and 
spontaneous; and her mood presented as normal with no signs of depression.  See id.  Her reasoning 
and thought processes appeared appropriate.  See id.  She exhibited no signs of hyperactive or 
attentional difficulties.  See id.  Plaintiff’s short- and long-term memory were also “intact.”  Id.  
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LCSW Bruno noted that at the time of Plaintiff’s discharge, she was diagnosed with unspecified 
post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and moderate major depressive disorder.  See id.  
As of February 3, 2020, Plaintiff was sleeping well, her medication was working well, and 
her mood was stable. See id. at 450–51.  At this appointment, Dr. Oledimmah “strongly 
emphasized” the need for Plaintiff to adhere to her medication regiment.  Id.  at 450.  However, 
following the onset of the COVID -19 pandemic, Plaintiff stopped taking her medications daily 
and began to suffer an increase in panic attacks, racing thoughts, stress, and anxiety.  See id. at 
453–56.  Plaintiff’s bout of symptoms subsided by June 2020, when she reported taking her 
medications “as prescribed.”  Id. at 457.  At this point, she characterized her depression and anxiety 
as “mild.”  Id. at 457–58.  
In response to her wave of increased symptoms, in April 2020, Plaintiff also resumed 
therapy with LCSW Bruno.  See id. at 586.  She continued therapy treatment sessions through July 
13, 2022.  See id. at 583–92.  During this time, Plaintiff made progress toward achieving her long-
term goal of developing healthy cognitive patterns to ameliorate symptoms of anxiety and 
depression.  See id. at 583–84, 592.  On July 15, 2022, LCSW Bruno completed a mental 
assessment of Plaintiff’s ability to perform work relate d activities.  See  id. at 594–96.  LCSW 
Bruno characterized Plaintiff’s ability to follow rules, use judgment, function independently, carry 
out complex job instructions, behave in an emotionally stable manner, and demonstrate reliability, 
as “good” (satisfactory).  See id.  Plaintiff’s ability to relate to and interact with co-workers, deal 
with the public, deal with work stress, and maintain attention/concentration was deemed “fair” 
(seriously limited but not precluded).  See id. 
2. Plaintiff’s Physical Impairments: Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus and Obesity. 
Preceding the period relevant to Plaintiff’s claim —beginning with the alleged onset of 
Plaintiff’s disability on February 1, 2019—Plaintiff’s  primary care physician, Sukhjender Goraya, 
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M.D. (“Dr. Goraya”), treated Plaintiff for Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus.  See id. at 506, 512, 517, 521, 
532–533, 538, 543, 548, 553, 559, 565, 573.  Dr. Goraya described Plaintiff’s Diabetes Mellitus 
as “without complications.”  Id.   Dr. Goraya regularly prescribed Plaintiff with Metformin 
(500mg) beginning January 24, 2017.  See, e.g., id. at 508, 515, 560, 574. 
On November 18, 2019, Dr. Goraya recorded Plaintiff’s weight as 207 pounds–equating to 
a body mass index (“BMI”) of 40.4.  See id. at 548.  Plaintiff’s medical records indicated no 
cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, respiratory, or endocrine issues attributable to her weight.  See  
id. at 510, 513, 519, 523–24, 526, 528–29, 541–42, 549, 556–57, 563, 567.  On June 17, 2020, 
Plaintiff underwent bariatric surgery for weight loss.  See id. at 453, 455, 457.  As of April 1, 2022, 
Plaintiff weighed 134 pounds.  See id. at 578. 
3. Expert Opinions on Plaintiff’s Conditions. 
On November 21, 2019, Thomas Clark, Ph.D. (“Dr. Clark”), reviewed Plaintiff’s medical 
records and opined as to how her mental impairments could affect workplace performance.  See  
id. at 65 –69.  Despite diagnoses of depression, anxiety, and PTSD , Dr. Clark determined that 
Plaintiff could carry out complex instructions; work with others to complete routine tasks; persist 
at tasks within skill levels for an eight- hour day; and adapt to the mental demands of unfamiliar 
assignments.  See id. at 68.  On February 12, 2020, Dr. Joseph Wieliczko, Psy.D. (“Dr. 
Wieliczko”), evaluated Plaintiff’s medical records and affirmed Dr. Clark’s determinations.   See 
id. at 76–81.  
Separately, on November 20, 2019, Lloyd Marks, M.D. (“Dr. Marks”), reviewed Plaintiff’s 
medical records and determined that her Diabetes Mellitus was medically controlled and “[n]ot 
severe.”  Id. at 65.  On February 11, 2020, Elois Phillips, M.D. (“Dr. Phillips”), evaluated 
Plaintiff’s medical records and affirmed Dr. Marks’ determination.  See id. at 76.  Neither expert 
made note of Plaintiff’s weight or BMI.  See id. at 63–65, 73–76.  
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C. The ALJ’s Decision 
On October 21, 2022, the ALJ issued his decision.  See id. at 19–29.  He concluded that 
Plaintiff was not “disabled” at step five of the sequential evaluation process.  See id. at 29.   
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 
since September 9, 2019—the date upon which Plaintiff  filed for SSI.  See id. at 21.  
At steps two and three, the ALJ found Plaintiff suffered from the following severe 
impairments:  (1) depressive disorder; (2) anxiety disorder; (3) and PTSD.  See id. at 21–22.  The 
ALJ further concluded that Plaintiff suffered from the following non- severe impairments: 
(1) obesity; and (2) diabetes.  See id. at 22.  After considering the impairments separately and in 
combination, the ALJ determined that they did not medically equal the severity of one of the listed 
impairments in Appendix 1.  See id. at 22–24.  
With respect to Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the capacity to 
“perform a full range of work at all exertional levels” with specific non-exertional limitations.  Id. 
at 24.  The ALJ determined that Plaintiff:  (1) “is able to understand, remember, and carry out 
simple instructions;” (2) “is restricted to work involving few workplace changes and occasional 
decision-making;” and (3) “can have occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the 
public.”  Id.  
At steps four and five, the ALJ found that although Plaintiff could not perform past relevant 
work, the testimony of a vocational expert indicated that Plaintiff could perform other work in the 
national economy as a hand packager, store laborer, or  package sorter.  See id. at 27 –28, 54.  
Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled and could not qualify for SSI .  
See id. at 28–29.  
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III. ANALYSIS 
In challenging the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff raises four main arguments:  (1) the ALJ’s 
findings at step two were not based on substantial evidence; (2) the ALJ’s findings at step three 
were not based on substantial evidence; (3) the ALJ failed to provide an adequate explanation for 
Plaintiff’s RFC; and (4) the ALJ failed to consider relevant vocational testimony and Plaintiff’s 
moderate limitations at step five.  As explained below, the Court disagrees with each of these 
assertions. 
A. Findings at Step Two 
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ’s determination at step two was erroneous, stating that 
the ALJ “eliminate[d] [Plaintiff’s diagnosis of diabetes and obesity] without providing any reason 
for the proposition other than an empty, foundationless assertion that they do not limit work related 
activities.”  ECF No. 6 (“Pl.’s Br.”) at 10.  The Court disagrees. 
Diagnoses alone do not provide a basis for determining the severity of an individual’s 
conditions.  See Salles v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 229 F. App’x 140, 145 (3d Cir. 2007).  Instead, a 
claimant must also provide evidence that an impairment “ significantly limit[s] [the claimant’s] 
ability to do basic work activities or impair[s] [the claimant’s] capacity to cope with the mental 
demands of working.”  Id. at 145 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1521(a)) (emphasis in 
original).  Regarding obesity, “[n]o specific weight or BMI establishes obesity as a ‘severe’ or ‘not 
severe’ impairment.”  Evaluating Cases Involving Obesity, 84 Fed. Reg. 22924, 22925 (May 20, 
2019) [“SSR 19-2p”].  The ALJ must “consider all evidence from all sources” in making his  
determination.  Id.   
Here, the ALJ indicated that he considered medical records provided by Dr. Goraya and 
concluded that Plaintiff’s obesity and diabetes caused no more “than [a] minimal limitation in the 
claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities for [the] 12 consecutive months relevant to th[e] 
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decision.”  Tr. at 22.  Substantial evidence exists to support that conclusion.  With respect to 
diabetes, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s medical records characterize her condition as “without 
complications.”  Id. at 22; see also, e.g. , id. at 506, 517, 532, 543, 559, 573.  Those records also 
indicate Plaintiff has been prescribed a daily dose of 500mg of Metformin since January 24, 2017, 
suggesting that her diabetes-related symptoms are mitigated with medication.  See id. at 508, 515, 
574.  This assumption is affirmed by testimony  at the July 15, 2022 hearing, where Plaintiff’s 
counsel emphasized that the only impairments causing Plaintiff to experience symptoms restricting 
her ability to work are her depression and anxiety.  See id. at 39–40; see also id. at 35–59 (no 
mention of symptoms arising from Plaintiff’s diabetes interfering with her ability to work). 
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s reliance on her BMI of 40+ as evidence of a severe impairment is 
unavailing.  See Pl.’s Br. at 10.  While a BMI in excess of 40 could impact a claimant’s ability to 
work, the ALJ must consider the actual limitations caused by a claimant’s symptoms —such as 
pain or fatigue.  See Evaluating Cases Involving Obesity, 84 Fed. Reg. at 22925.  Here, Plaintiff’s 
medical records describe pain resulting from obesity prior to her bariatric surgery (which occurred 
on June 17, 2020).  See Tr. at 418.  However, f ollowing the surgery, Plaintiff’s weight dropped 
from 207 to 134 pounds.  See id. at 549, 578.  This significant weight loss ostensibly alleviated 
Plaintiff’s pain, as neither she nor her counsel mentioned work prohibitive symptoms stemming 
from her weight during the hearing.  See id. at 35–59.   
In short, the ALJ’s decision at step two is consistent with the objective medical evidence 
and testimony in the record and is based on “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence.  McCrea, 
370 F.3d at 360.  It is therefore owed deference from this Court.  
B. Findings at Step Three 
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ’s determination at step three was erroneous because he 
proffered a “one-sided, cherry picked set of irrelevancies ” to justify his conclusion that Plaintiff 
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did not satisfy the requisite paragraph B criteria, and provided nothing more than a conclusory 
statement to justify his conclusion that the Plaintiff did not meet the paragraph C criteria.  Pl.’s Br. 
at 25.  In doing so, Plaintiff presses that the ALJ also ignored evidence in the record that satisfies 
the paragraph B requirements.  See id. at 16–17, 21.  The Court again disagrees. 
At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s severe mental impairments—depressive 
disorder, anxiety disorder, and PTSD—most closely aligned with Listing s 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15, 
respectively.  See Tr. at 22.  To be considered medically equivalent to one of these  listings, the 
Plaintiff’s impairments therefore must satisfy the requirements of paragraphs A and B of each 
listing, or paragraphs A and C of each listing, as specified under Appendix 1.  See  20 C.F.R. §§ 
416.920(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(d).   
The paragraph B criteria represent four main areas of mental functioning, focusing on one’s 
ability to :  (1) understand, remember, or apply information (“Criterion B1”); (2) interact with 
others (“Criterion B2”); (3) concentrate, persist, or maintain pace (“Criterion B3”); and (4) adapt 
or manage oneself (“Criterion B4”).  See id. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Part A 12.00(A)(2)(b), 
12.00(E)(1)–(4).  Paragraph B is satisfied if the ALJ determines that a  claimant’s impairments 
result in an “extreme” limitation in one of these Criterion or a “marked” limitation in two of these 
Criteria.  Id.  § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Part A, 12.00(A)(2)(b).  A limitation is “extreme” 
when it restricts a claimant from “function[ing] independently, appropriately, effectively, and on 
a sustained basis.”  Id. at § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Part A , 12.00(F)(2)(e).  A limitation is 
“marked” when a claimant’s ability to “function independently, appropriately, and effectively on 
a sustained basis is seriously limited.”  Id. at § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Part A 12.00(F)(2)(d).  
The paragraph C criteria evaluate whether a mental impairment is “serious and persistent.”  
See id. at § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Part A, 12.00(A)(2)(c).  They require a claimant to show: 
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(1) she suffers from a serious and persistent mental disorder (i.e., a disorder occurring over a period 
of at least two years) that requires ongoing mental treatment to “diminish the symptoms and signs 
of [the claimant’s] mental disorder”; and (2) that “despite [the claimant’s] diminished symptoms 
and signs, [the claimant has] achieved only [a] marginal adjustment” in their condition.  Id. at § 
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Part A 12.00(G)(2)(a)–(c).   
Here, the ALJ’s decision ostensibly acknowledged that Plaintiff satisfied the paragraph A 
criteria and only focused on assessing whether she satisfied the paragraph B or paragraph C 
criteria.  See Tr. at 22–23.  Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s consideration of three of the Paragraph 
B criteria: Criterion B2, B3, and B4.  See Pl.’s Br. at 14–23.  She also contests his analysis of the 
Paragraph C criteria as boilerplate and conclusory.  See id. at 24–25.  The Court assesses each 
argument in turn.   
1. Plaintiff’s Ability to Interact with Others (Criterion B2). 
The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s recognized impairments had only moderate limitations on 
her ability to interact with others, citing Plaintiff’s January 25, 2020 mental status exam for 
support.  See Tr. at 23.  This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.  During that January 
2020 examination, LCSW Bruno noted that Plaintiff’s speech was “normal in rate, volume, and 
articulation and [was] coherent and spontaneous.”  Id.  at 416.  Plaintiff’s affect was appropriate 
and consistent with her mood.  See id.  And her behavior was described as “cooperative” and 
lacking “gross [] abnormalities.”  Id. at 417.   
Plaintiff argues that this conclusion is based on “cherry-picked evidence.”  Pl.’s Br. at 18–
20.  But it is in fact consistent with other medical evaluations contained in the administrative 
record.  For example, Dr. Clark’s evaluation found that Plaintiff could cooperate on routine tasks, 
accept directions and feedback, and relate with others despite her anxious avoidance.  See id. at 
68.  Dr. Wieliczko similarly determined that Plaintiff was able to “cooperate in carrying out routine 
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or structured tasks and transactions” during his reconsideration of Dr. Clark’s evaluation.  Id. at 
77.  This is sufficient to satisfy the substantial evidence threshold warranting this Court’s 
deference.     
2. Plaintiff’s Ability to Concentrate, Persist, or Maintain Pace (Criterion 
B3). 
Although Plaintiff’s mental impairments caused some limitations in concentration, the ALJ 
concluded that she  did not experience “serious difficulty concentrating during medical 
examinations.”  Tr. at 23.  This conclusion, too, is supported by substantial evidence.  The ALJ 
again cited to Plaintiff’s January 2020 mental status exam, during which Plaintiff exhibit ed “no 
signs of hyperactive or attentional difficulties.”  Id.  at 416–17.  Although not explicitly cited, 
Plaintiff’s medical records reinforce the conclusion that she can maintain sustained focus and does 
not suffer from “attentional difficulties .”  See e.g. , id. at 255, 393, 397, 429, 457, 512.  And the 
assessments of Dr. Clark and Dr. Wieliczko provide further support for this determination.  See 
id. at 66, 68, 77–79.      
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly focused on factors irrelevant to her recognized 
impairments.  See Pl.’s Br. at 15–16.  She correctly points out that the ALJ’s Criterion B3 analysis 
appears to have conflated symptoms associated with Listing 12.03 (schizophrenia spectrum and 
other psychotic disorders) and  symptoms associated with Listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15 ( i.e., 
Plaintiff’s impairments).  But this the Court’s “primary concern has always been the ability to 
conduct meaningful judicial review.”  Albury v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 116 F. App’x 328, 330 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  Here, the Court concludes that any error made in analyzing the Criterion B3 factors 
was harmless because the ALJ’s conclusion on this C riterion “is still supported by substantial 
evidence” in the administrative record, “and the ALJ’s decision is explained in sufficient detail to 
allow [for] meaningful review” by this Court.  Id. 
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3. Plaintiff’s Ability to Adapt and Manage Herself (Criterion B4). 
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could adequately manage herself because “medical 
evidence of record shows [Plaintiff] did not usually have serious problems with adaptation and 
managing herself.”  Tr. at 23.  The record, again, contains evidence supporting that determination.  
The ALJ again principally cited to Plaintiff’s January 2020 mental status exam to support this 
proposition.  See id.   And this finding is, like the ALJ’s other determinations, consistent with other 
medical evidence in the record.  For example, Dr. Clark found that Plaintiff could “adapt to most 
changes and task demands on a sustained basis,” and that her “[a]daptive skills are adequate and 
independent within physical tolerances.”  Id. at 68.  Dr. Wieliczko  reached a similar conclusion.  
See id. at 79.      
Plaintiff responds by arguing that her history of mental impairments limits her ability to 
adapt to the demands of a job, a view she claims is supported by her inability to earn more than 
$20,000 in any year between 2000 and 2019.  See  Pl.’s Br. at 20–21 (citing Tr. at 236).  But she 
never provides evidence to tie her low earnings over this period of time to her inability to adapt to 
work demands—she just states a causal relationship exists between the two ipse dixit.  That is not 
a sufficient basis to reve rse an ALJ determination that is otherwise supported by substantial 
medical evidence in the record.     
4. Paragraph C Criteria 
Finally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medical records do not show “serious and persistent” 
symptoms based on her impairments because “medical treatment diminishes the signs of 
[Plaintiff’s] mental disorders” and provides more than a “ marginal adjustment” in her abi lity to 
adapt to changes in her environment .  Tr. at 23–24.  That determination , too, is supported by 
substantial evidence.  See, e.g., id. at 384, 389–98, 429–30, 414–17, 453–58, 583–92, 594–96.    
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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s determination relied on “conclusory statements without any 
attempt to offer a meaningful discussion” of the paragraph C criteria.  Pl.’s Br. at 25.  Although 
the ALJ did not provide a robust analysis of his paragraph C deter mination at s tep three of his 
disability analysis, he expounded upon the ways in which medical treatment helped Plaintiff 
regulate her symptoms when assessing Plaintiff’s RFC at step four.  See Tr. at 25–26.  This aligns 
with Third Circuit precedent which allows an ALJ to present substantive findings elsewhere in his 
or her decision, so long as the record is sufficiently developed to allow for meaningful review.  See 
Jones, 364 F.3d at 505 (explaining that an ALJ does not need to “use particular language or adhere 
to a particular format in conducting his analysis”).   
Here, the ALJ’s analysis satisfied this bar.  At step four , he detailed  how Plaintiff’s 
medication regiment resulted in positive symptom response and was generally “working well.”  Id. 
at 25, 418–20, 450.  Additionally, he noted that Plaintiff can “cook, clean, [] drive, and go[] grocery 
shopping when she needs to.”  Id.  at 25.  This exemplifies Plaintiff’s ability to adjust to variable 
demands in her daily routine with the assistance of her medication.  He also noted how Plaintiff 
experienced an onset of more severe symptoms when she deviated from her treatment regiment, 
but returned to a more stable situation when she began again taking her medicine “as prescribed” 
and resumed therapy sessions.  See id. at 25–26; see also id. at 450, 453–57, 583–92.  This is 
sufficient evidence an d analysis to conclude Plaintiff’s impairments are manageable and not 
persistently debilitating when treated.  And it is further bolstered by other medical evidence in the 
record, such as LCSW Bruno’s opinion that Plaintiff’s ability to act reliably, function 
independently, and use judgment outside of the domestic sphere were all “good.”  Id. at 594–95.   
* * * 
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In sum, the Court finds that the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s 
determination that Plaintiff was unable to satisfy either the paragraph B or paragraph C criteria 
associated with her specific impairments.   His conclusion that Plaintiff does not have an 
impairment that medically equals the severity of an Appendix 1 listed impairment was warranted.      
C. RFC Determination 
Plaintiff further avers that the ALJ “announce[d] an RFC without a rationale or a functional 
analysis.”  Pl.’s Br. at 6; see also id. at 26–33.  Once again, the Court disagrees.   
The RFC assessment reflects the most a claimant can still do despite his or her limitations 
and is based on all relevant evidence in the claimant’s case record.  See 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1545(a)(1)–(3).  Here, the ALJ sufficiently accounted for Plaintiff’s mental impairments and 
determined that, based on the record, she could perform simple tasks with few workplace changes, 
occasional decision -making, and occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the 
public.  See id.  The ALJ explained that his RFC analysis was influenced by Plaintiff’s “symptom 
response [to] medication and unremarkable mental exams.”  Id. at 25.  As previously noted, that 
positive symptomatic response has ample support in the record.  See supra at 14–15.  Indeed, APN 
Oledimmah’s treatment notes  further confirm this conclusion, as they repeatedly indicate that 
Plaintiff’s medication has mitigated symptoms related to her mental impairments.  See, e.g., id. at 
393, 397, 418–20, 429, 457.  And Plaintiff’s symptom management manifested positive results in 
her mental status examinations.  For example, the ALJ pointed to Dr. Goraya’s mental status 
examination of Plaintiff from April 1, 2022, where Plaintiff “denied any psychological issues,” 
and her “mood and affect were normal; speech was fluent; and she was well groomed.”  Id. at 26, 
578.   
Leaving no stone unturned, the ALJ also considered the potential impact of Plaintiff’s non-
severe physical impairments (diabetes and obesity) on her ability to perform work functions.  See 
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id. at 26.  As previously emphasized, a diagnosis alone will not support a finding that a claimant’s 
ability to perform work functions is impaired; there must be objective medical evidence showing 
the condition significantly hampers  the Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activities .  See  
Salles, 229 F. App’x at 145; see also Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1991).   
Here, Plaintiff offers no medical evidence to establish that her diagnosed obesity or 
diabetes impairs her ability to perform basic work activities.  Plaintiff merely refers to her body 
mass index of more than 40 to support the position that her weight could potentially impact work-
related activities.  See Pl.’s Br. at 40.  But this too is ipse dixit .  And Plaintiff’s medical records 
actually paint a contrary picture .  With respect to her weight, Plaintiff’s medical records 
consistently describe normal performance during physical examinations.  See e.g., Tr. at 510, 513, 
519, 523–26, 541–42, 557, 563–64, 567.  With respect to diabetes, the medical records also  
repeatedly classify Plaintiff’s condition as “without complications,” see e.g., id. at 506–07, 512, 
515, 517–18, 521–22, 532–34, 538–39, 543–44, 548, 551, 553, 559–60, 565, 571, 573,  and as 
medically controlled with medication and not severe, see id. at 65, 76.  
The ALJ’s RFC analysis is also consistent with the opinions of Dr. Clark, Dr. Wieliczko, 
and LCSW Bruno.  Dr. Clark concluded that Plaintiff had “no limitations in understanding, 
remembering or applying information; moderate limitations in interacting with others; mild 
limitations in concentration, persistence or maintaining pace; [and] mild limitations in adapting or 
managing oneself.”  Id. at 26, 65–69.  Dr. Wieliczko affirmed these findings upon reconsideration.  
See id. at 26, 76–81.  More specifically, Dr. Wieliczko found that Plaintiff could carry out complex 
instructions, perform tasks on a sustained basis, adapt to mental demands of most new tasks, and 
cooperate effectively with others.  See id. at 79.  Similarly, LCSW Bruno found that Plaintiff 
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maintained “good and fair ability in all areas except for poor/no ability in relating predictably in 
social situations.”  Id. at 26–27, 594–96.  
In short, the ALJ used pertinent medical evidence and testimony in formulating Plaintiff’s 
RFC, and his determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
D. Findings at Step Five 
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider relevant vocational testimony and 
Plaintiff’s moderate limitations at step five.  See Pl.’s Br. at 34–38.  The Court finds otherwise.     
After ascertaining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must determine whether “work exists in 
significant numbers in the national economy that [the claimant] can do, given [the claimant’s] 
residual functional capacity and vocational factors.”  20 CFR 416.960(c)(2).  The examination 
typically consists of “one or more hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ to [a] vocational 
expert.”  Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984).  The ALJ must use their findings 
at steps two and three of the evaluation to inform their determination of Plaintiff’s ability to engage 
in work at step five.  See Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2019).  The ALJ’s 
findings at steps two and three, however, need “not necessarily translate to the language used at 
steps four and five.”  Id.  Stated differently, the ALJ has latitude to use a “wide range of limitation 
language” in their analysis of a claimant’s ability to work , “so long as the chosen limitation 
language is explained.”  Id.  
At the July 15, 2022 hearing, a vocational expert testified that Plaintiff could perform 
unskilled work at light and medium exertional levels.  See  id. at 28, 54.  The vocational expert 
further testified that eight absences per year, any unscheduled fifteen-minute break, or a production 
level below ninety percent would preclude Plaintiff from employment.  See id. at 54–55.  Plaintiff 
runs with this testimony and claims that her panic attacks and outpatient treatment schedule would 
require her to be absent f rom work more than eight times per year.  See Pl.’s Br. at 35–36.  The 
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ALJ, however, cited to mental status examinations that indicated Plaintiff could “persist at tasks 
within physical tolerance and skill levels for an eight-hour day.”  Tr. at 79.  And Plaintiff provides 
no evidence to support the position that she must sche dule treatment or therapy sessions during 
work hours that would require her to be absent from work more than eight times each year. 
The ALJ also properly accounted for Plaintiff’s moderate limitations in the RFC 
evaluation.  In Hess, the Third Circuit affirmed an ALJ’s determination that a claimant could 
perform a job with a “simple tasks” limitation in place, even though the claimant faced “moderate 
limitations” in concentration, persistence, or pace.  See 931 F.3d at 209–210.  It explained that this 
conclusion was permissible because the ALJ offer ed a “valid explanation” for why a “simple 
tasks” limitation is appropriate in light of the claimant’s moderate limitations in concentration, 
persistence, or pace.  Id. at 210–11.     
Here, the ALJ  explained that the moderate limitations Plaintiff experiences in 
concentration, persistence, and pace would not impact her ability to perform jobs involving 
“simple instructions,” “few workplace changes,” and “occasional interaction with supervisors, 
coworkers, and the public.”  Tr. at 24.  He justified this conclusion —and his reference to these 
specific “simple tasks”— with a “valid explanation” based heavily on Plaintiff’s medical records, 
which establish that Plaintiff has the ability to communicate, think logically, and enjoy abated 
symptoms and an improved mood with medication and treatment.  See id. at 25–26, 393, 397, 416–
17, 429, 457.  The ALJ also cited the medical opinions proffered by Dr. Wieliczko, Dr. Clark, and 
LCSW Bruno, which, in totality, establish that Plaintiff can persist, maintain pace, and follow basic 
instructions, but can struggle specifically with social interactions.  See id.  at 26–27, 66, 76, 594–
95.  Simply put, his “simple task[]” limitations are tailored to the medical evidence in the record.  
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In turn, his step five conclusion is justifiable, even in light of his conclusion that Plaintiff 
experiences moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the determination of the Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED. 
 
Date: 04.07.2026 s/ Madeline Cox Arleo 
MADELINE COX ARLEO 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
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