govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_24-cv-03281-1

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
TORRI DORSEY, 
Plaintiff, 
 
Civil Action No.  
1:24-cv-03281-SDG v.  
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
 
 
OPINION AND ORDER  
This case is before the Court on the Final Report and Recommendation 
(R&R) of United States Magistrate Judge Justin S. Anand [ECF 31], which 
recommends that Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. ’s (UPS) motion for 
summary judgment [ECF 26] be granted, and that the claims against the remaining 
individual Defendants be dismissed based on  failure of service  and lack of 
personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff Torri Dorsey  filed objections, and UPS filed a 
response. [ECFs 34, 35]. After careful consideration , Dorsey’s objection s are 
OVERRULED, and the R&R is ADOPTED in its entirety. 
I. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD 
A party challenging a report and recommendation issued by a United States 
Magistrate Judge must file written objections that specifically identify the portions 
of the proposed findings and recommendations to which an objection is made and 
must assert a specific basis for the objection. United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 
1361 (11th Cir. 2009). The district court must “ make a de novo determination of 
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those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to 
which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Jeffrey S. ex rel. Ernest S. v. State Bd. 
of Educ. of Ga., 896 F.2d 507, 512 (11th Cir. 1990).  
Absent objection, the district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole 
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge,” 
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the 
face of the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The district court has broad discretion in 
reviewing a magistrate judge ’s report and recommendation. In addressing 
objections, it may consider an argument that was never presented to the magistrate 
judge, and it may also decline  to consider a party’s argument that was not first 
presented to the magistrate judge. Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1290–92 
(11th Cir. 2009). Further, “[f]rivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be 
considered by the district court.” Schultz, 565 F.3d at 1361 (quoting Marsden v. 
Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988)). 
II. DISCUSSION 
The factual and procedural background of this case are fully set out in the 
R&R.
1 As a preliminary matter, undersigned notes that Dorsey ’s objections total 
47 pages, which nearly doubles the 25 pages permitted by LR 72.1(E), NDGa. Nor 
 
1  ECF 31, at 2–25. As the remainder of this Order suggests, herding this case 
through summary judgment was a Herculean labor undertaken by Judge 
Anand. 
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did Dorsey obtain prior permission to file objections exceeding the Local Rules ’ 
page limits, as required by LR 72.1(E) as well as undersigned ’s Standing Order. 2 
Undersigned will therefore only consider the first 25 pages of Dorsey’s objections.3 
The first 11 pages of the objections contain a “Statement of Facts, ” none of 
which are cited to the record. Pages 11 through 13 contain a discussion of the 
summary judgment standard under Georgia procedural law, which is inapplicable 
in federal court. Beginning on Page 14, Dorsey gets to the crux of her objections (at 
least those in the first 25 pages), that the R&R improperly deemed certain facts in 
UPS’s statement of material facts admitted under LR 56.1, NDGa. 
The rule provides that “[t]his Court will deem each of the movant’s facts as 
admitted unless the respondent: (i) directly refutes the movant’s fact with concise 
responses supported by specific citations to evidence (including  page or 
paragraph number); (ii) states a valid objection to the admissibility of the movant’s 
fact; or (iii) points out that the movant ’s citation does not support the movant ’s 
fact or that the movant’s fact is not material or otherwise has failed to comply with 
the provisions set out in LR 56.1(B)(1).” Id., LR 56.1(B)(2)(a)(2). Further, the Court 
 
2  ECF 33, Section II.h. 
3  See id. (non-compliant objections “may be stricken, absent a compelling and 
unanticipated reason”); see also LR 7.1(E), NDGa (“The Court, in its 
discretion, may decline to consider any motion or brief that fails to conform 
to the requirements of these rules.”). 
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“will deem the movant ’s citations supportive of  its facts unless the respondent 
specifically informs the Court to the  contrary in the response .” Id., LR 
56.1(B)(2)(a)(3). Critically here, “failure to comply with local rule 56.1 is not a mere 
technicality,” as “[t]he rule is designed to help the court identify and organize the 
issues in the case. ” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009). 
Dorsey’s argument that the R&R erred in its analysis because the relevant evidence 
was available elsewhere in the record misses the point —the Local Rules require 
that the respondent file a response to the movant ’s statement of undisputed facts 
that individually addresses each of the movant ’s facts in order to “protect [ ] 
judicial resources by making the parties organize the evidence rather than leaving 
the burden upon the district judge.” Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th Cir. 
2008) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). 
With this in mind, undersigned turns to Dorsey ’s responses to UPS ’s 
undisputed facts, which are reproduced in her objections. 4 Dorsey objects to Fact 
Number 8 on the ground that it “is not a  quote and is written for the  purposes of 
argument.” Because Fact Number 8 is a paraphrase of Dorsey’s deposition 
testimony, and the fact is submitted in support of UPS’s motion for summary 
 
4  ECF 34, at 16 –25. The facts at issue are numbered consistent with UPS’s 
statement of undisputed facts and Dorsey ’s response thereto, see ECF 29-1, 
beginning on page 16 of her objections. 
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judgment, her objection is perhaps true by definition. However, undersigned has 
reviewed the cited testimony, and it does support this fact .5 This objection is 
overruled. 
Dorsey objects to the substance of Fact Number 15, citing to her deposition 
and paragraph 10 of her complaint. However, a generic citation to her deposition 
is not a “specific citation[ ] to evidence (including page or paragraph number),” as 
required by LR 56.1(B)(2)(a)(2), NDGa. Moreover, at summary judgment “ [t]he 
non-movant must ‘go beyond the pleadings,’ to provide evidence and ‘designate 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Poer v. Jefferson Cnty. 
Comm’n, 100 F.4th 1325, 1336 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). Thus, a bare citation to her deposition as a whole and one 
paragraph of the complaint is insufficient to avoid summary judgment. 
Accordingly, this objection is overruled. Dorsey’s objection to Fact Number 22 is 
overruled for the same reasons. 
Dorsey appears to object to Fact Number 39 as not being supported by the 
cited evidence. Fact Number 39 states that “[s]imilar to Plaintiff, a Caucasian male 
package car driver, ‘Jesse,’ was not paid his guaranteed eight (8) hours.” The cited 
 
5  ECF 26-3, at 63:17–21 (“[UPS:] I mean, is it fair to say that UPS is -- is -- puts 
significant energy into –- to tracking the data with respect to the package 
deliveries? [Dorsey:] For the most part, I believe, yes.”). 
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deposition testimony—which Dorsey also quotes in her original response—
acknowledges that “ Jesse . . . sometimes  wasn’t guaranteed his eight ,”6 which 
Dorsey also alleges happened to her and several other women. 7 Fact Number 39 
is supported by the cited testimony. This objection is overruled. 
Dorsey objects to Fact Numbers 41, 42, and 44 8 as “argumentative” and 
hearsay. It is unclear how a fact submitted in support of summary judgment can 
be excluded as argumentative. Nor does Dorsey support her hearsay argument 
with any authority. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 1272, 1287 n.13 (11th Cir. 
2007) (declining to address “perfunctory and underdeveloped argument ” not 
supported by legal authority). While “[t]he general rule is that inadmissible 
hearsay cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment ,” Jones v. UPS 
Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1293 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Macuba v. Deboer, 193 
F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999)) (emphasis added), the Court “ may consider a 
hearsay statement in passing on a motion for summary judgment if the statement 
 
6  ECF 29-1, at 10–11 (quoting ECF 26-3, at 140:5–141:9). 
7  See ECF 26-3, at 140:19–141:1 (Dorsey testified that “[a] route next to mine, a 
girl named Denise, she was never paid, I think, her pay -- her pay guarantee . 
. . . Teshira, a girl, she wasn ’t paid her guaranteed eight.”); see also ECF 31, at 
23 (noting that Dorsey alleged race and sex discrimination based on, among 
other things, not being paid her 8-hour guarantee). 
8  Dorsey also argues that Fact Number 44 “do[es] not appear in the deposition,” 
but this fact is cited to Jacqueline Borcherding ’s declaration. See ECF 26-14, ¶ 
5. 
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could be reduced to admissible evidence at trial or reduced to admissible form ,” 
id. at 1293–94 (quoting Macuba, 193 F.3d at 1323). One way to reduce hearsay to 
admissible form “is to have the hearsay declarant testify directly to the matter at 
trial.” Id. at 1294. Thus, even if the objected-to facts are hearsay, Dorsey has not 
shown that they are inadmissible hearsay, or that the deponent could not testify 
directly to the matter at trial. Accordingly, these objections are overruled. 
Dorsey’s objections to Fact Numbers 47 and 62 simply say that the facts are 
denied, without citation to evidence or any argument  as to admissibility . These 
objections are overruled. 
Dorsey objects to the substance of Fact Numbers 54, 57, 58, 61, and 64, 
offering her own alternative facts. However, none of these objections are 
supported by a citation to evidence. While her response to Fact Number 58 refers 
generally to “analysis” and the deposition of Omar Caesar , neither of those 
references could be reasonably construed as a “specific citation[ ] to evidence 
(including page or paragraph number)” as required by LR 56.1(B)(2)(a)(2), NDGa. 
These objections are overruled. 
  
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Undersigned has reviewed the remainder of the R&R for clear error and 
found none. In particular, undersigned notes that under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), the 
Court can dismiss an action for failure to timely serve the  defendant “on its own 
after notice to the plaintiff. ” The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted the Rule to 
require that “the plaintiff must be notified before the action is dismissed.” Cabrera 
v. CMG Dev. LLC, 717 F. App ’x 841, 844 (11th Cir. 2017). The R&R gave Dorsey 
notice of her failure to timely serve any defendant other than UPS, and Dorsey has 
not shown good cause for this failure or otherwise given the Court a reason to 
extend the time for service. See id. (“Notification is critical because if an action is in 
danger of being dismissed, the plaintiff is given an opportunity to explain the 
process defect to the court. At that point, the court is empowered to dismiss the 
action without prejudice or order that service be made within a specified time.”). 
Accordingly, the remaining defendants are due to be dismissed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Dorsey’s objections to the R&R [ECF 34] are OVERRULED, and 
undersigned ADOPTS the R&R [ECF 31] as the Order of this Court. UPS’s motion 
for summary judgment [ECF 26] is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter 
judgment in favor of UPS. The remaining defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE based on failure of service and lack of personal jurisdiction. 
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The Clerk is further DIRECTED to close this case. 
SO ORDERED this 31st day of March, 2026. 
 
 
 
  Steven D. Grimberg 
United States District Judge 
 
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