govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_25-cv-00019-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
LEONARD DANLEY, SR., 
Plaintiff, 
 
Civil Action No.  
1:25-cv-00019-SDG v.  
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 
Defendant. 
 
 
OPINION AND ORDER  
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N .A.’s 
motion for summary judgment [ECF 18] and Plaintiff Leonard Danley, Sr.’s 
motion for leave to file out of time [ECF 22]. For the reasons stated below, both 
motions are GRANTED. 
I. Background 
The following facts are undisputed or are supported by undisputed 
evidence in the record. Danley owns a  piece of real property in Douglas ville, 
Georgia (the Property). 1 In 2006, he obtained a loan on the Property from Wells 
Fargo (the Loan).2 The Loan is evidenced by a Note, and secured by a Deed to the 
Property.3 The Deed required Danley to timely make all payments due under the 
 
1  ECF 22-1, ¶ 1. 
2  Id. ¶ 4. 
3  ECF 18-3, at 12–18 (Note), 20–38  (Deed); ECF 22-1, ¶¶ 5, 8–9. 
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Note.4 It also required that Danley not “ destroy, damage or impair the property, 
allow the property to deteriorate or commit waste on the property.”5 It prevented 
Danley from permitting mold to affect the Property.6 Further, the Deed gives Wells 
Fargo the right to secure the Property, including entering it to eliminate dangerous 
conditions, in the event of default.7  
Starting in 2020, Wells Fargo suspended Danley’s obligation to make 
payments on the  Loan for 18 months because of the COVID -19 pandemic. 8 By 
September 2021, however, Danley had no suspension or forbearance of his 
obligation to repay the Loan .9 The Loan matured in July 2021 and has an unpaid 
principal balance of $71,821.32. Danley has not made any payment on the Loan 
since at least July 2021.10 
Danley concedes that no one has lived at the Property since early 2020. 11 
Danley did not frequently visit the Property after it became unoccupied, and does 
 
4  ECF 18-3, at 22, § 1; ECF 22-1, ¶ 10. 
5  ECF 18-3, at 24, § 6; ECF 22-1, ¶ 13. 
6  ECF 18-3, at 29, § 18; ECF 22-1, ¶ 14 . 
7  ECF 18-3, at 25, § 8; ECF 22-1, ¶ 15. 
8  ECF 22-1, ¶ 28. 
9  Id. ¶¶ 29–32. 
10  Id. ¶¶ 43, 46–49, 53. 
11  Id. ¶¶ 16–19, 55. 
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not know whether there was visible mold inside the home. 12 On March 14, 2023, 
Danley called the police because a contractor was removing drywall from the 
Property; the contractor informed Danley that he was performing work for Wells 
Fargo.13  
II. Discussion 
A. Motion for Leave to File Out of Time 
1. Procedural History 
Wells Fargo  moved for summary judgment on July 9, 2025. 14 Therefore, 
under the Court’s Local Rules, Danley’s response was due 21 days later, on July 
30. LR 7.1(B), NDGa. On August 6, Danley filed an opposition brief and  a 
purported statement of material facts in dispute, but did not include a response to 
Wells Fargo’s statement of undisputed material facts.15 Wells Fargo filed its reply 
on August 15, including a response and objection to Danley’s statement of material 
facts in dispute .16 Then, on August 21, Dan ley filed a motion for leave to file his 
response to the summary judgment motion out of time .17 His filing included a 
 
12  Id. ¶¶ 19, 23. 
13  Id. ¶ 25. 
14  ECF 18. 
15  ECF s 20, 20-1. 
16  ECFs 21, 21-1.  
17  ECF 22. 
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belated response to Wells Fargo ’s statement of undisputed material facts. 18 
Danley’s motion explains that his age and serious health issues prevented him 
from completing his response on time. H e says he did not realize it was late until 
Wells Fargo filed its reply brief.19 
While Wells Fargo does not object to the C ourt’s consideration of Danley’s 
August 6 filing, it does object to Danley ’s August 21 response to its statement of 
undisputed material facts. 20 Wells Fargo describes this, not as a mere late filing, 
but as an attempt to correct Danley’s substantive failure to have responded to the 
statement of undisputed facts in the first place.21 Wells Fargo says this is 
prejudicial because it had already filed its reply brief which could not have taken 
into account the contents of Danley’s August 21 filing.  
2. Discussion 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure provides that, “[w]hen an act may or must 
be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the 
time . . . on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because 
of excusable neglect.” Four factors are generally relevant to this determination: 
 
18  ECF 22-1. 
19  ECF 22, at 2, 7–8. 
20  ECF 23. 
21  Id. at 2. 
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(1) the danger of prejudice to the non -moving party; (2) the length of the delay; 
(3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith. Satco 
Prods., Inc. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., 551 F. Supp. 3d 1329, 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2021) 
(citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship , 507 U.S. 380, 395 
(1993)).  
The second, third, and fourth factors favor Danley. His August 21 
submission was only three weeks late and did not delay proceedings in this case. 
Danley describes himself as “an 81-year -old licensed attorney” who suffered 
serious health issues that hindered his ability to timely file a response to Wells 
Fargo’s summary judgment motion.
22 Wells Fargo does not contend  that Danley 
acted in bad faith, nor is there any indication of such conduct. Although there is 
some minor prejudice to Wells Fargo from not having the last word in support of 
its summary judgment motion , there is a strong preference in this Circuit for 
deciding cases on the merits  when possible, “not based on a single missed 
deadline.” Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2014).  
Accordingly, t he Court declines to disregard Danley’s August 6 and 21 
responses because they were late. However, th ose responses do little to support 
his claims because, while they are full of argument and invective, they point to 
 
22  ECF 22, at 2. 
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little by way of actual evidence. Danley’s statement of material facts in dispute, for 
example, cites no record evidence other than what was  filed by Wells Fargo in 
support of its summary judgment motion.23 The same is true of Danley ’s denials 
of Wells Fargo’s statements of material fact. 24 T he Court cannot consider facts 
unsupported by citations to record evidence. LR 56.1(B)(1), (2); Mann v. Taser Int’l, 
Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the plaintiff’s “failure to 
comply with [this Court’s] local rule 56.1 is not a mere technicality”).25 As a result, 
Danley—the party who bears the burden of proof at trial —has failed to show 
genuine disputes of fact on essential elements of his claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 
B. Motion for Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is genuine  “if the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The evidence is viewed in the light most 
 
23  See generally ECF 20-1. 
24  See generally ECF 22-1. 
25  Indeed, Danley (a Georgia lawyer admitted to practice before this Court) was 
aware of this  requirement, because the Court denied his own motion for 
summary judgment in part on this basis. ECF 25, at 5–6. 
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favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, “and all justifiable inferences 
are to be drawn” in favor of that party. Id. at 255. See also Herzog v. Castle Rock 
Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999) (“All reasonable doubts about the facts 
should be resolved in favor of the non -movant.”). But the non-movant “may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 
248. The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law  where the non-
movant fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of claims on 
which he has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.  
Wells Fargo moves for summary judgment on each of Danley ’s seven 
claims,
26 and Danley opposes the motion. 27 The Court addresses each claim in 
turn. 
1. Trespass to Personal Property/Conversion (Counts I, IV) 
O.C.G.A. § 51-10 -3 p rovides for recovery for damages done to personal 
property. A claim for conversion lies for the unauthorized assumption of rights 
over the personal property of another. Dierkes v. Crawford Orthodontic Care, P.C. , 
284 Ga. App. 96, 99 (2007). Danley argues that photographs produced by Wells 
Fargo show that there was personal property at the home, including “beds, lamps, 
 
26 ECF 18. 
27  ECFs 20, 22-1. 
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light fixtures, clothes, cabinets, bikes and other personal items .”28 But he has not 
cited any specific record evidence identifying the exact personal property that was 
allegedly damaged or converted, nor pointed to any evidence of the value of such 
property. Moreover, “to make out a conversion claim, ‘the plaintiff must show title 
to the property, possession by the defendant, demand for possession, and refusal 
to surrender the property, or an actual conversion prior to the filing of the suit.’” 
Wilson v. LoanDepot.com, LLC, No. 1:20- CV-1175-TCB, 2021 WL 7708406, at *5 
(N.D. Ga. Nov. 10, 2021) (quoting Johnson v. Citimortgage, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 
1372 (N.D. Ga. 2004)). Danley has not made such a showing. These claims cannot 
survive summary judgment based on Danley’s generic assertions of harm 
unsupported by record evidence. 
2. Criminal Damage to Property (Count II) 
Danley brings this count under  O.C.G.A. § 51-9-1, which (despite the 
nomenclature used in the complaint) provides a civil cause of action for unlawful 
interference with a person’s possessory interest in realty. Goia v. CitiFinancial Auto, 
499 F. App’x 930, 936 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). Danley contends that , under 
the Deed, Wells Fargo was required to contact him before entering the Property; 
since it did not, it is liable for the alleged damage to the home.
29 But this claim does 
 
28  ECF 20, at 9. See also id. at 12–14. 
29  Id. at 10, 15. 
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not depend on resolution of the parties ’ dispute about whether the P roperty was 
abandoned, as Danley argues.30 Rather, whether Wells Fargo ’s (or its agent ’s) 
entry onto the P roperty was unlawful depends on the terms of the parties ’ 
contract. That is a question of law. 
Danley asserts that Section 6 of the Deed required Wells Fargo to give notice 
because it says  
Lender [Wells Fargo] or its agent may make reasonable 
entries upon and inspections of the P roperty. If it has 
reasonable cause, Lender may inspect the interior of the 
improvements on the Property. Lender shall give 
Borrower notice at the time of or prior to such an interior 
inspection specifying such reasonable cause.
31 
While true, Danley’s argument is incomplete. Section 6 deals with “preservation, 
maintenance and protection of the Property ,” and “inspections.” It provides that 
”Borrower shall not destroy, damage or impair the Property, allow the Property 
to deteriorate or commit waste on the Property.”32 But Wells Fargo does not assert 
that it entered the Property on this basis. It instead contends that Danley  was in 
default under the Note and that Section 8 of the Deed therefore gave it the legal 
right to enter the Property to protect its interests.33 Wells Fargo is correct. 
 
30  ECF 22, at 21. 
31  ECF 20, at 15. 
32  ECF 18-3, at 24-25, § 6. 
33  ECF 18, at 11-13; ECF 21, at 6-9. 
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In relevant part, Section 8 states: 
Protection of Lender’s Interest in the Property and 
Rights Under this Security Instrument. If (a) Borrower 
fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained 
in this Security Instrument  . . . then Lender may do and 
pay for whatever is reasonable or appropriate to protect 
Lender’s interest in the Property and rights under this 
Security Instrument, including protecting and/or 
assessing the value of the Property, and securing and/or 
repairing the Property . . . . Securing the Property 
includes, but is not limited to, entering the Property to 
make repairs. . . .
34 
Nothing in Section 8 require d Wells Fargo to provide notice when entering the 
Property in the event of default. Danley admits that, when Wells Fargo made entry 
in March 2023, the Loan had matured and he had made no payments on it since at 
least July 2021.35 Nor had anyone lived at the Property for several years.36 Danley’s 
admitted failure to make payments on the Loan when due was an event of default 
under the Note.37  
Danley’s promissory estoppel argument that he was still negotiating with 
Wells Fargo about the Loan and that its representatives told him not to make 
 
34  ECF 18-3, at 25, § 8. 
35  ECF 22-1, ¶¶ 43, 46–49, 53. 
36  Id. ¶¶ 16–19, 55. 
37  ECF 18-2, at 15, § 12 (“I will be in default if  . . . I fail to pay the full amount of 
any payment when due.”). 
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payment during those negotiations 38—unsupported by any record evidence —is 
contrary to the express terms of the parties’ contract. In fact, the Deed itself 
provides that extensions of payment terms , modifications, or forbearance do not 
constitute waivers of Wells Fargo’s rights. 39 McClain v. Bank of Am., N.A., 637 F. 
App’x 552, 555 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[The borrower’s] failure to make mortgage 
payments, arguably her most significant obligation under the Security Deed, 
triggers [the lender’s] ability to enter the Property and protect its security interest 
by all reasonable and appropriate means necessary. Permitted actions include 
‘making repairs,’ which presumably involves entrance onto the Property.”).
40  
Since Wells Fargo had the legal right to enter the Property pursuant to the 
parties’ contract, no claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-9-5—which requires unlawful 
interference—can lie.  
3. Negligence (Count III) 
To establish a claim for negligence under Georgia law, the plaintiff must 
show a duty, breach, causation, and damages. City of Douglasville v. Queen, 270 Ga. 
 
38  ECF 20, at 6–7. 
39  ECF 18-3, at 26–27, § 10. 
40  Danley misreads McClain as requiring notice to a borrower before entry onto 
property by a lender when there is a payment default. ECF 20, at 15. Not only 
does McClain not suggest that notice is required under such circumstances, it 
rejects an argument similar to the one Danley makes about the notice 
requirement under Section 6 of the Deed. 637 F. App’x at 555 n.3. 
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770, 771 (1999). Danley’s negligence claim is predicated on the same theory as his 
O.C.G.A. § 51-9-1 claim—that Wells Fargo was required to obtain his permission 
before sending a contractor onto the Property.41 As discussed above, because 
Danley was in default, Wells Fargo did not need to provide notice or obtain 
permission to enter the Property to preserve its interests.42 
4. Vicarious Liability (Count V) 
Danley’s vicarious liability claim is similarly pr emised on the alleged 
wrongful entry onto the Property and destruction of his personal property.43 Since 
entry onto the P roperty was not wrongful and Danley  has provided no evidence 
supporting his claim for the destruction of personal property, he cannot proceed 
on this claim. 
5. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count VI) 
To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must 
show intentional or reckless conduct that is extreme and outrageous, and that 
caused severe emotional distress. Trimble v. Cir. City Stores, Inc., 220 Ga. App. 498, 
499 (1996). Danley argues that “entering and demolishing a person’s home without 
 
41  ECF 1-4, ¶¶ 23–25. 
42  In opposing summary judgment, Danley  also suggests that Wells Fargo failed 
to supervise its contractor. [ECF 20, at 15-16.] But Danley asserted no such 
claim in his complaint and has pointed to no record evidence supporting an 
alleged failure to supervise. 
43  ECF 1-4, ¶¶ 30–33. 
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notice— particularly while the property is undergoing hardship and the owner is 
communicating with the lender—can rise to the level of ‘extreme and outrageous ’ 
conduct.”44 He asserts that whether conduct is outrageous is a jury question.45  
Whether the conduct alleged “is sufficiently extreme or outrageous to 
support recovery is a question of law for the trial court ,” id.  (citing Yarbray v. 
Southern Bell Tel., 261 Ga. 703, 706 (1991)); only where  “reasonable persons could 
differ,” is it a jury question, id. at 500 (citing Gordon v. Frost, 193 Ga. App. 517, 521 
(1989)). Here, there is no question for the jury. Entry onto the Property consistent 
with the terms of the parties ’ contract was not extreme or outrageous as a matter 
of law. Thompson-El v. Bank of Am., N.A., 327 Ga. App. 309, 312 (2014) (quoting Blue 
View Corp. v. Bell, 298 Ga. App. 277, 279 (2009)) (“The defendant’s conduct must be 
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be 
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”). 
6. Stubborn Litigiousness (Count VII) 
Under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, a party may recover expenses of litigation where 
the defendant has acted in bad faith, been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the 
plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense. S uch a claim cannot proceed in the 
 
44  ECF 20, at 17.  
45  Id. 
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absence of a viable substantive claim for liability. 46 U-Tec Constr., Inc. v. Phoenix 
Loss Control, Inc., No. 1:21-CV-00265-JPB, 2022 WL 902727, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 
2022) (citing Sandy Springs Toyota v. Classic Cadillac Atlanta Corp., 269 Ga. App. 470, 
472 (2004)).  
III. Conclusion 
Danley’s motion for leave to file out of time [ECF 22] is GRANTED. 
However, because he has not shown a dispute of material fact  and Wells Fargo is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law , Wells Fargo’s motion for summary 
judgment [ECF 18] is GRANTED.  
The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in Wells Fargo ’s favor and to 
CLOSE this case.  
SO ORDERED this 31st day of March, 2026. 
 
 
 
  Steven D. Grimberg 
United States District Judge 
 
 
46  To the extent Danley seeks punitive damages in his ad damnum clause [ECF 1-
4, at 8], such damages are also foreclosed by the absence of a live  substantive 
claim. U-Tec Constr., 2022 WL 902727, at *5 (citing APAC-Se., Inc. v. Coastal 
Caisson Corp., 514 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 2007)). 
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