govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_24-cv-05290-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
WILLIAM AYALA, 
Plaintiff, 
 
Civil Action No.  
1:24-cv-05290-SDG 
v.  
QUIKTRIP CORPORATION and 
MIKAYLA JORDAN, 
Defendants. 
 
 
OPINION AND ORDER  
In September 2023, Plaintiff Wiliam Ayala  was punched in the face by a 
person loitering  outside of a store  owned by Defendant QuikTrip Corporation 
(QT). Ayala filed suit, contending that QT, as well as QT employee Mikayla Jordan, 
breached their duties to him as an invitee on the premises. Jordan now moves to 
dismiss, and QT seeks summary judgment.  After careful consideration, Jordan’s 
motion to dismiss [ECF 20] and QT’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF 21] are 
both GRANTED. 
I. Background 
Ayala first filed this action in the State Court of Clayton County, Georgia on 
October 2, 2024, 1 naming QT, Jordan, and his unknown assailant, referred to as 
 
1  The state court complaint was styled as William Ayala v. QuikTrip Corporation, 
Mikayla Jordan, and John Doe, Civil Action File No. 2024CV05468. See ECF 1, ¶ 2. 
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John Doe, as Defendants. 2 QT and Jordan timely  removed. 3 In their notice of 
removal, Defendants assert that Jordan’s citizenship should be disregarded for 
purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction because Ayala has no possibility of 
recovery against her, making Jordan’s joinder fraudulent.4 Ayala did not move to 
remand, and the case progressed through discovery. On July 18, 2025, Jordan filed 
her motion to dismiss, and QT filed its motion for summary judgment.5 Ayala did 
not respond to the motion to dismiss.  
For purposes of the summary judgment motion, unless otherwise noted, the 
following facts are undisputed or are supported by undisputed evidence in the 
record. On or about September 23, 2023,
6 Ayala visited a QT store located within  
 
2  As a general matter, fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal court. 
See Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010). Here, the Complaint 
does not even assert claims against the John Doe assailant. Accordingly, John 
Doe is DISMISSED as a party to this action. T he Court will refer to the 
unidentified assailant as “Doe” whenever necessary.  
3  ECF 1, ¶¶ 2, 4; ECF 1-2, at 2. 
4  ECF 1, ¶ 9. 
5  ECFs 20, 21. 
6  Ayala’s Complaint states that the incident occurred on September 18, 2023. 
ECF 1, ¶¶ 8, 10. However, QT’s Statement of Material Facts suggests that the 
incident occurred on September 23, 2023 , by referencing statements QT 
employee Christina Capps made in an affidavit. See ECF 21-1, ¶¶ 8–25 (citing 
ECF 21-3). Ayala did not dispute these references to September 23. ECF 23, ¶¶ 
11–25. QT’s security camera images are timestamped as September 18, 2023, 
see ECF 21-3, and Ayala’s deposition testimony discusses the incident as 
occurring on September 18, 2023, see ECFs 26–27. No party has raised an issue 
with the parties’ conflicting use of these two dates . Because the undisputed 
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walking distance from his apartment. 7 He visited this QT location five to seven 
times per week and was familiar with the area.8 Ayala considered the area around 
the store “sketchy” and “unsafe” because it was frequented by unhoused persons 
and persons experiencing mental health episodes. 9 He had also previously seen 
individuals try to steal from the QT store.10  
As of September 18, 2023, there were more than 25 properly -functioning 
video surveillance cameras at this QT location, and QT used off-duty City of 
Atlanta police officers to provide security. 11 An off-duty police officer provided 
security for this QT location between the hours of 5:30 p.m. on September 22, 2023 
and 6:30 a.m. on September 23, 2023. 12 Additionally, Midtown Blue, a program 
that provides specially-trained security professionals in Midtown Atlanta, has an 
office next to the QT store.13 On September 23, at 6:50 a.m., a Midtown Blue Public 
 
Statement of Material Facts uses the September 23 date,  the Court treats the 
incident as having occurred on September 23, 2023.   
7  ECF 21-1, ¶¶ 1, 16. 
8  Id. ¶¶ 2–6. 
9  Id. 
10  Id. ¶ 6. 
11  Id. ¶¶ 7–8. Ayala asserts that these facts are “disputed” but he does not explain 
why, nor does he provide any specific citations to evidence or other support . 
ECF 23, at 2–3. Accordingly, these facts are deemed admitted. L.R. 
56.1(B)(2)(a)(2), NDGa. 
12  ECF 21-1, ¶ 8. 
13  Id. ¶¶ 9, 10. 
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Safety Officer entered the store, and he escorted Doe out of the store at 6:52 a.m. 14 
Doe came back to the store at about 6:56 a.m.15 
At some point, Ayala also entered the store and observed Doe while Ayala 
waited behind him in the checkout line. 16 He later described Doe as someone 
appearing to have a “mental outbreak” because he was “arguing with the 
counterperson,” “trying to swing [at] the counterperson,” “knock[ing] some 
things down,” and “cursing at the counterperson.”
17 Doe eventually left, and 
Ayala purchased his items, making a point to tell the counterperson to “be careful” 
because Doe “could have gotcha.”18 But Ayala did not voice concern to anyone at 
QT about his own safety in leaving the store, nor did he call the police or ask 
anyone at QT to do so on his behalf.
19 Nevertheless, a QT employee called 911 
about Doe even prior to him punching Ayala.20  
 
14  Id. ¶¶ 11–13. Ayala disputes these facts but only on the grounds that “he could 
not recall ever seeing Midtown Blue officers in the [QT or] around the area 
outside of the store.” ECF 23, at 3–4. He does not respond with facts or 
otherwise offer a sufficient response to put these facts in dispute, so the Court 
deems them admitted. L.R. 56.1(B)(2)(a)(2), (4), NDGa. 
15  ECF 21-1, ¶ 14. 
16 Id. ¶¶ 15–20. 
17  Id. 
18  Id. 
19  Id. ¶¶ 21–22. 
20  Id. ¶ 23. 
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Doe hit Ayala at 7:04 a.m., soon after Ayala exited the store .21 Ayala had 
taken only “two to three steps” outside of the door before Doe ran up to Ayala, 
said something, and then punched him ,22 causing his nose to bleed. 23 Police were 
called after the incident, and they arrived at the store at about 7:54 a.m. 24 
The sidewalk where the incident occurred was not leased by QT,25 nor is QT 
allowed, under the terms of its lease, to use , place, or display anything on the 
sidewalk or have any sales on the sidewalk.26  
II. The Court’s subject matter jurisdiction and Jordan’s motion to dismiss. 
Jordan moves to dismiss on two grounds: that (1) she has never been served 
with process, and (2) she was fraudulently joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction.27 
 
21  Id. ¶ 25. 
22  Id. ¶¶ 15, 24–25. 
23  ECF 21-2, at 12.   
24  ECF 21-1, ¶ 29. 
25  Id. ¶¶ 26 –27. Ayala asserts that these facts are “disputed” but he does not 
explain why, nor does he provide any specific citations to evidence or other 
support. ECF 23, at 7. Accordingly, these facts are deemed admitted. L.R. 
56.1(B)(2)(a)(2), NDGa. 
26  ECF 21-1, ¶ 28. Ayala asserts that these facts are “disputed as immaterial” 
without providing an explanation for why. ECF 23, at 7. But they are relevant 
to whether the sidewalk is QT’s “approach” under Georgia law and thus, to 
Ayala’s claims. See Martin v. Six Flags Over Georgia II, L.P., 301 Ga. 323, 333 
(2017). Accordingly, these facts are deemed admitted. L.R. 56.1(B)(2)(a)(2), 
NDGa. 
27  ECF 20, at 2–3. Jordan also argues that the Complaint makes no allegations 
against her because it, instead, only makes allegations against a “Mikayla 
Johnson.” While true that the Complaint describes a Mikayla Johnson  in its 
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The Court will address her second argument first because its determination affects 
whether the Court  has subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case.  Because it 
concludes that Jordan was fraudulently joined, the Court need not address her 
argument concerning insufficient service of process. 
 Dismissing Jordan as a party to this action is  warranted for two reasons. 
First, it is warranted because Ayala abandoned his claims against Jordan when he 
did not respond to her motion to dismiss. “When a party fails to address a specific 
claim, or fails to respond to an argument made by the opposing party, the Court 
deems such claim or argument abandoned.” Ramsey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. 
of Ga., 201 WL 1222492, at *29 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2013), aff’d, 543 F. App’x 966 
(11th Cir. 2013). 
Second, the Court is independently satisfied that Jordan should be dropped 
from this case because she was fraudulently joined . “Fraudulent joinder is a 
judicially created doctrine that provides an exception to the requirement of 
complete diversity.” Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 
1998). Federal courts possess limited jurisdiction ; d istrict courts have diversity 
 
causes of action, see ECF 1-1, at 4–7, it also names Mikayla Jordan in the caption 
and in the introduction. See id. at 1–2. The Court understands the use of the 
name “Johnson” to be a typographical error and will not consider dismissal on 
this ground.  See generally Pears v. Mobile Cnty., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1082  
(S.D. Ala. 2009) (discussing the “misnomer rule ” and the correction of a 
defendant’s name under Rule 15). 
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jurisdiction over civil actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 
and there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
Complete diversity does not exist “unless each defendant is a citizen of a different 
state from each plaintiff.” Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger , 437 U.S. 365, 373 
(1978) (emphasis in original). However, a defendant can properly remove an 
action where complete diversity does not  exist if it can show that the non-diverse 
defendant was fraudulently joined. Henderson v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 454 F.3d 
1278, 1281 (11th  Cir. 2006). The doctrine of fraudulent joinder applies “[w]hen a 
plaintiff names a non-diverse defendant solely in order to defeat federal diversity 
jurisdiction.” Id. When this occurs, “the district court must ignore the presence of 
the non-diverse defendant and deny any motion to remand the matter back to state 
court.” Id.  
The removing party bears the “heavy burden” of establishing fraudulent 
joinder. Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011). It must 
prove “by clear and convincing evidence that either: (1) there is no possibility the 
plaintiff can establish a cause of action against the resident defendant; or (2) the 
plaintiff has fraudulently pled jurisd ictional facts to bring the resident defendant 
into state court.” Id. (citing Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997)). 
“The determination of whether a resident defendant has been fraudulently joined 
must be based upon the plaintiff’s pleadings at the time of removal, supplemented 
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by any affidavits and deposition transcripts submitted by the parties.” Pacheco de 
Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1380 (11th Cir. 1998).  
While the standard of review is “similar to that used for ruling on a motion 
for summary judgment” because the Court can examine evidence beyond the 
pleadings, it is not the same:   
[F]ederal courts are not to weigh the merits of a plaintiff’s 
claim beyond determining whether it is an arguable one 
under state law. If there is even a possibility that a state 
court could find that the complaint states a cause of 
action against any one of t he resident defendants, the 
federal court must find that joinder was proper and 
remand the case to state court. 
Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538. Further, “the district court must evaluate factual 
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve any uncertainties 
about the applicable law in the plaintiff’s favor.” Pacheco de Perez, 139 F.3d at 1380. 
All questions of fact must be resolved in plaintiff’s favor. Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 
1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005). However, “there must be some question of fact before 
the district court can resolve that fact in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. In other words, 
when a defendant presents affidavits or deposition transcripts that are undisputed 
by the plaintiff, “the court cannot then resolve the facts in the [p]laintiff[ ’s] favor 
based solely on the unsupported allegations in the [p]laintiff[’s] complaint.” Id. 
Rather, the plaintiff generally must come forward with some evidence to dispute 
the sworn testimony submitted by the defendant in order to support remand. 
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Shannon v. Albertelli Firm, P.C., 610 F. App’x 866, 871 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing  Legg, 
428 F.3d at 1323–25). In fact, a court can abuse its discretion by failing to consider 
sworn testimony by either party when resolving a question of fraudulent 
joinder. Id.  
Here, Jordan presented an affidavit refuting many of the allegations in 
Ayala’s Complaint. Specifically, Jordan declared that she has never been the owner 
or manager of the QT store where the events giving rise to this lawsuit took place.28 
She further testified that she was “not present” at any time during the “incident at 
issue,” nor did she have any role or involvement in investigating the incident 
afterwards.
29 She also declared that she was never responsible for things like 
“determining the operating hours,” “creat[ing] the policies or procedures” used 
by the QT store, or making repairs to premises. 30 Nor did she ever sign or have 
authority to sign the lease for this QT location.31  
Ayala did not respond to the motion to dismiss for fraudulent joinder, nor 
has he at any other time  pointed to evidence in the record t hat disputes Jordan’s 
sworn testimony. Indeed, during his deposition, Ayala repeatedly said that he did 
 
28  ECF 1-4, ¶¶ 4–6. 
29  Id. ¶ 19. 
30  Id. ¶¶ 11, 12, 14. 
31  Id. ¶ 7. 
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not know the name of the QT employee who was working on the morning of the 
incident.32 As such, it is undisputed that Jordan was not working at this QT 
location on the day of the incident, and it is further undisputed that she is not the 
owner or manager of this QT store. See Legg, 428 F.3d at 1323. Under Georgia law, 
liability may only be imposed against an “owner” or “occupier” of the subject 
premises. See O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1.  
The Court concludes that Jordan has shown that Ayala cannot possibly 
establish a cause of action against her. Ayala’s negligence and negligence per se  
claims against Jordan, based on her alleged failure to keep the premises safe on 
the day of the incident, cannot possibly proceed when Jordan was not working on 
the day at issue. See, e.g., Glenn v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 2018 WL 11444732, at *3 
(N.D. Ga. May 25, 2018) (finding joinder was fraudulent because the plaintiffs 
could not possibly recover from an employee who presented undisputed evidence 
that he was  absent from the store on the day of the incident and lacked an  
ownership interest in the premises ); Stewart v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 2023 WL 
2507569, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2023) (same). 
Accordingly, Jordan’s motion to dismiss  on fraudulent joinder grounds is 
granted, and Ayala’s claims against Jordan are dismissed without prejudice. With 
 
32  ECF 27, at 67–69. 
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only QT remaining, the Court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction over 
this case. Complete diversity exists between Ayala, a citizen of Georgia,33 and QT, 
a citizen of Oklahoma, 34 and the parties have sufficiently established  that the 
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.35 
III. The Court grants QT’s motion for summary judgment. 
A. Legal standard 
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it can affect the 
outcome of the  lawsuit under the governing legal principles. Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477  U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Factual disputes that are irrelevant or 
unnecessary” are not material. Id. A factual dispute is “genuine . . . if the evidence 
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.  
A party seeking summary judgment has the burden of informing the court 
of the basis for its motion and identifying th e parts  of the record showing an  
absence of an issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 
This evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party, “and all 
 
33  ECF 1, ¶ 5. 
34  Id. ¶ 6. 
35  Id. ¶ 12; ECF 1-1, ¶ 63; ECFs 26, 27 (describing lost wages, past and future 
medical expenses, and injuries sustained).  
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justifiable inferences are to be drawn” in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. See 
also Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999) (similar).  
If a movant meets its burden, the opposing party must present evidence 
showing either (1) a genuine issue of material fact or (2) that the movant is not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.  at 324. The non-movant “may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If 
the evidence relied on by the non -movant is “merely colorable, or is not 
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249.  
“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing 
of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions” and cannot be made by 
the district court. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. See also Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. 
Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999) (same,  citing Anderson). Summary 
judgment for the moving party is proper “[w]here the record taken as a whole 
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). See also Anderson, 477 
U.S. at 250 (“The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining 
whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any 
genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact 
because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”). 
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B. Discussion 
Ayala asserts one negligence claim and one negligence per se claim against 
QT, both based on premises liability. However, the negligence per se claim is based 
on alleged violation s of O.C.G.A. §§ 51-1-2 and 51-3-1; 36 t hese statutes cannot 
support a claim for negligence per se because the liability they describe is “simply 
the common -law liability for injury to another through negligence,” and a 
violation of these sections “is not negligence per se.” Burns v. Colonial Stores, 90 Ga. 
App. 492, 494–95 (1954); see also Sanders v. QuikTrip Corp., 378 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 
1194 (N.D. Ga. 2019) (holding that O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 “cannot support a claim for 
negligence per se”). As such, QT is entitled to summary judgment on the 
negligence per se claim. 
As for the negligence claim, such causes of action contain four essential 
elements: “[A] duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damages.” Collins v. 
Athens Orthopedic Clinic, P.A., 307 Ga. 555, 557 (2019). See also St. Jude’s Recovery 
Ctr. v. Vaughn, 354 Ga. App. 593, 594 (2020). O.C.G.A. § 51-3- 1 governs premises 
liability for invitees to property:  
Where an owner or occupier of land, by express or 
implied invitation, induces or leads others to come upon 
his premises for any lawful purpose, he is liable in 
damages to such persons for injuries caused by his 
 
36  ECF 1-1, ¶¶ 46, 47. 
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failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises 
and approaches safe. 
This obligation cannot, however, be used to turn property owners into insurers of 
the safety of their invitees. B-T Two, Inc. v. Bennett , 307 Ga. App. 649, 654 (2011) 
(collecting cases) (physical precedent only). “It is a well-settled principle of 
negligence law that ‘the occurrence of an unfortunate event is not sufficient to 
authorize an inference of negligence.’” Stadterman v. Southwood Realty Co., 361 
Ga. App. 613, 615 (Oct. 26, 2021) (quoting Wilson v. Guy, 356 Ga. App. 509, 511 
(2020); citing Wolfe v. Carter, 314 Ga. App. 854, 859 (2012)). 
In asserting that a grant of summary judgment in its favor is appropriate, 
QT makes several arguments. First, it contends that there is no evidence it 
breached any duty owed to Ayala.
37 Second, it argues that Ayala had equal 
knowledge of the alleged danger posed by Doe.38 Third, it asserts that the incident 
did not occur on QT’s premises or approach. 39 The Court need not determine 
whether the incident occurred on QT’s premises or approach, nor need it address 
the parties’ relative knowledge, because summary judgment is appropriate for the 
first reason QT raised. Drayton v. Kroger Co., 297 Ga. App. 484, 485 (2009) (affirming 
grant of summary judgment, even if a disputed fact question remained as to 
 
37  ECF 21, at 7. 
38  Id. at 10. 
39  Id. at 13. 
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whether the attack occurred within an “approach” to the store, because the 
plaintiffs failed to introduce any evidence showing that the third -party criminal 
attack was foreseeable by the defendants). QT’s first argument concerns the 
ultimate issue of whether the assailant’s actions were foreseeable by QT. Because 
the events leading to Ayala’s injury were not foreseeable, his claims cannot 
succeed. 
“[W]here an invitee is injured by a third party’s intervening criminal act, the 
proprietor is generally insulated from liability; an exception to this general rule 
arises, however, where the proprietor had sufficient reason to anticipate such 
criminal conduct. ” Georgia CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718, 721 
(2023). “[I]f the proprietor has reason to anticipate a criminal act, he or she then 
has a duty to exercise ordinary care to guard against injury from dangerous 
characters.” Id. at 722 (quotin g Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 492 (1991)). 
“[W]hether that duty of ordinary care embraces the specific duty to protect 
invitees against third -party criminal conduct hinges on foreseeability .” Id.  And 
whether an event was reasonably foreseeable is generally a jury question. Id. at 
724–25. 
A plaintiff can show that a criminal act was foreseeable by establishing that, 
under the “totality of the circumstances relevant to the premises ,” the proprietor 
had “sufficient ‘reason to anticipate the criminal act ’ giving rise to the plaintiff ’s 
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injuries on the premises .” Id. at 726. While “not susceptible to a mechanical 
formulation,” one factor usually “central to the inquiry” is evidence of 
“substantially similar prior criminal activity.” Id. at 726–27. Assessing similarity 
requires an inquiry into “ the location, nature and extent of the prior criminal 
activities and their likeness, proximity or other relationship to the crime in 
question.” Sturbridge Partners, Ltd. v. Walker, 267 Ga. 785, 786 (1997). “The crimes 
must: (1) occur at comparable locations; (2) occur under similar physical 
circumstances and conditions; (3) be of similar type; and (4) not be too remote in 
time.” Gordon v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 
1313 (N.D. Ga. 2011). To be considered similar, t he current and prior incidents 
need not be identical, but the prior event must “be sufficient to attract the 
[premises owner’s] attention to the dangerous condition which resulted in the 
litigated incident.” Sturbridge Partners, 267 Ga. at 786 (cleaned up) (citation 
omitted). Determining whether events are substantially similar is a question for 
the Court. Drayton, 297 Ga. App. at 485–86. 
Here, Ayala has failed to establish under the “totality of the circumstances 
relevant to the premises,”  that QT had “ sufficient ‘reason to anticipate’” that a 
patron exiting the store would be struck by an individual outside of the store. 
Carmichael, 316 Ga. at 726. Ayala does not identify a prior incident at the QT that 
was “substantially similar” to the crime of which he was a victim; indeed, he does 
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not specifically identify any other prior criminal incidents at the QT, similar or not. 
While the undisputed facts establish that the area around this QT location 
experiences “a lot of homeless activity” and that Ayala had seen people “ask for 
money or try to steal” from QT, 40 these facts lack specificity , and they altogether 
fail to demonstrate that a substantially similar crime to what Ayala experienced 
has taken place at this QT location.  Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmovant, the Court cannot conclude that QT had a duty to 
guard against the criminal activity of which Ayala was a victim; nonviolent petty 
theft, such as the attempted shoplifting that Ayala testif ies to observing, does not 
make it foreseeable to  QT that someone might commit a violent crime against a 
patron outside of the store. 
While true that proof  of substantially similar incidents is not the only 
method of establishing foreseeability, Ayala altogether fails to present any 
evidence on this point . For example, he has not presented  evidence that QT had 
special knowledge of Doe’s temperament that would make it reasonably 
foreseeable to QT that this incident would occur. Carmichael, 316 Ga. at 732, 735. 
While Doe had been escorted out of the store by a Midtown Blue Public Safety 
Officer before coming back into the store and having t he outburst that Ayala 
 
40  ECF 21-1, ¶¶ 3–6. 
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observed, nothing in the record suggests that QT knew Doe was dangerous prior 
to the outburst that Ayala witnessed .41 It is also undisputed that Doe exited the 
store and Ayala completed his transaction as usual ;42 Doe and the QT 
counterperson learned of Doe’s volatility at the same time, and they both 
witnessed him exit.
43 Ultimately, b ecause Ayala did not present competent 
evidence that the criminal act committed against him  was “reasonably 
foreseeable” under “the totality of the circumstances” —or, for that matter, any 
evidence at all —summary judgment in favor of QT is appropriate. Id. ; see also 
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (stating that the non-movant “must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial”). 
IV. Conclusion 
Jordan’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF 20] and QT’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment [ECF 21] are GRANTED. Ayala’s claims against Jordan are  
DISMISSED without prejudice on account of the Court’s finding that she was 
fraudulently joined. Ayala’s claims against QT are DISMISSED with prejudice.  
 
41  Id. ¶¶ 11–14. 
42  Id. ¶¶ 15–25. 
43  Id. It is also undisputed that a QT employee called 911 before the assault 
outside of the store occurred. Id. ¶ 23. 
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The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of QT and to CLOSE  
this case. 
SO ORDERED this 31st day of March, 2026. 
 
 
 
  Steven D. Grimberg 
United States District Judge 
 
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