govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_26-cv-01827-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
 
SANDRA ACOSTA DE MATA, 
 
Petitioner, 
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 
1:26-cv-1827-AT 
 
 
v. 
 
KRISTEN SULLIVAN, Director, 
Atlanta ICE Field Office; 
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, 
Department of Homeland Security; 
TODD LYONS, Acting Director, 
Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement; TODD BLANCHE, 
Acting Attorney General, 
 
Respondents. 
ORDER 
This case comes before the Court on Petitioner Sand ra A costa de Mata’s 
Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Comp laint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief  (“ habeas petition” ) (Doc. 1) and Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order [Doc. 2]. In the habeas petition, Petitioner asserts that she faces 
imminent detention by U.S. Immigration and C ustoms Enforcement ( “ICE”) 
authorities. (Doc. 1 ¶ 1). Petitioner alleges she has been present in the United States 
since 2003, when she entered lawfully and was inspected and admitted as a B -2 
visitor at Atlanta, Georgia. (Id. ¶ 30). In 2013, she was charged with and convicted 
of identity fraud and forgery, but those convictions were later reopened and 
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vacated. (Id.). Petitioner states she then pled guilty to the misdemeanor offense of 
possession of a false identification document under O.C.G.A. § 16 -9-4(b)(1). (Id.). 
Petitioner was subsequently ordered removed in 2013 by  an immigration judge, 
and that final removal order remains in place. ( Id. ¶¶ 2, 30). However, Petitioner 
has been subject to an Order of Supervision (“OSUP”) since that time, authorizing 
her release from detention and allowing her to legally reside and work in the 
United States while under ICE supervision. 
While under the Order of Supervision , Petitioner applied for a U visa 
because she was the victim of a violent crime, and law enforcement signed a 
certification that she was helpful to their investigation. ( Id. ¶¶ 2, 30). On August 
11, 2023, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ( “USCIS”) granted Petitioner 
deferred action on the basis of its finding that her U visa application was bona fide.1 
(See Doc. 1-1). USCIS also granted Petitioner employment authorization and stated 
that Petitioner’s “employment authorization document and grant of deferred 
action are valid for a period of four years.” (Id. at 1).  
In addition to hav ing been granted deferred action by USCIS, Petitioner  is 
awaiting a decision on an I-130 petition (i.e., a green card application) filed on her 
behalf by her 21-year old son, who is a U.S. citizen. (Doc. 1 ¶ 30, 31). If Petitioner 
obtains U visa status, she may seek to adjust  her statu s after four year s to 
 
1 Petitioner has not been granted U- 1 nonimmigrant status because the cap for U visas 
had been reached for the fiscal year at the time she was granted deferred action in 2023 . 
(Doc. 1 -1 at 1). Petitioner reports that there is a years-long wait and a queue o f o ver 
200,000 U visa applications awaiting decision because there is a statutory cap on U visas 
of only 10,000 per year. (Doc. 1 at 2 n.1). 
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permanent resident status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(14), § 1101(a)(15)(U),  
§ 1184(p)(6), and § 1255(m). In the alternative, if Petitioner is a ble to reopen her 
removal proceedings, she would be eligible as the parent of a child over 21 years 
old to adjust her status to permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) since she 
also made a lawful entry. (Id. ¶ 31). Considering the length of time she has been in 
the country, her ties to the country through her 21-year-old U.S. citizen son who is 
willing to sponsor her,2 and her bona fide deferred action letter, Petitioner argues 
she should be treated as a lower priority for deportation under Respondents ’ own 
regulations. (Id. ¶ 32).  
Petitioner alleges she has been compliant with the conditions of her release  
under the Order of Supervision for the past 13 years, routinely attending check-in 
meetings with ICE . (Id. ¶¶ 7, 56). At her last meeting with ICE authorities in 
January 2026, Petitioner contends that ICE held her for four hours, and they began 
the process of arresting her and taking her into custody. (Id. ¶ 4). After her attorney 
called and intervened, ICE authorities decided that Petitioner would be rele ased, 
but “they said she would see the supervisor at her next check -in, and they would 
handle her case at that time. ” (Id.). Petitioner thus anticipates that it is “ highly 
likely that she will be arrested” at her next ICE check-in on April 8, 2026. (Id. ¶ 5). 
Based on these allegations, Petitioner brings claims under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative P rocedure Act (“APA”), and 
 
2 Petitioner also has a 28-year-old non-citizen son who is a recipient of Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”).  
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the Accardi Doctrine. (Id. ¶¶ 52-77, 80-82). Petitioner also brings an ultra vires 
habeas claim on the basis that Respondents would be acting beyond their statutory 
powers if they detain her and revoke her Order of Supervision without first finding 
her to be a flight risk or a danger to the community. (Id. ¶¶ 78-79). Petitioner seeks 
habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, declaratory and injunctive  relief3, attorneys’ 
fees and costs, and a waiver of security (or setting of a nominal security) under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 65(c). (Id. at 30-31). 
In the immediate short term, Petitioner  separately moves the Court for an 
emergency temporary restraining order directing Respondents not to transfer her 
or her case outside the jurisdiction of th e Northern District of Georgia pending 
resolution of this action. [Doc. 2]. Petitioner explains that she has an appointment 
with ICE on April 8, 2026, at which time she is likely to be arrested. [Id.]; (see also 
Doc. 1 ¶¶ 4 -5). Thus, Petitioner also asks that the Court issue an order to show 
cause as to why a preliminary injunction should not issue and require Respondents 
to file a written response within three days. (Id. at 30); [Doc. 2]. 
Respondents in this case have not yet received service of the habeas petition 
or the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.  The Court may issue a temporary 
 
3 Specifically, Petitioner asks the Court to (1) declare that Respondents cannot revoke her 
Order of Supervision without following proper procedures under the governing statutory 
and regulatory framework; (2) declare that Petitioner cannot be arrested by ICE because 
she has deferred action status as the victim of a crime and has done nothing to violate that 
status; (3) declare that Respondents’ actions and Petitioner’s imminent detention violate 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the APA, and the Accardi Doctrine; and 
(4) enjoin Respondents from detaining Petitioner in the future absent changed 
circumstances such as new criminal conduct. 
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restraining order4 without notice to the adverse party only if (1) specific facts in an 
affidavit or verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, 
loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in 
opposition; and (2) the movant ’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to 
give notice and the reasons why it should not be required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).  
Additionally, to meet her burden  of showing she is entitled to a temporary 
restraining order (“TRO”), Petitioner must demonstrate (1) a substantial likelihood 
of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief  is 
not granted; ( 3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would 
inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that granting the relief would not be adverse to 
the public interest. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo , 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 
(11th Cir. 2005). 
 
4 At this stage, the Court finds it has jurisdiction over these proceedings. As a general rule, 
“[a] district court may entertain a habeas corpus petition only if a petitioner is ‘in custody 
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Whitfield v. U.S. 
Sec’y of State, 853 F. App’x 327, 329 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§  2241(c)(3), 
2254(a)). Petitioner is not curren tly in ICE custody. However,  “the ‘in custody’ 
requirement should be construed ‘very liberally.’” Clements v. Florida , 59 F.4th 1204, 
1213 (11th Cir. 2023). This is because the “custody requirement of the habeas corpus 
statute is designed to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy for severe restraints 
on individual liberty.” Hensley v. Mun. Ct., San Jose Milpitas Jud. Dist. , 411 U.S. 345, 
351– 2 (1973) (holding petitioner released on recognizance is “in custody” for purposes of 
habeas petition because “[h]is incarceration [was] not [merely] a speculative possibility” 
and the government “retain[ed] the determination and the power to seize him”). The 
Eleventh Circuit has specifically held that “non -citizens released on supervision while 
awaiting a final decision in their immigration proceedings are deemed to be ‘in custody’ 
for purposes of habeas corpus.” Clements , 59 F.4th at 1214 (citing United States ex rel. 
Marcello v. Dist. Dir. of INS, New Orleans, 634 F.2d 964, 971 & n.11 (5th Cir. 1981)). And 
in any event, even if the Court ultimately finds that it lacks jurisdiction after briefing and 
oral argument, the Court “always has jurisdiction to determine its own ju risdiction.” 
Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 218-19 (2021) (quotation omitted).  
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After considering the habeas petition and the attached documentation in 
support, the Court finds that at this early stage in the case, Petitioner has satisfied 
the four pre requisites for a TRO. Further, Petitioner has es tablished that 
immediate and irreparable injury will result to Petitioner before Respondents can 
be heard in opposition to the petition, and she has given reasons why notice should 
not be required here given the short time before her next appointment with ICE on 
April 8.  
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Petitioner’ s Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order [Doc. 2] is GRANTED as follows: 
(1) Petitioner shall cause service of the habeas petition (Doc. 1) , the 
Motion for TRO [Doc. 2], and this Order to be made on Respondents 
as soon as practicable and shall immediately file proof of such service, 
or waiver of service, on the case docket. 
(2) Respondents are ORDERED to show cause why the habeas petition 
(Doc. 1) should not be granted and why a preliminary injunc tion 
should not issue . Respondents must respond to the habeas petition  
within three days after service is perfected or waived.  
(3) Petitioner shall file any reply in support of her habeas petition no later 
than two days after the filing of any response briefs. 
(4) Respondents are RESTRAINED from detaining Petitioner until the 
pending habeas petition bef ore this Court can be heard and deci ded 
on the merits. As part of this restraint, Respondents may not impose 
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further conditions of release on Petitioner ot her than the conditions 
already required by the existing Order of Supervision. 
(5) Respondents are further RESTRAINED from removing Petitioner 
from the Northern District of Georgia until further order from this 
Court. 
(6) The Court shall hold a hearing on the merits of the habeas petition 
and r equest for permanent injunctive relief on April 15, 2026  at 
2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 230 8. Counsel for the parties may contac t 
the Courtroom Deputy Clerk at Keri_Gardner@gand.uscourts.g ov if 
that hearing time and date are not feasible.  
 
IT IS SO ORDERED this 6
th day of April, 2026. 
 
____________________________ 
     Honorable Amy Totenberg   
          United States District Judge  
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