govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_24-cv-00538-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
HANNAH LEDBETTER, 
Plaintiff, 
 
Civil Action No.  
1:24-cv-00538-SDG 
v.  
CLOUD 9 ONLINE SMOKE & VAPE, LLC, 
et al.,  
Defendants. 
 
 
OPINION AND ORDER  
When Plaintiff Hannah Ledbetter found out that the vape pens she 
purchased contained higher levels of THC than that permitted by federal law, she 
proceeded as any “regular consumer” of vape pens  would:1 she filed a putative 
class action to try to take down the entire vaping industry.  
Before the Court is a series of motions filed by the various industry 
Defendants named in Ledbetter’s Second Amended Complaint (SAC) [ECFs 219, 
229–36]. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are, for the 
most part, GRANTED.  
The motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim brought by Defendants 
Stiiizy, L&K D istribution (L&K), Cookies Creative Consulting (Cookies), Savage 
Enterprises, and Encore Labs  [ECFs 219, 230, 231, 235, 236]  are GRANTED as to 
 
1  Ledbetter is a self-proclaimed “regular consumer” of delta-8 products. See ECF 
200, ¶ 34. 
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the federal RICO claims , and those claims are dismissed with prejudice . The 
motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction brought by Stiiizy, L&K, 
Cookies, and Matthew Winters, Matthew Montesano, and Jon Dougherty  [ECFs 
232, 233, 234, 229] are GRANTED. The motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction brought by Savage Enterprises [ECF 229] is DENIED. The motions to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction brought by Cloud 9, Green Rush 
(Xhale City),
2 and TheSY (Element  Vape) 3 [ECFs 232–34] are GRANTED. And 
lastly, because the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the 
remaining state law claims, those claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. This 
case will be CLOSED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual and Procedural History 
This case arises out of an alleged multi -state conspiracy to sell vape pens 
containing Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinoal (more commonly known as, and 
referred to in the SAC as, Delta-9 THC) at concentrations beyond the permissible 
limit under federal law.
4 Delta-9 is well known as the main psychoactive 
 
2  Green Rush conducts business as Xhale City, which is how this court will refer 
to the entity. See id. ¶ 4.  
3  TheSY, LLC conducts business as Element  Vape, which is how the Court will 
refer to the entity. See id.  
4  See, e.g., id. ¶ 436.  
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component of cannabis, 5 a plant whose legal use was for a long time severely 
restricted by the federal Controlled Substances Act  (CSA). See generally Standing 
Akimbo, LLC., v. U.S., 141 S. Ct. 2236, 2237–38 (2021) (Statement of Thomas, J., 
respecting the denial of certiorari) ( describing the evolution of federal cannabis 
regulation and enforcement). Those federal restrictions were relaxed somewhat by 
the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018—the so-called “Farm Bill”— which 
legalized cannabis -derived products with a Delta -9 concentration of “not more 
than 0.3 percent on a dry weight basis.” 7 U.S.C. § 1639o(1)  (defining hemp); see 
also Earth Sci. Tech, Inc. v. Impact UA, Inc., 809 F. App ’x 600, 608 (11th Cir. 2020)  
(noting that the Farm Bill exempts hemp  from the CSA unless it has more than 
0.3% THC).  
Ledbetter alleges that, in November 2023, she bought what were advertised 
as Farm Bill -compliant vape distillates that contained less than 0.3% dry weight 
Delta-9.6 She bought an assortment of these products from an assortment of 
retailers, spending $146.74. 7 But when  Ledbetter—seeking to “reassure herself” 
 
5  For a fuller description of cannabis, see generally NIDA, Cannabis (Marijuana), 
National Institute on Drug Abuse (Sep.  24, 2024), 
https://nida.nih.gov/research-topics/cannabis-marijuana. For purposes of 
this Order, “cannabis” refers to the plant with the scientific name Cannabis 
sativa L. Id.; see also ECF 200, ¶ 37.  
6  ECF 200, ¶¶ 5, 16–17, 21, 439.  
7  Id. ¶¶ 16–17, 21.  
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that the vapes were legal —had the distillate tested, 8 she came to learn that they 
contained excessive Delta-9 levels ranging from 230 to 703 percent above the legal 
limit.9 As she alleges in the SAC , she “unknowingly purchased  . . . five products 
that were Schedule 1 Controlled Substance[s].”10 
These products include the following:11  
• COOKIES, with a strain name of Huckleberry Gelato , manufactured 
by Cookies for a purchase price of $22.99, plus tax and shipping costs, 
that included a Delta -9 percentage variance of 640%, above the legal 
limit; 
• EXTRAX, with a strain name of Forbidden Jelly, manufactured by 
Savage Enterprises for a purchase price of $24.48 that included a 
Delta-9 percentage variance of over 456%, above the legal limit; 
• EXTRAX, with a strain name of Power Plant, manufactured by Savage 
Enterprises for a purchase price of $58.29 that included a Delta-9 
percentage variance of over 436%, above the legal limit; 
 
8  Id. ¶ 440.  
9  Id. ¶ 47.  
10  Id. ¶ 42.  
11  Id. ¶ 42-(a)-(e); ¶ 47(a)-(e).   
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• LOOPER, with a strain name of Blue Gusherz, manufactured by L&K 
for a purchase price of $17.99, plus tax and shipping cost s that 
included a Delta-9 percentage variance of 230%, above the legal limit; 
and  
• STIIIZY HEMP, with a strain name of OG Kush, manufactured by 
Stiiizy for a purchase price of $22.99, plus tax and shipping costs that 
included a Delta-9 percentage variance of over 703%, above the legal 
limit.  
In the SAC, Ledbetter makes clear that she did not want products with such 
high qualities of Delta -9.12 She acknowledges the Department of Justice has 
“largely declined” to prosecute violations of federal cannabis laws .13 Despite this 
non-enforcement, Ledbetter asserts, cannabis remains “just as illegal” as it was 
when Congress first passed the CSA in 1970.14 She emphasizes that manufacturing 
such cannabis products with more than 0.3% Delta -9 THC “is an illegal activity” 
under both state and federal law.15  
 
12  Id. ¶ 42.  
13  ECF 200, ¶ 50.  
14  Id. ¶ 51.  
15  Id. ¶¶ 53, 434.   
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Ledbetter thus filed a putative class action against a suite of companies and 
individuals allegedly involved in the manufacture, testing, distribution, and sale 
of illegal vapes, asserting the following claims:   
• Negligence, negligent misrepresentation, intentional 
misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment, all under Georgia 
common law; 
• Strict products liability under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 (both failure to warn 
and manufacturing defect); 
• Violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
(RICO) Act under both federal and Georgia law (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) 
and O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4, respectively); and 
• RICO conspiracy under federal law (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)). 
Ledbetter initially filed her complaint in January 2024.
16 In March, she filed 
her first amended complaint (FAC).17 Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim. 18 This Court held oral argument in November 2024 on 
 
16  ECF 1.  
17  ECF 69.  
18  ECFs 148, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158.  
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the motions to dismiss and on whether a preliminary injunction was appropriate.19 
The Court found a preliminary injunction was not warranted.20  
At the close of oral argument, Ledbetter asked the Court for leave to amend 
the FAC, citing newly discovered evidence involving one of the named defendants 
as reason for the limited amendment. 21 The Court granted leave, allowing 
Ledbetter to include the additional factual allegations that the newly discovered 
evidence might support. 22 What Ledbetter filed was far beyond the limited 
amendment permitted by the Court’s leave: the SAC is over two-and-a-half times 
as long as the FAC, containing over three times as many paragraphs and asserting 
over four times as many claims .
23 The Court denied as moot all pending motions 
and ordered the parties to confer and fil e a joint brief ing schedule.24 The parties 
complied, and Defendants subsequently filed their various motions to dismiss.  
 
19  See ECF 238 (transcript).   
20  See ECF 199.  
21  ECF 238, 86–88. 
22  ECF 199. 
23  See generally ECF 206, at 2–3; ECF 206-1 (showing how the SAC amended the 
FAC); ECF 209. 
24  ECF 209, at 2–3. 
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B. An Overview of the Parties and the Defendants’ Motions 
In total, Ledbetter brings nine different causes of action against various 
combinations of Defendants, totaling 42 separate claims . Ledbetter organizes her 
claims against the Defendants based on the products they have allegedly played a 
role in producing or selling. She also refers collectively to groups of defendants—
across product lines—by their role in the respective supply chain of each product. 
There are the “Manufacturer Defendants,” consisting of Stiiizy, L&K, Cookies, and 
Savage Enterprises; 25 the “Lab oratory Defendants,” consisting, now, 26 of only 
Encore Labs and various “John Does”; 27 and the “Retail Defendants,” consisting 
of Cloud 9, Element Vape, Xhale City, and Xhale Franchise.28  
Against different groups of defendants related to each product she 
purchased, Ledbetter brings six counts of state law non -RICO claims; in other 
words, she raises 30 state law non -RICO claims. 29 Substantively, however, each 
count consists of largely the same allegations, copied-and-pasted from one 
 
25  ECF 200, ¶ 2. 
26  After filing the SAC, Ledbetter voluntarily dismissed Pharmlabs, see ECFs 215–
16, which the SAC characterizes as a lab defendant. ECF 200, ¶ 3. 
27  ECF 200, ¶ 3. 
28  Id. ¶ 4. 
29  See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 99–166 (bringing six state law non- RICO claims under the title 
of “Extrax – Forbidden Jelly” against Savage Enterprises and Pur Iso Labs). 
The remaining state law non -RICO claims against other Defendants proceed 
in this fashion. 
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grouping of defendants to another, essentially alleging the  various defendants 
engaged in the same wrongdoing in their respective production and sale  of each 
product.  
Ledbetter organizes her RICO claims in a similar fashion . She identifies 
what she believes are four vertical enterprises relating to the production and sale 
of the various products she purchased. There are the “Savage Defendants,” the 
“Cookies Defendants,” the “L&K Defendants ,” and the “Stiiizy Defendants.”
30 
Against each grouping of defendants, Ledbetter  raises federal substantive RICO, 
federal RICO conspiracy, and Georgia RICO claims — labeled, confusingly, as 
Counts I, II, and III; in total, she raises 12 RICO claims .31 Again, substantively, 
these claims consist of largely the same allegations, suggesting that each vertical 
enterprise operates similarly to each other and engages in similar wrongdoing. 
 According to Ledbetter, the conspiracy within each enterprise is structured 
as follows. Distillate makers 32 produce distillate, the raw material to be used in 
vape pens, with intentionally high levels of Delta -9 THC .33 The Manufacturer 
 
30  See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 470, 503, 535, 567. 
31  See id.  ¶¶ 470–502 (This same pattern of claims and allegations is repeated 
against the three other alleged enterprises). 
32  Ledbetter has brought claims against only one named distillate maker, Puro 
Iso Labs LLC, see id. ¶ 73, who is now in default, see ECF 204. 
33  ECF 200, ¶¶ 73–79. 
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Defendants then purchase the distillate from the distillate makers, and they use 
the distillate to manufacture cannabis products  with excessively high levels of 
Delta-9 THC , like the vape pens that Ledbetter purchased. 34 The Manufacturer 
Defendants then have their products tested by the Laboratory Defendants, who 
produce fraudulent Certificates of Analysis (COAs), which in turn allows the 
Manufacturer Defendants to distribute the noncompliant cannabis products to the 
Retail Defendants.35 
Because Ledbetter repeats factual allegations and legal arguments across  
groupings of defendants and purported  enterprises, the Court will discuss the 
multiple counts by claim name and address their sufficiency collectively wherever 
practical. This largely coincides with how the Defendants have structured their 
motions to dismiss.36 
The Defendants jointly move to dismiss all 42 claims  (the “Joint Motion”), 
arguing that fatal deficiencies exist across all counts, such that each can be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
 
34  Id. ¶¶ 487, 519, 551, 583. 
35  Id. ¶ 441. Ledbetter does not include any of the Retail Defendants in her RICO 
claims. Id. at 116, n.1. 
36  See, e.g., ECF 219. 
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12(b)(6).37 They also make collective arguments against the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.38  
Additionally, individual Defendants and smaller groups of Defendants 
move to dismiss on more individualized grounds.  The Manufacturer and 
Laboratory Defendants all largely argue that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction 
over them, especially if the federal RICO claims are dismissed. 39 The Retail 
Defendants all argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
Ledbetter’s claims against them, should the Court find that Ledbetter fails to state 
a federal RICO claim against the Manufacturer and Laboratory Defendants.40 And 
three individual officers or shareholders of Savage Enterprises —Winters, 
Montesano, and Dougherty—argue that, despite being named as Defendants, it 
appears that the SAC does not actually state any causes of action against them, 
and in any event the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. 41 Most of these 
motions also raise arguments, similar to those made in the Joint Motion, that the 
claims against them should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 
 
37  See, e.g., id., at 11–12, 30. 
38  See, e.g., id., at 27, 30 n.13. 
39  See generally ECFs 230, 231, 235, 236. 
40  See generally ECFs 232–34. 
41  See generally ECF 229. 
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II. The federal RICO claims must be dismissed. 
The Court  will first determine whether the federal RICO claims survive 
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) because this determination affects whether the Court 
has jurisdiction—both subject matter and personal —for the remaining state law 
claims. The RICO statute authorizes nationwide service of process, see generally 18 
U.S.C. § 1965, but the circuit courts are divided over whether RICO’s nationwide 
service provision first requires at least one defendant to have minimum contacts 
in the forum before a plaintiff can bring all members of an alleged RICO 
conspiracy before the court. See generally Jonathan R. Nash, National Personal 
Jurisdiction, 68 E
MORY L. J. 509, 527 n.104 (2019) (noting the circuit split).  The 
Eleventh Circuit is in the minority of circuits who conclude that Section 1965 
confers personal jurisdiction over every civil RICO defendant, regardless of 
whether any defendant has a connection with the forum. See id.; Republic of Panama 
v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 941–42 (11th Cir. 1997). Under 
Republic of Panama, a district court in the Eleventh Circuit has personal jurisdiction 
over all defendants if the plaintiff states a “colorable” RICO claim and the 
defendant has minimum contacts with the United States. Republic of Panama , 119 
F.3d at 941–42.  
Arguing that the SAC fails to assert RICO claims against a defendant with 
min
imum contacts in the forum, the Defendants urge the Court to dismiss all RICO 
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claims for lack of personal jurisdiction , “notwithstanding Republic of Panama.” 42 
The Court declines to go against binding Eleventh Circuit precedent. Were there 
ever a case to challenge the Eleventh Circuit’s position in this circuit split, it is not 
this one: the RICO claims can be dismissed here because they fail to state a claim. 
The Court notes, however, that for purposes of deciding the Defendants’ 12(b)(6) 
motions on the RICO claims, the SAC at least states a “colorable” RICO claim 
because it is “not ‘so insubstantial, implausible, or otherwise completely devoid of 
merit’ as to deprive [Ledbetter] of the right to utilize RICO’s nationwide service of 
process provision.” Id. at 942 n.9. 
A. Legal standard on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 
605 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
570 (2007)). A complaint is plausible on its face when a plaintiff pleads sufficient 
factual content for the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable f or the conduct alleged. Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Courts 
 
42  ECF 219, at 30. 
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may infer from the factual allegations in the complaint ‘obvious alternative 
explanation[s],’ which suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct 
the plaintiff would ask the court to infer.” Am. Dental Ass’n, 605 F.3d at 1290; see 
also Rivell v. Priv. Health Care Sys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1308, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008) (deeming 
dismissal appropriate under 12(b)(6) if the factual allegations are not “enough to 
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”). 
A complaint must also present sufficient facts to “‘raise a reasonable 
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’ of the claim.” Am. Dental Ass’n , 
605 F.3d at 1289 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] ll well-pleaded facts are 
accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff.” FindWhat Inv’r Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 
1296 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 
(11th Cir. 2006)). This principle, however, does not apply to legal conclusions. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
B. The substantive RICO claims must be dismissed because Ledbetter 
fails to plausibly allege the existence of an enterprise. 
Within what Led
 better labels as the  “RICO Counts,” each Count II alleges 
Defendants conducted or participated in a RICO enterprise through a pattern of 
racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Congress passed the RICO 
Act in 1970 to combat the rise of organized criminal activity. Russello v. United 
States, 464 U.S. 16, 26–27 (1983) (analyzing the legislative history of the RICO 
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statute for legislative intent).  The statute makes it “unlawful for any person 
employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of 
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or 
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise ’s affairs through a pattern of 
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). In 
addition to its criminal proscriptions, the statute provides a private cause of action 
to “[a]ny person injured in his business or property” by a violation of § 1962(c). 
See RJR Nabisco v. Eur. Cmty., 579 U.S. 325, 349 (2016) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). 
 Though the RICO Act was originally enacted to combat organized crime, 
the Supreme Court has made clear that the statute’s application is not limited  to 
only “mobsters” or organized criminals in the traditional sense. See, e.g., Sedima, 
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 49 9 (1985); U.S. v. Turkette , 452 U.S. 576, 580 
(1981) (noting that RICO ’s enterprise definition includes  “legitimate and 
illegitimate” entities). Rather, “the RICO statute provides that its terms are to be 
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.” Boyle v. United States, 556 
U.S. 938, 944 (2009) (quotation omitted). Still, “RICO is not a run -of-the-mill 
consumer protection statute .” Lewis v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 530 F. Supp. 3d 
1183, 1219 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (internal citations omitted).  
A private plaintiff suing under the civil provisions of RICO must plausibly 
alleg
e six elements: that the defendants (1) operated or managed; (2) an enterprise; 
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(3) through a pattern; (4) of racketeering activity  that included at least two 
predicate acts of racketeering, which  (5) caused; (6) injury to the business or 
property of the plaintiff. Cisneros v. Petland, Inc. , 972 F.3d 1204, 1208 (11th Cir. 
2020). “If a plaintiff fails to adequately plead any one of these elements,” they have 
failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and their complaint must 
be dismissed under Fed eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. Here, the Court 
concludes that Ledbetter  has failed to plausibly allege the existence of a RICO 
enterprise, and this alone is fatal to her RICO claims. Indeed, Ledbetter’s pleading 
deficiencies span across all of her  substantive federal RICO counts, such that not 
one of the four association- in-fact enterprises that she describes meets the 
definition of an enterprise under RICO.  
A RICO enterprise is “any in
 dividual, partnership, corporation, association, 
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact 
although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). An “association-in-fact enterprise 
is simply a continuing unit that functions with a common purpose.” Boyle, 556 U.S. 
at 948. To plead an association-in-fact enterprise, the Supreme Court has held that 
a plaintiff must allege that a group of persons shares three structural features: “(1) 
a ‘purpose,’ (2) ‘relationships among those associated with the enterprise,’ and (3) 
‘longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise ’s 
purpose.’” Almanza v. United Airlines, Inc., 851 F.3d 1060, 1067 (11th Cir. 2017) 
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(quoting Boyle, 556 U.S. at 944). Here, Ledbetter failed to plausibly allege that the 
participants in any of the four purported enterprises shared a qualifying purpose. 
 An association-in-fact enterprise will have “‘a common purpose of engaging 
in a course of conduct’ among the enterprise’s alleged participants.” Cisneros, 972 
F.3d at 1211 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583). A shared, abstract interest, such as 
a “generally shared interest in making money ,” does not satisfy the purpose 
prong. Id. (citing Ray v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d 1340, 1352–53, n.3 (11th Cir. 
2016)). Instead, if the various participants’ ultimate purpose is “to make money for 
themselves,” a RICO plaintiff must plausibly allege that participants “shared the 
purpose of enriching themselves through a particular criminal course of conduct.” 
Id. at 1211–12 (citing Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1284–85 (11th 
Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in  Simpson v. Sanderson Farms, 
Inc., 744 F.3d 702, 714–15 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding sufficient a common purpose of 
making money by hiring undocumented immigrants)). Moreover, a RICO plaintiff 
must allege facts showing that the defendants “participate[d] in the operation or 
management of the enterprise itself,” and “conducted or participated in the 
conduct of the ‘enterprise’s affairs,’ not just their own  affairs.” Reves v. Ernst & 
Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183, 185 (1993) (emphasis in original). 
 In Cisneros, a cas
 e involving an alleged conspiracy to sell sick puppies for a 
premium price, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff had not alleged 
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facts that “plausibly support the inference that the defendants were collectively 
tryi
ng to make money in pet sales by fraud” (which is a common purpose sufficient 
to find a RICO enterprise), as opposed to the “‘obvious alternative explanation’ 
that they were simply trying to make money in pet sales,” which is not a qualifying 
RICO purpose. 972 F.3d at 1211 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567) (emphasis in 
the original). There, the plaintif f only provided high-level generalizations about 
the roles of a franchisor, franchisee, and a pet care business in the sale and care of 
puppies; devoid of conclusory allegations that the companies carried out their 
business functions to further a shared purpose of committing fraud, the plaintiff’s 
allegations merely described “legitimate businesses” selling products  and 
providing services. Id. at 1212–15. Repeatedly, the Eleventh Circuit noted the 
absence of any “concrete factual allegations” for which the court could infer a 
fraudulent purpose of any individual defendant. See id. at 1212–13 (noting the 
absence of concrete facts as to fraud by the franchisor, franchisee, and pet care 
business). And the Court concluded that even if it could assume a fraudulent 
purpose on behalf of the franchisee, it could not infer that the illicit purpose was 
shared among the defendants. Id. at 1213 (“Cisneros was required to allege not just 
that Petland Kennesaw had a fraudulent purpose, but that it was a common 
purpose, formed in collaboration with Petland, PAWSitive, and the preferred 
veterinarians.”) (emphasis in the original). 
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Similar shortcomings plague the SAC . Ledbetter offers little more than 
conclusory and unsupported generaliz ations about a RICO enterprise that 
conveniently matches the typical  supply chain for hemp products . The SAC is 
devoid of concrete facts sufficient to suggest that Defendants were operating with 
a common purpose to make money in the fraudulent or illegal sale of vape pens , 
rather than the “obvious alternative explanation” that they were each trying to 
make money, independently, in their respective role in the supply chain.  
Removing hyperbole and legal conclusions, the SAC merely describes links in a 
supply chain connected by ordinary commercial dealings. 
 At the highest order of abstraction, Ledbetter alleges throughout each Count 
II that the distillate makers, Manufacturer Defendants, and Laboratory Defendants 
“together formed an open -ended association-in-fact enterprise for the purpose of 
selling illegal D8 vape pens, marijuana, across the United States and selling it to 
retailers.”
43 Yet Ledbetter offers no concrete facts to support this assertion. For 
instance, Ledbetter alleges multiple times that each Manufacturer Defendant 
“purchased distillate” from a distillate maker, as if this transaction alone is enough 
to show common purpose.44 It is not. Without any plausible factual allegations that 
the Defendant manufacturers and distillate makers  had agreements to produce 
 
43  ECF 200, ¶¶ 488, 520, 552, 584. 
44  Id. ¶¶ 487, 519, 551, 583. 
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vape pens with illegal amounts of Delta -9 THC, these assertions merely show the 
routine transactions between participants in a supply chain for hemp products. 
Ledbetter repeatedly allege s that the Manufacturer Defendants and Lab oratory 
Defendants “have contractual and other relationships with each other,” 45 but 
without plausibly alleging the  substance of these agreements and relationships, 
this again only shows  routine commercial dealing s. See id.  at 1212 ( considering 
indicative of plaintiff’s pleading deficiencies that she failed to allege the 
“substance of any . . . communication” between defendants ). Indeed, it would be 
strange if the parties did not have contracts relating to the production and sale of 
a final product.  
Though Ledbetter alleges in conclusory fashion that the Laboratory 
Defendants issued fraudulent COAs, 46 her allegations do not assert  that any 
Laboratory Defendant was doing so because of some identifiable agreement it had 
with a  specific Manufacturing Defendant ; i ndependent conduct —even illegal 
conduct—cannot satisfy RICO’s shared purpose requirement. See Ray, 836 F.3d at 
1354 (concluding that allegations about one member’s fraudulent conduct say 
nothing about an “allegedly fraudulent purpose” shared among defendants).  She 
also vaguely alleges that “ the Manufacturer Defendants . . . lab-shopped” until 
 
45  Id. ¶¶ 489, 521, 553, 585. 
46  Id. ¶¶ 83, 441. 
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21 
they found Lab oratory Defendants willing to issue false COAs, 47 but this 
allegation, devoid of any allegations relating to specific Defendants, does not allow 
the Court to “infer that [the Manufacturer Defendants] decided on this purpose 
together with” the Laboratory Defendants as an enterprise. Cisneros, 972 F.3d at 
1213. And w hile Ledbetter repeatedly asserts that  “all . . . defendants agreed to 
participate in and assist the enterprise with full knowledge of its overall aim ,”48 
the Court is not required to accept the truth of conclusory statements like these. 
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
 It is further telling of the deficiency of Ledbetter’s enterprise allegations just 
how many John Doe defendants she has included in place of named participants 
in the enterprises. See Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010) (“As 
a general matter, fictitious -party pleading is not permitted in federal court.”).  In 
this way, Ledbetter is asking the Court to allow her RICO claims to proceed based 
on conclusory allegations committed by unnamed parties—in essence, 
unidentified wrongdoing by unidentified wrongdoers. For one of the four alleged 
enterprises between a manufacturer and a laboratory, the only named defendant 
is the manufacturer —for th e alleged enterprises responsible for H uckleberry 
 
47  Id. ¶¶ 70, 443. 
48  Id. ¶¶ 490, 522, 554, 586. 
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22 
Gelato,49 the laboratory defendant is a “John Doe laboratory.” 50 Ledbetter named 
Pharmlabs as the laboratory defendant for two of t he alleged enterprises, 51 but 
soon after filing the SAC, she dismissed it from the case .52 And almost every 
distillate maker is a “John Doe laboratory” or “John Doe distillate maker.” 53 The 
speculation inherent in allegations involving these John Doe  parties is apparent 
with the following example. While d escribing the alleged enterprise responsible 
for Blue Gusherz, Ledbetter states that L&K “may have purchased the distillate to 
manufacture their vape pen from John Doe distillate maker  who may have had 
their distillate tested by a John Doe laboratory.”54 Bare, speculative allegations like 
these are not enough to survive a motion to dismiss. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
 In the end, Ledbetter has alleged only that  unnamed distillate makers sell 
distillate, potentially with excess levels of D elta-9 THC , to Manufacturer 
 
49  While Ledbetter does name Encore Labs among the “Stiiizy Defendants,” she 
alleges Encore’s role is as a laboratory who tests the end product rather than 
as one that manufactures distillate or tests the distillate. See id. ¶ 581. 
50  See id. ¶ 504.   
51  See id. ¶¶ 471 (Power Plant & Forbidden Jelly), 536 (Blue Gusherz).  
52  See ECFs 215–16. 
53  See ECF 200, ¶¶ 471, 504, 536, 568. The only named distillate maker is Pur Iso 
Labs, see id. ¶ 471, who is currently in default, see ECF 204. 
54  ECF 200, ¶ 549 (emphasis added). Such speculative allegations involving 
various John Doe parties are repeated in many of Ledbetter’s RICO claims. See 
id. ¶¶ 486, 581.  
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23 
Defendants who use that distillate to manufacture vape pens  that have COAs 
issued by Laboratory Defendants . She has not plausibly alleged that four groups 
of Defendants are working together to further four shared criminal purposes, and, 
therefore, she has not adequately pled the existence of a ny association- in-fact 
RICO enterprise s. Her SAC fails to state a claim for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1962(c).  
C. Ledbetter’s federal RICO conspiracy claim must be dismissed. 
Count III of the RICO Counts against the four purported enterprises is a 
RIC
O conspiracy claim, which alleges that the Manufacturer and Laboratory 
Defendants conspired to commit the substantive RICO offense discussed above, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). A RICO conspiracy can be found through “the 
conduct of the alleged participants or from circumstantial evidence of a scheme.” 
United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1264 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States 
v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1328 (11th Cir. 2005)). But of course, “parties cannot be 
found guilty of conspiring to commit an act that is not itself against the law.” 
Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms, 372 F.3d 1250, 1269 (11th Cir. 2004). And a complaint 
that “simply concludes that the defendants conspired and confederated to commit 
conduct which in itself does not constitute a RICO violation” must be dismissed. 
Id. (quotation omitted).  
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24 
This is what Ledbetter has done here. In each RICO Count III, Ledbetter 
states that the Defendants “agreed and conspired . . . to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) 
by forming an association -in-fact enterprise for the purpose of selling illegal D8 
vape pens. . . after testing with the Lab Defendants who agreed to provide false 
THC values and conceal harmful substances in the marijuana.” Ledbetter’s theory 
of conspiracy here matches her theory of a substantive RICO offense , which this 
Court has concluded fails to state a claim. Because Ledbetter has failed to 
adequately allege an association -in-fact enterprise, her RICO conspiracy claim 
must also fail. 
This leaves only the state law claims remaining. The  federal RICO claims 
served as Ledbetter’s primary basis for why the Court’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over the Manufacturer and Laboratory Defendants was proper,
55 and 
they also supported her primary theory for why the Court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over the case .56 The Court therefore must address issues relating to 
personal and subject matter jurisdiction before it can consider the remaining state 
law claims. 
 
55  Id. ¶ 15. 
56  Id. ¶ 8. 
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III. The Court does not have  personal jurisdiction over the Laboratory 
Defendants, Individual Defendants, and most of the Manufacturer 
Defendants. 
The Manufacturer Defendants—Stiiizy, L&K, Cookies, and Savage 
Enterprises57—and the only named Laboratory Defendant, Encore Labs, move to 
dismiss on the grounds that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over 
them if the federal RICO claims do not survive dismissal.58 Further, the Individual 
Defendants—Montesano, Winters, and Dougherty, all officers of Savage 
Enterprise— move to dismiss on personal jurisdiction grounds. 59 Largely, all 
Defendants contesting personal jurisdiction argue that the SAC fails to allege any 
specific forum contacts as to each of them that would support the Court’s exercise 
of specific jurisdiction over any of them. In other words, they argue that p ersonal 
jurisdiction must be assessed defendant by defendant, and that the SAC’s lumping 
of claims fails, as a matter of law, to properly allege that the Court has personal 
jurisdiction over any of them.  
 
57  Note that Savage Enterprises did not brief arguments concerning the Court’s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over it. In a motion to dismiss filed by Savage 
Enterprises and other persons affiliated with the company, it simply joined the 
arguments raised in the Joint Motion. ECF 229, at 3. But because the Joint 
Motion contests personal jurisdiction, see ECF 219, at 27 –30, the Court 
considers Savage Enterprises to have preserved this defense. 
58  ECF 219, at 27 (arguing that Ledbetter abandoned her theory of personal 
jurisdiction under the Georgia Long-Arm statute); ECF 230, at 6; ECF 231, at 8; 
ECF 235, at 7; ECF 236, at 2 n.1.  
59  ECF 229, at 7. 
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26 
A. Legal standard on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. 
“The plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.” Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, 
Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 
492 (11th Cir. 1988)). The Supreme Court recognizes two types of personal 
jurisdiction: general and specific. Bristol- Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., San 
Francisco Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017). “A court may assert general jurisdiction 
over foreign (sister -state or foreign -country) corporations to hear any and all 
claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and 
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (quoting Int’l Shoe 
Co. v. Wash. Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)). In 
contrast, specific jurisdiction “depends on an affiliation between the forum and 
the underlying controversy.” Id. at 919 (citation omitted).  
Ledbetter does not contend that the Manufacturer , La b
 oratory, or 
Individual Defendants are subject to general jurisdiction, so the Court need only 
consider whether specific jurisdiction exists. A federal court sitting in diversity 
undertakes a two -step inquiry in determining whether specific personal 
jurisdiction exists: the exer cise of jurisdiction must (1) be appropriate under the 
state long-arm statute and (2) not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
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27 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food 
Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1257–58 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting United Techs. 
Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009)). The Georgia long -arm statute 
“imposes independent obligations that a plaintiff must establish for the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction that are distinct from the demands of procedural due 
process.” Id. at 1259 (interpreting Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., LLC v. First 
Nat’l Bank of Ames, Iowa, 279 Ga. 672 (2005)).  
To satisfy the Georgia long-arm statute, a plaintiff must show that personal 
juri
sdiction is permitted under one of the express statutory bases, interpreted and 
applied literally. Id. Since the Court’s application of the Georgia long-arm statute 
is governed by state law, the Court “must interpret and apply Georgia’s long arm 
statute in the same way as would the Georgia Supreme Court.” Id.  at 1258. To 
satisfy due process, the defendant must have “fair warning” that its activities in 
the forum may subject it to jurisdiction. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 
(1985). The nonresident defendant must have “certain minimum contacts with [the 
forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 
466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316). 
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B. The Court must assess personal jurisdiction defendant-by-
defendant. 
Ledbetter responded to the Defendants’ Joint Motion, as well as to each 
additional motion to dismiss raised by a single party, by raising varying 
arguments for why the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over these parties 
would be proper. She primarily argues that the Court has “pendent personal 
jurisdiction” over the Defendants on the state-law claims because they “arise from 
the same nucleus of operative facts as the federal RICO claims,” of which personal 
jurisdiction is supported by Section 1965(d).
60 This argument was already tenuous, 
even before the federal RICO claims were dismissed, because “pendent personal 
jurisdiction” (also referred to as “supplemental personal jurisdiction”) is a 
doctrine that — if it exists at all— is supported only by federal common law . See 
Moore v. Cecil, 488 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1160 (N.D. Ala. 2020) (“A federal statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1367, governs the exercise of supplemental subject matter jurisdiction but 
does not address supplemental or pendent personal jurisdiction.”) (emphasis in the 
original); Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 1069.7 (4th ed. 2025) 
(explaining that because “there is no federal statute on [pendent personal 
jurisdiction], it seems clear that if it exists, pendent personal jurisdiction must be a 
creature of federal common law”) . It is unclear whether the Eleventh Circuit has 
 
60  ECF 242, at 22. 
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even recognized the doctrine. See  Moore, 488 F. Supp. 3d. at 1160 (noting that 
“Eleventh Circuit law on [supplemental personal jurisdiction] is sparse” and citing 
two Eleventh Circuit cases which do not include the words “supplemental” or 
“pendent personal jurisdiction”). Because the Court has dismissed the RICO 
claims on which Ledbetter argues that pendent personal jurisdiction attaches, the 
Court declines to consider whether to exercise personal jurisdiction over the 
Manufacturer and Laboratory Defendants on such tenuous grounds. See Wright & 
Miller, supra, §  1069.7 (noting that, where pendent personal jurisdiction is 
recognized, district courts have “discretion to decline to exercise [it],” particularly 
“if the only jurisdictionally sufficient claim is dropped or dismissed”).  
As such, Ledbetter’s claims against the Defendants contesting personal 
jurisdiction must be proper under Georgia’s long -arm statute and constitutional 
due process.  Diamond Crystal, 593 F.3d at 1257–58. Georgia’s long-arm statute 
permits the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant under six express 
statutory bases. O.C.G.A. § 9-10 -91. Relevant here, the Georgia long -arm statute 
provides:  
A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction 
over any nonresident  . . .  as to a cause of action arising 
from any of the acts, omissions, ownership, use, or 
possession enumerated in this Code section, in the same 
manner as if he or she were a resident of this state, if in 
person or through an agent, he or she: 
 
(1) Transacts any business within this state; 
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30 
(2) Commits a tortious act or omission within this 
state . . . ; 
(3) . . .  
(4) Owns, uses, or possesses any real property 
situated within this state. 
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Because the Court must have personal jurisdiction over each 
Defendant, the Court will assess Ledbetter’s jurisdictional allegations defendant -
by-defendant, beginning with each of the  Manufactur er and Laboratory 
Defendants.61 
1. The Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Cookies. 
Ledbetter’s allegations are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over 
Cookies, as they provide only speculation about transactions that “may have” 
happened.62 As to Cookies, Ledbetter states only that  she purchased one of 
Cookies’ products, Huckleberry Gelato, from “www.elementvape.com,” 63 that 
Element Vape shipped the product to Norcross, Georgia,64 and that “Element Vape 
 
61  While L&K, Cookies, and Encore Labs also contested personal jurisdiction 
under Georgia’s long-arm statute, see ECFs 230, 235, 236, Ledbetter failed to 
respond to those arguments, resting primarily on pendent personal 
jurisdiction under RICO, see ECFs 244, 253, or, as was the case in her response 
to Cookies, failing to mention personal jurisdiction entirely, see ECF 246. 
62  Id. ¶ 504. 
63  Id. ¶ 21. 
64  Id. 
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may have purchased [Huckleberry Gelato] from John Doe Distributor . . . or may 
have purchased the product directly from Cookies.”65 
The Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant based merely on speculation. See Meier, 288 F.3d at 1268–69 (stating that 
the burden is on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of personal 
jurisdiction). It is telling that Ledbetter did not even contest the portion of Cookies’ 
motion to dismiss that argued lack of  personal jurisdiction.
66 Accordingly, 
Cookies’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2).67 
2. The Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Encore Labs. 
The Court likewise lacks personal jurisdiction over Encore Labs. The SAC’s 
broad allegations merely assert that Stiiizy opted to have Encore Labs 
independently test its products before Stiiizy sent the products to an online 
retailer.68 This does not satisfy any provision of the long-arm statute.  
To meet § 9-10-91(1) of the Georgia long-arm statute, Ledbetter  must show 
that (1) Encore Labs transacted business within Georgia, and (2) her cause of action 
 
65  Id. ¶ 504. 
66  See generally ECF 246. The words “personal jurisdiction” are not mentioned 
once, despite Cookies moving to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(2). Id. 
67  ECF 235. 
68  ECF 200, ¶ 568 (“Defendant retailer Element Vape purchased product from 
Stiiizy. Stiiizy had the distillate tested by Defendant Encore Labs, LLC.”). 
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32 
arises out of such business transaction(s). Diamond Crystal, 593 F.3d at 1264. To 
have transacted business in Georgia, Encore Labs must have “purposefully done 
some act or consummated some transaction in this state.” Aero Toy Store, LLC v. 
Grieves, 279 Ga. App. 515, 517 (2006) (internal citations omitted). Ledbetter fails to 
allege that Encore Labs did anything of this nature. She does not even allege that 
any of the samples tested by Encore Labs ended up in Georgia. These allegations 
do not satisfy the long-arm statute, let alone constitutional due process. See Hanson 
v. Denckla , 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“The unilateral activity of those who claim 
some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of 
contact with the forum State.”). Accordingly, Encore Labs’ motion to dismiss is 
GRANTED pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2).
69 
3. The Court lacks personal jurisdiction over L&K and Stiiizy. 
The Court will address  L&K and Stiiizy  together because  the SAC’s 
allegations against them are largely the same. Ledbetter asserts that Element Vape, 
an online retailer, purchased vape pens from L&K and Stiiizy ;
70 Ledbetter later 
ordered vapes from Element Vape’s online website;71 and Element Vape had the 
 
69  ECF 236, at 2 n.1 (incorporating by reference ECF 150); ECF 219. 
70  ECF 200, ¶¶ 536, 568. See also id. ¶ ¶ 539, 571. 
71  Id. ¶ 21. 
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products shipped to Ledbetter in Georgia. 72 Ledbetter argues that personal 
jurisdiction is satisfied through sub sections (1) and (4) of Georgia’s long-arm 
statute.73 
Subsection (4) is plainly not satisfied —not once does the SAC assert that 
L&K or Stiiizy “own [], use [], or possess [] any real property situated within 
[Georgia].” O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(4). That leaves only subsection (1). Again, Ledbetter 
fails to satisfy the long-arm statute. 
Her broad allegations are insufficient to demonstrate that L&K and Stiiizy 
transacted business within Georgia.  Ledbetter does not specify any details 
surrounding L&K or St iiizy’s sales to Element Vape, nor does she establish  
whether the manufacturers knew their products were being sent to Georgia . 
Ledbetter acknowledges that Element Vape is “an online retailer,” organized 
under Alabama’s limited liability laws, that “sells and distributes D8 and other 
vape products across several states, including Georgia.”74 It is insufficient to allege 
that L&K and Stiiizy  distribute their products to an online  retailer who sells  
products “across several states” without connecting their distribution practices in 
Georgia to the vape pens that Ledbetter purchased. See generally Kurtz v. LG Chem, 
 
72  Id. 
73  ECF 250, at 8. 
74  ECF 200, ¶ 25. 
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34 
Ltd., 2022 WL 19331877, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2022) (requiring, for purposes of § 
9-10-91(1), that the plaintiff allege how the product that ultimately caused his harm 
is connected to the defendant’s distribution practices in Georgia). Where Ledbetter 
alleges merely that L&K and Stiiizy sold their products to an  Alabama-based  
online retailer with a multi-state market, she alleges “[a]t most,” that the online 
retailer “transacted business in Georgia, not the Defendant[s].” Paradise Media 
Ventures, LLC v. Mills, 2013 WL 6388627, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 5, 2013).  
Again, Ledbetter’s allegations do not satisfy the long-arm
  statute, and they 
certainly do not satisfy constitutional due process. What the SAC’s factually bare 
allegations describe is a manufacturer placing its products into the so-called 
“stream of commerce ,” but the Supreme Court has never upheld  the exercise of 
jurisdiction on a stream -of-commerce theory standing alone. See LG Chem, Ltd. v. 
Lemmerman, 361 Ga. App. 163, 171 n.8 (2021) (citing J. McIntyre Machinery v. 
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (plurality opinion)); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior 
Ct. of California, Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion) 
(advocating for additional details to support the stream-of-commerce theory, such 
as “designing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the 
forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the 
forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to 
serve as the sales agent in the forum State.”); see also Jekyll Island-State Park Auth. v. 
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35 
Polygroup Macau Ltd., 140 F.4th 1304, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2025) (requiring additional 
contacts with the forum other than merely placing the injury -causing product in 
the stream of commerce) . Accordingly, L&K and Stiiizy’s motions to dismiss are 
GRANTED pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2).75 
4. The Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Savage 
Enterprises comports with the long-arm statute and due 
process. 
The Court now considers the last of the Manufactur er Defendants, Savage 
Enterprises. Here, the SAC alleges just enough to demonstrate  that the Court’s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction is  proper. The SAC specifies that Ledbetter 
purchased two of Savage Enterprise’s products —Forbidden Jelly  and P ower 
Plant—from retail locations in Lawrenceville, Georgia in November 2023. 76 She 
alleges that Savage Enterprises sold these products to the retail ers,77 and she also 
alleges that these retailers predominantly do business in Georgia — that Cloud 9 
has locations only in Florida and Georgia and that Xhale City has locations only in 
Georgia.78  
 
75  ECF 230, at 6 (incorporating by reference ECF 153); ECF 231, at 9; ECF 219. 
76  ECF 200, ¶¶ 16–17. 
77  Id. ¶ 471. 
78  Id. ¶¶ 23–24. 
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36 
These allegations are enough to support § 9-10-91(1) of the long-arm statute. 
They allege that Savage Enterprises sold its products to Georgia-based retailers to 
be purchased by Georgia customers. This meets the “literal construction” of 
“transacts any business” found in § 9-10-91(1), Diamond Crystal, 593 F.3d at 1261 –
62 (citing Innovative Clinical, 279 Ga. at 675), and shows that Savage Enterprises 
“purposefully [did] some act or consummated some transaction in [Georgia].” 
Aero Toy Store, 279 Ga. App. at 517 (internal citations omitted). Ledbetter’s cause 
of action also “arises out of” Savage Enterprises’ transactions within Georgia 
because her claims against the company concern the very products they sent into 
the state for customers to purchase. See Diamond Crystal, 593 F.3d at 1264.    
The Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Savage Enterprises also 
com
ports with constitutional due process. The constitutional due process inquiry 
is a three -step analysis. The Court must consider “whether [a] plaintiff’s claims 
‘arise out of or relate to’ at least one of the defendant ’s contacts with the forum” 
state; (2) “whether the . . . defendant ‘purposefully availed’ himself of the privilege 
of conducting activities within the forum state”; and (3) finally, “whether the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.’” SkyHop Techs., Inc. v. Narra, 58 F.4th 1211, 1229 (11th Cir. 2023) 
(internal citations omitted).  
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First, as already discussed, Ledbetter’s claims “arise out of or relate to” 
Savage Enterprises’ contacts with the forum . Because the products Savage 
Enterprises sold to Georgia-based retailers include the vape pens allegedly giving 
rise to Ledbetter’s claims, “this litigation has the required connection to 
[Ledbetter’s Georgia-based] contacts.” Id.  
Second, t o support purposeful availment, the defendant must have had 
contacts with the forum that were its  “own choice and not ‘random, isolated, or 
fortuitous.’” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 359 (2021) 
(quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). Those contacts “must 
show that the defendant deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ its home,” such as by  
“‘exploit[ing] a market’ in the forum State or ‘entering a contractual relationship 
centered’” in the forum. Id. (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014)). 
Again, this is readily established: Savage Enterprises seemingly made a “choice” 
to sell its products to “a market in the forum state” when it sold products to 
Georgia retailers for final sale to Georgia consumers. Id.  (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
Third and finally, the Court must consider “whether the exercise of 
jur
isdiction in [Georgia] accords with ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice. ’” SkyHop Techs., 58 F.4th at 1231. The burden is on the 
defendant to make  “a compelling case” that the exercise of jurisdiction is 
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38 
improper. Id. (internal citations omitted). Savage Enterprises has not attempted to 
do so; indeed, Savage Enterprises’ only arguments contesting the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over it are found in the Joint Motion. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Savage Enterprises is 
consistent with constitutional due process. To the extent that Savage Enterprises 
moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2),
79 that motion is DENIED. 
5. The Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Montesano, 
Winters, and Dougherty. 
The SAC’s allegations are most sparse as to the Individual Defendants. As 
to Montesano, Winters, and Dougherty, the SAC states only that: 
• “The corporate officers are listed as . . . Matt Winters as President and 
shareholder. . . . Corporate filings show five shareholders: Mathew  
[sic] Winter – 40.5%;”80 
• “Jon Dougherty holds himself out as the president of Savage 
Enterprises on social media platforms such as LinkedIn;”
81 
• “The corporate officers are also shown as Matthew Montesano, Chief 
Financial Officer; Matthew Winters, Chief Executive Officer;”
82 
 
79  See ECF 219; ECF 229, at 3 (incorporating by reference the Joint Motion).  
80  ECF 200, ¶ 30. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. 
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39 
Other than these general allegations about their roles as officers or 
shareholders of Savage Enterprises, the SAC does not even mention Montesano, 
Winters, or Dougherty by name.83 Moreover, not one of the SAC’s 42 counts states 
that it is being brought against Montesano, Winters, or Dougherty. 84 No specific 
contact is attributed to them, let alone any contact or connection to Georgia. 
Accordingly, the Individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED  
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2).85 
 
83  While the SAC does attempt to ascribe a group moniker to  Montesano, 
Winters, and Dougherty, see id. (referring to Montesano, Winters, Dougherty, 
and others as “the Savage Defendants” ), the Court will not attribute any 
allegations about “the Savage Defendants” to Montesano, Winters, or 
Dougherty for jurisdictional purposes. That is for two reasons. First, a plaintiff 
must allege facts specific to each defendant to sustain her initial burden of 
showing a defendant’s minimum contacts with the forum. See Brazil v. Janssen 
Rsch. & Dev. LLC, 249 F. Supp. 3d 1321, 1331–32  (N.D. Ga. 2016) (finding 
insufficient factual basis for the Court to conclude that it could exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant because the plaintiff “alleged no facts, 
specific to [the defendant]” to show the defendant’s contacts with Georgia).  
Second, the SAC also confusingly refers to another group of defendants as the 
“Savage Defendants,” id. ¶ 471 (referring to Cloud 9 Online Smoke and Vape, 
LLC, Savage Enterprises, Pharmlabs, Xhale City, and various John Does), and 
uses the term in counts where Montesano, Winters, and Dougherty are not 
named as defendants. For these reasons, the Court lacks any specific facts by 
which it can assess the Individual Defendants’ contacts with Georgia. 
84  See ECF 229, at 6. 
85  Id. 
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IV. The Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 
Only Savage Enterprises and the Retail Defendants remain. Having 
dismissed the federal claims, there is no federal question jurisdiction remaining in 
this case. Ledbetter argues that the state law claims are nevertheless properly in 
federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), and 
the Court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.86 
A. Legal standard on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 
12(b)(1) may be based on a facial or factual challenge to the complaint. McElmurray 
v. Consol. Gov’t of Augusta-Richmond C nty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. May 1981)). A facial attack 
“requires the court merely to look and see if the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a 
basis of subject matter jurisdiction,” and for purposes of the motion, the allegations 
in the complaint are taken as true. Id. at 1251 (quoting Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 
1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)) (alterations omitted). By contrast, a factual attack 
challenges “the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the 
 
86  ECF 200, ¶ 8. Ledbetter also argues that Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure allows for jurisdiction. Id. ¶¶ 9, 13. This argument is plainly 
frivolous. Rule 19 concerns the joinder of absent parties; it is not a way to 
circumvent the requirements of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 
19. 
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pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits are 
considered.” Id. (quoting Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529). The Retail Defendants are the 
only defendants challenging subject matter jurisdiction, and they raise both facial 
and factual attacks.87  
B. Ledbetter has not established subject matter jurisdiction under 
CAFA. 
CAFA vests district courts with diversity jurisdiction over putative class 
actions where (1) the proposed class has 100 or more members; (2) at least one 
member of the proposed class ha s a  different citizenship from at least one  
defendant; and (3) the claims of the proposed class members exceed $5,000,000 in 
the aggregate. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (6).  
 T he Retail Defendants have each contested the threadbare jurisdictional 
allegations of the SAC.
88 Those allegations consist of Ledbetter’s jurisdictional 
statement and her description of the class. The jurisdictional statement merely 
alleges, in conclusory fashion, that “the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds 
$5 million in retail sales of vape pens using the illegal distillate, minimal diversity 
exists, and the proposed class consists of more than 100 members.” 89 As to her 
description of the putative class, Ledbetter asserts that it consists of “thousands of 
 
87  See ECF 232, at 5; ECF 233, at 5; ECF 234, at 6. 
88  ECF 232, at 5; ECF 233, at 5; ECF 234, at 6. 
89  ECF 200, ¶ 9. 
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class members,” who “bought one or more of the same Products purchased by 
Plaintiff . . . in the State of Georgia who have a receipt or are identified in 
Defendants, Cloud 9, Element, Xhale City, and Xhale Franchise [’s] purchaser 
database within the appropriate statute of limitations until the date of 
certification.”
90 In what the Court interprets as a facial challenge, t he Retail 
Defendants argue that the SAC “fails to show on its face that the amount in 
controversy exceeds $5,000,000” and says nothing about the citizenship of the 
putative class members or the size of the class.91  
The Retail Defendants proceed to raise a factual challenge, asserting that 
Ledbetter “cannot prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she satisfies the 
amount in controversy amount” and that she “cannot point to a single other 
member of her supposed class beside herself.” 92 When one party or the Court 
contests the jurisdictional allegations of the party seeking federal court 
adjudication, the party seeking to litigate in federal court “bears the burden of 
proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence” that jurisdiction is satisfied, 
 
90  Id. ¶ 87. 
91  ECF 232, at 5; ECF 233, at 5; ECF 234, at 6. While minimum diversity may be 
met between Ledbetter, a citizen of Georgia,  see ECF 270, and Savage 
Enterprises, a citizen of Wyoming and California, see ECF 268, the Retail 
Defendants’ arguments regarding the amount in controversy and class size 
hold water. 
92  ECF 232, at 5. 
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usually requiring a showing that “the [CAFA] amount in controversy exceeds the 
jurisdictional minimum.” Dudley v. Eli Lilly & Co., 778 F.3d 909, 913 (11th Cir. 2014).  
Ledbetter cannot overcome either challenge. In response to the subject 
matter jurisdiction challenges raised by the Retail Defendants, Ledbetter offers no 
evidence, resting only on her pleadings to reiterate that “[t]he SAC explicitly 
alleges that proposed nationwide class includes hundreds —if not thousands —of 
purchasers,” “putting ‘millions of dollars’ at issue” and “alleges diversity of 
citizenship between Plaintiff and multiple Defendants.”
93 Offering no specifics as 
to class size or the amount in controversy, these allegations fail to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that CAFA’s jurisdictional requirements are met.94 
Indeed, during oral argument, counsel for Ledbetter acknowledged as much: “I’m 
not certain if the amount in controversy exceeds 5 million. It should. It may, but 
I’m not certain.”95 Given a chance to replead since oral argument, Ledbetter still 
offers only conclusory jurisdictional allegations, which fail to provide the Court 
 
93  ECF 247, at 5; ECF 248, at 7 (same). See also ECF 245, at 3 (stating only that there 
is “jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act”). 
94  Ledbetter did not make a request for jurisdictional discovery. See Am. C.L. 
Union of Fla., Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 859 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2017)  
(describing jurisdictional discovery as a “qualified right” that the parties must 
request). 
95  ECF 238, at 21. 
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with any evidence on which it can ascertain that its exercise of jurisdiction would 
be proper. 
The Retail Defendants point out that even if every class member had spent 
the same amount of money on the allegedly illegal vape pens as Ledbetter did—a 
sum totaling $146.74 —the putative class would need to consist of over  34,000 
members for the amount in controversy to be met. 96 Notably, with the possibility 
of treble damages on the  Georgia RICO claims, the class must be over 11,000 
members, not 34,000. Still, Ledbetter counters only that the class includes 
“hundreds—if not thousands — of purchasers”; 97 she gets nowhere close to 
asserting that the class contains over 11,000 other plaintiffs. Ledbetter simply does 
not supply the evidence upon which the Court can make “ reasonable inferences” 
that the class is this large. Dudley, 778 F.3d at 913 (affirming the district court’s 
determination that the party seeking jurisdiction under CAFA  “ha[d] not 
established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy 
exceeded $5,000,000”). Courts have found the amount in controversy established 
in a CAFA class action based on, for example, declarations or affidavits made by 
people with knowledge of the claims amount and class size. See, e.g., Anderson, 943 
F.3d at 923–24 (finding jurisdictional amount established where non -movant 
 
96  ECF 232, at 5.  
97  ECF 247, at 5; ECF 248, at 7 (same). 
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submitted a declaration from a company manager estimating a  dollar amount  
based on the face value of life insurance policies and the number of policies owned 
by potential class members); Williams v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 2023 WL 2703998, at *2–
3 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2023) (finding jurisdictional amount established based on 
declaration from a director of merchandising analytics who relied on sales data); 
c.f., Dudley, 778 F.3d at 913 (granting remand on grounds that damages 
calculations made improper assumptions  that all class members were denied the 
same amount of benefits). Yet, here, the Court has only Ledbetter’s naked 
assertions.
98 
Accordingly, Ledbetter has not  carried her burden, as the party seeking 
federal court adjudication, to establish that subject matter jurisdiction is proper 
under CAFA. 
C. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under traditional 
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. 
The Court also considers, independently, whether diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction is met under Section 1332(a)(1), without having to rely on CAFA’s 
 
98  Ledbetter also fails to overcome the Retail Defendants’ facial challenge to her 
assertion that jurisdiction is proper under CAFA. As identified, Ledbetter 
provides merely a formulaic recitation of CAFA’s statutory requirements. See 
ECF 200, ¶ ¶ 9, 87 . “Formulaic recitations of the statutory language” are 
insufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Griffin v. Internal Revenue Serv., 730 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1320 (S.D. 
Fla. 2024) (citing Georgia Ass’n of Latino Elected Offs., Inc. v. Gwinnett Cnty. Bd. 
of Registration & Elections, 36 F.4th 1100, 1118 (11th Cir. 2022)). 
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amount-in-controversy requirement . In a class action based on traditional 
diversity jurisdiction , unlike in a class action brought under CAFA, claims of 
multiple class members cannot be aggregated to surpass  the amount -in-
controversy threshold. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336–37 (1969) (holding 
that Rule 23 did not alter the prohibition against aggregating claims of two or more 
plaintiffs to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement); Cappuccitti v. DirecTV, 
Inc., 623 F.3d 1118, 1122 (11th Cir. 201 0) (noting the disti nction under CAFA 
allowing for the aggregation of plaintiffs’ claims); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 82 (“These 
rules do not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts.”). Here, Ledbetter 
has plainly not satisfied t he amount-in-controversy requirement. Ledbetter spent  
only $146.74 on the allegedly noncompliant vape pens;
99 even considering the 
treble damages she seeks for her Georgia RICO claim, the amount -in-controversy 
is well below the $75,000 threshold. Accordingly, the Court also lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction under Section 1332(a)(1) to hear the remaining state law claims. 
  
 
99  ECF 200, ¶¶ 16–17 , 21. Even the $146.74 amount in controversy is too high 
because it aggregates Ledbetter’s claims against multiple defendants, which is 
not allowed under Section 1332(a)(1). See Jewell v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 
290 F.2d 11, 13 (5th Cir. 1961) (“The general rule with respect to the aggregation 
of the claims of a plaintiff against two or more defendants is that ‘where a suit 
is brought against several defendants asserting claims against each of them 
which are separate and distinct, the test of jurisdiction is the amount of each 
claim, and not their aggregate.’”) (internal citations omitted).  
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D. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction  over the 
claims against the remaining Defendants. 
Having dismissed Ledbetter’s federal claims and having determined the 
Court lacks an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction over the state law 
claims against the Retail Defendants and Savage Enterprises, the Court is left only 
with a decision on whether to exercise  supplemental jurisdiction. As provided in 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a “district court may decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a)” in certain contexts, such as if “the 
claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law” or “the district court has 
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” among others. In these 
contexts, “although supplemental jurisdiction persists, the district court need not 
exercise it: Instead, the court may (and indeed, ordinarily should) kick the case to 
state court.” Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 32 (2025). “Where 
§ 1367(c) applies, considerations of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and 
comity may influence the court’s discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.” 
Baggett v. First Nat. Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997). 
Because the outcome of this dispute now depends exclusively on issues of 
stat
e law, the Court finds that judicial economy, fairness, and convenience favor 
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ledbetter’s remaining claims 
against the Retail Defendants  and Savage Enterprises . This result is especially 
desirable considering Ledbetter seeks to impose potentially existential liability on 
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48 
a nascent industry in the state. Such questions are better left to the Georgia courts 
to determine. 
Because “[a] dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a 
judgment on the merits and is entered without prejudice,” Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. 
Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1233 (11th Cir. 2008), the claims 
against the Retail Defendants  and Savage Enterprises are dismissed without 
prejudice. 
V. Remaining Defendants   
The Court notes that there are two remaining defendants who appear 
named in the lawsuit but whom Ledbetter seemingly has stated no claims against. 
These two defendants are Savage Eliquid Corporation and Delta Extrax. Because 
Ledbetter has stated no claims against them, they are dismissed without prejudice. 
There also remains Pur Iso Labs, who is in default.
100 The federal RICO 
claims against Pur Iso Labs are dismissed with prejudice because Ledbetter fails 
to allege the existence of an enterprise for the reasons discussed above. The state 
law claims against Pur Iso Labs are dismissed without prejudice because the Court 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate them, also for reasons  previously 
discussed. 
 
100  See ECF 204; December 2, 2024 Docket Entry (“Clerks Entry of Default as to 
Pur Iso Labs LLC.”). 
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VI. Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, this entire action is DISMISSED. The Joint 
Motion [ECF 219] is GRANTED to the extent that it argues that the federal RICO 
claims fail to state a claim. The Savage Defendants’ Motion [ECF 229] is 
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; it is granted to the extent that it argues 
the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Winters, Montesano, and Dougherty, 
but it is denied to the extent that it argues the Court lacks personal jurisdiction 
over Savage Enterprises. L&K’s Motion [ECF 230], Stiiizy’s Motion [ECF 231], 
Cookies’ Motion [ECF 235], and Encore Lab’s Motion [ECF 236] are all GRANTED 
to the extent that they argue the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them for 
the remaining state law claims. Xhale City’s Motion [ECF 232], Cloud 9’s Motion 
[ECF 233], and Element Vape’s Motion [ECF 234] are all GRANTED to the extent 
that they argue the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over them. And because 
the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Savage Enterprises, the remaining 
state law claims against it are dismissed. 
The federal RICO claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. The state law 
claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. 
Lastly, Ledbetter’s motion to amend particular responsive briefs  already 
filed [ECF 252] is DENIED. 
  
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The Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case. 
SO ORDERED this 31st day of March, 2026. 
 
 
 
  Steven D. Grimberg 
United States District Judge 
 
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