govinfo:USCOURTS-laed-2_25-cv-00670-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
DEWANNA D. MCKINLEY  CIVIL ACTION  
VERSUS  NO. 25-670 
SCI SHARED RESOURCES, LLC; 
SCI SHARED SERVICES, INC..; AND 
S.E. CEMETERIES OF LOUISIANA 
 SECTION “B” (4)  
 
ORDER AND REASONS 
Before the Court are defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 15), plaintiff’s opposition 
(Rec. Doc. 32), and defendants’ reply (Rec. Doc. 40). Also before the Court is defendants’ Motion 
to Strike (Rec. Doc. 39), For the following reasons,  
IT IS ORDERED that defendants’ Motion to Strike (Rec. Doc. 39) be DENIED. 
Defendants may reurge the motion following plaintiff’s submission of the information concerning 
the October 2024 supplemental letter submitted to the EEOC; 
IT IS ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to dismiss (Rec. Doc. 15) be GRANTED 
in part and DENIED in part as follows:  
Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Section 1981 disparate treatment claim is 
DENIED;  
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the following claims is GRANTED: plaintiff’s Section 
1981 retaliation and disparate impact claims and Title VII retaliation claim are DISMISSED 
WITH PREJUDICE;  
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the following claims is GRANTED: plaintiff’s Section 
1981 hostile work environment claim and Title VII hostile work environment, disparate impact, 
and disparate treatment claims are  DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE , subject to 
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reconsideration pursuant to plaintiff’s submission, no later than April 15, 2026, of both a motion 
for leave to amend complaint to address the deficiencies noted herein and affidavit addressing the 
deficiencies noted herein concerning the October 2024 supplemental letter. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Mount Olivet Cemetery, located in New Orleans ’ Mid-City District, was established in 
1918 and primarily serves the African American and Creole communities in the surrounding areas. 
Rec. Doc. 5 at 7. In 2013, Mount Olivet was acquired by SCI Holdings, through its subsidiaries 
SCI Funeral Services and S.E. Cemeteries of Louisiana (collectively, “SCI”). Id. at 6. SCI also 
owns and manages other funeral homes and cemeteries, including (1) Lake Lawn Metairie Funeral 
Home & Cemeteries, (2) St. Bernard Memorial Funeral Home & Gardens, (3) St. Vincent de Paul 
Cemeteries, (4) Leitz- Eagan Funeral Home, (5) Westside/Leitz -Eagan Funeral Home, and ( 6) 
Grace Funeral Home & St. Lazarus of Bethany Memorial Garden. Id. at 14.  
Dewanna McKinley, an African American woman, began working at Mount Olivet in 2010 
as a Community Service Counselor and, due to “consistent exemplary sales performance,” was 
promoted to Sales Manager for Mount Olivet on November 29, 2014, serving in that role until her 
November 2023 termination. Rec. Doc. 5 at 14. As Sales Manager for Mount  Olivet, McKinley 
led a sales team that assisted customers with purchasing funeral and burial services. McKinley’s 
sales team consisted of African American employees only. Id. at 14. McKinley asserts that, aside 
from the members of her sales  team, no other African American served as a Sales Manager or 
member of a sales team at any other SCI-owned cemetery or funeral home. Id. at 15.  
Sales associates at SCI-owned cemeteries and funeral homes received compensation from 
either, or a combination of, a base salary, bonuses, or commissions. Rec. Doc. 5 at 11. These sales 
associates provided either pre-need or at-need services. Pre-need services refer to the planning and 
paying for funeral and related services and products before a death occurs while at -need services 
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refer to funeral and related services that are arranged after a death occurs. Id . at 11–12. A sales 
associate would receive a 9% commission for the sale of pre-need services or products but only a 
4% commission for the sale of at-need services or products. Id. at 13. McKinley could provide pre-
need and at-need services, and her compensation was a combination of a base salary, bonuses, and 
any commission she earned from the sale of funeral, burial, or related services and products. Id. at 
14–15.  
Before October 2020, McKinley and her sales team would travel to other SCI -owned 
cemeteries and funeral homes to sell at -need products and services, including at Lake Lawn 
Metairie Funeral Home & Cemeteries (“ Lake Lawn ”), which McKinley states serves a 
predominately Caucasian clientele. Rec. Doc. 5 at 15 –16. From these sales, McKinley and her 
team would receive the full 4% commission from the sale of an at -need service or product . 
However, the Sales Manager at Lake Lawn complained to SCI management about McKinley and 
her team providing at-need services at Lake Lawn. Id.  
Following the Lake Lawn Sales Manager’s  complaint, o n October 26, 2020, Jonathan 
Laskie, the Market Sales Director for SCI, introduced a new Lead Protection Policy that informs 
sales associates about how associates may earn commissions from the sale of a product or service 
to a lead. Rec. Doc. 1 at 16. In this context, a “lead” refers to a potential customer. Id. at 13. The 
policy provides that an associate can “protect,” or ensure they receive the commission for, a lead 
only if they include relevant information about the lead into Salesforce, an online platform that 
SCI relies on to track information about  potential sales. Id. at 16. The  policy also explains that 
Preplanning Advisors (“PPA”) will receive 100% of the commission of the sale of a cremation 
property if the placement takes place after 30 days  of first contact and 50% of the commission if 
the placement takes place within 30 days (the other 50% to be provided to the sales associate 
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handling primarily at-need services like cremation). Id. at 16–17. The Policy was amended in the 
following months and years, effectively changing the relevant split to 70% in favor of a  PPA. 
McKinley alleges that the policy effectively allows PPAs—all but one of whom are non-Black—
to take the commission that otherwise would go to McKinley and her all-Black sales team who 
primarily sell at-need products like burial plots and cremation niches. Id. at 18. Meanwhile, PPAs 
allegedly “are allowed to make sales for any location for Pre-Need Services.” Id. at 17. Mckinley 
argues that the policy “intentionally and purposefully” targeted her team. Id. at 18.  
On September 26, 2022, a married couple  walked into the Mount  Olivet Cemetery office 
to inquire about purchasing pre-need services for a burial plot. Rec. Doc. 5 at 21.  This couple had 
previously visited Lake Lawn but determined that they could not afford the products on offer there. 
Id. at 22. McKinley, and the sales associate assisting the couple, searched Salesforce to see if either 
person had been added as a lead . Id. Finding that the couple’s personal information was not in 
Salesforce, McKinley directed the sales associate to proceed with providing the couple a pre-need 
sales presentation; the following morning, the associate completed the sale. Id.  
Two days later, on September 29, 2022, Laskie texted McKinley to inform her that the sale 
to the married couple was to be given to a PPA because he had directly provided that person with 
the couple’s information; the couple and the PPA had scheduled to meet at Lake Lawn; and that 
all of these details were added to Salesforce. Rec. Doc. 5 at 23. McKinley alleges that Laskie 
became irate and began berating her, speaking to her in a condescending tone, and accusing her of 
ignoring the Lead Protection Policy. I d. Though McKinley and her sales associate informed 
Laskie, during a phone call, that no information pertaining to the couple existed in Salesforce, 
McKinley alleges that Laskie stated he would credit the sale to the PPA regardless of that fact. Id. 
According to McKinley, Laskie threatened to write -up both McKinley and her sales associate 
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because of their raised voices and for cursing at him. Id . at 24. McKinley states that, shocked by 
Laskie’s actions and “obvious bias,” on September 29, 2022, she emailed SCI management to 
report him. Id. McKinley asserts that, in response, Laskie ordered that McKinley be subjected to a 
“lateral transfer,” i.e., that McKinley would report directly to Laskie. Id. The order  became 
effective on October 8, 2022, despite McKinley’s emails to SCI management and human resources 
personnel about possible retaliation. Id. Following the transfer, Laskie allegedly began issuing 
“pretextual counseling or discipline for various alleged poor performance or for not following his 
directives.” Id. at 27.  
According to McKinley, the lateral transfer was the start of Laskie’s and other supervisors’ 
discriminatory actions. In March 2023, Mount Olivet began preparing for “Phase 8,” an expansion 
project that included additional burial crypts . Rec. Doc. 5 at 28. On March 22, 2023, McKinley 
requested a seminar for Mount Olivet to promote the Phase 8 expansion. Id . Laskie had initially 
agreed to conduct the seminar and provided McKinley with two options: (1) to conduct self-invite 
seminars in April 2023 or (2) to wait until May 2023 for company- sponsored 2500 Mail -Out 
seminar for the Mount Olivet location only. Id . McKinley accepted the second option and began 
to prepare accordingly. Id. However, on April 24, 2023, two weeks from the first of two planned 
company-sponsored seminars, Laskie informed McKinley that “[i]f it’s a company mailed seminar 
it’s really for PPA but you guys can do self -invites. You can do a self -invite Mt. Olivet only 
seminar there but we can’t do a mailer for it.” Id . at 29. McKinley asserts that Laskie had not 
informed her there was a change in plans or that the company-sponsored mailouts was only for the 
PPA team.  
In response, on April 25, 2023, McKinley emailed SCI management to complain about the 
change, noting that PPAs involvement would lead to PPAs taking the leads —and therefore the 
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commissions—from the mail- outs sent to a predominantly African American and Creole clientele. 
Rec. Doc. 5 at 31. While PPAs could benefit from the company- sponsored mail-outs and other 
opportunities, McKinley asserts that she and her sales team were intentionally prevented from 
accessing high-value sales territories with white clientele while the “predominantly white ” PPA 
team was not similarly restricted. Rec. Doc. 5 at 32.  
The alleged discriminatory and retaliatory actions continued. In May 2023, Laskie , 
allegedly enraged about McKinley’s high earnings after learning of her compensation plan in the 
months prior, directed SCI’s Human Resources to change McKinley’s plan to reduce her overall 
compensation. Rec. Doc. 5 at 38.  Additionally, Laskie increased McKinley’s sales team quota 
from $310,000 per month to $370,000 per month, which effectively made it more difficult for 
McKinley to meet sales quotas. Id . at 40. McKinley claims that no other Sales Manager, all of 
whom were white during her tenure, had their compensation plan reduced. Id. at 41. 
McKinley’s remaining months at Mount Olivet culminated in what she alleges were two 
final discriminatory actions. First, on August 25, 2023, Laskie directed another manager to hand 
McKinley a written warning for contacting, on the same day, a person that another sales associate 
had contacted. Rec. Doc. 5 at 41. McKinley argues that the basis for the written warning was 
pretextual and that Laskie “con tinued to harbor race -based and retaliatory animus” against her 
because of her prior EEO complaint and for reporting his conduct to various supervisory and 
human resources personnel. Id . Finally, on November 17, 2023, Laskie terminated McKinley 
because of the latter’s decision to remove from Workday—an online personnel management 
platform—a member of her sales team who had resigned a week earlier. Id . at 42. Laskie did not 
want to accept the sales associate’s resignation and wanted to see if there was another position he 
could offer her. Id . McKinley asserts that the Human Resources Manager gave McKinley the 
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option to remove the sales associate from Workday and that she exercised authority she was given. 
Id. at 42–43. McKinley argues that Laskie used her action as a pretext for firing her for reporting 
him to management and engaging in other protected activity. Id. at 44.  
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On June 6, 2024, McKinley filed a Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”) with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the Louisiana Commission on Human 
Rights. Rec. Doc. 15- 2. In her Charge, she alleged that: (1) in June 2023, SCI changed her  
compensation plan; (2) in June 2023, Laskie informed her that mail out leads would be given to a 
different sales team composed of only white associates; and (3) that in November 2023, she was 
suspended and subsequently discharged. Id. She stated her belief that she was discriminated against 
because of her race. Id. On January 7, 2025, the EEOC issued McKinley a Notice of Right to Sue 
in this matter for the allegations contained in her Charge. Rec. Doc. 5 at 73.  
On April 7, 2025, McKinley filed a complaint against SCI in this Court, which she 
subsequently amended. Rec. Docs. 1, 5. In her Amended Complaint, McKinley asserts several 
claims against SCI, including: (1) hostile work environment in violation of Title VI I of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981; (2) disparate treatment in violation of Title VII and 42 
U.S.C. 1981; (3) disparate impact in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981; and (4) retaliation 
in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. Id. at 46–71. SCI has moved to dismiss the claims 
against it, arguing that McKinley failed to exhaust and timely file most of her claims and failed to 
state causes of action for which she could be afforded relief. Rec. Doc. 15. McKinley opposes 
SCI’s motion to dismiss and has attached to her opposition a letter which she claims she submitted 
to the EEOC in October 2024—four months after she initially filed her Charge. Rec. Docs. 32, 32-
1. SCI has moved to strike the supplemental letter and additional exhibits contained therein. Rec. 
Doc. 39. McKinley has not opposed the motion to strike. All motions are ripe for adjudication.  
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III. LAW AND ANALYSIS 
A. Legal Standard 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 
8’s pleading standard demands more than “labels and conclusions .” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A defendant may 
file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if they contend that a plaintiff’s complaint does not satisfy 
Rule 8’s pleading standard. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead 
enough facts “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 
662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). A claim is plausible 
when the pleaded facts allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. When the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer 
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. Id . at 679. A 
court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draw “all reasonable inferences 
in the plaintiff’s favor.” Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009). 
In considering a 12(b)(6) motion, a court generally is limited to the face of the pleadings. 
Xavier v. Belfor USA Grp., Inc., No. CIV.A. 06-491, 2007 WL 4224320, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 26, 
2007). However, a court is permitted to rely on documents attached to the complaint, and any 
documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the 
complaint. Lane Star Fund v (U.S.), L.P v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). 
A court may also consider matters of public record and those of which a Court may take judicial 
notice. Xavier, 2007 WL 4224320, at *1. 
B. Analysis 
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McKinley raises discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
42 U.S.C. § 1981. While both statutes prohibit race -based discrimination in employment and are 
analyzed using the same substantive framework, they differ in their procedural requirements. 
O’Neal v. Cargill, Inc ., 178 F. Supp. 3d 408, 420 (E.D. La. 2016). Notably, Title VII requires 
exhaustion of administrative remedies; Section 1981 does not. Id. Title VII claims are subject to a 
300-day statute of limitations; Section 1981 claims are not.1 Id. The Court will address McKinley’s 
Section 1981 claims before turning to whether she has exhausted and timely filed her Title VII 
claims.
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1. Hostile Work Environment under Section 1981 
The Court begins with McKinley’s hostile work environment claims under Section 1981. 
To establish a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must prove that (1) she belongs to a protected 
class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome conduct; (3) the harassment c omplained of was based 
on race; (4) the harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; 
and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take 
prompt remedial action. Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 509 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Body by 
Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2017) (stating that the analysis 
of discrimination claims is the same under Section 1981 and Title VII).  
In her Opposition to SCI’s Motion to Dismiss, McKinley relies almost entirely on factual 
allegations she detailed in an October 2024 supplemental letter she sent to the EEOC but did not 
attach to her Amended Complaint. In her Opposition, McKinley claims  that (1) her pay was less 
than white managers at other locations; (2) Laskie caused plaintiff and her team to feel devalued 
 
1 Section 1981 claims are, instead, subject to a four-year statute of limitations. O’Neal v. Cargill, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 
3d 408, 420 (E.D. La. 2016). 
2 SCI does not dispute the timeliness of McKinley’s Section 1981 claims.  
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and openly ostracized by white colleagues; (3) Laskie instructed her not to speak to white 
counselors; (4) Laskie told her to “shut up and listen”; and (5) that McKinley feared Laskie. Rec. 
Doc. 32 at 12–13. These allegations do not appear in the Amended C omplaint. Instead, the 
operative complaint focuses on (1) the October 2022 lateral transfer  and receipt of written 
warnings; (2) an October 2022 comment from Laskie that members of McKinley’s sales team 
could join the PPA team; (3) comments about McKinley’s income; and (5) conclusory allegations 
that Laskie tolerated and directed other employees to engage in discriminatory conduct toward her. 
Rec. Doc. 5 at 47–54. After review of the Amended Complaint, the Court concludes that McKinley 
has not shown that the hostile work environment was based on her race. Her hostile work 
environment claims are therefore DISMISSED. Because Section 1981 and Title VII hostile work 
environment claims are analyzed using the same substantive framework, this necessarily requires 
that McKinley’s Title VII hostile work environment claims also be  DISMISSED. However, 
because the allegations in the Opposition possibly supports a hostile work environment claim 
based on race, the Court will allow McKinley leave to file a motion to amend her complaint. SCI 
may oppose any motion for leave to amend.   
2. Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment under Section 1981 
The Court turns to McKinley’s disparate impact and disparate treatment claims. A disparate 
impact claim is not legally cognizable under Section 1981. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 388–89 (1982). That claim is therefore DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE. As for the disparate treatment claim, SCI concedes that “[McKinley] can proceed 
under Section 1981 for intentional discrimination claims.”  Rec. Doc. 40 at 5. For a disparate 
treatment claim, there are two ultimate elements that must be pleaded: (1) an adverse employment 
action that is (2) taken against an employee because of a protected status. Cicalese v. Univ. of 
Texas Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 2019). Though a close call, the Court concludes 
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that McKinley has adequately pled a disparate treatment claim. She has alleged specific instances 
of possibly adverse actions that occurred because of her race including, for example, being 
prevented from selling burial and funeral products in high- earning client locations, having her 
income reduced while white Sales Managers’ income remained the same, and denial of salary 
increases and promotional opportunities. Rec. Doc. 5 at 54–56. SCI’s Motion to Dismiss 
McKinley’s Section 1981 disparate treatment claim is DENIED.  
3. Retaliation under Section 1981 
Finally, the Court reviews McKinley’s retaliation claims. To state a claim for retaliation, a 
plaintiff must show: (1) she participated in some statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an 
adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and 
the adverse action. Mota v. The Univ. of Texas Houston Health Sci. Ctr ., 261 F.3d 512, 519 (5th 
Cir. 2001). A plaintiff engages in protected activity if she opposes a practice deemed an unlawful 
employment practice by Title VII (the “opposition clause”) or makes a charge, testifies, assists, or 
participates in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII (the 
“participation clause”). EEOC v. Rite Way Serv., Inc., 819 F.3d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 2016); see also 
Davis v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit , 383 F.3d 309, 319 (5th Cir. 2004) (applying the Title VII 
retaliation framework to a claim of retaliation under Section 1981). Courts have found that 
“lodging an internal complaint that explicitly alleges discrimination or harassment based on a 
protected characteristic…qualifies as a protected activity” while “an internal complaint that does 
not allege discrimination or any other unlawful activity…is not considered protected activity.” 
Rodriguez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 540 F. App’x 322, 328–29 (5th Cir. 2013).  
In the operative complaint, McKinley alleges that she “engaged in protected activity when 
she refused to make false statements about a subordinate and instead reported discriminatory 
conduct” in emails to SCI management about Laskie’s behavior during the September 26, 2022 
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incident. Rec. Doc. 5 at 65. However, these emails do not demonstrate that McKinley complained 
about discriminatory conduct. Even if Exhibit 1 to McKinley’s Opposition is admissible, the 
attached emails contained therein do not convince the Court that McKinley engaged in protected 
activity. In McKinley’s September 30, 2022 email to SCI management, she certainly complained 
about Laskie’s behavior during the September 26, 2022 incident, but at no point does she claim 
that he was discriminatory or engaged in a ny other unlawful behavior. Rec. Doc. 32 -1 at 10–11. 
Nor do McKinley’s October 2022 emails, cited in her Amended Complaint, suggest a different 
result. In those emails, McKinley complains about the lateral transfer and states that it would place 
her in an uncomfortable position. Rec. Doc. 5 at 25–27. But there is no complaint about any 
discriminatory action or harassment.  
McKinley also cites as protected activity her opposition to and reporting of “race -based 
exclusion of her Sales Team from high-value territories and resources, including the seminars and 
mail-out leads”  and internal complaints, dated April 25, 2023 and May 2, 2023, about 
discriminatory practices involving the PPA team. Rec. Doc. 5 at 65–66; Rec. Doc. 32 at 30. 
However, aside from the conclusory allegations, McKinley has not shown that she engaged in 
protected activities. Her April 25, 2023 email, included in her complaint, shows that she 
complained about the PPA team benefitting from the seminar she planned and that the PPA team 
would be taking money from her sales associates as a result. Rec. Doc. 5 at 30–31. However, 
though she complained about the PPA team benefiting from Laskie’s actions, she did not complain 
about race discrimination or other unlawful activity, and therefore did not engage in any protected 
activity. See Moore v. United Parcel Serv., Inc ., 150 F. App’x 315, 319 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding 
that plaintiff “was not engaged in protected activity, as his [complaint] did not oppose or protest 
racial discrimination or any other unlawful employment practice[.]”). 
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Because McKinley has not shown that she engaged in any protected activities, her Section 
1981 retaliation claims are DISMISSED  WITH PREJUDICE. Because Section 1981 and Title 
VII retaliation claims are analyzed using the same substantive framework, McKinley’s Title VII 
retaliation claims are likewise DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
4. The Remaining Title VII Claims 
Given that Section 1981 and Title VII are analyzed using the same substantive framework, 
the Court has, based on the foregoing analysis, dismissed under both statutes  McKinley’s 
retaliation and hostile work environment claims —though the latter claims are subject to 
reconsideration upon McKinley’s timely submission of a motion for leave to file  amended 
complaint addressing the deficiencies noted herein. McKinley’s remaining claims are for disparate 
treatment and disparate impact under Title VII.  But before the Court can assess the plausibility of 
McKinley’s claims, it must assess whether she has satisfied  Title VII’s exhaustion requirement 
and will do so with respect to her disparate treatment, disparate impact, and hostile work 
environment.
3  
Title VII  requires employees to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking 
judicial relief. McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc ., 519 F.3d 264, 273 (5th Cir. 2008). To properly 
exhaust, a plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC before bringing their claim to federal court . 
Grice v. FMC Techs. Inc., 216 F.App’x 401, 405 (5th Cir. 2007). The scope of a complaint must 
be “limited to the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out 
of the charge of discrimination.” Thomas v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 220 F.3d 389, 395 (5th 
Cir. 2000). Allegations in a complaint “may encompass any kind of discrimination like or related 
 
3 Though the Court has dismissed without prejudice all of McKinley’s hostile work environment claims for not 
stating a claim for which relief can be granted, the Court will nevertheless address whether the Title VII hostile 
work environment claim has been exhausted because SCI raises the argument in its motion to dismiss.  
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to allegations contained in the charge and growing out of such allegation during the pendency of 
the case before the [EEOC].” Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970). 
Because “the provisions of Title VII were not designed for the sophisticated, and because most 
complaints are initiated pro se, the scope of an EEOC complaint should be construed liberally.” 
Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788–89 (5th Cir. 2006). However, a plaintiff’s “ability to expand 
the scope of the EEOC charges in a complaint” is not unlimited. Ghahramani v. BASF Corp., 755 
F. Supp. 708, 711 (M.D. La. 1991) (citing Young v. City of Houston, 906 F.2d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 
1990)). 
The Court concerns itself with McKinley’s  disparate treatment , disparate impact , and 
hostile work environment claims under Title VII. In support of her disparate treatment claim, she 
alleges that (1) she was excluded from high- earning client locations; (2) she was subjected to 
hostile behavior, including disparaging remarks about her compensation; (3) she was denied 
promotional opportunities; (4) she was reassigned via a lateral transfer; (5) she denied access to 
at-need service opportunities; (6) she was t argeted with fabricated write -ups; and (7) she was 
retaliated against through adverse assignments and discipline for opposing discrimination. Rec. 
Doc. 5 at 55–56. In support of her disparate impact claim, McKinley alleges that the June 2020 
Lead Protection Policy, and its subsequent amendments, had disproportionate adverse effects on 
McKinley and all-Black her sales team —despite being facially neutral. Id . at 56–59. Finally, 
McKinley alleges that she was subjected to a hostile work environment for various reasons, which 
consisted of disciplinary lateral transfers, disciplinary writeups, disparaging and hostile comments, 
and discriminatory and hostile behavior from other employees. Id. at 46–54. These allegations do 
not appear in McKinley’s June 2024 Charge, in which she alleges only (1) that her compensation 
plan was changed, (2) that in June 2023, Laskie informed her that mail -out leads would be given 
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to another sales team, and (3) that she was suspended and discharged— all because of he r race. 
Rec. Doc. 15-1 at 1.  
McKinley argues that her charge “expressly alleged that she was subjected to race 
discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment during her employment with SCI.” Rec. 
Doc. 32 at 6. But it does not. Instead, McKinley’s argument is nearly exclusively supported by 
Exhibit 1, attached to her Amended Complaint, which includes an October 2024 supplemental 
letter she allegedly sent to the EEOC. Id (citing Rec. Doc. 32-1 at 2–8). While the Court is allowed 
to consider documents submitted to the EEOC during its investigation into an employee’s charge 
without converting the instant 12(b)(6) motion into a summary judgment motion, see Bracken v. 
Welborn, No. CV 20-72-S DD-EWD, 2021 WL 237693, at *9 (M.D. La. Jan. 25, 2021), 
questions remain that prevent the Court from doing so. Questions remain on whether the EEOC 
received the October 2024 letter, whether that agency in vestigated the claims co ntained therein 
as part of its investigation into McKinley’s Charge, and whether the Right to Sue letter the EEOC 
provided encompasses the later-submitted claims. We cannot simply rely on her Exhibit 1 to 
determine whether the hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and disparate impact 
claims have been exhau sted. See Bracken, 2021 WL 237693, at *9 (stating that “the Court will 
not consider any evidence submitted that was not clearly part of the EEOC investigation 
file.”). As such, McKinley’s Title VII hostile work env ironment, disparate treatment, and 
disparate impact claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE subject to timely 
reconsideration upon McKinley’s filing of documentation addressing questions noted herein. 
SCI’s Motion to Strike, Rec. Doc. 39, is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. SCI will be allowed 
Case 2:25-cv-00670-ILRL-KWR     Document 44     Filed 03/27/26     Page 15 of 16
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to reurge its motion to strike upon McKinley’s submission of an affidavit or other 
document addressing the earlier discussed questions.  The record shows that the EEOC 
investigator assigned to McKinley’s case stated that her EEOC charge had not been amended. 
See Rec. Doc. 39-3.  Absent evidence that the EEOC's investigative file contains reference to 
Title VII hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and disparate impact claims, those 
claims would be subject to dismissal with prejudice.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 26th day of March 2026 
______________________________________ 
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
Case 2:25-cv-00670-ILRL-KWR     Document 44     Filed 03/27/26     Page 16 of 16

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