govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_25-cv-03719-1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
BRIANA A. DILLARD, 
Plaintiff, 
 
Civil Action No.  
1:25-cv-03719-SDG 
v.  
SELENE FINANCE, LP, JPMORGAN 
CHASE BANK, N.A., and STEARNS 
LENDING, LLC, 
Defendants. 
 
 
OPINION AND ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on the  Final Report and Recommendation 
(R&R) of United States Magistrate Judge Catherine M. Salinas  [ECF 22], which 
recommends that the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Stearns Lending, 
LLC; Selene Finance, LP ; and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. [ECFs 6, 10, 15] be 
granted. Plaintiff Briana Dillard filed objections. After careful consideration , 
Dillard’s objections are OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part. The R&R 
is ADOPTED insofar as it grants the motions to dismiss, but undersigned 
concludes that the dismissal of Counts I and V should be without prejudice. 
I. Applicable Legal Standard 
A party challenging a R&R issued by a United States Magistrate Judge must 
file written objections that specifically identify the portions of the proposed 
findings and recommendations to which an objection is made and must assert a 
specific basis for the objection. United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1361 
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(11th Cir. 2009). The district court must “ make a de novo determination of those 
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to 
which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Jeffrey S. ex rel. Ernest S. v. State Bd. 
of Educ. of Ga., 896 F.2d 507, 512 (11th Cir. 1990).  
Absent objection, the district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole 
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge,” 
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the 
face of the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The district court has broad discretion in 
reviewing a magistrate judge ’s report and recommendation. In addressing 
objections, it may consider an argument that was never presented to the magistrate 
judge, and it may also decline  to consider a party’s argument that was not first 
presented to the magistrate judge. Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1290–92 
(11th Cir. 2009). Further, “‘[f]rivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not 
be considered by the district court.’” Schultz, 565 F.3d at 1361 (quoting Marsden v. 
Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988)). 
When a litigant  chooses to proceed pro se, her pleading  is “held to less 
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers ” and must be 
“liberally construed. ” Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation and 
quotation omitted); see also Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006), 
abrogated in part on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010). But even a 
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pro se plaintiff must comply with the threshold requirements of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding 
that “once a pro se IFP litigant is in court, he is subject to the relevant law and rules 
of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ”). The leniency the Court 
must apply does not permit it “to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro 
se litigant] in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 
F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Randall v. 
Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010). 
II. Discussion 
The factual and procedural background of this case are fully set out in the 
R&R.1 Dillard, proceeding pro se, raises nine objections to the R&R,  though some 
objections are duplicative and some are frivolous. 2 Liberally construing Dillard’s 
 
1  ECF 22, at 2–8. 
2  Dillard’s objection “B” states that “[t]he R&R minimizes Defendant Chase’s 
central role in the foreclosure chain.” ECF 25, at 3. Dillard does not specify 
what portion of the R&R this objection is directed at, nor does she suggest how 
an alternative reading of “Chase’s central role” would affect a single one of her 
claims; indeed, the objection does not appear to address any claim in 
particular. As such, undersigned will not consider this objection. Schultz, 565 
F.3d at 1361 (requiring parties to make specific objections and stating that the 
district court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections ). 
For similar reasons, the Court will not consider Dillard’s objection “C,” which 
asserts that “[t]he R&R disregard Georgia’s strict compliance rule for 
recordation.” ECF 25, at 4. Dillard states only that the R&R “excus[es] these 
statutory failures,” “conflicts with binding Georgia precedent,” and 
“undermines the integrity of the public recording system.” Id. Again, this 
objection does not specify a particular portion of the R&R, nor does it address 
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pro se filing, the Court will address five of Dillard’s objections, namely that: (1) the 
R&R incorrectly concludes that Dillard lacks standing to challenge various 
assignments;3 (2) Dillard “did not abandon her RESPA claim and should have 
been granted leave to amend”;4 (3) the R&R erred in concluding that Dillard failed 
to allege a continuing controversy to support her declaratory judgment claims; 5 
(4) the R&R did not liberally construe her pro se filing to interpret her  Complaint 
as raising wrongful foreclosure or constitutional claims; 6 and that (5) the R&R’s 
recommendation of dismissal should have been without prejudice. 7 
A. The R&R did not err in concluding that Dillard lacks standing to 
challenge the assignments.  
Dillard repeatedly argues that the R&R misapplied Georgia law as it 
pertains to a borrowe r’s standing to challenge an assignment .8 The R&R did not 
err; it is well -established that third parties to an assignment lack standing under 
Georgia law to challenge the validity of the assignment. Montgomery v. Bank of Am., 
 
Judge Salinas’s recommendation on any particular claim; as such, the Court 
need not consider it. See Schultz, 565 F.3d at 1361. 
3  ECF 25, at 2 (objection “A”), 5 (objection “F”). 
4  Id. at 5 (objection “E”). 
5  Id. at 6 (objection “G”). 
6  Id. (objection “H”). 
7  Id. at 7 (objection “I”). 
8  Id. at 2 (objection “A”), 5 (objection “F”). 
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321 Ga. App. 343, 345–46 (2013) (“Even if we were to assume . . . that [the 
attorney’s] execution of the assignment [ ] was flawed, the proper party to bring a 
claim against MERS would be the other party to the assignment . . . [the borrower] 
has no basis to contest the validity of the assignment.”); s ee also White v. Bank of 
Am. Bank, NA, 597 F. App ’x 1015, 1019 (11th Cir. 2014); Ames v. JP Morgan Chase 
Bank, N.A. , 298 Ga. 732, 738–42 (2016). Contrary to what Dillard argues, this 
principle is true regardless of whether the borrowe r argues an instrument is 
“voidable” or “void ab initio.”9 Ames, 298 Ga. at 740 (stating that a borrower lacks 
standing to challenge an assignment even where “the entity attempting to 
foreclose has no legitimate claim to the security deed”). Additionally, Georgia law 
explicitly authorizes the transfer of deeds to secure debt. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-64(c). 
This objection is overruled. 
B. The R&R did not err in concluding that Dillard abandoned her 
RESPA claim. 
Dillard argues in her second objection that the R&R improperly dismissed 
her RESPA claim because she “did not intend” to abandon it .10 Undersigned 
agrees with the R&R’s finding that Dillard abandoned her RESPA claim when she 
 
9  ECF 25, at 2–3 (objection “A”). 
10  Id. at 5  (objection “E”). Dillard also argues that if her RESPA claim lacked 
factual detail, the proper remedy was to grant leave to amend. Id. Undersigned 
considers this objection as part of her general objection that dismissal should 
have been without prejudice. 
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did not address it in her response to Selene ’s motion to dismiss. Her response to 
Selene’s motion essentially concedes that her RESPA claim fails; she only mentions 
the claim in arguing that its dismissal will not affect her state-law claims.11 Further, 
a party’s “intent” does not guide the Court in determining whether a claim has 
been abandoned. “When a party fails to address a specific claim, or fails to respond 
to an argument made by the opposing party, the Court deems such claim or 
argument abandoned.” Ramsey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 2013 WL 
1222492, at *29 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2013), aff’d, 543 F. App’x 966 (11th Cir. 2013). 
Accordingly, this objection is overruled.
12 
  
 
11  ECF 18, at 4 (“Even if Plaintiff’s RESPA claim is dismissed . . . [it] does not 
affect other state-law claims.”). 
12  Undersigned also agrees with the R&R’s alternative reason for dismissing 
Dillard’s RESPA claim, namely that she failed to state a plausible claim. ECF 
22, at 21–22. To state a RESPA claim for failure to respond to a qualified written 
request, a plaintiff must “plead facts demonstrating that a written request was 
actually made, such as by discussing the date the request was sent, how it was 
delivered, and describing its contents showing they satisfied the requirements 
enumerated in 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B). Indeed, plaintiffs must make specific 
factual allegations showing that a written request was made, and that such 
request included the detail necessary to qualify under the statute. ” Costine v. 
BAC Home Loans, 946 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1232–33 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (collecting 
cases). “It is not enough to simply use the words ‘qualified written request ’ 
somewhere in the Complaint. ” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 555 (2007)). Dillard’s Complaint did not include sufficient factual 
allegations to support her RESPA claim. 
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C. The R&R did not err in dismissing her declaratory judgment claims. 
Dillard argues that the R&R erred in  treating her foreclosure as a past 
injury.13 This addresses the portion of the R&R that recommends dismissal of her 
two claims seeking declaratory judgments that the Security Deed is unenforceable 
and that the Waiver of Borrower’s Rights provision is invalid and unenforceable.14 
There, the R&R correctly cites controlling law that, to be entitled to a declaratory 
judgment, a plaintiff must allege that there is “a substantial continuing 
controversy between two adverse parties”  and “must allege facts from which it 
appears there is a substantial likelihood that [s]he will suffer injury in the future.” 
Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 1999). The 
R&R correctly noted that Dillard did not provide facts in her C omplaint 
suggesting the injury is likely to continue or be repeated.
15 This alone is enough to 
support dismissal. 
Dillard argues that the R&R overlooked her allegations, made for the first 
time in her response to the motion to dismiss,16 that the foreclosure is void because 
 
13  ECF 25, at 6 (objection “G”). 
14  ECF 22, at 11. 
15  ECF 1, at 3–5. 
16  ECF 18, at 4. On this point, t he R&R correctly cites controlling law that a 
plaintiff cannot  add claims to her complaint through arguments in her 
response brief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 
F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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it is based on a void assignment, which, she says, renders her injury ongoing.17 To 
the extent Dillard argues that the assignment from JP Morgan to Selene is void 
because of inconsistencies with the notary’s signature and there being only an 
“unofficial witness,” 18 these arguments  also fail. The R&R correctly cites 
controlling law that, in Georgia, “improper attestation of an assignment does not 
render it void.” Stoudemire v. HSBC Bank USA, 333 Ga. App. 374, 376 (2015) (citing 
Budget Charge Accounts v. Peters, 213 Ga. 17, 18 (1957)).
19 
D. The R&R did not err in concluding that Dillard did not raise 
independent wrongful foreclosure or constitutional claims. 
Dillard argues that the R&R erred in concluding that she did not raise 
wrongful foreclosure or constitutional claims. 20 She insists that her factual 
allegations about being “manipulated into signing a waiver of her constitutional 
 
17  ECF 25, at 6 (objection “G”). 
18  Id. at 4 (objection “D”), 6 (objection “G”); ECF 18, at 3–4. 
19  To the extent that Dillard argues the R&R erred in relying on Stoudemire  
because it is factually different, see ECF 25, at 4 (objection “D”), that objection 
is overruled. While Dillard argues the  plaintiffs in Stoudemire “did not allege 
that the assignment was void ab initio due to notarization fraud or improper 
attestation[,]” that is exactly what the y argued. 333 Ga. App. at 375 (“[The] 
assignment, they argue, is void on its face because it is a forgery and it was not 
signed by the necessary corporate officers.”). Additionally, Dillard’s reliance 
on U.S. Bank National Association  v. Gordon, 289 Ga. 12 (2011), is inapposite 
because that case held that a facially invalid security deed did not provide 
constructive notice to subsequent purchasers. But here, the assignment’s 
alleged procedural irregularities do not render it facially invalid. 
20  ECF 25, at 6 (objection “H”). 
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rights in connection with the loan transaction” should be construed as such, 
despite not including wrongful foreclosure or constitutional counts in her  claims 
for relief.21 This objection is overruled. While Dillard is correct that pro se pleadings 
are to be construed liberally, Erickson , 551 U.S. at 94, a court is not “require[d] or 
allow[ed] . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an 
action.” Thomas v. Pentagon Fed. Credit Union, 393 F. App’x 635, 637 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(citing GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), 
overruled on other grounds by Swann v. S. Health Partners, Inc., 388 F.3d 834 (11th Cir. 
2004)). Here, Dillard’s Complaint includes a section titled “Claims for Relief” that 
specifically numbers five sepa rate counts, none of which include a wrongful 
foreclosure or constitutional claim.22 The Court is not obligated to infer additional 
claims for relief other than those actually identified. 
E. The R&R erred  in part in concluding that Dillard’s claims should 
be dismissed with prejudice. 
Lastly, Dillard argues that the R&R improperly recommends dismissal with 
prejudice.23 While courts often give pro se plaintiffs leave to amend when 
requested, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, courts need not give 
leave to amend when “a more carefully drafted complaint could not state a claim.” 
 
21  Id. 
22  ECF 1, at 5–8. 
23  ECF 25, at 5 (objection “E”), 6 (objection “I”). 
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Woldeab v. DeKalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018). The R&R 
is generally correct in concluding that many of Dillard’s claims are based on 
assignments of the Security Deed that she lacks standing to challenge, and for 
those claims, the R&R was correct in recommending dismissal with prejudice. 
However, for Dillard’s challenges that are not based on the assignment —
specifically, Count I (violation of RESPA) and Count V (fraud in the 
inducement)— undersigned concludes that Dillard should b e granted the 
opportunity to amend. Accordingly, the objection is adopted in part and overruled 
in part. Dismissal of Counts II–IV shall be with prejudice, but dismissal of Counts 
I and V shall be without prejudice. 
III. Conclusion 
Dillard’s objections to the R&R [ECF 25] are  OVERRULED in part  and  
SUSTAINED in part. Undersigned ADOPTS the R&R [ECF 22] as the Order of 
this Court, except to the extent that it recommends dismissal of Counts I and V be 
with prejudice. Defendants’ motions to dismiss [ECFs 6, 10, and 15] are 
GRANTED. Counts II, III, and IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint are DISMISSED with 
prejudice. Counts I and V of Plaintiff’s Complaint are DISMISSED without 
prejudice. Dillard is granted leave to amend Counts I and V only . Dillard may 
file an amended complaint  as to Counts I and V  within 21 days  of this Order. 
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Failure to timely do so will deem all her claims abandoned and dismissed with 
prejudice.  
Lastly, Dillard’s motion for leave to file a surreply to Selene’s reply brief 
[ECF 26], motion to compel Defendants’ compliance with Fed eral Rule  7.1 and 
Local Rule 3.3 [ECF 28], and “Plaintiff’s Enhanced Rule 17(a) motion to require 
Defendants to show they are the real parties in interest and to prevent dismissal 
with prejudice” [ECF 29] are DENIED.
24 
The Clerk is DIRECTED to reinstate the referral of this case to Judge Salinas 
for further proceedings, and submit this Order to Judge Salinas after 21 days.  
SO ORDERED this 31st day of March, 2026. 
 
 
  Steven D. Grimberg 
United States District Judge 
 
 
24  To the extent that Dillard seeks to compel Defendants’ compliance with 
Federal Rule 7.1 and Local Rule 3.3’s requirements that a party file its 
certificate of interested persons and corporate disclosure statement, this 
request is moot. Defendants have filed their certificates of interested persons 
and corporate disclosure statements. See ECFs 11, 13, 16. To the extent that 
Dillard attempts to bring a motion under Federal Rule 17(a), she 
misunderstands the Rule. Rule 17(a) requires a plaintiff to sue in the name of 
the real party in interest. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a). There is no right to relief for 
Dillard as she demands under Rule 17(a). 
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