govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_19-cv-03826-1

1 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
ASHRAF MANIAR and UMAIMA 
SHAIKH, 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
KRISTI NOEM, in her 
official capacity as 
Secretary of the United 
States Department of 
Homeland Security,
1 et 
al., 
 
               Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 19-3826 (EGS) 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Plaintiffs Ashraf Maniar (“Mr. Maniar”) and Umaima Shaikh 
(“Ms. Shaikh) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), two U.S. citizens 
married to each other, bring this action asserting 
constitutional and procedural claims related to their alleged 
placement in the Terrorist Screening Dataset (“TSDS”). See Pls.’ 
Third Amend. Compl. (“TAC”), ECF No. 36.2 Plaintiffs have sued 
various federal government officials in their official 
capacities (collectively, “Defendants” or “the government”), 
 
1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the current 
government officials holding these positions are “automatically 
substituted as” Defendants for their predecessors. 
2 When citing electronic filings throughout this opinion, the 
Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the original page 
number of the filed document. 
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including Kristi Noem, Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”); Melanie Harvey, Administrator of the 
Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”); Pete R. Flores, 
Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(“Customs”); Pam Bondi, Attorney General of the United States; 
Brian Driscoll, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(“FBI”); and Michael Glasheen, Director of the Terrorist 
Screening Center (“TSC”). Id. Additionally, Plaintiffs have sued 
Unknown TSC and FBI employees in their official and individual 
capacities. Id.  
Pending before the Court is the Official Capacity 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Amended 
Complaint, ECF No. 43; and Memorandum in Support, ECF No. 43-1 
(collectively, “Defs.’ Mot.”). Upon careful consideration of the 
parties’ briefing materials, the relevant legal authority, and 
the entire record herein, the Court GRANTS the government’s 
Motion to Dismiss. 
I. Background 
The following facts reflect the allegations in the Third 
Amended Complaint and the documents incorporated by reference 
therein, which the Court assumes are true and construes in 
Plaintiffs’ favor for the purposes of deciding this motion. See 
Baird v. Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 169 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  
 
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A. Statutory and Regulatory Background 
The TSC, a multi-agency executive organization, is 
administered by the FBI in coordination with DHS, the Department 
of State, the DOJ, and the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence. See FBI, Overview of the U.S. Government’s 
Terrorist Watchlisting Process and Procedures, 1 (Apr. 2024), 
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/counterterrorism/terrorist-
watchlisting-transparency-document-april-2024-050224.pdf/view 
[hereinafter “Watchlisting Overview”].
3 The TSC consolidates the 
U.S. government’s terrorist watchlists into a single database 
known as the TSDS, which “contains biographic and biometric 
identifying information . . . of known and suspected 
terrorists.” Id. at 2. This information is not publicly 
available and only accessible “to persons who have a need to 
know, such as federal law enforcement officials, for their 
 
3 Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint incorporates by reference 
the Overview of the U.S. Government’s Watchlisting Process and 
Procedures as of September 2020. See, e.g., TAC, ECF No. 36 at 
15 n.5. Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the 
currently available Watchlisting Overview. Patrick v. Dist. of 
Columbia, 126 F. Supp. 3d 132, 135–36 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Although a 
court generally cannot consider matters beyond the pleadings at 
the motion-to-dismiss stage, it may consider ‘documents attached 
as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, or 
documents upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily 
relies . . . .’” (citation omitted)); Ashbourne v. Hansberry, 
245 F. Supp. 3d 99, 103 (D.D.C. 2017) (noting that courts may 
take judicial notice of “official, public documents”); Detroit 
Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, 133 F. Supp. 3d 70, 85 
(D.D.C. 2015) (same conclusion for “public records and 
government documents available from reliable sources”). 
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authorized screening and vetting functions.” Id. Inclusion in 
the TSDS results from a multi-step nomination process in which 
U.S. government agencies and foreign partners “nominate” 
individuals where there is enough credible investigative 
information to establish “reasonable suspicion that the person 
is engaged, has been engaged, or intends to engage in conduct 
constituting, in preparation for, or in aid or in furtherance of 
terrorism and/or terrorist activities.” Id. at 3. After an 
individual is nominated, the TSC reviews the nomination and 
accepts or rejects the person for inclusion in the TSDS. Id. at 
4.  
Once individuals are added to the database, the TSC sorts 
them into subset lists, known as the No Fly List and the 
Selectee List, which are used by TSA “to secure commercial air 
travel against the threat of terrorism.” Id. at 2. “Nominations 
to the No Fly List or Selectee List . . . must satisfy 
additional criteria beyond that required for inclusion in the 
TSDS as a known or suspected terrorist.” Id. at 5. Individuals 
are placed on the No Fly List, prohibiting them from boarding an 
aircraft, if they present a threat of (1) “committing an act of 
international . . . or domestic terrorism . . . with respect to 
an aircraft”; (2) “committing an act of domestic terrorism . . . 
with respect to the Homeland”; (3) “committing an act of 
international terrorism . . . against any [U.S. government] 
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facility abroad”; or (4) “engaging in or conducting a violent 
act of terrorism and [ ] is operationally capable of doing so.” 
Id. at 4. In addition to the inability to travel via aircraft, 
Plaintiffs allege that “[p]lacement on the No Fly List also 
results in family separation, the inability to travel to 
complete religious pilgrimage, the inability to engage in chosen 
business ventures or employment, reputational harms and more.” 
TAC, ECF No. 36 ¶¶ 110–11.  
Placement on the Selectee List subjects individuals to 
enhanced screening before boarding a flight. Watchlisting 
Overview at 4. The U.S. government does not publicly disclose 
who is on either TSDS list or the criteria for placement on the 
Selectee List. Id.; see TAC, ECF No. 36 ¶ 112. Plaintiffs allege 
that the enhanced screening that individuals on the Selectee 
List are subject to while traveling “result[s] in extensive 
delays and public shame.” TAC, ECF No. 36 ¶ 113. Additionally, 
Plaintiffs allege that “Selectee Listed persons often encounter 
extreme difficulty traveling abroad, including being detained or 
prohibited from entering the country, based on disseminating the 
TSDS data to other governments.” Id. ¶ 114.  
B. Factual Background 
Mr. Maniar and Ms. Shaikh are U.S. citizens of Pakistani 
national origin. TAC, ECF No. 36 ¶¶ 1–2. Plaintiffs identify as 
practicing Muslims, id. ¶¶ 15, 67; and neither has a history of 
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mental health concerns or criminal activity. Id. ¶¶ 14, 16, 65-
66. As practicing Muslims, Plaintiffs hope to participate in 
religiously mandated pilgrimages, which require carefully 
thought-out travel arrangements. Id. ¶¶ 18, 68.  
1. Mr. Maniar’s Travel Difficulties 
Mr. Maniar’s travel difficulties began in May 2016, but 
after being prohibited from traveling in May 2017, he initiated 
a redress inquiry with the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 
(“DHS TRIP”). Id. ¶¶ 26–28. Mr. Maniar was permitted to fly from 
Boston to Los Angeles in November 2017, id. ¶ 30; but on 
December 14, 2017, FBI agents raided his home. Id. ¶¶ 30–32. The 
agents had a warrant to take electronics, but they also took Mr. 
Maniar’s passport. Id. ¶ 32. In addition to the FBI searching 
their home, FBI agents have questioned Mr. Maniar and Ms. 
Shaikh’s friends, which Plaintiffs claim have damaged [their] 
reputation and violated [their] privacy interests.” Id. ¶¶ 59–
61; 100–102.   
A few days later, on December 18, 2017, Mr. Maniar 
attempted to fly from Nevada to Georgia for his wedding, but he 
was unable to print his boarding pass, escorted out of the 
airport by security, and prohibited from flying. Id. ¶¶ 34–36. 
Suspecting that he was on TSC’s No Fly List, Mr. Maniar 
initiated a second inquiry with DHS TRIP “to acquire information 
as to whether he [was] on the No Fly List, the reasons for that 
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designation, if any, and a way to appeal any determination.” Id. 
¶ 37. Mr. Maniar received no response, and on June 7, 2018, his 
attorneys filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus seeking the 
court to compel DHS to respond. Id. ¶ 40. On June 27, 2018, DHS 
sent Mr. Maniar a letter informing him that he was on the No Fly 
List; however, the letter did not provide any reasoning for the 
placement. Id. ¶¶ 41–42. Eventually, after additional requests 
from counsel, DHS informed Mr. Maniar that he was on the No Fly 
List partially due to his “association and extensive 
communication with a known extremist located in the United 
Kingdom who has supported terrorist organizations.” Id. ¶ 44. 
The government informed Mr. Maniar that this was the only 
information it could provide due to the classified nature of 
additional details. Id. ¶ 45.  
On August 18, 2020, DHS TRIP notified Mr. Maniar that he 
was removed from the No Fly List. Id. ¶ 48. DHS TRIP’s reasoning 
stated: 
[a]fter further review of your inquiry, we 
have determined that you [Plaintiff Maniar] 
no longer satisfy the criteria for placement 
on the No Fly List. You have been removed 
from the No Fly List and will not be placed 
back on the no Fly List based on currently 
available information. The change in your 
status was based on the totality of 
available information, including information 
you provided to DHS TRIP.  
 
Id. 
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 Mr. Maniar’s traveling difficulties did not, however, end 
there. Less than two weeks after receiving the government’s 
notice that he was no longer on the No Fly List, Mr. Maniar was 
subject to “extensive individualized questioning” during a 
layover in Turkey on his way to Pakistan. Id. ¶ 50. Mr. Maniar 
was allowed to board his flight to Pakistan, however, upon 
arrival, he was detained by the Pakistani officials, handcuffed, 
and asked questions about his travel plans. Id. ¶ 51. The 
Pakistani officials then placed a black bag over his head and 
took him to an unknown location where he was questioned for 
three days. Id. ¶¶ 52–53. The Pakistani Officials informed him 
that “the U.S. shared information indicating he was involved in 
terrorist activity.” Id. ¶ 54. He was immediately directed to 
board a flight back to the United States where he was questioned 
again by DHS agents for thirty minutes upon landing. Id. ¶¶ 55–
56.  
2. Ms. Shaikh’s Travel Difficulties 
 Ms. Shaikh’s first alleged difficulty traveling was in July 
2018 while traveling to Karachi, Pakistan for her brother’s 
wedding. Id. ¶ 74. After checking in for her flight, Ms. Shaikh 
was informed that she needed to get her boarding pass from a 
ticketing agent. Id.¶ 73. When she arrived at the counter, 
airline officials “informed her they could not issue [her] the 
boarding pass and could not tell her why.” Id. ¶ 75. She was 
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unable to board the flight and missed her brother’s wedding. Id. 
¶ 76. 
 Thereafter, on August 13, 2018, Ms. Shaikh submitted a 
redress inquiry to DHS TRIP “to determine whether she [was] on 
the No Fly List, the reasons for that designation, if any, and a 
way to appeal any No Fly List designation.” Id. ¶ 78. In 
response, DHS TRIP notified Ms. Shaikh that she was on the No 
Fly List and informed her that she could request additional 
information, respond to the information provided, and request an 
administrative review of her status. Id. ¶ 82. On December 26, 
2018, Ms. Shaikh and her counsel requested an administrative 
review of her placement on the No Fly List, asking for all 
information related to her placement on the list. Id. ¶ 85.  
 When she did not receive a response from DHS TRIP, Ms. 
Shaikh filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus seeking an order 
compelling DHS to respond to her request. Id. ¶ 86. On February 
3, 2020, DHS TRIP informed Ms. Shaikh that she was on the No Fly 
List partially due to her “provision of support to an 
individual, made with the knowing purpose of furthering the 
individual’s desire to join a foreign-based terrorist 
organization, as well as your association and communication with 
multiple known extremists.” Id. ¶ 88. The letter also stated 
that additional reasons could not be given “due to law 
enforcement and security concerns.” Id. ¶ 89. Ms. Shaikh filed 
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an administrative appeal on March 9, 2020, id. ¶ 91; and on July 
15, 2020, DHS TRIP notified Ms. Shaikh that she was no longer on 
the No Fly List, with the same statement that explained Mr. 
Maniar’s removal from the list, id. ¶ 92. 
 A few days after notification of her removal from the No 
Fly List, Ms. Shaikh took a flight from Raleigh, North Carolina 
to Atlanta, Georgia. Id. at 93. When she was again unable to 
print her own boarding pass, she had to speak with an airline 
clerk who “had to get permission from . . . the TSC[] before 
issuing [her] a boarding pass.” Id. ¶ 94. She and her young 
son’s boarding passes had both been marked with “SSSS”—a 
notation typical for individuals in the TSDS and subset 
watchlists—indicating selection for secondary security 
screening. Id. ¶¶ 95–97. 
Plaintiffs believe that they are still included within the 
TSDS and listed on the Selectee List. Id. ¶ 57. However, the 
government will not release records or confirmation regarding 
whether an individual is on the Selectee List. Id. ¶ 127. In 
January 2023, the government acknowledged the authenticity of 
copies of the No Fly List and Selectee List discovered by a 
Swiss “hacktivist.” Id. ¶¶ 128–130. Mr. Maniar’s name was on the 
Selectee List in multiple discovered versions. Id. ¶ 132. 
Plaintiffs allege that these lists were posted on the internet, 
making them available to the public. Id. ¶¶ 130-33.  
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C. Procedural Background 
In December 2019, after filing an administrative appeal to 
DHS TRIP regarding Mr. Maniar’s status on the No Fly List, 
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit. See Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs 
filed an Amended Complaint on August 12, 2020 alleging: (1) 
violations of Fifth Amendment right to procedural and 
substantive due process (Counts 1 and 2); (2) violations of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq., 
due to alleged inadequacies in DHS TRIP redress process (Count 
3); (3) violations of First Amendment rights (Count 4); (4) 
entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs under Equal Access to 
Justice Act (“EAJA”), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 
2412. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 19. 
On September 28, 2020, Defendants moved to dismiss the 
Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See 
Second Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, ECF No. 23-1. 
Defendants argued that as an initial matter, the Court lacked 
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims because they lacked 
standing. Id.
 at 27—31. On March 30, 2023, this Court issued a 
Memorandum Opinion granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. See 
generally Maniar v. Mayorkas, Civil Action No. 19-3826, 2023 WL 
2709040 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2023). First, the Court concluded that, 
since Plaintiffs were removed from the No Fly List in August 
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2020, they failed to allege any “ongoing” injury and thus lacked 
standing to pursue their No Fly List claims. Id. at *10-*17.  
The Court also concluded that Plaintiffs lacked standing as 
to their Selectee List claims because they failed to establish 
that a favorable decision from the Court would redress their 
alleged injuries. Id. at *17-*21. Specifically, the Court found 
that the Second Amended Complaint did not indicate how the 
specific declaratory and injunctive relief Plaintiffs sought had 
to do with their status on the Selectee List. Id. at 64. Rather, 
Plaintiffs’ Selectee List claims were “so intertwined” with 
their No Fly List claims that it was difficult to evaluate their 
Selectee List claims on their own. Id. at 63. Rather than 
dismiss the action, however, the Court permitted Plaintiffs to 
file an amended complaint “to disentangle their Selectee List 
claims from their nonjusticiable No Fly List claims.” Id. at 
*20. 
On May 1, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended 
Complaint, alleging five counts: (1) Violation of Fifth 
Amendment Procedural Due Process Rights (against all 
Defendants); (2) Violation of Substantive Due Process Rights 
(against all Defendants); (3) Violation of the APA (against all 
Defendants); (4) Violation of the First Amendment (against all 
Defendants); (5) Violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (against all 
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Defendants); (6) Nominal and Compensatory Damages (against the 
unknown TSC and/or FBI employees); and (7) Attorney’s Fees under 
the EAJA (from all Defendants). TAC, ECF No. 36 ¶¶ 141-219.4 
On September 20, 2023, the Official Capacity Defendants 
filed a motion to dismiss. See Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 43. 
Plaintiffs filed their response on February 1, 2024, see Pls.’ 
Response to Official Capacity Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ Third 
Am. Compl. (“Pls.’ Opp’n”), ECF No. 45; and Defendants filed 
their reply on March 13, 2024, see Defs.’ Reply Mem. in Support 
of Official Capacity Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ Third Am. 
Compl. (“Defs.’ Reply”), ECF No. 46.
5 
 
4 The TAC includes numerous allegations related to Plaintiffs’ 
former placement on the No Fly List. Because the Court 
determined that Plaintiffs failed to establish standing to 
pursue their No Fly List claims, the Court construes these 
allegations as background information supporting their Selectee 
List claims. Plaintiffs briefly argue in their Opposition that 
“[jurisdiction [e]xists for [their] No Fly List Claims,” but 
neither ask the Court to reconsider its prior determination, nor 
provide legal support for the brief argument. See Opp’n, ECF No. 
45 at 16-17. Accordingly, the Court does not construe the TAC to 
assert any claims based on Plaintiffs’ prior placement on the No 
Fly Lists and therefore does not need to address whether there 
is jurisdiction for such claims. 
5 On March 25, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Supplemental 
Authority, bringing to the Court’s attention a recent Supreme 
Court decision, see Pls.’ Notice of Suppl. Authority (“Pls.’ 
Suppl.”), ECF No. 47; and Defendants filed a response on April 
3, 2024. See Defs.’ Response to Pls.’ Notice of Suppl. Authority 
(“Defs.’ Suppl. Response”), ECF No. 49. The Court previously 
explained why the issues raised in the underlying case from the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”) do “not 
provide a helpful analog.” Maniar, 2023 WL 2709040, at *13 n.16 
(quoting Jibril v. Maykorkas, No. 19-cv-2457 2023 WL 2240271, at 
*7 n.2 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2023). The Supreme Court decision 
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Defendants’ motion is now ripe for the Court’s 
adjudication. 
II. Legal Standard 
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain 
sufficient factual matter accepted as true, to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.” Id.  
In considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court should 
liberally view the complaint in the plaintiff's favor, accepting 
all factual allegations as true, and giving the plaintiff the 
benefit of all inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Redding 
v. Edwards, 569 F. Supp. 2d 129, 131 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Kowal 
v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). 
Nevertheless, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 
suffice.” Id. “While detailed factual allegations are not 
necessary, [the] plaintiff must plead enough facts to ‘raise a 
right to relief above the speculative level.’” Morello v. 
 
affirming the underlying case from the Ninth Circuit does not 
change the Court’s analysis.   
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D.C., 73 F.Supp.3d 1, 3 (D.D.C.2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The court “may consider 
attachments to the complaint as well as the allegations 
contained in the complaint itself.” English v. D.C., 717 F.3d 
968, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
III. Analysis 
A. Due Process 
The Due Process Clause guarantees that no person “shall . . 
. be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. This guarantee “has both 
procedural and substantive components.” Jacinto-Castanon de 
Nolasco v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 319 F. Supp. 3d 491, 
499 (D.D.C. 2018). To adequately plead either type of due 
process claim, a plaintiff must establish: “(i) deprivation of a 
protected liberty interest or property interest; (ii) by the 
government; (iii) without the process that is ‘due’ under the 
Fifth Amendment.” N.B. ex rel. Peacock v. Dist. of Columbia, 794 
F.3d 31, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citations omitted); Gen. Elec. Co. 
v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 117 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The first 
inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff 
has been deprived of a protected interest in ‘liberty’ or 
‘property.’”). The first inquiry is a threshold question, and 
“[o]nly after finding the deprivation of a protected interest do 
we look to see if the [government’s] procedures comport with due 
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process.” Am. Mfrs. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 
(1999). 
Here, Plaintiffs allege that their placement and retention 
on the Selectee List violates both procedural and substantive 
due process. “[T]he threshold element of both claims is the 
deprivation of a protected interest.” Ahmed v. Kable, Civ. 
Action No. 21-3333, 2023 WL 6215024, *17 n.29 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 
2023) (citing Gen. Elec. Co., 610 F.3d at 117 (procedural); 
Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Dist. of Columbia, 502 F. Supp. 3d 
45, 60 (D.D.C. 2020) (substantive), aff’d, 45 F.4th 954 (D.C. 
Cir. 2022)).  
1. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Plead the Deprivation of a 
Liberty Interest Stemming From their Alleged 
Inclusion on the Selectee List 
 
Plaintiffs allege that their inclusion on the Selectee 
List—or otherwise within TSDS—infringes upon their right to 
travel, religious exercise, and reputation. Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 
45 at 17-21, 22-23. Additionally, Mr. Maniar alleges that 
Defendants’ conduct infringes upon his right to practice his 
chosen employment. See Id. at 21. Defendants argue that none of 
these alleged liberty interests satisfy the threshold question. 
See Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 43-1 at 25. For the reasons explained 
below, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to 
adequately plead that they have been deprived of a liberty 
interest to support their due process claims.  
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a. Right to Travel 
 
Plaintiffs do not allege that their placement on the 
Selectee List—or within the TSDS more broadly—has placed any 
restrictions on their ability to travel via plane. See generally 
TAC, ECF No. 36 ¶¶ 26-105. Rather, Plaintiffs assert that their 
alleged status within the TSDS makes air travel “difficult, 
humiliating, and often costly[.]” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 45 at 18. 
In response, Defendants argue that regardless of the extent to 
which Plaintiffs have a right to travel, Plaintiffs’ alleged 
travel delays or difficulties do not amount to a deprivation of 
any such right. See Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 43-1 at 25-31. The 
Court agrees. 
While Plaintiffs plead two distinct instances of facing 
difficulties while traveling via plane since being removed from 
the No Fly List, neither Plaintiff alleges that he or she has 
been prevented from flying altogether. See TAC, ECF No. 36 ¶¶ 
26-105. For example, Ms. Shaikh’s only allegation is that she 
“could not obtain a boarding pass without speaking to a 
ticketing counter clerk.” Id. ¶ 94. Once she obtained her 
boarding pass, it was marked with “SSSS,” indicating “Secondary 
Security Screening Selection,” id. ¶ 95; however, Ms. Shaikh 
does not allege that she was subject to additional screening, 
that she missed a flight, or that she was otherwise delayed 
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during this trip. Id. ¶ 95.6 In contrast, Mr. Maniar’s alleged 
travel difficulties appear more burdensome. Mr. Maniar alleges 
that during a trip to Pakistan, he was subjected to extensive 
questioning when he arrived in Turkey for a layover and upon his 
arrival in Pakistan. Id. ¶¶ 50-55. While in Pakistan, Mr. Maniar 
asserts that he was detained and questioned for three days by 
Pakistani officials before being forced to board a plane back to 
the United States. Id. ¶ 55. Thereafter, upon his arrival in the 
United States, Mr. Maniar was questioned by DHS agents for 
approximately thirty minutes. Id. ¶ 56.  
Examining Mr. Maniar and Ms. Shaikh’s alleged travel 
difficulties after their removal from the No Fly List, the Court 
concludes that their alleged placement on the Selectee List has 
not substantially burdened their right to travel. First, Ms. 
Shaikh has failed to allege any burden to her air travel beyond 
having to obtain her boarding pass from a ticketing agent and 
the boarding pass being designated for secondary screening. Id. 
¶¶ 94-95. Compared to delays faced by everyday air travelers, 
and even other cases where plaintiffs alleged travel 
 
6 Plaintiffs’ Opposition asserts that Ms. Shaikh “faced scrutiny 
and questioning that led to her missing flights, necessitating 
the cost and lost time of rebooking the flight” even after she 
was removed from the No Fly List. Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 45 at 20 
(citing TAC, ECF No. 36 ¶¶ 93-101). However, the paragraphs 
cited from the Third Amended Complaint raise no such factual 
allegations, and Plaintiffs have not provided any details about 
what type of screening she was subjected to nor how long the 
delays were.  
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difficulties due to placement on the Selectee List, Ms. Shaikh’s 
allegations are mere inconveniences. See, e.g., Abdi v. Wray, 
942 F.3d 1019, 1031 (10th Cir. 2019) (holding plaintiff’s 
placement on Selectee List did not interfere with right to 
travel where delays did not “exceed those experienced by many 
air travelers nor preclude his ability to travel”); Beydoun v. 
Sessions, 871 F.3d 459, 468 (6th Cir. 2017) (concluding the 
extra security hurdles resulting in delays from ten minutes to 
an hour “do not amount to a constitutional violation” of 
plaintiff’s right to travel). 
As to Mr. Maniar’s travel experience, Defendants argue that 
the bulk of his allegations stem from actions of foreign agents, 
and “the actions taken by [other countries] are not redressable 
by this Court.” Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 43-1 at 31–32 (citing Simon 
v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). 
Regardless of whether the Court considers the allegations of 
detention and delay by the Pakistani officials, the Court 
concludes that Mr. Maniar’s singular air travel-related incident 
is insufficient to establish a substantial interference with his 
ability to travel. See El Ali v. Barr, 473 F. Supp. 3d 479, 509 
(D. Md. 2020) (finding that placement on Selectee List deprived 
plaintiffs of right to travel where they experienced “pattern[s] 
of multi-hour delays nearly every time they travel . . . 
amount[ing] to a significant impediment to travel”).  
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Moreover, Plaintiffs alleged status on the Selectee List 
does not affect their ability to travel within the United States 
by any other mode of transportation. Busic, 62 F.4th at 550 
(emphasizing there is no “fundamental right to travel by 
airplane” (quoting Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th 
Cir. 2006)). And to the extent that Plaintiffs have a right to 
international travel, it “does not include the right to be ‘free 
from screening and delays at the border.’” Ahmed v. Kable, No. 
21-3333, 2023 WL 6215025, at *17 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2023) 
(quoting Elhady v. Kable, 993 F.3d 2018, 219-24). This 
conclusion is consistent “with the weight of authority, which 
establishes that travel delays resulting from inclusion on the 
selectee list ‘do not substantially interfere with [the] ability 
to travel.” Ahmed, 2023 WL 6215025, at *17 (quoting Abdi, 942 
F.3d at 1030-31) (collecting cases). 
To the extent Plaintiffs argue that their right to travel 
has been impeded because they are deterred from traveling due to 
their previous experience, see Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 45 at 27; 
this argument has no merit. As the D.C. Circuit has recognized, 
a law’s “effect upon [a plaintiff’s] willingness to travel, 
i.e., to exercise her right to travel, is ‘negligible’ and does 
not warrant scrutiny under the Constitution.” Pollack v. Duff, 
793 F.3d 34, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Kansas v. United 
States, 16 F.3d 436, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); see Matsuo v. United 
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States, 586 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[N]ot everything 
that deters travel burdens the fundamental right to travel.”).  
Finally, Plaintiffs assert that their case “aligns in part” 
with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Ghedi v. Mayorkas, 16 F.4th 
456 (5th Cir. 2021), because “it determined that Mr. Ghedi 
alleged a sufficient harm tied to ‘the act of flying, not his 
destination.’”. Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 45 at 20–21 (quoting Ghedi, 
16 F.4th at 465). However, the holding Plaintiffs pick out of 
Ghedi to support their argument is tied to whether Mr. Ghedi 
alleged an injury in fact sufficient for standing, not whether 
he sufficiently alleged a due process violation. Ghedi, 16 F.4th 
at 465. In fact, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal of Ms. Ghedi’s due process claims, holding that he did 
not plausibly allege the deprivation of his right to travel 
where he was required to obtain his boarding pass at the 
airport, received extra searches upon arrival in the United 
States after international trip, missed flights and was removed 
from an airplane twice after boarding. Id. at 466–67. It is 
illustrative that Plaintiffs’ alleged difficulties traveling 
after being removed from the No Fly List are even more minimal 
than Mr. Ghedi’s.  
For all these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs 
have failed to allege a deprivation of their right to travel 
from their alleged inclusion on the Selectee List.  
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b. Right to Chosen Profession 
The Fifth Amendment protects the right to “follow a chosen 
profession free from unreasonable governmental interference.” 
Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 787 F.3d 524, 538 
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 
(1959)). A plaintiff can establish a deprivation of this right 
by showing that the government’s action: (1) “‘formally or 
automatically excludes’ her from some category of work,” 
Campbell v. Dist. of Columbia, 894 F.3d 281, 289-90 (D.C. Cir. 
2018) (quoting Kartseva v. Dep’t of State, 37 F.3d 1524, 1528 
(D.C. Cir. 1994)); or (2) “has ‘the broad effect of largely 
precluding [the plaintiff] from pursuing her chosen career,’” 
id. (quoting O’Donnell v. Barry, 148 F.3d 1126, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (alteration in original)). 
Mr. Maniar alleges that “Defendants’ actions infringed upon 
his right to practice his chosen employment” because his 
profession requires international and domestic travel, and he 
cannot travel to maintain his businesses in the United States 
and abroad. Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 45 at 21-22. Defendants argue 
that since Mr. Maniar has not been barred from traveling, he has 
failed to allege that he has been deprived of the right to 
follow his chosen profession. Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 43-1 at 33.  
Mr. Maniar’s only assertion is that he is unable to travel, 
and therefore unable to maintain his businesses abroad and here 
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in the United States. Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 45 at 21. Aside from 
Mr. Maniar’s trip to Pakistan, which he does not allege was for 
business purposes, Mr. Maniar alleges no instances where he was 
unable to travel to a foreign country or unable to travel 
domestically, let alone unable to travel for business ventures. 
See generally TAC, ECF No. 36. In fact, he fails to allege any 
tangible harm to his professional life, such as a loss of income 
or business due to an inability to travel. Furthermore, as 
explained above, Mr. Maniar’s alleged status on the Selectee 
List does not prevent him from traveling, nor does he allege 
that it does. See id. Without more, the Court fails to see how 
the Defendants’ alleged act of including him within the TSDS is 
precluding him from maintaining his businesses. Accordingly, the 
Court concludes that Mr. Maniar has failed to allege a 
deprivation of such a right.
7 
c. Religion 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have “infringe[d] upon 
their right[] to practice their religion freely by making it 
 
7 The Parties disagree as to the standard that applies in 
determining whether a plaintiff has adequately demonstrated a 
deprivation of the right to a chosen profession. See Defs.’ 
Mot., ECF No. 43-1 at 33 (arguing that in Conn v. Gabert, 526 
U.S. 286, 292 (1999), the Supreme Court created a “complete 
prohibition” standard); Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 46 at 21 (citing 
Campbell’s “broad effect” standard). However, the Court need not 
decide whether Conn created a stricter standard because even 
under the more lenient inquiry, the Court’s conclusion remains 
the same.  
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dangerous, if not impossible, for them to complete their 
religious pilgrimage obligations.” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 45 at 
27. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that because of the 
treatment that Mr. Maniar was subject to in Pakistan, he and his 
wife are concerned that they will be subject to similar 
treatment if they were to attempt to travel internationally to 
fulfill their religious obligations. Id.  
Once again, however, Mr. Maniar and Ms. Shaikh’s status on 
the Selectee List does not prevent them from traveling to 
fulfill their religious obligations. Pointing to Mr. Maniar’s 
experience in Pakistan, Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Shaikh is 
“concerned about similar treatment were she to travel 
internationally.” Id. at 27. To the extent Plaintiffs’ argument 
is that they are deterred from or worried about encountering 
delays or being detained in other countries, the Court 
considered and rejected this argument above. Plaintiffs cite no 
authority to support their argument that a fear of traveling 
violates their right to religious expression. Thus, for the same 
reasons that Plaintiffs failed to allege a deprivation of their 
right to travel, they have failed to allege any deprivation of 
their right to practice their religion freely. 
d. Reputational Harm 
Plaintiffs argue that their due process rights were 
violated when the “2019 No Fly list and watchlist were at the 
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very least distributed outside of the ‘intragovernmental 
dissemination’ to private airline companies.” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF 
No. 45 at 22-23. 
“[R]eputation by itself [is] not a ‘liberty’ interest 
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Siegert v. Gilley, 
500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991). However, “reputational harm that also 
alters or extinguishes ‘a right or status previously recognized 
by state law’ does implicate the protections of due process.” 
Khalid, 2023 WL 2561943, at *4 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 
693, 711-12 (1976)). In the D.C. Circuit, there are two theories 
according to which a plaintiff can establish a due process 
violation based on a reputational harm. See Hutchinson v. CIA, 
393 F.3d 226, 231 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Relevant here is the 
“stigma-plus” test.
8 
Under the “stigma-plus” test, a plaintiff adequately pleads 
a due process claim where “in addition to reputational harm, 
[plaintiffs show] that (1) the government has deprived them of 
some benefit to which they have a legal right . . . or (2) the 
government-imposed stigma is so severe that it ‘broadly 
 
8 Here, Plaintiffs’ claims and arguments focus solely on the 
stigma associated with being labeled a “known or suspected 
terrorist.” See TAC, ECF No. 36 ¶ 154; Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 45 
at 22-23. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the “reputation-
plus” test, which focuses on harms resulting from defamation 
resulting in loss of government employment, is inapplicable 
here. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Harris, 170 F. Supp. 3d 194, 205 
(D.D.C. 2016) (laying out the requirements to plead a 
reputation-plus claim).
 
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precludes’ plaintiffs from pursuing ‘a chosen trade or 
business[.]’” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 121 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (quoting Trifax Corp. v. Dist. of Columbia, 314 F.3d 
641, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). Additionally, a plaintiff must show 
that the government “publicly disclos[ed] [] the allegedly 
damaging statements.” Orange v. Dist. of Columbia, 59 F.3d 1267, 
1274 (D.D.C. 1995) (collecting cases). 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately 
plead a reputational harm infringing upon their due process 
rights for two reasons. First, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs 
have failed to establish that the government “publicly” 
disclosed any TSDS data. See Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 43-1 at 34-35. 
Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to identify any 
change in legal status to meet the “plus factor.” Id. at 37. The 
Court concludes that regardless of whether the government’s 
actions constitute “public disclosure” of TSDS data, Plaintiffs 
failed to establish the loss of a legal right. The only legal 
rights Plaintiffs argue they lost with the disclosure of the 
TSDS data is their right to travel and right to employment, see 
Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 45 at 23; both of which the Court already 
concluded Plaintiffs were not deprived of due to their status on 
the Selectee List.  
 Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs failed to 
adequately plead a due process violation based on a stigmatized 
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reputation. Further, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs failed 
to adequately allege a deprivation of any property or liberty 
interest. Accordingly, the Court need not reach the question of 
whether Defendants redress procedures are sufficient nor whether 
a governmental interest justifies any such action.  
B. Plaintiffs Have Failed to State an Administrative 
Procedure Act Claim 
 
Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state 
a claim under the APA. Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 43-1 at 45-46. 
Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants’ actions in placing [them] on 
a watchlist without any professed reason is arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion” under the APA. Pls.’ 
Opp’n, ECF No. 45 at 28. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that 
the DHS TRIP redress procedures failed to provide them with a 
meaningful notice or a meaningful opportunity to challenge their 
placement on the list. Id.; TAC, ECF No. 36 ¶¶ 180–182. 
Defendants argue that the DHS TRIP redress procedures are 
“plainly reasonable” balancing “the significant national 
security interest at stake.” Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 43-1 at 46. 
“The APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard is 
deferential,” Jackson v. Mabus, 808 F.3d 933, 936 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) (citing Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)); and “a court is 
not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor 
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Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43. “Rather the 
question is whether the agency action was reasonable and 
reasonably explained.” Jackson, 808 F.3d at 936 (citing Roberts 
v. United States, 741 F.3d 152, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).  
The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to 
adequately allege any arbitrary or capricious conduct by the 
Defendants. First, Plaintiffs do not even allege that they 
submitted DHS TRIP inquiries regarding their status on the 
Selectee List. See generally TAC, ECF No. 36. Regardless, the 
Defendants’ actions in not disclosing the criteria for the 
Selectee List nor why Plaintiffs are on the Selectee List are 
reasonable. The criteria for being placed on the Selectee List 
is not publicly disclosed “because disclosure of the Selectee 
criteria could give known or suspected terrorists information 
that may assist in developing strategies to circumvent security 
screening.” Watchlisting Overview at 4. Plaintiffs fail to 
allege any facts that undermine this rationale. For these 
reasons, Plaintiffs have failed to establish a plausible APA 
claim.  
C. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Plausibly Allege a First 
Amendment Violation 
 
Next, Plaintiffs claim that their placement within the TSDS 
violates their First Amendment right to free exercise of 
religion. TAC, ECF No. 36 ¶¶ 185-96. Due to their placement in 
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the TSDS, Plaintiffs allege that they “believe they will be 
unable to travel to Saudi Arabia to complete religious 
pilgrimage requirements as observant Muslims, without extensive 
difficulty and invasive, unjustified and prolonged searches, due 
to information provided to other countries by Defendants.” TAC, 
ECF No. 36 ¶ 188. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have 
failed to plausibly allege a violation of their First Amendment 
rights.  
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits Congress from enacting 
laws “respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S CONST., 
amend. I § 1. A plaintiff bringing a free exercise case must 
“show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operated 
against him in the practice of his religion.” School Dist. Of 
Abington Tp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). “[A] 
burden upon religion exists [when governmental action] put[s] 
substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and 
to violate his beliefs.” Thomas v. Review Bd. Of Indiana 
Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). “[T]he right 
of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general 
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or 
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribed (or 
proscribes).’” Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States 
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v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J, concurring in 
judgment)). 
Here, Plaintiffs’ claim is premised on the assertion that 
they will be unable to travel to complete Hajj. However, as 
discussed in detail above, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that 
their status on the Selectee List has resulted in significant, 
frequent travel delays, let alone an inability to travel at all. 
Plaintiffs assert that they “are subject to secondary screenings 
nearly every time they fly[,]” id.; however, Plaintiffs each 
only assert one instance of travel since being removed from the 
No Fly List, and Ms. Shaikh does not allege that she was subject 
to secondary screenings at all during that trip. TAC, ECF No. 36 
¶¶ 49-56, 93-96. Mr. Maniar’s only alleged delays were cause by 
foreign agents. Id. ¶¶ 49-56. For these reasons, Plaintiffs have 
failed to plausibly allege that their ability to perform their 
religious pilgrimage has been burdened by their alleged 
placement on the Selectee List. Because Plaintiffs have failed 
to do so, the Court need not consider whether the statute that 
requires the Transportation Security Administration “to use 
information from government agencies to identify [travelers] who 
may be a threat to civil aviation or national security,” 49 
U.S.C. § 114(h)(3)(A), and to “prevent [those] individual[s] 
from boarding an aircraft, or take other appropriate action with 
respect to th[em],” id. § 114(h)(3)(B); is a neutral law of 
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general applicability, nor whether there is a disparate impact 
on Muslim Americans.  
D. Plaintiffs Fail to Plausible Allege a RFRA Violation 
Next, Plaintiffs allege that their inclusion on the 
government watchlists violates the RFRA because it “limits their 
freedom of movement and prevents them from engaging in one of 
the most basic tenets of their religion.” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 
45 at 31.  
Enacted in 1993, the RFRA was intended “to provide greater 
protection for religious exercise than is available under the 
First Amendment.” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 357 (2015) 
(citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 694-
95 (2014)). 
The RFRA provides:  
“Government shall not substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion even if the 
burden results from a rule of general 
applicability, [unless] . . . it 
demonstrates that application of the burden 
to the person (1) is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is 
the least restrictive means of furthering 
that compelling governmental interest.”  
 
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b). “A substantial burden exists when 
government action puts ‘substantial pressure on an adherent to 
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.’” Kaemmerling v. 
Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Thomas v. 
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Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718, 101 S. Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 
(1981)). 
The Court has discussed in detail above why Plaintiffs have 
failed to allege facts supporting the claim that their freedom 
of movement is burdened, much less substantially burdened, by 
their placement within the TSDS. Since they have failed to do 
so, they have failed to plausibly allege a violation of the 
RFRA. See id. at 679 (a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient 
to state a substantial burden on religious exercise).   
E. Plaintiffs’ EAJA Claim Is Premature 
Finally, Plaintiffs’ EAJA claim is premature because there 
has been no final judgment in this action. See Melkonyan v. 
Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 94 (1991). Accordingly, this claim will 
be dismissed. 
IV. Conclusion 
For the reasons explained above, the Court GRANTS 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 43; and DISMISSES this 
case WITHOUT PREJUDICE.  
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 
SO ORDERED. 
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 
  United States District Judge 
  April 1, 2026  
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