govinfo:USCOURTS-kywd-3_26-cv-00067-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
LOUISVILLE DIVISION 
 
YUNIOR SOSA ORDONEZ,  
 
 Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, ICE 
Enforcement and Removal Operations, 
Louisville, Kentucky Field Office, U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
Department of Homeland Security, in his 
official capacity (and any successor in 
office), et al., 
 
Respondents. 
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Civil Action No. 3:26-CV-067-CHB 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
ORDER 
 
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 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Yunior Sosa Ordonez’s Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus, [R. 1], and Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Immediate 
Release from Custody, [R. 3]. Therein, Mr. Ordonez (hereinafter, “Petitioner”) alleges that 
Respondents—which include the unnamed Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal 
Operations at the Louisville Field Office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (hereinafter, 
“ICE”); Department of Homeland Security (hereinafter, “DHS”) Secretary Kristi Noem; DHS; 
Pamela Bondi, United States Attorney General; the Director of ICE, and the Warden of Oldham 
County Detention Center—have detained him in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause and constitutional principles of comity and federalism. [R. 1, pp. 10, 12, 13–14, 15; R. 3, 
p. 3]. The Court issued an Order to Show Cause, [R. 4], setting an evidentiary hearing date and 
establishing a briefing schedule for the parties. Thereafter, the parties submitted a Joint Motion, 
[R. 8], to forego the evidentiary hearing, which the Court granted. [R. 9]. Both parties also 
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submitted further briefs, with Respondents filing a Response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, 
[R. 5], and Petitioner filing a reply, [R. 7].1 The matter is therefore ripe for review. For the 
following reasons, the court will deny Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, [R. 1], and 
Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Immediate Release from Custody, 
[R. 3]. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Petitioner Yunior Sosa Ordonez is a native and citizen of Cuba who entered the United 
States on October 19, 2021, and has resided in Louisville, Kentucky since then. [R. 1, p. 6; R. 12-
1, p. 1; R. 5-3, p. 4]. When Petitioner first entered the United States, he encountered a Border 
Patrol Agent who determined that Petitioner had unlawfully entered the United States. [R. 5-3, 
p. 2]. He was then arrested but, after being served with a Notice to Appear pursuant to the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), was ultimately released on his own recognizance 
pending further removal proceedings. [R. 12-1; R. 5-3, pp. 2, 4]. Since then, Petitioner has 
submitted multiple pending applications for lawful status, including applications for asylum, for a 
U-Nonimmigrant visa, and for a Green Card under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. [R. 1, p. 13].  
On June 9, 2025, Petitioner was cited for “no/expired plates and failure of non-owner 
operator to maintain required insurance.” [R. 5-3, p. 4]. Petitioner pled guilty to the latter charge 
on July 9, 2025, and was ordered to pay a fine. Id. Then, on October 10, 2025, Petitioner was 
arrested after he failed to appear in court regarding the violation. Id.; [R. 1, pp. 8, 13]. Petitioner 
was taken into ICE custody later that day and has been confined since then, including at Oldham 
County Detention Center where he is currently confined. [R. 1, p. 8].  
 
1 Petitioner also filed a Motion to Expedite Decision on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, [R. 13], in which he 
urged the Court to “issue a ruling as soon as possible.” Id. at 3. 
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Notably, before his detention and confinement, Petitioner worked as a Lyft driver in 
Jefferson County, Kentucky. Id. at 7. During that employment, Petitioner was the victim of an 
armed carjacking in which a passenger produced a handgun, forced Petitioner to stop and exit his 
vehicle, and fired the gun at Petitioner before fleeing in Petitioner’s vehicle. Id. The perpetrator 
has since been apprehended and charged with various felonies related to the incident, and the case 
is pending before the Jefferson County Circuit Court. Id. Based on Petitioner’s cooperation in that 
investigation and status as a victim of a violent offense, Petitioner has a pending application for a 
U-Nonimmigrant visa, for which the authorized official at the Louisville Metro Police Department 
completed a Form I-918, Supplement B, on Petitioner’s behalf. [R. 1, p. 13; R. 1-4, pp. 2–13]. That 
form confirms that Petitioner is a victim of a serious violent felony who has been cooperating with 
investigators and is likely to remain helpful in the investigation and prosecution of the crime, 
among other things. [R.1-4, pp. 4–8].  
After Petitioner was detained, his counsel sought his parole or release based on his status 
as the victim and sole witness to this crime, the public-safety interest in the state prosecution of 
the offender, and Petitioner’s lack of criminal history besides minor traffic infractions. [R. 1, p. 9; 
R. 1-2]. Counsel emailed ICE’s Chicago Outreach email address, Chicago.Outreach@ice.dhs.gov, 
and ICE agent Jason Johnson responded, declined to release Petitioner on parole, and directed 
Petitioner’s counsel to seek relief before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). [R. 1, p. 6; R. 1-3, p. 3].2   
Meanwhile, Petitioner’s counsel also filed a motion for bond before an IJ. [R. 1-3, p. 3]. 
On January 14, 2026, Petitioner received a bond redetermination hearing3 before IJ Kelly Johnson, 
 
2 It is not clear precisely who Jason Johnson is or what position he holds with ICE. See generally [R. 1-3]. Regardless, 
nowhere do Mr. Johnson’s communications suggest that he purported to communicate ICE’s official policies or speak 
on behalf of ICE as an agency, rather than simply in response to the inquiry made by Petitioner’s counsel. See id.  
 
3 The hearing before the IJ is a redetermination hearing because the initial custody and bond determination is made by 
a DHS official, typically the district director. See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1) (“After an initial custody determination by 
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who denied Petitioner’s request for release on bond under 8 C.F.R. § 1236. [R. 5-2, p. 1]. The IJ 
based his ruling on two grounds, alternatively finding (1) he lacked authority to grant bond under 
Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (2025), and (2) even if he did have authority to grant 
Petitioner’s bond, Petitioner was a danger to the community and a flight risk. Id. Petitioner’s merits 
hearing before IJ Johnson, in which his removal will be discussed, is scheduled for April 7, 2026. 
After IJ Johnson denied Petitioner’s request for bond, Petitioner filed the instant Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, [R. 1], and Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Immediate Release from Custody, [R. 3], on January 29, 2026. In his Petition and Motion, 
Petitioner argues he is being wrongfully detained at Oldham County Detention Center and is 
entitled to immediate release from custody based on numerous grounds. See [R. 1; R. 3]. First, 
Petitioner contends his continued detention violates the Fifth Amendment because it does not serve 
a legitimate purpose, contending that he is not a danger to the community or a flight risk as well 
as pointing to the need for his testimony in state criminal proceedings and the “prolonged” nature 
of his detention. [R. 1, pp. 10, 13–14]. Relatedly, Petitioner claims ICE’s refusal to grant parole 
was “arbitrary, capricious, and unconstitutional.” Id. at 14–15. Petitioner further argues his 
detention “interferes with Kentucky’s sovereign authority to enforce its criminal laws.” Id. at 15. 
Lastly, Petitioner asserts his detention “frustrates the statutory purpose of the U-visa program,” 
under which Petitioner currently seeks a visa. Id. at 16. Based on these arguments, Petitioner 
contends he has a strong likelihood to succeed on the merits, his continued detention subjects him 
to irreparable harm, his release would not harm others, and his release would serve the public 
interest, thus entitling him to a temporary restraining order. Id. at 16–17; [R. 3, pp. 3–5]. Petitioner 
seeks his immediate release from ICE custody and an injunction from this Court preventing 
 
the district director, including the setting of a bond, the respondent may, at any time before an order under 8 CFR part 
1240 becomes final, request amelioration of the conditions under which he or she may be released.”). 
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Respondents from removing Petitioner until the completion of the proceedings before the Jefferson 
County Circuit Court. [R. 1, pp. 17–18; R. 3, p. 5].  
Respondents filed a Response at [R. 5] to Petitioner’s Petition and Motion, and Petitioner 
replied at [R. 7]. This matter is therefore ripe for review.  
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a writ of habeas corpus “may be granted by the Supreme Court, 
any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 
28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). Thus, federal courts may “issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners being 
held ‘in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Rice v. White, 660 
F.3d 242, 249 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)). The right to petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus is “‘available to every individual detained within the United States,’” Montiel v. 
Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610, 2026 WL 32076, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2026) (quoting Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)), including “non-citizens in immigration-related matters.” Id. 
(citations omitted).  
The petitioner seeking habeas relief bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that his detention is unlawful. See Freeman v. Pullen, 658 F. Supp. 3d 53, 58 (D. Conn. 
2023) (citations omitted); Lallave v. Martinez, 609 F. Supp. 3d 164, 171 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (citation 
omitted).4  
 
4 Petitioner has also filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Immediate Release from 
Custody with the Court. [R. 3]. In determining whether to grant a temporary restraining order, the Court considers 
“(1) the movant’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant ‘would likely be permanently harmed 
absent the injunction; (3) whether the injunction would cause substantial harm to third parties; and (4) whether the 
injunction would serve the public interest.’” Dinter v. Miremami, 627 F. Supp. 3d 726, 730 (E.D. Ky. 2022) (quoting 
McGirr v. Rehme, 891 F.3d 603, 610 (6th Cir. 2018)). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds Petitioner has no 
likelihood of success on the merits, and his motion therefore fails.   
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Bond Determination: Section 1225 and Section 1226 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, federal courts have jurisdiction to review noncitizens’ claims 
challenging the constitutionality of their detention during the pendency of removal proceedings. 
See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (“Section 1226(e) contains no explicit provision 
barring habeas review, and we think that its clear text does not bar respondent’s constitutional 
challenge to the legislation authorizing his detention without bail.”). Although § 1226(e) provides 
that “[n]o court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section 
regarding the detention or release of any [noncitizen] or the . . . denial of bond or parole,” the 
Supreme Court has recognized that district courts retain jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions 
concerning issues that are collateral or ancillary to removal proceedings. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 
583 U.S. 281, 295 (2018) (“Section 1226(e) does not preclude challenges to the statutory 
framework that permits [an] alien’s detention without bail.” (quotations omitted) (citing Demore, 
538 U.S. at 517)). 
As this Court has previously outlined, Congress has distinguished between two classes of 
aliens, providing a bond hearing for those detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) but imposing 
mandatory detention without bond for those detained under § 1225(b)(2). See Martinez-Elvir v. 
Olson, No. 3:25-CV-589-CHB, 807 F.Supp.3d 725, 735 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 27, 2025) (discussing 
each provision). For the reasons set forth in this decision, the Court finds that Petitioner has 
received the process he is due regardless of the statutory authority for his detention—in other 
words, regardless of whether his detention is pursuant to § 1225 or § 1226. This is because to the 
extent Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226, the parties agree he has already 
received it. See [R. 1, p. 9; R. 5, p. 2; R. 5-2, pp. 1–2].  
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Nevertheless, Petitioner now contends that his detention “no longer serves any legitimate 
civil or regulatory purpose.” [R. 1, p. 13]. But, in support, he argues only that he is not a flight risk 
or a danger to his community, his testimony is needed in state criminal proceedings, and his 
detention is “prolonged or arbitrary.” Id. (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001)). 
Respondents answer that the IJ already established Petitioner is a danger to the community and a 
flight risk, and the Court lacks jurisdiction to review those decisions. The Court agrees.  
Jurisdiction poses a threshold question. See Florida v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774, 777 (2001) 
(“[W]e must first consider whether we have jurisdiction to decide this case.”). And “‘[f]ederal 
courts,’ it bears repeating, ‘are courts of limited jurisdiction.’” In re: 2016 Primary Election, 836 
F.3d 584, 587 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 
377 (1994)). Accordingly, “[w]ithin constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the 
federal courts have jurisdiction to consider.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212 (2007). 
Therefore, as an initial matter, this Court must determine whether it has jurisdiction to consider 
Petitioner’s claims. 
In his Reply, Petitioner agrees that § 1226(e) divests this Court of jurisdiction over 
“discretionary custody determinations in the ordinary course of removal proceedings.” [R. 7, p. 4]. 
Although Petitioner correctly argues that he may challenge pre-removal immigration detention in 
certain circumstances pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Petitioner does not address Respondents’ 
argument that § 1226(e) specifically precludes review where an IJ has already made a bond 
determination pursuant to the INA. See id. at 4–6. Section 1226(e) provides:  
The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of this 
section shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision 
by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention or release of any 
alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole. 
 
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8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). Accordingly, district courts lack jurisdiction to review discretionary bond 
decisions made by an IJ. See Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 401 (2019). This jurisdiction-
stripping only applies, however, “to ‘discretionary’ decisions about the ‘application’ of § 1226 to 
particular cases. It does not block lawsuits over ‘the extent of the Government’s detention authority 
under the “statutory framework” as a whole.’” Nielsen, 586 U.S. at 401 (quoting Jennings v. 
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 295-96 (2018)). This means that where a petitioner challenges a particular 
discretionary “action” taken by an IJ, rather than the statutory framework as a whole, § 1226(e) 
precludes review of that action by federal courts. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 296; Demore, 538 U.S. at 
516–517. This court may therefore only consider Petitioner’s Petition and Motion insofar as it 
challenges the extent of ICE’s detention authority under the framework established by the INA. 
See Nielsen, 586 U.S. at 401.  
Petitioner’s Petition and Motion do not challenge the IJ’s authority to deny bond. [R. 7, 
p. 5 (recognizing that the IJ’s bond decision is “discretionary”)]. Instead, Petitioner argues that the 
dual findings by the IJ—that he lacked jurisdiction to provide bond relief, and alternatively, that 
Petitioner was a danger to the community and a flight risk “[s]hould a reviewing body find that 
the Court has authority to hear [Petitioner’s] bond,” [R. 5-2, p. 1]—create a “jurisdictional void 
where neither the Immigration Courts nor the federal courts may test the legality of confinement.” 
[R. 7, pp. 3, 5]. In other words, Petitioner appears to believe that he did not receive a bond hearing 
at all, and therefore that he has been denied any meaningful review of his detention. See [R. 7, 
pp. 5, (“[T]he government has effectively denied that any forum possesses meaningful authority 
to release [Petitioner].”), 6 (“Under [Respondents’] theory, ICE may detain a noncitizen 
indefinitely while simultaneously disclaiming parole authority, while the Immigration Court 
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disclaims jurisdiction to grant meaningful custody relief, and while the federal courts are said to 
be powerless to intervene.”)].  
Petitioner does not appear to understand that the IJ’s bond determination provided precisely 
the process he is due under the Fifth Amendment. As the Court has already extensively discussed 
elsewhere, see Martinez-Elvir, 807 F.Supp.3d at 735, the INA provides two frameworks for 
detention depending on whether an alien is an “applicant for admission” or an “alien seeking 
admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, or is instead an “alien” covered by the more general provision 
8 U.S.C. § 1226. This distinction between § 1225 and § 1226 corresponds to the IJ’s alternative 
grounds for his decision in Petitioner’s case. Although the IJ did not explain as such, if Petitioner’s 
detention was under § 1225, then the IJ determined Matter of Hurtado applies and forbids him 
from granting bond.5 [R. 5-2, p. 1]; see 29 I&N Dec. 216, 227 (2025) (“[T]he mere issuance of an 
arrest warrant does not endow an Immigration Judge with authority to set bond for an alien who 
falls under Section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).”). But, if Petitioner’s 
detention was under § 1226, the IJ understood that Petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing, and 
thus he appropriately issued findings as to Petitioner’s danger to the community and flight risk. 
[R. 5-2, p. 1].6 Although the IJ could have explained this reasoning more clearly, to summarize, 
the IJ ruled that if Petitioner was detained under § 1225, the IJ lacked jurisdiction to release him, 
and alternatively, if Petitioner was detained under § 1226, he was a flight risk and a danger to the 
community, and therefore release was not warranted. See id. In making this determination, the IJ 
 
5 In any event, Petitioner does not challenge any ruling under § 1225, see generally [R. 1; R. 3; R. 7], and even if he 
did, as the Court has explained, he already received the bond hearing to which he would be entitled under § 1226. 
See supra.  
 
6 Similarly, Petitioner does not argue this Court has jurisdiction to review the IJ’s determination on the merits. See 
generally [R. 1; R. 3; R. 7]. 
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afforded Petitioner all the process he was due under BIA precedent and the text of the INA. See 
[R. 5-2]. 
Petitioner attempts to reframe these well-established issues by characterizing his continued 
detention as “no longer serv[ing] any legitimate civil or regulatory purpose.” [R. 1, p. 13]; see also 
[R. 7, pp. 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12]. But in support, Petitioner argues only that he is neither a danger 
to the community nor a flight risk, that his testimony is needed in state court, and that his detention 
is “prolonged.” See [R. 1, pp. 10, 13; R. 7, p. 3]. The Court has already addressed Petitioner’s first 
argument, see supra, and rejects his second argument below, see infra Section III(C). As for his 
third argument, Petitioner cites Zadvydas v. Davis and Ly v. Hansen in claiming that this Court 
may review lengthy detention periods that lack adequate constitutional justification. See [R. 7, p. 3 
(citing 533 U.S. 678, 690–92 (2001); 351 F.3d 263, 269–72 (6th Cir. 2003))]. These cases are 
inapposite, as they address detention periods of indefinite confinement and two years’ 
confinement, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–86, and one and one-half years’ confinement, Ly, 351 
F.3d at 271. By contrast, Petitioner’s detention period has not yet even begun to trigger the six-
month period within which detention is presumptively reasonable, since he has not been issued a 
final order of removal. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683, 701–02. Petitioner’s third argument 
therefore fails.  
In summary, Petitioner does not dispute that he requested and received a bond 
redetermination hearing. [R. 7, p. 2]. Petitioner nowhere alleges that the IJ wholly failed to consider 
the evidence he offered as to his continued residence, community ties, work history, and criminal 
record, nor does he claim the hearing was procedurally improper. See generally [R. 1; R. 3; R. 7]. 
Petitioner’s reference to the “civil or regulatory purpose[s]” of detention is unavailing. See [R. 1, 
pp. 2, 13]. And, as discussed above and below, Petitioner’s references to pending state criminal 
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proceedings and “prolonged” detention periods are unavailing. See id. at 10–11; [R. 7, pp. 5, 7]. 
Petitioner therefore fails to raise a cognizable challenge to the underlying statutory framework or 
the extent of ICE’s detention authority. Lastly, as the Court has already briefly outlined, to the 
extent Petitioner takes issue with IJ Johnson’s discretionary decision to deny bond, that challenge 
is barred by § 1226(e). See Nielsen, 586 U.S. at 401; Jennings, 583 U.S. at 295; Demore, 538 U.S. 
at 516. Taken together, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground.  
B. ICE’s Refusal to Grant Discretionary Parole 
Petitioner next challenges ICE’s refusal to grant parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), 
describing the decision as “arbitrary, capricious, and unconstitutional.” [R. 1, p. 14]. Petitioner 
points to 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b), which provides for parole of “[a]liens whose continued detention is 
not in the public interest” as determined by various officials identified in § 212.5(a).7 According 
to Petitioner, ICE has been informed of Petitioner’s status as the sole witness to a violent crime, 
making Petitioner’s detention “not in the public interest.” [R. 1, pp. 14–15]; 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(5). 
Rather than grant parole, ICE used “bureaucratic deflection” to direct defense counsel to the 
Immigration Court, which then “disclaimed parole authority and directed counsel back to ICE,” 
ultimately producing a system “incompatible with due process” where “parole authority exists in 
theory but in practice is exercised by no one.” [R. 1, pp. 14–15]. 
 
7 Section 212.5(a) allows parole to be granted by the following individuals, “subject to the parole and detention 
authority of the Secretary or his designees”:  
 
[T]he Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations; Director, Detention and Removal; 
directors of field operations; port directors; special agents in charge; deputy special agents in charge; 
associate special agents in charge; assistant special agents in charge; resident agents in charge; field 
office directors; deputy field office directors; chief patrol agents; district directors for services; and 
those other officials as may be designated in writing . . . . 
 
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a).  
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As previously discussed, see supra Section III(A), the Immigration Court did exercise its 
bond authority through IJ Johnson’s determination at Petitioner’s bond hearing. See [R. 5-2, p. 1]. 
However, the IJ’s determination addressed his authority to grant parole under § 1225 and § 1226, 
not the parole authority afforded to ICE under § 1182(d)(5)(A). The Court will therefore address 
whether ICE properly denied parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A).  
Under Section 1182(d)(5)(A), 
[t]he Secretary of Homeland Security may . . . in his discretion parole into the 
United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-
by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien 
applying for admission to the United States. . . . 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1182. The Supreme Court has recognized this statute confers an “exceedingly broad” 
and “discretionary” authority, Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 852, 855 (1985), and this Court has 
reasoned similarly, see Perez v. Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer, No. 3:24-CV-
735-RGJ-LLK, 2026 WL 516570, at *16 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 3, 2026) (“Immigration law clearly 
enables the Executive Branch to exercise its discretion to temporarily allow noncitizens into the 
United States who are applying for admission to the country instead of holding them in detention.” 
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)), report and recommendation adopted by Perez v. Supervisory 
Detention and Deportation Officer, No. 3:24-cv-735-RGJ-LLK, 2026 WL 512698 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 
24, 2026), as have other district courts within the Sixth Circuit, see, e.g., Rodriguez v. Raycraft, 
No. 4:26-CV-0302, 2026 WL 656956, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2026) (“[D]iscretionary parole is 
permitted under section 1182(d)(5)(A).”); Ikharo v. Shanks, No. 1:19-CV-256, 2020 WL 3490376, 
at *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2020) (describing the “discretionary use of parole” and the “discretionary 
decision” under Section 1182(d)(5)(A)).  
Petitioner cites to no sources that indicate ICE lacks this discretion under § 1182(d)(5)(A). 
Instead, Petitioner characterizes his continued detention despite such discretion as “arbitrary.” 
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[R. 1, p. 15]. Although Petitioner may be attempting to invoke the Administrative Procedure Act 
to set aside ICE’s action as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with the law under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), Petitioner provides no further explanation or 
argumentation along these lines. Because any such argument is wholly undeveloped, the Court 
need not consider it further. See McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(“Issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed 
argumentation, are deemed waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument 
in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its bones.” (quoting Citizens 
Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 59 F.3d 284, 293–34 (1st 
Cir. 1995))) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Setting aside Petitioner’s wholly insufficient possible invocation of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, Petitioner also characterizes ICE’s decision to deny his release on parole as creating 
a “jurisdictional vacuum where no agency actor will accept responsibility for his confinement.” 
[R. 7, p. 10]. But this description of his circumstances is supported by neither the objective facts 
nor by Petitioner’s language elsewhere describing these facts. In claiming that ICE refuses to 
“accept responsibility for his confinement,” id., Petitioner appears to contend that the email he 
received from ICE agent Jason Johnson, in which Mr. Johnson stated he “cannot release anyone 
on parole,” [R. 1-3, p. 3], reflected some sort of official ICE position disclaiming parole authority, 
as opposed to merely a denial of parole as to Petitioner specifically. See [R. 1, p. 6 (describing ICE 
as “disclaim[ing] authority to provide the release sought”)]. Yet at other points, Petitioner appears 
to recognize that Agent Johnson was only speaking as to Petitioner’s specific detention, as 
Petitioner elsewhere describes ICE as merely “refus[ing] to grant parole or release,” id. at 9; see 
also id. at 14; [R. 7, p. 10], and as “oppos[ing] [Petitioner’s] release,” [R. 1, p. 10], and even 
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characterizes ICE’s parole authority as “discretion[ary],” id. at 11. Petitioner’s own statement of 
the facts reflects the reality that a single email from an ICE agent of unknown standing within the 
agency cannot possibly represent an official ICE position disclaiming ICE’s broad and 
discretionary parole authority.  
Moreover, even if Petitioner intends to challenge ICE’s decision to deny parole in 
Petitioner’s specific case, the sources cited in Respondents’ Response make clear that the decision 
by immigration authorities to deny parole is not judicially reviewable. See [R. 5, pp. 3–4]. For 
example, when considering 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)—providing that “[t]he Secretary of 
Homeland Security may . . . in his discretion parole into the United States . . . any alien applying 
for admission to the United States”—together with 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)—providing that 
“no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any decision or action of the Attorney General or 
Secretary of Homeland Security” that is “specified . . . to be in the discretion of” that official—it 
is clear that this Court cannot review ICE’s discretionary decision to decline parole. As 
Respondents note, numerous courts—including numerous circuit courts and some district courts 
within the Sixth Circuit—have reached the same conclusion. See [R. 5, p. 4 (citing decisions from 
the Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits holding the same)]; see also Ikharo v. 
Shanks, No. 1:19-CV-256, 2020 WL 3490376, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2020), report and 
recommendation adopted, No. 1:19-CV-256, 2020 WL 3488925 (S.D. Ohio June 26, 2020) 
(“[T]he Court is without jurisdiction over challenge[s] to the discretionary use of parole pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).”); Sillah v. Davis, 252 F.Supp.2d 589, 597 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) 
(“[D]ecisions concerning the granting and revocation of immigration parole [under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(d)(5)(A)] are within the discretion of the Attorney General . . . and are not subject to 
judicial review.” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii))). These sources of law, taken together with 
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Petitioner’s failure to even cite to § 1182 or § 1252 in his Reply—much less address these 
arguments raised by Respondents—are fatal to Petitioner’s claim. As a final note, the Court points 
out that Petitioner does not cite to any recent change in the applicable law or regulations such that 
the Court’s understanding of Sections 1182 and 1252 may be outdated, nor does Petitioner’s 
briefing suggest that he has filed a formal request for parole pursuant to ICE’s § 1182 authority, 
as opposed to his mere email request sent to ICE’s Chicago outreach email address. See generally 
[R. 1; R. 1-3; R. 3; R. 7].  
Therefore, Petitioner’s arguments under § 1182(d)(5)(A) are wholly unavailing and do not 
support his release by order of this Court.  
C. Kentucky’s Sovereign Interest 
Petitioner’s next argument in support of his release invokes the sovereign interest of the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky. [R. 1, p. 15; R. 3, p. 3; R. 7, pp. 7–9]. Petitioner notes his status as 
the sole victim and witness to a violent armed carjacking and points to the Jefferson County 
Attorney’s Office’s request for Petitioner’s “continued presence and availability to testify in the 
pending prosecution” as demonstrating the necessity of his immediate release. See [R. 1, p. 15; 
R. 3, p. 3; R. 7, pp. 7–9; R. 1-1, p. 3]. According to Petitioner, “[t]he federal government may not 
use its regulatory authority to disable a state’s courts, obstruct prosecutions, or nullify the exercise 
of police power.” [R. 1, p. 15]. Because Respondents have shown no “compelling necessity” for 
his continued detention, the Constitution supposedly demands his release. [R. 7, p. 8].  
In countering, Respondents point to the preliminary issue of Petitioner’s standing, arguing 
that he lacks standing to assert Kentucky’s interest in his appearance as a witness. [R. 5, p. 5]. 
Then, addressing the merits, Respondents argue “states and their officials cannot compel or 
preclude actions taken by the federal government,” and further note that his appearance in the 
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Kentucky state prosecution “is more likely if he is in ICE custody than if he is left at large,” as 
shown by his failure to appear in his own court case and by the IJ’s finding that he is a flight risk. 
Id.  
Petitioner’s Reply does not address Respondents’ standing argument. See generally [R. 7]. 
Instead, the Reply reiterates Petitioner’s previous arguments, claiming that Petitioner’s release is 
necessary so that the state prosecution can proceed. See id.  
As to Respondents’ standing argument, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear 
that “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of 
another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Such is the case even where the 
individual claims to be a witness or victim of a crime. See Harris v. Bradley, No. 1:15-CV-1041, 
2016 WL 286076, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 25, 2016). The Court therefore finds Petitioner lacks 
standing to argue he is entitled to release on this ground.  
Moreover, even if Petitioner had standing to bring this claim—which he does not—the 
federal government need not accede to the Commonwealth’s request. Other courts have found that 
even federal prosecutors “cannot preclude a deportation proceeding . . . because such action would 
constitute an impermissible exercise of authority over the INS,” essentially permitting “the United 
States attorney’s general power of prosecution [to] usurp the attorney general’s specific power to 
deport certain classes of aliens.” San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065, 1070 (11th Cir. 1996). 
It would be even more extreme to permit state prosecutors to exercise authority over the INS by 
halting deportation, as Petitioner requests here, and there is no indication that the Attorney General 
has delegated such authority here. See id. at 1071. (“The need for express delegations in the area 
of immigration and naturalization is particularly acute. . . . As a result, the Attorney General must 
take special care to make delegations of authority in this area to officials outside INS with 
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particular clarity.”). Taken together, between Petitioner’s lack of standing and the lack of authority 
in state prosecutors to halt federal deportation proceedings, Petitioner’s requested relief is not 
warranted on this ground.  
D. U-Visa Program 
Petitioner’s final argument in support of his requested relief contends that his status as a 
certified crime victim under the U-Visa program supports his release, as his continued detention 
despite that status “defeats the purpose of the statute.” [R. 1, p. 16]; see [R. 3, p. 4]. Respondents 
counter that Petitioner’s Petition and Motion “offer[] no legal authority for the notion that his 
pursuit of a U visa somehow entitles him to nonapplication of all other immigration laws, including 
those related to custody of aliens in removal proceedings . . . .” [R. 5, p. 6]. Petitioner makes no 
reply in his subsequent filing. See generally [R. 7].  
The Court agrees with Respondents. The governing regulation for U-visas, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.14, provides that “[t]he filing of a petition for U-1 nonimmigrant status has no effect on 
ICE’s authority to execute a final order [of removal],” but a petitioner who is subject to a final 
order may seek a stay of removal pending the completion of the U-visa process. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.14(c)(1)(ii). The law is clear; Petitioner’s pending application for a U-Visa does not prevent 
his removal, but Petitioner may nevertheless seek a stay of removal as outlined by the regulation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court has reviewed Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, [R. 1], and 
Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Immediate Release from Custody, 
[R. 3], Respondents’ Response, [R. 5], Petitioner’s Reply, [R. 7], and Petitioner’s Motion to 
Expedite Decision on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, [R. 13]. Based on the evidence and 
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arguments therein as well as the above discussion thereof, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 
either filing.  
Accordingly, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED as follows: 
1. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, [R. 1], is DENIED. 
2. Petitioner’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Immediate 
Release from Custody, [R. 3], is DENIED. 
3. Petitioner’s Motion to Expedite Decision on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
[R. 13], is DENIED AS MOOT. 
4. This matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and STRICKEN from the Court’s 
active docket.  
5. A separate Judgment shall enter contemporaneously herewith. 
This the 6th day of April, 2026. 
 
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