govinfo:USCOURTS-nynd-1_14-cv-00339-2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________
MAXMILLIAN SLOLEY,
1:14-cv-339
Plaintiff, (GLS/CFH)
v.
ERIC VANBRAMER et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________
APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Maxmillian Sloley
Pro Se
18 Knollwood Ave.
Elmsford, NY 10523
FOR THE DEFENDANT:
HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN STEPHEN M. KERWIN
New York State Attorney General Assistant Attorney General
Litigation Bureau
The Capitol
Albany, NY 12224
Gary L. Sharpe
Senior District Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I.  Introduction
Plaintiff pro se Maxmillian Sloley commenced this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Eric VanBramer and Brian
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VanBramer alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment rights.  (Compl.,
Dkt. No. 1.)  Pending is defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  (Dkt.
No. 41.)  For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted.  
II.  Background1
On April 1, 2013, State Trooper Bryan VanBramer responded to a
911 call concerning a domestic dispute at the home of Daphne Rollins. 
(Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts (SMF) ¶¶ 5, 11-13.)  Rollins reported
that Sloley, who apparently was her boyfriend at the time, had struck her,
smashed the windshield of her car with a baseball bat, and took her cell
phone.  (Id. ¶¶ 14-15; Dkt. No. 41, Attach. 2 at 36-37.)  Before police
arrived, Sloley fled the scene in a white Nissan Maxima.  (Defs.’ SMF ¶¶
12, 16.)  According to defendants, Rollins also informed B. VanBramer that
Sloley may have drugs on him.  (Id. ¶ 17.)  Sloley disputes this.2  (Dkt.
1  In response to defendants’ statement of material facts, (Dkt. No. 46), Sloley failed to
comply with this District’s Local Rules.  Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) provides that, in a response to a
statement of material facts, “[t]he non-movant’s response shall mirror the movant’s [s]tatement
of [m]aterial [f]acts by admitting and/or denying each of the movant’s assertions . . . .  Each
denial shall set forth a specific citation to the record where the factual issue arises.”  Pursuant
to Local Rule 7.1(a)(3), the court deems admitted defendants’ statement of material facts,
which are properly supported.  However, in an abundance of caution and considering Sloley’s
pro se status, the court also admits properly supported facts raised in Sloley’s response.  
2  Defendants asks this court to strike the supporting affidavit of Daphne Rollins
attached to Sloley’s response.  (Dkt. No. 46 at 6.)  Defendants fail to supply any legal authority
supporting their request and, thus, their request is denied.  
2
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No. 46 at 6.)  
Shortly after, Sloley was pulled over by local police who escorted 
him in their patrol vehicle to Rollins’ home for questioning by B.
VanBramer.  (Defs.’ SMF ¶¶ 20-21; Dkt. No. 41, Attach. 2 at 43-44.)  At
some point, B. VanBramer directed State Trooper Eric VanBramer, a
member of the canine unit, to Sloley’s vehicle and notified him that Sloley
had been stopped while fleeing from a crime and may have been in
possession of illegal drugs.  (Defs.’ SMF ¶¶ 29-31.)  E. VanBramer
recognized Sloley’s name as a well known drug dealer in the area and had
previously been informed by others of the same.  (Id. ¶ 31.)  
E. VanBramer arrived at Sloley’s car and approached it with a police
trained canine who positively alerted at the various locations on the
vehicle.  (Id. ¶¶ 32-33.)  E. VanBramer observed a small quantity of a
loose, chunky substance appearing to be crack cocaine in the crease of
the driver’s seat.  (Id. ¶ 34.)  A field test revealed that the substance was
indeed cocaine.  (Id. ¶ 36.)  Based on his experience, E. VanBramer
reasoned that some of the drugs had fallen out while Sloley quickly tried to
hide them when he was pulled over.  (Id. ¶ 35.)  E. VanBramer informed B.
VanBramer that drugs were found in Sloley’s car.  (Dkt. No. 41, Attach. 4
3
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¶ 7.)
After being questioned at Rollins’ home, Sloley was transported to
the police station.  (Defs.’ SMF ¶ 37.)  The parties do not dispute that
Sloley was arrested at this point.  (Id.; Compl. ¶¶ 11-12; Dkt. No. 41,
Attach. 2 at 60-62.)  B. VanBramer processed Sloley and reviewed his
criminal history, which revealed that he was on federal supervised release
and was previously convicted of multiple felonies as well as crimes for drug
possession and sales.  (Defs.’ SMF ¶ 38.)  
E. VanBramer then returned to the station, told Sloley that drugs
were found in his car, and escorted him to a private office for a visual strip
search.  (Id. ¶¶ 39-43.)  E. VanBramer, who was the only officer present,
directed Sloley to remove his clothing and to lift his genitals, squat, and
spread his buttocks.  (Id. ¶¶ 41-42, 44-45, 47.)  Sloley was not touched by
E. VanBramer during this search and ultimately no drugs or contraband
were found.  (Id. ¶ 43; Dkt. No. 41, Attach. 2 at 72.)  
Sloley was then charged and later arraigned on two felony counts of
criminal mischief in the third degree, one misdemeanor count of criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, and one count
of harassment in the second degree, a violation.  (Defs.’s SMF ¶¶ 48-49.) 
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He was remanded because of his prior felony convictions and later pleaded
guilty to harassment in the second degree in satisfaction of all charges. 
(Id. ¶¶ 50, 52.)  
Sloley commenced this civil rights action alleging that the strip search
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  (Compl.)  Defendants subsequently
filed the now-pending motion for summary judgment.  (Dkt. No. 41.)  
III.  Standard of Review
The standard of review pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 is well
established and will not be repeated here.  For a full discussion of the
standard, the court refers the parties to its decision in Wagner v. Swarts,
827 F. Supp. 2d 85, 92 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Wagner v.
Sprague, 489 F. App’x 500 (2d Cir. 2012).
IV.  Discussion
A. Personal Involvement
Defendants argue that State Trooper B. VanBramer should be
dismissed from the lawsuit because he took no part in the strip search. 
(Dkt. No. 41, Attach. 7 at 9.)  To be liable for a section 1983 claim, “a
plaintiff must establish a given defendant’s personal involvement in the
claimed violation.”  Patterson v. Cty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 229 (2d Cir.
5
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2004).  Here, where Sloley only alleges a constitutional violation based on
the defendants’ direct involvement and it is undisputed that B. VanBramer
was not present for nor ordered the strip search, he lacks personal
involvement sufficient for liability.  See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873
(2d Cir. 1995).  Accordingly, he is entitled to summary judgment.  
B. Strip Search
Defendants note that Sloley only contests the constitutionality of the
strip search and argue that the search passes constitutional muster.  (Dkt.
No. 41, Attach. 7 at 10-15.)  Specifically, defendants assert that the strip
search was supported by reasonable suspicion that Sloley was secreting
drugs on his person.3  (Id.) 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable
searches by the government.  See U.S. Const. amend IV.  A search of a
person is presumptively unreasonable if conducted without a warrant.  See
3  The Supreme Court in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of
Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1520-21 (2012), held that corrections officers may perform visual
body cavity searches on new detainees, regardless of the level of the offense charged,
admitted to the general prison population without reasonable suspicion.  Defendants
acknowledge, but do not advocate, that some district courts in this circuit have extended
Florence’s holding to strip searches in police stations.  (Dkt. No. 41, Attach. 7 at 11 n. 4); see
Paulin v. Figlia, 916 F. Supp. 2d 524, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); but see Fate v. Charles, 24 F.
Supp. 3d 337, 344-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).  Absent direction from the Second Circuit, the court
assumes without deciding that Florence does not apply to this case.  
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Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).  Warrantless searches
are constitutionally justified, however, if they fall under an exception to the
warrant requirement.  See id.  
The leading Second Circuit case on warrantless strip searches of
arrestees at police stations analyzed those searches under the incident to
arrest exception.  See Hartline v. Gallo, 546 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 2008). 
Indeed, here, defendants appear to only contend that E. VanBramer
searched Sloley to discover evidence and, thus, other exceptions to the
warrant requirement, such as a special needs exception, do not apply.  Cf.
Reinhart v. City of Schenectady Police Dep’t, 599 F. Supp. 2d 323, 333-35
(N.D.N.Y. 2009).  To pass constitutional muster, a warrantless strip search
must be supported by individualized “reasonable suspicion that [a
misdemeanor] arrestee is concealing weapons or other contraband based
on the crime charge, the particular characteristics of the arrestee, and/or
the circumstances of the arrest.”4  Hartline, 546 F.3d at 100 (internal
4  Defendants do not assert that a less demanding standard should apply because
Sloley was also arrested for a felony.  In an abundance of caution, however, the court applies
the same standard to Sloley’s felony arrest.  See, e.g., Sarnicola v. Cty. of Westchester, 229
F. Supp. 2d 259, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that the Second Circuit has not directly spoken
to the test for strip searches of felony arrestees but held that the same particularized
reasonable suspicion standard should apply); see also Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728
F.3d 149, 161-62, 164 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that qualified immunity applied to an officer who
strip searched a felony arrestee without reasonable suspicion because the law was not clearly
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quotation marks and citation omitted); see Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796,
802 (2d Cir. 1986).  Courts evaluate reasonable suspicion under the totality
of the circumstances and allow officers “to draw on their own experience
and specialized training to mark inferences from and deductions about the
cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained
person.”  United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).  “A reasonable suspicion is more
than a hunch, but less than probable cause, and considerably less than a
preponderance of the evidence.”  United States v. DeLouya, No.
1:04CR588, 2005 WL 3244173, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2005) (citing
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274).  
The facts here support a finding of reasonable suspicion even
discounting Rollins’ statement to the police, which as noted above, see
Part II supra, is in dispute.  Before the search, the police recovered drugs
from the driver’s seat of Sloley’s car.  (Defs.’ SMF ¶ 36.)  E. VanBramer
inferred from the manner that the drugs were found that Sloley hurriedly
attempted to hide them on his body as he was pulled over by the police. 
(Id. ¶ 35.)  The police were also aware that Sloley was a drug dealer.  (Id. ¶
established); People v. Hall, 10 N.Y.3d 303 (2008).  
8
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31.)  Finally, the police knew that Sloley had past convictions for
possession and sale of drugs.  (Id. ¶ 38.)  In total, these facts support the
conclusion that there was reasonable suspicion that Sloley was concealing
contraband on his person.  
Additionally, the manner that the search was performed was
reasonable.  Sloley was escorted to a private room in the station with one
other officer.  (Id. ¶¶ 40, 44-45, 47.)  He removed his own clothing and the
officer did not touch or reach inside his body cavities.  (Id. ¶¶ 41, 43.) 
Accordingly, based on these facts, the search was constitutional.  
C. Qualified Immunity
Defendants also contend that even if E. VanBramer violated Sloley’s
Fourth Amendment rights, he is entitled to qualified immunity.  (Dkt.
No. 41, Attach. 7 at 15-18.)  The court agrees.  
Officers are entitled to qualified immunity if their conduct did not
“violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982).  More specifically, an officer receives qualified immunity if
it was “objectively reasonable” for him to believe that his conduct was
constitutional.  See Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 169-70 (2d Cir.
9
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2007).  An officer is objectively reasonable if “officers of reasonable
competence could disagree on [the legality of the defendant’s actions].” 
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).  
The court finds that even if Sloley’s Fourth Amendment rights were
violated, E. VanBramer is entitled to qualified immunity.  As detailed above,
the court cannot say that the facts of this case demonstrate that “it is
clearly established that no ‘reasonable suspicion’ justified a strip-search.” 
Wachtler v. Cty. of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1994).  Indeed, here,
Sloley exhibited some factors that Hartline deemed relevant to determine
the reasonableness of the search including “computerized information
showing pertinent criminal propensities” and “discovery of incriminating
matter during routine searches.”  Hartline, 546 F.3d at 101 (citing United
States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 973, 976-77 (2d Cir. 1978)); see Easton v. City
of New York, No. 05-CV-1873, 2009 WL 1767725, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 23,
2009).  Accordingly, because “[t]here are so many permutations of fact that
bear upon the constitutional issues of a search,” Gonzalez, 728 F.3d at
162, it cannot be said that no reasonable officer in E. VanBramer’s position
would have determined there was no reasonable suspicion for the strip
search.  
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V.  Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt.
No. 41) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED; and it is
further
ORDERED that the Clerk close this case; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide a copy of this Memorandum-
Decision and Order to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED
November 8, 2016
Albany, New York
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