govinfo:USCOURTS-nyed-1_23-cr-00328-3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
------------------------------------ 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
      
 
-against- 
 
 
TONY CLANTON, et al.,  
 
   Defendants. 
------------------------------------ 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
  
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
23-CR-328 (KAM) 
 
Kiyo A. Matsumoto, United States District Judge: 
 
On March 11, 2024, a grand jury sitting in the Eastern 
district of New York returned a six-count superseding indictment 
(ECF No. 89, the “Superseding Indictment”) charging Tony Clanton 
(“Clanton”), Lawrence Dotson (“Dotson”), and Rameen Smith 
(“Smith” and together with Clanton and Dotson, “Defendants”)with 
Count One, Hobbs Act Robbery Conspiracy between January 2023 and 
July 2023 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); Count Two, Hobbs 
Act Robbery on June 3, 2023 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); 
Count Three, Use of a Firearm During a Crime of Violence in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii) – specifically 
the Crime of Violence alleged in Count Two; and Count Four, 
Attempted Hobbs Act Robbery on June 27, 2023 in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1951(a).  (Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 1–4.)  Clanton and 
Smith were also charged with Count Five, Hobbs Act Robbery on 
July 12, 2023 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and Count Six, 
Use of Firearms During a Crime of Violence in violation of 18 
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U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii) – specifically the Crime of 
Violence alleged in Count Five.  (Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 5–
6.) 
Pending before this Court are Smith’s (I) pre-trial motion 
to suppress evidence purportedly obtained in violation of 
Smith’s rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and in violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 12, and (II) 
motion in limine seeking preclusion of cross-examination related 
to his criminal history.  (ECF No. 173, “Smith Mot.”; ECF No. 
181, “Smith Resp.”)  The government opposes Smith’s motion.  
(ECF No. 177, “Govt. Reply II.”) 
Also before this Court are Clanton’s motions in limine 
seeking preclusion of (III) evidence of his gambling activity 
and bankruptcy petition, (IV) certain social media evidence, 
(V) certain “consolidated” Amazon records as produced in their 
current form, and (VI) evidence regarding Clanton’s pre-trial 
release violations.  (ECF No. 87, “Clanton Mot. I”; ECF No. 92, 
“Govt. Reply I”; ECF No. 175, “Clanton Mot. II”; Govt. Reply II; 
ECF No. 180, “Clanton Resp.”)   
Based on the Court’s review of the parties’ submissions, 
the case record, and applicable law, and for the reasons set 
forth below, Smith’s motion to suppress evidence and request for 
a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) is 
DENIED.  Smith’s motion to preclude cross-examination regarding 
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his criminal history is denied as MOOT.  Clanton’s motion in 
limine to preclude evidence of his gambling activity and 
bankruptcy petition is DENIED.  Clanton’s motion to preclude 
certain social media evidence is DENIED in part and GRANTED in 
part.  Clanton’s motion to preclude Amazon records as produced 
in their current form is denied as MOOT.  Clanton’s motion to 
preclude evidence regarding his violations of his pretrial 
release conditions is DENIED.     
Factual Background 
I. The February 1, 2024 Warrant Regarding the Smith Phone 
On February 1, 2024, the government obtained a warrant to 
acquire cell site location data for one phone number believed to 
be associated with Smith (the “Smith Phone”).1  The “February 1, 
2024 Warrant” application was submitted with an affidavit of FBI 
Special Agent Jacqueline Muller (the “FBI Agent-Affiant”).  (See 
generally ECF No. 173-1, February 1, 2024 Warrant Affidavit, 
“Smith Mot. Ex. A”.) 
In the February 1, 2024 Warrant affidavit (the “Warrant 
Affidavit”), the FBI Agent-Affiant set forth an evidentiary 
basis for a finding of probable cause and attested that the 
Smith Phone was believed to have been used by Smith in 
connection with four robberies or attempted robberies between 
 
1 The Smith Phone is referred to as “Subject Phone” in the February 1, 2024 
Warrant application and ends in the digits 3295.  (Smith Mot. Ex. A, ¶ 1.) 
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June 2023 and July 2023 and that the fruit of the requested 
search warrants would yield evidence of violations of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 912, 922(g)(1), 924(c), 1951(a), 2, and 371.  (Smith Mot. Ex. 
A ¶¶ 5-7.)  The FBI Agent-Affiant identified two phone numbers, 
a number ending in 8087 used by Clanton (the “Clanton 8087 
Number”), and a number ending in 1264 used by Dotson (the 
“Dotson 1264 Number”) as well as three vehicles, a white 
Mercedes registered to Dotson (the “Dotson Mercedes”), a grey 
BMW registered to Spin Empire, a business owned by Clanton (the 
“Clanton-Business BMW”), a white Mercedes registered to Clanton 
(the “Clanton Mercedes”), and a black Infiniti registered to 
Clanton that the FBI Agent-Affiant believed to have been driven 
by Smith (the “Black Infiniti”), that were present at the 
robberies.  (Id. ¶¶ 7–9.)   
The Warrant Affidavit also described evidence recovered 
from the Black Infiniti connecting it to Smith.  Law enforcement 
agents collected from the vehicle, among other things, (1) a 
letter from Capital One addressed to Smith, (2) an order and 
summons from Richmond County Supreme Court related to Smith, and 
(3) a music download card with the name “Ise Kream,” a known 
alias of Smith’s.  (Smith Mot. Ex. A ¶ 27.)  The phone seized 
from Dotson upon his arrest also contained a contact under the 
name “Kream” for the Smith Phone.  (Id. ¶ 31.)   
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The Warrant Affidavit described a Domestic Incident Report 
(“DIR”) that detailed a domestic incident between Smith and his 
sister-in-law.  (Smith Mot. Ex. A ¶ 29.)  In the DIR, Smith’s 
sister-in-law gave the Smith Phone as Smith’s phone number, and 
said Smith drove a black Infinity, had social media accounts 
under the name “Isekream Shalon,” and lived at the same address 
listed on the letter from Capital One addressed to Smith that 
was recovered from the Black Infiniti.  (Id.) 
A. June 3, 2023 Annadale Smoke Shop Robbery  
The first incident described in the Smith Phone Warrant 
Affidavit is a robbery that took place at the Annadale Smoke 
Shop in Staten Island, New York on June 3, 2023 (the “June 3, 
2023 Annadale Smoke Shop Robbery”).  (Smith Mot. Ex. A ¶¶ 12-
18.)  According to the FBI Agent-Affiant, two men carrying 
handguns and wearing masks robbed an employee of the Annadale 
Smoke Shop.  (Id. ¶ 12.)  The perpetrators allegedly approached 
the employee outside of the store, forced him into the store, 
tied his hands with zip ties, threatened him with a handgun, and 
forcibly obtained cash from his person and the store register.  
(Id.)   
Video footage from the New York Police Department’s speed 
camera reflects the Clanton-Business BMW, the Black Infiniti, 
and the Dotson Mercedes driving near an intersection in the 
vicinity of the Annadale Smoke Shop within minutes of the June 
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3, 2023 Annadale Smoke Shop Robbery.  (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.)  Phone 
company records show that the Clanton 8087 Number, the Dotson 
1264 Number, and the Smith Phone had a multi-party call around 
the time of the June 3, 2023 Annadale Smoke Shop Robbery.  
(Smith Mot. Ex. A ¶¶ 17-18.)  The events of the June 3, 2023 
Annadale Smoke Shop Robbery underlie Counts Two and Three of the 
Superseding Indictment.  (See Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 2-3) 
(“the defendants TONY CLANTON, also known as ‘Tone,’ LAWRENCE 
DOTSON and RAMEEN SMITH, also known as ‘Kream’ and ‘Ise Kream’” 
are alleged to have participated in “the robbery of an operator 
of a smoke shop business in Staten Island, New York” on or about 
“June 3, 2023” and to have “knowingly and intentionally 
possess[ed] [] firearms in furtherance of” their participation 
in “the crime charged in Count Two.”) 
B. June 24, 2023 Attempted Home Invasion 
The Warrant Affidavit next described an attempted invasion 
of a residential building in Staten Island, New York on June 24, 
2023 (the “June 24, 2023 Attempted Home Invasion”).  (Smith Mot. 
Ex. A ¶¶ 19–21.)  According to the FBI Agent-Affiant, Dotson sat 
in the Dotson Mercedes with an individual identified as Dotson’s 
friend.  (Id. ¶ 20.)  As Dotson and his friend spoke in the 
Dotson Mercedes, a gunman entered the backseat of the car and 
instructed Dotson’s friend not to move while pointing a gun at 
them.  (Id.)  When Dotson’s friend ran out of the car and into 
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his home, the gunman chased after him, but was unable to open 
the door to the residential building.  (Smith Mot. Ex. A ¶ 20.)  
The gunman, apparently unable to get into Dotson’s friend’s 
home, ran eastbound and entered the Clanton-Business BMW and 
drove away from the scene of the attempted home invasion.  (Id.)   
Shortly before the incident, a car that appears to be the 
Clanton-Business BMW was observed driving past the Dotson 
Mercedes in the direction of the street where the Clanton-
Business BMW was parked immediately after the incident.  (Id.)  
Around the time of the attempted home invasion, phone records 
show several calls between Defendants, including the Clanton 
8087 Number making an outgoing call to the Smith Phone during 
which the Clanton 8087 Number connected to a cell tower near the 
location of the attempted home invasion.  (Id. ¶ 21.)   
C. June 27, 2023 Impersonation and Attempted Robbery 
Next, the Warrant Affidavit describes an attempted robbery 
and impersonation of federal law enforcement officials that took 
place in Edison, New Jersey on June 27, 2023 (the “June 27, 2023 
Attempted Robbery”).  (Smith Mot. Ex. A ¶¶ 22–23.)  On the 
evening of June 27, 2023, the owner of jewelry stores in New 
Jersey was driving his wife to their shared residence when he 
pulled into the driveway of his home and observed another car 
parked on the street nearby.  (Id. ¶ 22.)  Two men exited the 
car wearing “masks, hats, what appeared to be bulletproof vests 
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with the letters ‘FBI’ and an FBI badge.”  (Id.)  They 
approached the jewelry store owner while he sat in his car.  
(Smith Mot. Ex. A ¶ 22.)  At least one of the men who approached 
the jewelry store owner appeared to be in possession of a gun, 
which he used to knock on the window of the passenger door and 
instructed the occupants to exit the car.  (Id.)  The jewelry 
store owner drove away and met with the police.  (Id.)   
Earlier during the day of June 27, 2023, the Dotson 
Mercedes, Clanton-Business BMW, and Black Infiniti were observed 
by a local resident and on video surveillance footage driving on 
the same block as the jewelry store owner’s home.  (Id.)  The 
three cars were also tracked by license plate reader cameras 
driving through an intersection near the jewelry store owner’s 
stores, and video footage depicts the three cars driving from 
the jewelry store owner’s home towards his jewelry stores hours 
before the attempted robbery.  (Id.)  Police dashboard cameras 
also observed the three cars traveling together near the jewelry 
store owner’s home shortly after the attempted robbery.  (Id.)   
Phone records indicate that on the day of the June 27, 2023 
Attempted Robbery, there were multiple calls between Defendants 
in the vicinity of the attempted robbery.  (Id. ¶ 23.)  The 
events of the June 27, 2023 Attempted Robbery underlie Count 
Four of the Superseding Indictment.  (See Superseding Indictment 
¶ 4) (“On or about June 27, 2023, . . . the defendants TONY 
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CLANTON, also known as ‘Tone,’ LAWRENCE DOTSON, and RAMEEN 
SMITH, also known as ‘Kream’ and ‘Ise Kream’” are alleged to 
have “knowingly and intentionally attempt[ed] to obstruct, delay 
and affect commerce . . . by the robbery of an operator of a 
jewelry store in Edison, New Jersey.”) 
D. July 12, 2023 Armed Robbery 
Finally, the Warrant Affidavit described a robbery alleged 
to have taken place on July 12, 2023 in Brooklyn, New York (the 
“July 12, 2023 Robbery”).  (Smith Mot. Ex. A ¶¶ 24–26.)  On July 
12, 2023, the owner of an ice cream store in Brooklyn, New York 
collected approximately $6,700 from the store, transferred the 
cash to a TD Bank branch located in Brooklyn, New York, where he 
exchanged the cash for larger bills, and then drove to his home 
with the cash, where upon he was robbed in front of his home.  
(Id. ¶ 25.)  The ice cream store owner described a gunman 
dressed in dark clothing and a ski mask who demanded money from 
him at gunpoint and fled by getting into the passenger seat of a 
white Mercedes with New Jersey license plates.  (Id.)  Video 
footage from a nearby residence and traffic camera images 
captured the Clanton Mercedes, which matched the ice cream store 
owner’s description of the getaway vehicle from the July 12, 
2023 Robbery, driving to and from the ice cream store owner’s 
home at around the time of the robbery.  (Id.)   
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The FBI Agent-Affiant identified cell phone location 
information associated with the Clanton 8087 Number that placed 
the phone in close proximity to both the TD Bank branch and the 
ice cream store owner’s home around the time of the July 12, 
2023 Robbery.  (Smith Mot. Ex. A ¶ 26.)  Phone company records 
also show the Clanton 8087 Number and the Smith Phone 
communicating with each other numerous times the day of the July 
12, 2023 Robbery, but not during the time of the robbery, which 
the FBI Agent-Affiant alleges indicates the user of the Smith 
Phone was present and participated in the robbery.  (Id.)  The 
events of the July 12, 2023 Robbery underlie Counts Five and Six 
of the Superseding Indictment.  (See Superseding Indictment 
¶¶ 5-6) (“[T]he defendants TONY CLANTON, also known as ‘Tone,’ 
and RAMEEN SMITH, also known as ‘Kream’ and ‘Ise Kream,’” are 
alleged to have participated in “the robbery of an operator of 
an ice-cream business in Brooklyn, New York” on or about “July 
12, 2023” and to have “knowingly and intentionally possess[ed] 
[] firearms in furtherance of” their participation in “the crime 
charged in Count Five.”) 
E.  
 
 
     
 
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A. Clanton’s Flight  
Clanton was first arraigned on August 17, 2023 and released 
on a $1 million bond under certain conditions, including that he 
remain in “24-hour lock-down at his residence.”  (Govt. Reply II 
at 11.)  This condition was enforced through an ankle monitor 
that tracked Clanton’s location.  (Id.)  On March 19, 2024, 
Clanton was arraigned on the Superseding Indictment, which added 
Smith as a co-defendant and expanded the time period for the 
charged conspiracy as to Clanton and Dotson.  (See generally 
Superseding Indictment.)  Clanton’s bond conditions did not 
change after the March 19, 2024 arraignment. 
On March 25, 2024, two weeks before his then-scheduled 
trial date and less than one week after he was arraigned on the 
Superseding Indictment, Clanton removed his ankle monitor and 
video footage from outside of his Staten Island residence shows 
a person leaving with luggage and getting into a car at 
approximately the same time the ankle monitor was removed.  
(Govt. Reply II at 11–12.)  The same day, Clanton was stopped by 
a New York State trooper on a Staten Island highway, provided 
them with a fraudulent Pennsylvania driver’s license with the 
name “Vincent Browning,” and then fled the scene when he was 
asked to step out of his vehicle.  (Id. at 12.)   
Between March 29, 2024 and April 20, 2024, Clanton “changed 
his phone number and checked into a Days Inn hotel in 
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Woodbridge, New Jersey twice using the name ‘Troy Smith.’”  
(Govt. Reply II at 13.)  On April 22, 2024, Clanton was stopped 
by a New York City Police Department highway patrol officer on a 
Staten Island highway, provided them with another fraudulent 
Pennsylvania driver’s license with the name “Troy Smith,” and 
then fled.  (Id.)     
Clanton was arrested pursuant to a bench warrant on April 
30, 2024 in Dingmans Ferry, Pennsylvania, more than five weeks 
after he fled.  (Id.)  An iPhone seized at the time of his 
arrest contained messages with an individual (“Individual-1”), 
including an April 4, 2024 message in which Clanton wrote, “the 
next 90 days is crucial and I need to be out the way.”  (Id. at 
13–14.)  Individual-1 responded to this message in part, “I know 
you have to disappear for a while.  Once your passport comes 
through you should leave the country . . . No one knows you’re 
going there.  But you have to do what feels good to you.”  (Id. 
at 14.)  Clanton responded, “So can I go?” and Individual-1 
responded in the affirmative.  (Id.)  On April 20, 2024, Clanton 
and Individual-1 discussed meeting in person and Clanton told 
Individual-1 they could not go to City Island because “it’s one 
way in one way out.”  (Id.)  The seized iPhone also shows that, 
before he was arrested pursuant to a bench warrant on April 30, 
2024, Clanton visited two webpages with the titles “Faking your 
own death takes work – and lots of cash” and “How to Fake Your 
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Own Death: 12 Essential Tips,” and conducted a Google search for 
“is Serbia a non-extradition country to the United States.”  
(Govt. Reply II at 14.)   
LEGAL STANDARD 
In advance of a trial, parties may submit motions in limine 
for the district court’s review and decision.  “‘In limine’ has 
been defined as ‘on or at the threshold; at the very beginning; 
preliminary.’”  Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 
(1984) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 708 (5th ed. 1979)).  This 
Court’s authority to rule on in limine motions stems from the 
inherent and discretionary authority of a district court to 
manage its own docket and to ensure the just and efficient 
course of trial.  See Palmieri v. Defaria, 88 F.3d 136, 141 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (“[T]he purpose of an in limine motion is to aid the 
trial process by enabling the Court to rule in advance of trial 
on the relevance of certain forecasted evidence, as to issues 
that are definitely set for trial, without lengthy argument at, 
or interruption of, the trial.”) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  A district court’s ruling on an in limine 
motion constitutes a preliminary determination in preparation 
for trial, but the district court’s ruling “is subject to change 
[as] the case unfolds” and the district court is free, “in the 
exercise of [its] sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous 
in limine ruling.”  Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42. 
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DISCUSSION 
I. Smith’s Motion to Suppress Cell Phone Records. 
Smith moves to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to the 
February 1, 2024 Warrant.  Smith contends that the Warrant 
Affidavit contained “material misrepresentations,” “material 
omissions and deliberately misleading statements”  
 
 
(Smith Mot. at 1–4.)  Smith further alleges that 
the search resulting from the flawed warrant violates the 
principles outlined in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), 
and that an evidentiary hearing is required to affirmatively 
establish whether probable cause existed to support the February 
1, 2024 Warrant.  (Smith Mot. at 3–4.)  For the reasons set 
forth below, Smith’s motion to suppress and for a Franks hearing 
is DENIED. 
Legal Standard 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures” and 
provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
Probable cause is determined based on “a practical, common-sense 
[assessment of] whether, given all the circumstances set forth 
in the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability that 
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contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place.”  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).  Once a 
magistrate judge has made such a determination and issued the 
challenged warrant, “the task of a reviewing court is simply to 
ensure that the totality of the circumstances afforded the 
magistrate a substantial basis for making the requisite probable 
cause determination.”  United States v. Clark, 638 F.3d 89, 93 
(2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Indeed, the Supreme Court has long cautioned that “after-the-
fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit 
should not take the form of de novo review.”  Gates, 462 U.S. at 
236.  
However, in certain limited circumstances, a criminal 
defendant may challenge a warrant by attacking the veracity of 
the warrant’s underlying affidavit pursuant to Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).  “To be entitled to a Franks 
hearing, a defendant must make a ‘substantial preliminary 
showing’ that: (1) the claimed inaccuracies or omissions are the 
result of the affiant’s deliberate falsehood or reckless 
disregard for the truth; and (2) the alleged falsehoods or 
omissions were necessary to the judge’s probable cause finding.”  
United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(citing United States v. Levasseur, 816 F.2d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 
1987)).   
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The first prong of the Franks test requires a showing of 
deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth.  
Salameh, 152 F.3d at 113.  Notably, “[e]very statement in a 
warrant affidavit does not have to be true.”  United States v. 
Trzaska, 111 F.3d 1019, 1027 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Franks, 438 
U.S. at 165).  Instead, Franks requires that the statements in a 
warrant affidavit “be ‘believed or appropriately accepted by the 
affiant as true.’”  United States v. Campino, 890 F.2d 588, 592 
(2d Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).  A defendant challenging 
misstatements or omissions in connection with a warrant 
affidavit under Franks must demonstrate that the allegedly false 
statements were “made intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless 
disregard for the truth.”  United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 
843, 848 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56).  
Allegations of intentionally or knowingly false statements must 
be “accompanied by an offer of proof.”  Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 
(“Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are 
insufficient.”).  A defendant can prove reckless disregard for 
the truth where “the affiant in fact entertained serious doubts 
as to the truth of his allegations.”  United States v. 
Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 154 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).   
Omissions, though, “are not subject to the same high level 
of scrutiny as misstatements.”  United States v. Rivera, 750 F. 
Supp. 614, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).   Although reckless disregard 
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“can sometimes be inferred from the omission of critical 
information, . . . such an inference is not to be automatically 
drawn simply because a reasonable person would have included the 
omitted information.”  Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d at 154.  This is 
particularly true where “the omission was the result of a 
considered and reasonable judgment that the information was not 
necessary to the . . . application.”  Id. at 155. 
“[I]f a defendant can make a sufficient showing that false 
statements were deliberately or recklessly included in a warrant 
affidavit, a court should” then move on to the second prong of 
the Franks test, which takes the form of a materiality analysis.  
Trzaska, 111 F.3d at 1027 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72).  
This inquiry requires that the court put aside the alleged 
misstatements or omissions and determine whether “the remaining 
portions of the affidavit would support probable cause to issue 
the warrant.”  United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713, 718 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).  A Franks hearing is only 
required if the reviewing court determines that, taking together 
the untainted portions of the application, the affidavit 
includes an insufficient basis for a finding of probable cause.  
See Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d at 146.  Otherwise, “suppression is not 
required.”  Id.  
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Discussion 
A. Deliberate Falsehood or Reckless Disregard for the Truth 
Smith argues that the “misleading nature of the 
representations [in the Warrant Affidavit] is glaring, 
intentional and reckless” because there “simply can be no 
innocent explanation” for the FBI Agent-Affiant’s “deliberate 
choice to mislead Magistrate Levy .”  
(Smith Mot. at 3.)   
      
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
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  Far from showing the 
FBI Agent-Affiant behaved recklessly, this disclosure instead 
provides ample information for the magistrate judge to consider 
when determining whether there was sufficient probable cause to 
issue the warrant. 
Although reckless disregard “can sometimes be inferred from 
the omission of critical information,” that inference should not 
be “automatically drawn simply because a reasonable person would 
have included the omitted information.”  Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d at 
154 (citation omitted).   
 
 
 
 
  
  
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  Rajnaratnam, 719 F.3d at 155.  This Court also 
finds no evidence that the FBI Agent-Affiant “entertained 
serious doubts as to the truth of [their] allegations” or 
possessed a “deliberate intent to mislead” the magistrate judge 
  
Id. at 154 (citation omitted). 
Accordingly, Smith has failed to satisfy the first Franks 
prong because he has not demonstrated, based on probative 
evidence or otherwise, that the FBI Agent-Affiant engaged in 
“deliberate falsehood[s] or [acted with] reckless disregard for 
the truth.”  Salameh, 152 F.3d at 113. 
B. Materiality   
If, arguendo, Smith had provided evidence of deliberate 
falsehoods or evidence from which the Court could infer the FBI 
Agent-Affiant’s reckless disregard for the truth, the Court must 
consider whether the alleged misstatements or omissions were 
material under the second prong of the Franks test.  Franks, 438 
U.S. at 171–72.  With respect to materiality, the Court 
considers whether a finding of probable cause could have been 
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supported by the remainder of the information within the 
affidavit, putting the allegedly false information to the side.  
See United States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Discala, No. 22-675, 2023 WL 4118637, at *3 (2d 
Cir. June 22, 2023) (“When viewed in the context of the 
application as a whole, the challenged representations and 
omissions were clearly not material.”).   
 the 
Court finds there was ample evidence to support a finding of 
probable cause in the February 1, 2024 Warrant application.  The 
Warrant Affidavit described calls between the Smith Phone, 
Clanton 8087 Number, and the Dotson 1264 Number at times 
relevant to the charged robberies.  (Smith Mot. Ex. A ¶¶ 17–18, 
21, 23, 26, 32.)  Law enforcement records show Smith’s sister-
in-law reported, among other things, that Smith’s phone number 
is the number ending in 3295 identified in the Warrant Affidavit 
as the Smith Phone and that he had social media accounts under 
the name “Isekream Shalon,” a name similar to a known alias for 
Smith.  (Id. ¶¶ 29, 31.)  Evidence obtained pursuant to a search 
warrant from Dotson’s cell phone shows the Smith Phone number 
saved under the contact name “Kream.”  (Id. ¶ 31.)  Phone 
company subscriber records for the Smith Phone also listed the 
same address found on mail addressed to Smith recovered from the 
Black Infiniti.  (Smith Mot. Ex. A ¶ 27, 32.)  
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Based on the foregoing evidence, the Court is satisfied 
that there was sufficient probable cause for the  
February 1, 2024 Warrant and “the totality of the circumstances 
afforded the magistrate a substantial basis for making the 
requisite probable cause determination.”  Clark, 638 F.3d at 93 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).   
 
 
  In any event, the 
alleged misstatements or omissions were immaterial, and no 
Franks hearing is warranted.  Accordingly, Smith’s motion to 
suppress evidence resulting from the February 1, 2024 Warrant is 
DENIED. 
II. Smith’s Motion to Preclude Cross-Examination as to his 
Criminal History. 
Smith also seeks to preclude cross-examination about his 
criminal history, including six prior felony convictions, on the 
grounds that they do not bear on his credibility or character 
for truthfulness.  (Smith Mot. at 4–6.)  In response, the 
government has represented that it “no longer intends to cross-
examine Smith about his prior convictions.”  (Govt. Reply II at 
25.)  Accordingly, Smith’s motion to preclude cross-examination 
related to his criminal history is denied as MOOT. 
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III. Clanton’s Motion to Preclude Evidence as to his 
Bankruptcy Petition and Gambling Activity. 
Clanton seeks to preclude evidence regarding his bankruptcy 
petition before the Eastern District of New York (the 
“Bankruptcy Petition”) and records concerning his gambling 
activity at the Hard Rock Hotel & Casino and Ocean Casino Resort 
(the “Gambling Records”) on the grounds that the proffered 
evidence is not relevant, constitutes impermissible character 
evidence, and is substantially more prejudicial than probative.  
(Clanton Mot. I at 2–4.)  For the reasons set forth below, 
Clanton’s motion to preclude the Bankruptcy Petition and 
Gambling Records is DENIED. 
Legal Standard 
First, neither filing for bankruptcy nor gambling at a 
casino is a crime or “wrong.”  Moreover, “evidence of uncharged 
criminal activity is not considered other crimes evidence under 
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) if it arose out of the same transaction or 
series of transactions as the charged offense, if it is 
inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged 
offense, or if it is necessary to complete the story of the 
crime on trial.”  United States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39, 44 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 936, 942 
(2d Cir. 1997).  Courts within the Second Circuit have “long 
adopted an ‘inclusionary’ approach to the admission of uncharged 
crime evidence, under which evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or 
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acts ‘is admissible for any purpose other than to show a 
defendant's criminal propensity.’”  United States v. Paulino, 
445 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).  
Further, direct evidence of the crimes charged in the 
indictment is considered relevant and admissible without 
reference to Rule 404(b). See, e.g., United States v. Towne, 870 
F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101 
(1989).  “To be relevant, evidence need only tend to prove the 
government's case, and evidence that adds context and dimension 
to the government's proof of the charges can have that 
tendency.”  United States v. Kahale, 789 F. Supp. 2d 359, 381 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Graham, 477 
Fed. App’x 818 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).  “Thus, 
evidence is often admissible to provide background for the 
events alleged in the indictment or to enable the jury to 
understand the complete story of the crimes charged.”  Id. at 
707-08 (noting “the prosecution is entitled to present a 
complete narrative of the crime that ‘satisf[ies] jurors' 
expectations about what proper proof should be’”) (quoting Old 
Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 188-89 (1997)). 
In addition to considerations of relevance, any evidence 
that the parties seek to offer or exclude in their motions is 
subject to the Court's balancing of its probative and 
prejudicial value, as provided in Fed. R. Evid. 403.  Rule
 403 
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permits the exclusion of evidence, even if relevant, “if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . 
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, 
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence.”  Fed. R. Evid. 403.  Courts have broad discretion in 
making decisions under Rule 403’s probative-prejudice balancing 
analysis.  See United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 131 
(2d Cir. 2010) (“We review a district court's evidentiary 
rulings deferentially, mindful of its superior position to 
assess relevancy and to weigh the probative value of evidence 
against its potential for unfair prejudice.”) (citing United 
States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886, 901 (2d Cir. 2008)); see 
also United States v. Dwyer, 539 F.2d 924, 927 (2d Cir. 
1976) (“In the balancing of probative value against unfair 
prejudice required by Rule 403, the trial judge has wide 
discretion[.]”) (citation omitted).  Under Rule 403, courts make 
“‘a conscientious assessment of whether unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs probative value’ with regard to each 
piece of proffered evidence.”  United States v. Pugh, 162 F. 
Supp. 3d 97, 103 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting United States v. Al-
Moayad, 545 F.3d 139, 160 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
Discussion 
In response to Clanton’s argument that the bankruptcy and 
gambling records are irrelevant impermissible character evidence 
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and substantially and unfairly prejudicial rather than 
probative, the government argues that the Bankruptcy Petition 
and Gambling Records are admissible as “direct evidence of the 
charged crimes.”  (Govt. Reply I at 1.)  The government contends 
the records, “tie Clanton to certain phones, vehicles, and co-
conspirators that are key to [the] government’s case in chief.”  
(Govt. Reply I at 2.)  For the reasons set forth below, this 
Court agrees.   
The assets listed in the Bankruptcy Petition include a 2021 
Mercedes-Benz S580 that the government alleges was present at 
the July 12, 2023 Robbery charged in Count Five of the 
Superseding Indictment.  (Govt. Reply I at 2.)  The assets also 
list Clanton as the sole owner of Spin Empire, LLC (“Spin 
Empire”), a company name listed on items found in the Dotson 
Mercedes, a vehicle allegedly used to carry out the charged 
offenses.  (Id.)  The items removed from the Dotson Mercedes 
included, among other things, a traffic vest, and a business 
card with a number the government alleges was used by Clanton 
during at least one of the robberies charged in the Superseding 
Indictment.  (Id.)  This evidence not only serves to connect 
Clanton to phones and vehicles allegedly used to carry out 
certain charged offences, but also connects Clanton to his co-
conspirator, Dotson.  These factors weigh in favor of a finding 
that the Bankruptcy Petition provides background information, 
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serves to “explain the mutual trust that existed between 
coconspirators,” Clanton and Dotson, and “adds context and 
dimension to the government's proof of the charges.”  United 
States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 334 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations 
omitted); Kahale, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 381 (citation omitted). 
Similarly, the Gambling Records tie Clanton to phones that 
were allegedly present at the charged robberies.  For example, 
the records list the date and time of purchases Clanton made at 
the Hard Rock Hotel & Casino and Ocean Casino Resort that 
correspond to cell phone location data pulled from his phone 
showing that, at the time those purchases were made, Clanton was 
in the vicinity of those casinos.  (Govt. Reply I at 2.)  
Clanton has already indicated that he plans to dispute whether 
he was the user of certain phones during the charged robberies.  
(ECF No. 80, Clanton Req. to Charge, at 7.)  Accordingly, the 
Gambling Records are relevant to demonstrate that Clanton was 
the user of cell phones that he disputes using and vehicles that 
allegedly were present at the charged robberies, and they 
provide a “complete narrative of the crime” charged.  Kahale, 
789 F. Supp. 2d at 381 (citation omitted).   
Notably, Clanton filed for bankruptcy and engaged in 
gambling activity during the same time period as the robberies 
charged in the Superseding Indictment.  (Govt. Reply I at 3.)  
The timing of the Bankruptcy Petition and Gambling Records 
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provide context for Clanton’s financial difficulties and, 
therefore, speak to why Clanton may engage in gunpoint 
robberies.  Courts in this district have admitted “evidence 
regarding defendant’s gambling activities” to “‘complete the 
story’ of the crimes charged in the indictment” because they 
would “aid[ ] the jury in deciding—on the basis of defendant’s 
motive, rather than character—whether the defendant is likely to 
have been the one responsible for the crimes charged in the 
indictment.”  United States v. Chan, No. S1197CR1053(PKL), 2002 
WL 46994, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2002).  It follows that the 
timing of when Clanton filed for bankruptcy and engaged in 
gambling activities provides “crucial background evidence that 
[gives] coherence to the basic sequence of events that occurred” 
in connection with the incidents underlying the instant charges.  
Gonzalez, 110 F.3d at 942.  Accordingly, the Court finds the 
Bankruptcy Petition and Gambling Records are relevant and 
probative.  
Turning to the question of unfair prejudice under Rule 403, 
it is well settled in the Second Circuit that relevant evidence 
will not be precluded by Rule 403 where “the conduct is not ‘any 
more sensational or disturbing’ than the charged crime.”  United 
States v. Rosemond, 958 F.3d 111, 125 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting 
United States v. Lyle, 919 F.3d 716, 737 (2d Cir. 2019)).  Here, 
there is no doubt that the mere act of filing for bankruptcy or 
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gambling is not “more sensational” than the crimes charged in 
the Superseding Indictment, which include two counts of Hobbs 
Act Robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and two counts 
of use of a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 
18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii).  United States v. Pitre, 960 
F.2d 1112, 1120 (2d Cir. 1992).  Accordingly, the Court finds 
that the probative value of the Bankruptcy Petition and Gambling 
Records is not substantially outweighed by any prejudice, and 
Clanton’s motion to preclude this evidence is DENIED. 
IV. Clanton’s Motion to Preclude Certain Social Media 
Evidence. 
Next, Clanton moves to preclude evidence from certain 
social media accounts (the “Social Media Records”) as “not 
relevant and substantially more prejudicial than probative.”  
(Clanton Mot. I at 4.)  The Social Media Records include posts 
from Clanton’s and a co-conspirator’s social media accounts 
referencing “Take Money” in captions, images of a cartoon “Take 
Money” logo, a photograph of a firearm and driver’s license the 
government alleges belongs to a co-conspirator, as well as a 
post from a co-conspirator’s social media account depicting that 
co-conspirator and Clanton together.  (See ECF No. 87-1, 
“Clanton Mot. I Ex. A”.) 
The government argues that the Social Media Records are 
relevant because they tie Clanton to phone numbers allegedly 
used during the charged robberies and demonstrate a connection 
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to his co-conspirator.  (Govt. Reply I at 5.)  For example, in 
the Bankruptcy Records described above, Clanton also claims sole 
ownership of the business “Take Money Clothing & Apparel, LLC.”  
(Id.)  The proffered Social Media Records include multiple 
references to “Take Money” in both images and captions, 
including in posts on an account associated with a co-
conspirator, as well as photographs of Clanton and the co-
conspirator together.  (See generally Clanton Mot. I Ex. A.)  
The government also alleges that one of the accounts that posted 
about “Take Money” is “associated with a co-conspirator and a 
phone number that was present at some of the robberies.”  (Govt. 
Reply I at 5.)  The Court finds that this evidence demonstrates 
the relationship between Clanton and his co-conspirator, which 
serves to “inform the jury of the background of the conspiracy 
charged[,] . . . help[s] explain how the illegal relationship 
between” Clanton and his co-conspirator developed, and 
“explain[s] the mutual trust that existed between 
coconspirators.”  Rosa, 11 F.3d at 334.  The photograph of a 
firearm on Clanton’s co-conspirator’s Instagram is also relevant 
and probative because it serves to demonstrate Clanton’s “co-
conspirator’s access to and comfort level with firearms,” which 
is, of course, a key feature of the charged 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A) offenses.  United States v. Dervishaj, 787 F. 
App’x 12, 15 (2d Cir. 2019).   
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Even after considering whether the proffered evidence is 
relevant, the Court must also balance its probative and 
prejudicial value under Rule 403.  Here, the Court finds 
persuasive Clanton’s argument that the probative-prejudice 
balancing analysis weighs in favor of excluding the cartoon 
“Take Money” logo with a bullet hole in the “O.”  Unlike the 
photograph of an actual firearm, the cartoon “Take Money” logo 
is just that: a cartoon.  It does not demonstrate Clanton’s or 
his co-conspirator’s “access to and comfort level with firearms” 
and the exaggerated cartoon imagery may unduly prejudice the 
jury.  Dervishaj, 787 F. App’x at 15.  To the extent the 
government intends to use the Social Media Records to show the 
relationship between Clanton, his co-conspirators, and the “Take 
Money” business, there are numerous other proffered social media 
posts that are probative of this relationship and do not present 
the risk of unfair prejudice.  (Clanton Mot. I Ex. A at 3, 8, 
13); see United States v. Brack, 21-3077-cr, 2023 WL 3513572, 
at *3 (2d Cir. May 18, 2023) (finding “no error in the district 
court’s exclusion of the video evidence” where the video was 
cumulative of undisputed testimony).   
Weighing the probative and prejudicial value of the 
remaining Social Media Records, the Court finds that they are 
not precluded by Rule 403 because they do not demonstrate 
conduct that is “‘any more sensational or disturbing’ than the 
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charged crime.”  Rosemond, 958 F.3d at 125 (quoting Lyle, 919 
F.3d at 737).  Here, where Clanton has been charged with two 
counts of Use of Firearms During a Crime of Violence in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii), the probative 
value of the photograph of a firearm on his co-conspirator’s 
Instagram page is not outweighed by any prejudice, particularly 
as “it did not show anyone holding the gun or in any way suggest 
that the possession or use of the gun was illegal.”  Dervishaj, 
787 Fed. App’x at 15. 
Accordingly, Clanton’s motion to preclude the Social Media 
Records is GRANTED as to the images depicting the cartoon “Take 
Money” logo and bullet hole, (Clanton Mot. I Ex. A, at 5, 9), 
and DENIED as to the remaining proffered social media evidence. 
V. Clanton’s Motion to Preclude the “Consolidated” Amazon 
Records. 
Clanton also moves to preclude certain records obtained 
from Amazon that provide in a single document information on 
purchases made by Dotson and Clanton.  (Clanton Mot. I at 5; ECF 
No. 87-2, “Clanton Mot. I Ex. B”.)  Clanton argues that the 
consolidated records “create[ ] a misimpression of some sort of 
relationship between the defendants’ Amazon account,” which is 
unduly prejudicial under Rule 403 as Dotson and Clanton are co-
defendants in a conspiracy case.  (Clanton Mot. I at 5.)  The 
government responds that it has obtained separate Amazon records 
for the Clanton and Dotson accounts and will seek to admit them 
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as separate exhibits at trial.  (Govt. Reply I at 6.)  
Accordingly, Clanton’s motion to preclude consolidated Amazon 
records is denied as MOOT.  
VI. Clanton’s Motion to Preclude Evidence of his Pretrial 
Release Violations. 
Finally, Clanton moves to preclude all evidence of his 
flight from his pretrial supervision conditions, arguing (1) 
testimony from a Pretrial Services officer regarding Clanton’s 
flight is precluded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3153, and (2) the 
probative value of the government’s remaining evidence of flight 
is “far outweighed by its prejudicial effect” because it does 
not satisfy the four part test for admitting evidence of flight 
laid out in United States v. Al-Sadawi, 432 F.3d 419, 424 (2d 
Cir. 2005).  (Clanton Mot. II at 1.)  The government has 
indicated that it “does not intend to call a Pretrial Services 
officer as a witness at a trial of the charges in the current 
indictment.”  (Govt. Reply II at 8 n.2.)  Accordingly, Clanton’s 
motion to preclude testimony from a Pretrial Services officer is 
denied as MOOT.  For the reasons set forth below, the remainder 
of Clanton’s motion is DENIED. 
Legal Standard 
“It is well-settled that flight can, in some circumstances, 
evidence consciousness of guilt.”  Al-Sadawi, 432 F.3d at 424 
(citing United States v. Glenn, 312 F.3d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 2002); 
Salameh, 152 F.3d at 157).  But “before a court may instruct a 
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jury regarding flight, a satisfactory factual predicate must 
exist from which the jury can infer consciousness of guilt from 
flight.”  Id.  (citing United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d 1251, 
1260 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 245, 252 
(2d Cir. 1986)).  This requirement “ensures that the evidence is 
probative in a legal sense and protects the defendant against 
the possibility of the jury drawing unsupported inferences from 
otherwise innocuous behavior.”  Amuso, 21 F.3d at 1260. 
The probative value of evidence of flight as 
“circumstantial evidence of guilt depends upon the degree of 
confidence with which four inferences can be drawn: (1) from the 
defendant's behavior to flight; (2) from flight to consciousness 
of guilt; (3) from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of 
guilt concerning the crime charged; and (4) from consciousness 
of guilt concerning the crime charged to actual guilt of the 
crime charged.”  Al-Sadawi, 432 F.3d at 424 (citation omitted).  
Each link in the chain must be “sturdily supported.”  Id.  
(citing United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d 414, 420 (4th Cir. 
1981)).  The government has met its burden of establishing all 
four inferences. 
DISCUSSION 
First, the government proffers evidence that Clanton’s 
conduct constitutes flight from law enforcement.  (Govt. Reply 
II at 16.)  The government represents that it will present 
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evidence that Clanton removed his ankle monitor and then “left 
the Eastern District of New York, changed his phone number, 
changed his car, [and on at least two occasions] presented 
police officers with false identification documents, and fled 
from those officers.”  (Govt. Reply II at 12, 16.)  During this 
time, Clanton also conducted Internet searches on how to fake 
his death and whether he could be extradited to the United 
States from Serbia.  (Id. at 14.)  These actions are clear 
evidence of flight. 
Second, the government proffers evidence that Clanton’s 
flight was connected to his consciousness of guilt.  (Govt. 
Reply II at 16.)  Although Clanton argues that he never missed a 
court date and may have self-surrendered prior to any 
appearance, this is belied by the evidence.  (Clanton Mot. II 
at 2.)  Clanton removed his ankle monitor in violation of his 
conditions of release, and fled from law enforcement after 
providing police officers with a fake ID at a traffic stop on at 
least two occasions.  (Govt. Reply II at 12–13.)  Clanton also 
expressed his desire to avoid detection when he sent Individual-
1 the message, “the next 90 days is crucial and I need to be out 
the way” and refused to meet Individual-1 at City Island because 
there was only “one way in one way out.”  (Id. at 14.) 
Third, the government intends to present evidence linking 
the defendant's consciousness of guilt to his consciousness of 
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guilt concerning the crimes charged.  (Govt. Reply II at 17.)  
The government represents that Clanton fled just two weeks 
before his trial was scheduled to begin and just one week after 
he was arraigned on the Superseding Indictment.  (Id.)  During 
the time of his flight, Clanton researched how to fake his death 
and whether he could be extradited from Serbia.  (Id. at 14.)  
He also had conversations with Individual-1 in which Individual-
1 told him to “disappear for a while” and “leave the country.”  
(Id.)  Clanton appears to concede that this evidence is 
sufficient to establish the inference that his flight was 
related to consciousness of guilt, noting, “[p]roviding a fake 
name is a far cry from making arrangements to leave the country 
or some similar conduct that would demonstrate consciousness of 
guilt of these charges.”  (Clanton Mot. II at 3.) 
Fourth, the government intends to present evidence of a 
nexus between the defendant's consciousness of guilt for the 
crimes charged and his actual guilt.  (Govt. Reply II at 17.)  
Although not many cases address this specific inference, it 
appears to be met by virtue of the inherent relationship between 
consciousness of guilt and actual guilt. See, e.g., United 
States v. Anderson, 575 F. Supp. 31, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (“The 
statements do, however, meet the relevancy test of Fed. R. Evid. 
401 since they support the inference of consciousness of guilt 
which in turn supports an inference of actual guilt.”) 
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(citing United States v. Buigues, 568 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 
1978))).  The timing of Clanton’s flight, just one week after he 
was arraigned on the Superseding Indictment and two weeks before 
his then scheduled trial date, the measures he took to flee, 
including changing his number, securing fake IDs, and fleeing 
from law enforcement, as well as his searches for how to fake 
his death and how to escape extradition, demonstrate this nexus.   
Moreover, “[t]he fact that a defendant's flight is subject 
to varying interpretations does not lead inevitably to the 
conclusion that the district court abused its discretion in 
admitting flight evidence.”  United States v. Steele, 390 F. 
App'x 6, 12 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Amuso, 21 F.3d at 1258).  
Although Clanton has presented other explanations for why he 
fled from police officers, for example, the possible presence of 
contraband in his vehicle, “[w]here the evidence passes the 
threshold inquiry of relevance, ‘[t]he accepted technique is for 
the judge to receive the evidence and permit the defendant to 
bring in evidence in denial or explanation.’”  Amuso, 21 F.3d at 
1258 (quoting United States v. Ayala, 307 F.2d 574, 576 (2d Cir. 
1962)); (Clanton Mot. I at 3.)  Despite the ruling in Amuso and 
Ayala, this Court acknowledges that Mr. Clanton need not present 
evidence or explanation.  For the foregoing reasons, Clanton’s 
motion to preclude all evidence of his flight is DENIED. 
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