govinfo:USCOURTS-nyed-1_23-cr-00328-7

United States District Court 
Eastern District of New York 
 
---------------------------X 
 
United States of America, 
 
- against - 
 
Tony Clanton, 
also known as “Tone,” 
 
Defendant. 
 
---------------------------X 
 
 
 
 
 
Memorandum & Order 
 
No. 23-cr-328 (KAM)  
 
Kiyo A. Matsumoto, United States District Judge: 
 
On April 21, 2025, after a six-day trial, a jury found Tony 
Clanton (“Clanton”) guilty of five counts of a superseding 
indictment charging him with one count of Hobbs Act Robbery 
Conspiracy (Count One), two counts of completed Hobbs Act Robbery 
(Counts Two and Five), one count of attempted Hobbs Act Robbery 
(Count Four), and one count of use of firearms during a Crime of 
Violence, specifically, the Hobbs Act Robbery charged in Count Two 
(Count Three).  Mr. Clanton moved for a judgment of acquittal 
during trial after the government rested and again before the jury 
began its deliberations, and the Court reserved its ruling.  (Tr. 
at 822, 836–37.)  At the Parties’ request, the Court scheduled 
post-trial briefing on Mr. Clanton’s motion.  (Tr. at 838.) 
Before the Court is Mr. Clanton’s motion pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 29(c) for a judgment of 
acquittal on Counts Two, Three and Four of the Superseding 
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Indictment.  (ECF No. 323, Def. Mot.; ECF No. 330, Def. Reply.)   
The government opposes Mr. Clanton’s motion.  (ECF No. 329, Govt. 
Opp.)   
For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Clanton’s Rule 29 motion 
for a judgment of acquittal is respectfully DENIED. 
BACKGROUND  
I. The Charges  
On March 11, 2024, Mr. Clanton, Lawrence Dotson (“Dotson”), 
and Rameen Smith (“Smith,” and together with Clanton and Dotson, 
“Defendants”) were charged in a six-count superseding indictment, 
(ECF No. 89, the “Superseding Indictment”), charging Defendants 
with Count One, Hobbs Act Robbery Conspiracy between January 2023 
and July 2023 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); Count Two, Hobbs 
Act Robbery on June 3, 2023 in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), 
2; Count Three, Use of a Firearm During a Crime of Violence in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), 2—
specifically the attempted Hobbs Act Robbery charged in Count Two; 
and Count Four, Attempted Hobbs Act Robbery on June 27, 2023 in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), 2.  (Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 
1–4.)  Mr. Clanton and Mr. Smith were also charged with Count Five, 
Hobbs Act Robbery on July 12, 2023 in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1951(a), 2 and Count Six, Use of Firearms During a Crime of 
Violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), 
924(c)(1)(A)(ii), 2—specifically the Crime of Violence alleged in 
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Count Five.  (Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 5–6.)   
On January 28, 2025, the Court granted the government’s motion 
to dismiss Count Six of the Superseding Indictment.  (ECF No. 254, 
Dkt. Order dated Jan. 28, 2025.) 
II. Mr. Clanton’s Trial and the Jury’s Verdict 
Jury selection for Mr. Clanton’s trial commenced on April 7, 
2025, and trial commenced on April 14, 2025.  (ECF Minute Entry 
dated April 7, 2025; ECF Minute Entry dated April 14, 2025.)  After 
preliminary instructions by the Court and opening statements by 
both parties, the government presented its case-in-chief over the 
course of the next three days.  On April 17, 2025, outside the 
presence of the jury but in Mr. Clanton’s presence, the Court held 
a charging conference with the parties.  (Tr. at 837–89.)  The 
government rested on April 17, 2025.  (Tr. at 820:17–18.) 
After his initial Rule 29 motion, Mr. Clanton presented a 
defense case and rested on the same day—Mr. Clanton did not 
testify.  (Tr. at 822–837.)  Mr. Clanton then renewed his Rule 29 
motion, and the Court reserved its decision.  (Tr. at 838.)  On 
April 18, 2025, both parties presented their closing arguments to 
the jury, the Court charged the jury, and, following its 
deliberations, the jury convicted Mr. Clanton of Counts One through 
Five of the Superseding Indictment.  (ECF No. 316, Court Ex. 7A.)  
As to Count Three, the jury found that the government did not prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm was brandished in 
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connection with the robbery charged in Count Two.  (Id.) 
LEGAL STANDARD 
A defendant challenging his conviction on sufficiency grounds 
“faces a heavy burden, as the standard of review is exceedingly 
deferential to the jury's apparent determinations.”  United States 
v. Davis, No. 21-cv-1486, 2023 WL 4582002, at *1 (2d Cir. July 18, 
2023) (alteration adopted) (quoting United States v. Flores, 945 
F.3d 687, 710 (2d Cir. 2019)); see also United States v. Ramos, 26 
F. App’x 80, 81 (2d Cir. 2002) (“A defendant challenging a 
conviction based upon a claim of insufficiency of the evidence 
bears a heavy burden.”) (quoting United States v. Feliciano, 223 
F.3d 102, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) cert. denied, 532 U.S. 943 (2001)) 
(collecting cases).   
In deciding a Rule 29 motion, a court should “avoid usurping 
the role of the jury,” and cannot “substitute its own determination 
of the weight of the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn for that of the jury.”  United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d 
122, 129 (2d Cir. 1999) (alteration adopted) (quoting United 
States v. Mariani, 725 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir. 1984)); see 
also United States v. Facen, 812 F.3d 280, 286 (2d Cir. 
2016); United States v. Hampton, 676 F. Supp. 3d 283, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 
2023) (citing United States v. Dore, No. 12-cr-45 (RJS), 2013 WL 
3965281, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2013)).   
Courts must consider the totality of the evidence “in the 
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light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference 
that could have been drawn in the government's favor, and deferring 
to the jury's assessment of witness credibility and its assessment 
of the weight of the evidence.”  United States v. White, 7 F.4th 
90, 98 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Aquart, 912 F.3d 
1, 17 (2d Cir. 2018)) (reversing partial grant of Rule 29 motion 
because “district court failed to view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the government and overlooked or minimized 
[inculpatory] evidence”).  The Second Circuit further instructs 
that courts must evaluate the evidence in a sufficiency challenge 
“in conjunction,” rather than “piecemeal or in isolation.”  United 
States v. Klein, 913 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting United 
States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 94-95 (2d Cir. 2006)); see 
also Guadagna, 183 F.3d at 130 (noting that “each fact may gain 
color from others” (citing United States v. Monica, 295 F.2d 400, 
401 (2d Cir. 1961))). 
Ultimately, a court may enter a judgment of acquittal “only 
if the evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged is 
‘nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury could find guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  Guadagna, 183 F.3d at 
130 (quoting United States v. White, 673 F.2d 299, 301 (10th Cir. 
1982)); see also United States v. Jackson, 335 F.3d 170, 180 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (“a district court will grant a motion to enter a 
judgment of acquittal on grounds of insufficient evidence if it 
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concludes that no rational trier of fact could have found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”).  “A conviction must 
be upheld if any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  White, 
7 F.4th at 98 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Vernace, 811 F.3d 609, 615 (2d 
Cir. 2016); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).   
DISCUSSION 
I. The June 3 Smoke Shop Robbery (Counts Two and Three) 
 Mr. Clanton argues that this Court should overturn the jury’s 
verdict as to Count Two, Hobbs Act Robbery of Annadale Smoke Shop 
on or about June 3, 2023 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (the 
“June 3 Smoke Shop Robbery”), because “the government failed to 
prove that Mr. Clanton possessed the requisite specific intent to 
commit the smoke shop robbery.”  (ECF No. 323 at 12.)  Mr. Clanton's 
sole argument as to Count Three, use of firearms during and in 
relation to the robbery charged in Count Two in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 924 (c)(1)(A)(i), 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), is contingent upon 
the Court overturning his conviction on Count Two.  (See ECF No. 
316, Verdict Sheet (“If you found the defendant TONY CLANTON guilty 
as to Count Two, answer the following question” as to Count 
Three).)  For the reasons set forth below, this Court finds there 
is fulsome evidence supporting the jury’s conviction of  Mr. 
Clanton as to Count Two and, as a result, Count Three because  Mr. 
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Clanton participated in the June 3 Smoke Shop Robbery as an aider 
and abettor and the robbery of the smoke shop was a “reasonably 
foreseeable result[ ] in furtherance of the conspiracy,” charged 
in Count One.  United States v. Vasquez, 672 F. App’x 56, 60 (2d 
Cir. 2016). 
A. Aiding and Abetting Liability 
In addition to substantive Hobbs Act Robbery, Count Two also 
charged Mr. Clanton under the aiding and abetting statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 2, which provides that “whoever commits an offense or 
aids and abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its 
commission, is punishable as a principal” and “whoever willfully 
causes an act to be done which, if directly performed by him or 
another would be an offense against the United States, is 
punishable as a principle.”  (ECF No. 89 ¶ 2; Tr. at 1064; ECF No. 
313, Court Ex. 3 at 43–44.)  To be liable under 18 U.S.C § 2 for 
aiding and abetting a crime, a defendant must “(1) take[ ] an 
affirmative act in furtherance of that offense, (2) with the intent 
of facilitating the offense's commission.”  Rosemond v. United 
States, 572 U.S. 65, 71 (2014) (citations omitted).  The Court 
charged the jury that to find Mr. Clanton guilty of Count Two under 
the aiding and abetting statute, they must “find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the Government has proven that another person 
or persons actually physically committed the robbery, and that the 
defendant aided or abetted that person or persons in the commission 
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of the robbery or caused them to commit the robbery.”  (ECF No. 
313, Court Ex. 3 at 44; Tr. at 1064–65.)   
The Court further charged the jury that “[i]n order to aid or 
abet another to commit a crime, it is necessary that the defendant 
knowingly associates himself in some way with a crime and that he 
participates in the crime by doing some act to help make the crime 
succeed.”  (ECF No. 313, Court Ex. 3 at 45; Tr. at 1065–66.)  “The 
mere presence of a defendant where a crime is being committed, 
even coupled with knowledge by the defendant that a crime is being 
committed or merely associating with others who were committing 
the crime, is not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting 
liability. . . . An aider and abettor must know that the crime is 
being committed and act in a way that is intended to bring about 
the success of the criminal venture.”  (ECF No. 313, Court Ex. 3 
at 45–46; Tr. at 1066–67.)  The Court instructed jurors to ask two 
questions:  
First, did the defendant know that a Hobbs Act robbery 
was going to occur? That is, did he know that the 
victim’s personal property was going to be obtained 
against the victim’s will by use of actual or 
threatened force, violence, or fear of injury and 
intended for that crime to occur?  
 
Second, did the defendant intentionally cause another 
person [to] obtain a victim’s personal property 
against that victim’s will by use of actual or 
threatened force, violence, or fear of injury?  
 
(ECF No. 313, Court Ex. 3 at 46; Tr. at 1066–67.)  “If you are 
persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer to both of 
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these questions is yes, then the defendant is guilty of the crime 
charged just as if he himself had physically committed it, and you 
should find that defendant committed Hobbs Act robbery with respect 
to that count.”  (ECF No. 313, Court Ex. 3 at 46–47.) 
The Court also instructed the jury on the elements of Hobbs 
Act robbery, the definitions of property, force, violence, and 
fear, as well as the “meaning of interstate or foreign commerce 
and what it means to act knowingly and intentionally.”  (ECF No. 
313, Court Ex. 3 at 43; Tr. at 1063–64.)   
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence  
 Here, the “various actions [Mr. Clanton] took to assemble, 
plan, and execute the [June 3 Smoke Shop Robbery] were each 
affirmative acts in furtherance of the robbery, and they clearly 
evince his intent to facilitate the robbery” charged in Count Two.  
United States v. Elias, 619 F. Supp. 3d 296, 303 (E.D.N.Y. 2022). 
First,  Mr. Clanton recruited his co-conspirators, Mr. Dotson 
and Mr. Smith, to commit robberies with him.  (Tr. at 361, 368.)  
Thereafter, Mr. Dotson informed Mr. Clanton that he observed 
someone delivering marijuana to a smoke shop near Mr. Dotson’s 
home and Mr. Clanton responded that they should “watch [the 
supplier] and see what’s going on.”  (Tr. at 405–06.)  When making 
plans to rob the marijuana supplier, Defendants discussed being 
armed with guns and Mr. Clanton gave Mr. Dotson a black 10-
millimeter semiautomatic handgun, which Mr. Dotson used during the 
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robbery.  (Tr. at 407–09.)  Defendants also discussed using zip 
ties, which Mr. Smith brought to the robbery, to tie the victim’s 
hands so he couldn’t “fight back or call the police.”  (Tr. at 
409–10.)   
The night of the June 3 Smoke Shop Robbery, Defendants drove 
separately to the vicinity of the smoke shop and agreed that each 
would have a role: Mr. Dotson and Mr. Smith approached Annadale 
Smoke Shop with their guns, while  Mr. Clanton sat in his car, 
which he had parked in front of Mr. Smith’s car, with a police 
scanner to “let [Mr. Dotson and Mr. Smith] know if police [were] 
coming.”  (Tr. at 407; GX 336 at 02:47–03:50.)  Special Agent Jason 
Bevan testified that, after the June 3 Smoke Shop Robbery he found 
a police scanner in  Mr. Clanton’s car.  (Tr. at 722-24; GX 919 
(physical police scanner).)  During the robbery, between 9:30 p.m. 
and 10:36 p.m., Defendants were in constant communication through 
a three-way call.  (Tr. at 411 (testimony from Mr. Dotson stating 
he had his AirPods in his ears and all three Defendants were on a 
phone call); Tr. at 774; GX 152 at 8; GX 600(b) at 1; GX 601B at 
1; GX 601E at 1.)  According to expert testimony, during this time, 
Defendants’ phones also connected the same cell tower next to 
Annadale Smoke Shop.  (Tr. at 772–75 (testimony from Special Agent 
John Hauger, a qualified cell site expert, stating phone numbers 
associated with Defendants were on a three-way call during the 
time of the June 3 Smoke Shop Robbery and connected to a cell phone 
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tower in the area around the Annadale Smoke Shop); GX 152 at 8 
(report prepared by Special Agent Hauger containing maps based on 
call detail records in GX 225, 228, 229, and 231).)  
Mr. Dotson testified that the marijuana supplier did not 
arrive as expected at 9:45 p.m. and, at approximately 10:00 p.m., 
the smoke shop owner “came out and started pulling the gate down 
for the store.  At that time, [Mr. Smith] proceeded to go towards 
him, [Mr. Clanton] said ‘No,’ and [Mr. Smith] didn’t listen, he 
went anyway, and when he went, [Mr. Dotson] followed behind him.”  
(Tr. at 410–11.)  The victim, Zaid al-Hemyari, testified that, 
during the robbery, he heard someone on Mr. Dotson’s and Mr. 
Smith’s phones saying, “keep going, faster, and clear,” and that 
it sounded “like they had somebody watching out in the front.”  
(Tr. at 145.)  Mr. Dotson also testified that after he and Mr. 
Smith stole cash, cigarettes, and marijuana from the smoke shop,  
“towards the end, [Mr. Clanton] let [them] know the police [were] 
coming,” which prompted them to leave.  (Tr. at 411–12.)  Mr. 
Clanton waited in his car until Messrs. Smith and Dotson emerged 
from the smoke shop and got into their cars, and then Defendants 
left the scene in their own cars and “went [their] separate ways,” 
activity which was captured on numerous videos admitted into 
evidence.  (Tr. at 412; GX 336A (video compilation).)  After the 
robbery, Defendants split the proceeds, with each making 
approximately $1,800.  (Tr. at 412–13.) 
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“This evidence of [Mr. Clanton’s] key role in assembling the 
team and planning and executing the robbery provided sufficient 
evidence for the jury to find [Mr. Clanton] guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of aiding and abetting the robbery.”  Elias, 619 
F. Supp. 3d at 304.  Mr. Clanton argues that his verbal, “No,” 
when Mr. Smith approached Mr. al-Hemyari after the marijuana 
supplier did not appear, “demonstrates, clearly, that Mr. Clanton 
lacked the requisite specific intent to commit the Hobbs Act 
robbery of the smoke shop.”  (ECF No. 323 at 13.)  Citing United 
States v. Rosemond, the government responds that Mr. Clanton “would 
[nevertheless] not escape liability because he continued to assist 
his co-conspirators once they began robbing al-Hemyari.”  (ECF No. 
329 at 16 (citing Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 79 (finding where “[t]he 
driver of a getaway car wants to help rob a convenience store (and 
argues passionately for that plan), but eventually accedes when 
his confederates decide instead to hold up a national bank, . . . 
he has the requisite intent to aid and abet bank robbery, after 
all, he put aside those doubts and knowingly took part in” that 
crime) (emphasis in original).)  This Court agrees with the 
government and the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Rosemond.  572 U.S. 
at 79. 
The evidence is clear that Mr. Clanton “took numerous 
affirmative acts in furtherance of the robbery,” including 
providing Mr. Dotson with a gun to use during the robbery and 
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discussing plans with his co-conspirators in advance—including 
their plan to zip tie the victim so he couldn’t fight back.  (Tr. 
at 407–10.)  Even after Mr. Clanton said, “No,” when Mr. Smith 
approached Mr. al-Hemyari, he continued to participate in the June 
3 Smoke Shop Robbery via a three-way phone call during which Mr. 
al-Hemyari heard Mr. Clanton say, “keep going, faster, and clear,” 
and Mr. Dotson testified Mr. Clanton warned them to run when police 
arrived.  (Tr. at 142, 415.)   After the robbery, Mr. Clanton even 
collected his share of the profits.  (Tr. at 412–13.) 
Accordingly, considering this evidence “in conjunction,” the 
Court finds there was abundant evidence to support Mr. Clanton’s 
conviction as to Count Two and, as a result, Count Three.  Klein, 
913 F.3d at 78.  The “jury was entitled to credit each piece of 
[the aforementioned] evidence in reaching its verdict [as to Counts 
Two and Three] . . . [and] this court will not now second-guess 
the jury’s assessments.”  Elias, 619 F. Supp. 3d at 304 (citing 
United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1222 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)). 
B. Co-conspirator Liability 
Having determined there is ample evidence to support the 
jury’s verdict as to Counts Two and Three under the aiding and 
abetting statute, the Court need not reach Mr. Clanton’s arguments 
as to the sufficiency of the evidence under accomplice or co-
conspirator liability.  Nevertheless, the Court shall briefly 
address the Parties’ arguments below.  
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The Court instructed the jury that, “[i]f you find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was a member of the Hobbs Act 
robbery conspiracy charged in Count One, and thus guilty of the 
conspiracy count, but you do not find that the Government has 
satisfied its burden of proving that the defendant is guilty as a 
principal or as an aider and abettor as to Counts Two and Three, 
then you may find the defendant guilty of the substantive crimes 
charged in Counts Two and Three through what is known as accomplice 
or co-conspirator liability.”  (ECF No. 313, Court Ex. 3 at 47; 
Tr. at 1068.)  The Court further charged the jury that “in order 
to find the defendant guilty through co-conspirator liability, you 
must find that each of the following elements is proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt for the count you are considering: 
First, that the substantive crime charged in the count 
you are considering was committed. Here, Count Two 
and Count Three;  Second, that the defendant was a 
member of the conspiracy charged in Count One; Third, 
that the crime charged in the count you are  
considering was committed pursuant to a common plan, 
and understanding that you found to exist among the 
co-conspirators in the conspiracy alleged in Count 
One; Fourth, that the defendant was a member of that 
conspiracy at the time the substantive crime charged 
in the count you are considering was committed; [and] 
Fifth, that the defendant could have reasonably 
foreseen that the substantive crime charged in the 
count you are considering might be committed by his 
co-conspirators in the conspiracy alleged in Count 
One. 
 
(ECF No. 313, Court Ex. 3 at 47–48; Tr. at 1068–69.) 
Mr. Clanton argues that “there is no evidence that the robbery 
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of the smoke shop was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the 
agreement to rob the marijuana supplier.”  (ECF no. 323 at 14.)  
The government responds that “the fact that the robbery unfolded 
differently from the original plan is no reason to think that it 
was not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.”  (ECF No. 329 at 
18 (citing United States v. Lloyd, 631 F. App’x 45, 47–48 (2d Cir. 
2015) (summary order).)  For the reasons set forth below, this 
Court agrees with the government.  
Pinkerton liability does not only extend to co-conspirators’ 
“desired results,” but also extends to reasonably foreseeable 
consequences.  Vasquez, 672 F. App’x at 60; Pinkerton v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).  Indeed, both Parties agree that 
“[t]he Pinkerton theory permits criminal liability of a 
conspirator ‘for the substantive crimes committed by his co-
conspirators to the extent those offenses were reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of acts furthering the unlawful 
agreement, even if he did not himself participate in the 
substantive crimes.”  United States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 95 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Romero, 897 F.2d 47, 51 (2d 
Cir. 1990)).   
It is well settled that “[i]n order to prove a single 
conspiracy, the government must show that each alleged member 
agreed to participate in what he knew to be a collective venture 
directed toward a common goal.  The co-conspirators need not have 
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agreed on the details of the conspiracy, so long as they agreed on 
the essential nature of the plan.”  United States v. Geibel, 369 
F.3d 682, 689 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. McDermott, 
245 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2001)).   
Here, the “essential nature of the plan” was to commit 
robberies and there is ample evidence that the robbery of the smoke 
shop owner was reasonably foreseeable to Mr. Clanton.  Id.  
Although Defendants’ initial plan was to rob the marijuana supplier 
to the smoke shop, which was open while Defendants waited for the 
supplier to arrive, Defendants were aware that the supplier made 
regular deliveries to Annadale Smoke Shop.  (Tr. at 142–43; 405–
06.)  Accordingly, as the government points out, had the marijuana 
supplier shown up, he may have made his delivery inside the smoke 
shop and the robbery could have taken place inside the store; “the 
marijuana supplier might have fled from the gunmen and been pursued 
by them into the shop”; or Defendants might have robbed the 
marijuana supplier outside of the smoke shop and “then decide[d] 
to press their advantage and continue to steal more money and other 
items from inside the smoke shop.”  (ECF No. 329 at 18.) 
Accordingly, Mr. Clanton’s argument that the “jury could not 
find foreseeability proved in the absence of evidence” that 
Defendants agreed to rob the smoke shop in addition to or instead 
of the marijuana supplier is belied by the evidence and without 
merit.  Vasquez, 672 F. App’x at 60.  The mere fact that the June 
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3 Smoke Shop Robbery unfolded differently than Mr. Clanton expected 
does not make the smoke shop robbery unforeseeable and Mr. Clanton 
has not met the “heavy burden” required of “a defendant challenging 
a conviction based upon a claim of insufficiency of the evidence.”  
Ramos, 26 F. App’x at 81 (quoting Feliciano, 223 F.3d at 113); see 
also Lloyd, 631 F. App’x at 48–49 (finding it reasonably 
foreseeable that defendant’s co-conspirators “would be armed with 
a gun during the robbery” where defendants discussed using guns 
advance, even when the robbery did not occur on the agreed upon 
day).  
“[V]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government and drawing all inferences in the government’s favor,” 
the Court finds there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 
finding that the robbery of the smoke shop was a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy to commit robberies Mr. 
Clanton was convicted of in Count One.  United States v. Parkes, 
497 F.3d 220, 232 (2d Cir. 2007) abrogated on other grounds by, 
United States v. Acevedo-Colon, 417 F. App’x 46 (2d Cir. 2011).  
Thus, Mr. Clanton’s motion to overturn his conviction as to Counts 
Two and Three of the Superseding Indictment is respectfully DENIED.  
II. The June 27 Attempted Robbery of Two Jewelry Store Owners 
(Count Four) 
Mr. Clanton also urges this Court to overturn the jury’s 
verdict as to Count Four, Attempted Hobbs Act Robbery of two 
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jewelry store owners on or about June 27, 2023 in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1951(a) (the “June 27 Attempted Robbery”) because “the 
government failed to prove that the June 27 Attempted Robbery would 
have affected interstate commerce.”  (ECF No. 323 at 10.)  For the 
reasons set forth below, this Court finds Mr. Clanton has not met 
his “heavy burden” for the Court to overturn “the jury’s apparent 
determinations,” Davis, 2023 WL 4582002, at *1, and the government 
has met its “minimal burden of proving a connection to interstate 
commerce” as to Count Four.  United States v. Jamison, 299 F.3d 
114, 118 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Elias, 285 F.3d at 187–88; United 
States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 389–90 (2d Cir. 1999)).   
The Court charged the jury that to find Mr. Clanton guilty of 
Count Four, “the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant intended to commit a Hobbs Act robbery on or 
about June 27, 2023,” and that the “defendant did some act that 
was a substantial step in an effort to bring about or accomplish 
the crime.”  (ECF No. 313, Court Ex. 3 at 57; Tr. 1079:15–20.)   
The Court further charged the jury on the elements of Hobbs 
Act Robbery, specifically that the government must establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt, (1) “that the defendant obtained or 
took the personal property of one or more individuals”; (2) “that 
the defendant took this property against the victim’s will by 
actual or threatened force, violence, or fear of injury, whether 
immediate or in the future”; (3) “that the objective of the robbery 
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in some way or degree would have affected commerce over which the 
United States has jurisdiction”; and (4) “that the defendant acted 
knowingly and intentionally.”  (ECF No. 313, Court Ex. 3 at 40; 
Tr. 1060:19–1061:6.)   
Mr. Clanton argues only that the government failed to prove 
the third element of Hobbs Act Robbery—namely that the June 27 
Attempted Robbery would have affected interstate commerce.  (ECF 
No. 323 at 10–12.)  On this element, the Court charged the jury as 
follows:  
If you decide that the defendant took or obtained 
another’s property by robbery, you must then decide 
whether the government has proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt that this action had the potential to affect 
commerce between one state and the District of 
Columbia or commerce within one state that goes 
through any place outside the state.  The government 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the acts 
had an effect, however minimal, on interstate 
commerce.  If you decide there was any effect at all 
on interstate commerce, then that is enough to satisfy 
this element.  The effect can be minimal.   
 
You do not have to find that interstate commerce was 
actually affected.  A defendant does not have to 
intend or anticipate an effect on interstate commerce.  
You may find that the effect is a natural consequence 
of his actions.  If you find that a defendant intended 
to take certain actions—that is, he did the acts 
charged in the indictment—and you find that those 
actions either caused or would probably cause an 
effect on interstate commerce, then you may find that 
the requirements of this interstate commerce element 
has been satisfied. 
 
(ECF No. 313, Court Ex. 3 at 41–42; Tr. 1062–63.) 
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A. Sufficiency of the Evidence  
It is well settled that “the requirement of showing an effect 
on commerce involves only a minimal burden of proving a connection 
to interstate commerce, and is satisfied by conduct that affects 
commerce ‘in any way or degree.’”  Jamison, 299 F.3d at 118 
(quoting United States v. Elias, 285 F.3d 183, 187–88 (2d Cir. 
2002)).  Indeed, “any interference with or effect upon interstate 
commerce, whether slight, subtle, or even potential . . . is 
sufficient to uphold a prosecution under the Hobbs Act.”  Id. 
(quoting Jund v. Town of Hempstead, 941 F.2d 1271, 1285 (2d Cir. 
1991)).  
As Mr. Clanton accurately points out, where, as here, the 
“target of the defendant was an individual instead of a business,” 
the Second Circuit has held that it is not sufficient for the “only 
connection to interstate commerce [to be] that the victim worked 
for a company engaged in interstate commerce.”  United States v. 
Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 728–29 (2d Cir. 2004).  Nevertheless, the 
Second Circuit instructs that the interstate commerce element of 
Hobbs Act Robbery could be satisfied in the following 
circumstances: 
(i) where the victim directly participated in 
interstate commerce; (ii) where the defendant 
targeted the victim “because of her status as an 
employee at a company participating in interstate 
commerce”; (iii) where the assets of a company engaged 
in interstate commerce were, or would have been, 
depleted as a result of the harm or potential harm, 
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respectively, to the individual victim; or (iv) where 
the defendant targeted the assets of a business 
engaged in interstate commerce rather than an 
individual. 
 
United States v. Orelien, 119 F.4th 217, 224 (2d Cir. 2024) 
(quoting United States v. Rose, 891 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2018)). 
 Here, the evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the government, was sufficient to satisfy each 
of the aforementioned circumstances and “demonstrate an interstate 
nexus.”  United States v. Silverio, 335 F.3d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 
2003).  Mr. Masson testified that he owns Rajni Jewelers in Iselin, 
New Jersey and buys jewelry for his store from India, Singapore, 
the United Arab Emirates, and New York, thereby demonstrating he 
“directly participated in interstate commerce.”  (Tr. at 306–07);  
Silverio, 335 F.3d at 186 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding the evidence 
presented at trial was “sufficient to demonstrate an interstate 
nexus” where the victim was a “direct participant in interstate 
commerce through his business of treating a worldwide celebrity 
clientele”). 
Mr. Dotson testified that Defendants targeted the Massons 
after  Mr. Clanton saw Mr. Masson deposit “large sums of money” at 
a bank and learned from a bank teller that Mr. Masson did so every 
week.  (Tr. at 433 (testimony from Mr. Dotson that “the [bank] 
teller told [Mr. Clanton], can you please . . . wait a few minutes 
because a customer came in . . . [who] comes in every week with 
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large sums of money” and that  Mr. Clanton showed Mr. Dotson a 
“picture of [Mr. Masson] at the [teller] window with large sums of 
money”).)  Mr. Dotson further testified that, after  Mr. Clanton 
saw Mr. Masson at the bank, Mr. Clanton identified Mr. Masson’s 
jewelry business, and they began watching Mr. Masson’s business 
for “about a week and a half.”  (Tr. at 435.)  During this time, 
Defendants gathered information about the Massons such as “what 
kind of car they drove” and “where their house was [located].”  
(Tr. at 435–36.)  On the day of the June 27 Attempted Robbery, 
Defendants again watched the Massons’ jewelry business, then drove 
to the Massons’ home before the Massons’ left their store because 
Defendants “knew what time they [were] closing”, and approached 
the Massons as soon as they pulled into their driveway.  (Tr. 
at 436–41.)  Mr. Dotson testified that he “hope[d]” to get “money 
[and] jewelry” out of the robbery.  (Tr. at 370.)   
Although  Mr. Clanton cites to United States v. Perrotta, 313 
F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2002), to argue that “an attempted robbery after 
the Massons left work, in the driveway of their home, with a ‘hope’ 
that they would get money and/or jewelry, is insufficient to 
establish the required nexus to support a federal prosecution,” 
(ECF No. 330 at 4), the Second Circuit is clear that “the fact 
that a robbery takes place at a residence does not transform the 
robbery from the robbery of a business into the random robbery of 
an individual (as was the case in Perrotta) so long as the evidence 
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supports the conclusion that the robbery targeted the assets of a 
business.”  Wilkerson, 361 F.3d at 731.  Moreover, even assuming 
arguendo that the Massons did not have any proceeds from their 
business or jewelry on their person at the time of the attempted 
robbery, there was ample evidence for a rational juror to conclude 
Mr. Clanton intended to rob the Massons’ of jewelry or business 
proceeds. See United States v. Fabian, 312 F.3d 550, 555 (2d Cir. 
2002), abrogated in part on other grounds by, United States v. 
Parkes, 597 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2007) (“What is legally relevant is 
whether at the time of the crime, [defendant] believed he was 
robbing a [business operating in interstate commerce] and the 
proceeds of [the business], not whether the crimes actually 
involved [the business and its proceeds].”).  For example, the 
government presented evidence that Defendants began surveilling 
the Massons after Mr. Clanton identified Mr. Masson as the owner 
of a jewelry business who often deposited large sums of cash at 
the bank, and attempted to rob the Massons’ as soon as they arrived 
home from their jewelry store.  (See Tr. at 306, 312–13, 332–33, 
440, 433–35; GX 601P (photographs from Mr. Clanton’s Apple iCloud 
account showing searches for the Massons’ addresses approximately 
ten days before the attempted robbery); GX 601O (same).) 
Based on this evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 
the government, a rational juror could infer (i) that Defendants 
targeted the Massons because they owned Rajni Jewelers—a “company 
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participating in interstate commerce”—even though the attempted 
robbery took place at the Massons’ home, Orelien, 119 F.4th at 
224; United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(finding the evidence established that the victims were “targeted” 
because of their business where witness testified defendant knew 
the victim “owned a landscaping business” and “kept large sums of 
money inside their house”), (ii ) that that the robbery, if 
successful, would “potentially deplete [Mr. Masson’s] business 
assets,” United States v. Acosta, 595 F. Supp. 2d 282, 298 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Wilkerson, 361 F.3d at 732); and (iii) 
that Defendants “targeted the assets of [Rajni Jewelers,] a 
business engaged in interstate commerce rather than [the Massons 
as] individual[s].”  Orelien, 119 F.4th at 225. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the government has plainly 
demonstrated at least a “de minimis impact on interstate commerce” 
and will not disturb the jury’s finding that  Mr. Clanton committed 
attempted Hobbs Act Robbery in violation of § 1951(a).  Elias, 285 
F.3d at 188.  Mr. Clanton’s motion to overturn his conviction as 
to Count Four is, therefore, respectfully DENIED.  
 
 
 
  
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Clanton’s Rule 29 motion for 
a judgment of acquittal on Counts Two, Three, and Four is 
respectfully DENIED.  As previously directed, Mr. Clanton’s 
sentencing will proceed on October 6, 2025 at 11:00 a.m. in 
Courtroom 6B South. 
So ordered. 
Dated: July 16, 2024 
Brooklyn, New York  _______________________________ 
Kiyo A. Matsumoto 
United States District Judge 
Eastern District of New York
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