govinfo:USCOURTS-nynd-1_23-cv-01479-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
RYAN AB
DUL-MALIK, 
Pla
intiff, 
-against- 1:23-CV-1479 (LEK/PJE)
NEW
 YORK STATE POLICE 
TROOPER NICHOLAS VASTO  
And NEW YORK STATE POLICE  
TROOPER JOHN S. KOLACH, III, 
Def
endants. 
ME
MORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER 
I. INT
RODUCTION
On November 28, 2023, Plaintiff Ryan Abdul-Malik commenced this action against New
York State Police Trooper Nicholas Vasto and an unknown defendant, Police Trooper John Doe. 
Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”). Defendant Vasto filed an answer to the complaint. Dkt. No. 6 
(“Answer”). On April 1, 2024, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, naming New York 
State Police Trooper John S. Kolach III as the second defendant. Dkt. No. 13 (“Amended 
Complaint”). The Amended Complaint names two counts: excessive force, and false arrest and 
unlawful imprisonment, both under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments through 42 U.S.C. 
§1983. Id. at 4. Defendants then filed an answer to the Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 18.
(“Answer to Amended Complaint”). 
On May 30, 2025, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 30-19 
(“Motion”). Plaintiff filed a response. Dkt. No. 40-1 (“Response). Defendants filed a reply. Dkt. 
No. 44 (“Reply).  
For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion is granted. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The following facts are undisputed, except where otherwise noted.  
A. Plaintiff Walks on I-787 and Police are Contacted 
On April 30, 2023 Plaintiff Ryan Abdul-Malik and his mother Malakiya Beeks were in 
the car together, having just returned a rental car. Dkt. No. 30-8 (“Beeks Deposition) at 12–13. 
During an argument, Beeks pulled over on to the shoulder while on I-787. Dkt. No. 30-5 
(“Plaintiff Deposition”) at 21–23; Beeks Dep. at 16. Abdul-Malik then exited the vehicle. Beeks 
Dep. at 15–18; Plaintiff Dep. at 22–23. His mother called 911, sharing her concern that Plaintiff 
was trying to kill himself. Beeks Dep. at 18. At some point, Plaintiff expressed such desires. Id. 
at 16; Plaintiff Dep. at 23.  
It is disputed as to whether Plaintiff walked in the middle of I-787, or on the shoulder. 
Compare Dkt. No. 40-1 (“Response to SMF”) at 2; Plaintiff Dep. at 22–23 with Dkt. No. 30-1 
(“Statement of Material Facts” or “SMF”) ¶¶1–2; It is undisputed that his mother and multiple 
other individuals called 911, reporting that Plaintiff was in the middle of I-787. See Resp. to 
SMF at 2–3. 
Plaintiff then returned to his mother’s vehicle; she exited the highway. Beeks Deposition 
at 19; Plaintiff Dep. at 23. Plaintiff then left the vehicle again, on Morrison Avenue in Troy, and 
began walking up the hill on a sidewalk, towards his home. Beeks Dep. at 24–25; Plaintiff Dep. 
at 26.  
Meanwhile, Defendants received reports of an individual walking on I-787, and both 
indicated that they would respond to the incident. Dkt. No. 30-7 (“Kolach Deposition”) at 44; 
Dkt. No. 30-3 (“Vasto Declaration”) ¶¶6–7. The Defendants were later advised that Plaintiff’s 
location had changed to Morrison Avenue. Vasto Declaration ¶7; Dkt. No. 30-2 (“Kolach 
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Declaration”) ¶7. Defendants were also given Plaintiff’s mother’s vehicle make and model. 
Vasto Declaration ¶7.  
Initially, both Defendants passed Ms. Beeks’ vehicle. Vasto Declaration ¶8; Kolach 
Declaration ¶8. They were told this by the dispatcher, turned around, and observed Plaintiff. 
Vasto Declaration ¶8; Kolach Dep. at 47. 
B. Plaintiff and Defendants Interact on Morrison Avenue 
Upon his arrival, Defendant Kolach pulled over, exited his vehicle, and began attempting 
to speak with Plaintiff. See Kolach Declaration ¶¶9–10. Defendant Kolach was initially in front 
of the Plaintiff, and asked him, “You good? You good?” Dkt No. 30-15, video 
Axon_Body_3_Video_2023-04-30_1604_X60A0028E (“Kolach Footage”) at 0:07:15–0:07:20. 
Ms. Beeks, standing behind Kolach and Plaintiff, near her car, responded, “No, he’s not good.” 
Id. Plaintiff continued walking up the hill. Id. at 0:07:18–0:07:25; Vasto Declaration ¶10; see 
Kolach Declaration ¶10. Defendant Kolach followed slightly behind Plaintiff, attempting to 
engage him in conversation. Dkt. No. 30-16, video Axon_Body_3_Video_2023-04-
30_1603_X60A0171G (“Vasto Footage”) at 0:08:49–0:08:54.  
At this point, Defendant Vasto had also arrived, exited his vehicle, and stood in front of 
Plaintiff. Kolach Footage at 0:07:23. As Plaintiff approached Officer Vasto, Officer Vasto put 
out his hand as if to signal Plaintiff to stop. See Vasto Declaration ¶10; Kolach Declaration ¶10; 
Kolach Footage at 0:07:26–0:07:28. Defendant Vasto also tried to speak with Plaintiff, telling 
him “we’ve got to talk to you.” Kolach Footage at 0:07:28–0:07:34; Vasto Footage at 0:08:53–
0:09:02. Plaintiff tried to walk around Vasto, but Vasto blocked his path. See Kolach Footage at 
0:07:28–0:07:34. Plaintiff continued walking forward, and his body and Defendant Vasto’s hand 
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came into contact. Id.; Vasto Footage at 0:09:00–0:09:02. It is disputed whether the hand 
touched Plaintiff, or Plaintiff walked into the hand. SMF ¶17; Resp. to SMF ¶17.  
At that point, Plaintiff became visibly aggravated. He cursed Officer Vasto, telling him 
not to touch him. See Kolach Footage at 0:07:36–0:07:44; Vasto Footage at 0:09:01–0:09:10. 
Defendant Vasto insisted that the officers needed to talk to the Plaintiff. See Vasto Footage at 
0:09:01–0:09:10. Officer Kolach briefly touches Plaintiff’s left arm. See Kolach footage at 
0:07:41–0:07:43. Vasto’s hand and Plaintiff’s chest came into contact again, and Plaintiff pushed 
the hand off of him. See Vasto footage at 0:09:04–0:09:12. 
Plaintiff then pulled his pants up, spuns around, clenched his hands into fists, and made a 
forceful forward motion with his right hand towards Defendant Vasto’s arm.
1 Kolach Footage at 
0:07:43–0:07:48. It is disputed whether Plaintiff “slapped” Defendant Vasto’s arm. See Resp. to 
SMF ¶19. Defendants then grabbed Plaintiff’s arms and brought him to the ground. Plaintiff 
Deposition at 27–28; Vasto Declaration ¶¶12–13; Kolach Declaration ¶¶13–14; see Vasto 
Footage at 0:09:14–0:09:26; Kolach Footage at 0:07:47–0:08:00. Defendants placed themselves 
on top of Plaintiff, who was face down. Plaintiff Deposition at 32–33; Kolach Footage at 
0:08:00–0:08:13; Vasto Footage at 0:09:24–0:09:30. Defendants put Plaintiff in handcuffs. 
Kolach Footage at 0:08:06–0:08:30; Vasto Footage at 0:09:32–0:09:55; Plaintiff Deposition at 
34; Vasto Declaration ¶14; Kolach Declaration ¶15.    
C. Plaintiff’s Medical Care and Injuries 
During and immediately following the takedown, Plaintiff yelled out in pain. Kolach 
Footage at 0:07:50–0:09:00. He complained about his head and his leg. Id.  
 
1 Insofar as Plaintiff contests this description, see Resp. To SMF ¶18, Plaintiff’s account 
is contracted by the video evidence, see Kolach Footage at 0:07:43–0:07:48.   
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Plaintiff cut his head and was bleeding as a result of the takedown. Plaintiff Deposition at 
35–36; see Vasto Declaration ¶15; Kolach Declaration ¶16; Dkt. No. 30-11 (“Kline 
Memorandum”); Beeks Dep. at 32–33. Defendants called EMS to the scene. Vasto Declaration 
¶16; Kolach Declaration ¶17. Officer Kolach retrieved a wipe for the cut, which Ms. Beeks 
applied. Kolach Footage at 0:15:20–0:16:25. When the EMT arrived, Plaintiff refused any 
additional treatment. Dkt. No. 31 (“Medical Services Deposition”); Kolach Footage at 0:23:10–
0:24:30; see Resp. to SMF ¶25 (disputing that Plaintiff “refused any medical treatment,” by 
explaining that he accepted (only) a wipe for the cut to the forehead).  
Plaintiff did not want to go to the hospital. Vasto Declaration ¶16, 18; Kolach 
Declaration ¶17, 19; Plaintiff Deposition at 41; see Medical Services Deposition; see e.g. Vasto 
Footage at 0:19:12–0:19:20 (“I’m not going to the hospital.”). However, due to Defendants’ 
concerns regarding Plaintiff’s prior suicidality and decision to walk on I-787, he was transported 
to the hospital, in Officer Kolach’s car. Kolach Declaration ¶18–21; Vasto Declaration ¶17–20. 
Defendants’ decision was informed by a conversation Ms. Beeks had with Officer Vasto, in 
which she explained the background of the situation, including the I-787 incident and 
information regarding Plaintiff’s mental health. See Vasto Footage at 0:10:55–0:15:21.  
When he got back from the hospital, Plaintiff noticed his right hand hurting. Plaintiff 
Dep. at 49–50. Plaintiff later went to the doctor’s office, where an x-ray was performed, finding 
a fracture in Plaintiff’s right hand. Id. at 53; Beeks Deposition at 47–48.  
III. LEGAL STANDARD 
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instruct courts to grant summary 
judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the 
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outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a dispute is “‘genuine’… if the evidence is 
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving part.” Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, while “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or 
unnecessary” will not preclude summary judgment, granting summary judgment is improper if 
there are genuinely disputed material facts. Id.; see also Taggart v. Time, Inc., 924 F.2d 43, 46 
(2d Cir. 1991) (“Only when no reasonable trier of facts could find in favor of the nonmoving 
party should summary judgment be granted.”). The party seeking summary judgment bears the 
burden of informing a court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the 
record that the moving party claims will demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of 
material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  
In attempting to defeat a motion for summary judgment after the moving party has met its 
initial burden, the nonmoving party “must do more than simple show that there is some 
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The nonmoving party may not rely on mere conclusory allegations, 
speculation, or conjecture, see Fischer v. Forrest, 968 F.3d 216, 221 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting 
Cifarelli v. Village of Babylon, 93 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1996), and must present more than a mere 
“scintilla of evidence” supporting its claims, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. At the same time, a 
court must resolve all ambiguities and “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 
party,” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000), and “eschew[s] 
credibility assessments[,]” Amnesty Am. V. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 
2004) (quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 854 (2d Cir. 1996)). Thus, a Court’s duty in 
reviewing a motion for summary judgment is “carefully limited” to finding genuine disputes of 
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fact, “not to deciding them.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 
1224 (2d Cir. 1994).  
A Court may use video evidence to find that one party’s version of the facts “is blatantly 
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonably jury could believe it.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 
372, 380–81 (2007). When this is the case, “a court should not adopt that version of the facts for 
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 380.  
IV. DISCUSSION  
Defendants aver they should be granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force, 
and false arrest and false imprisonment claims. Mot. at 6–16. Plaintiff argues that summary 
judgment should not be granted on these claims. See generally Resp.  
A. Excessive Force  
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claims should be 
dismissed. Mot. at 6–9. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees. 
Fourth Amendment excessive force claims are reviewed under the standard of objective 
“reasonableness.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Reasonableness is understood 
by analyzing “the ‘totality of the circumstances,’” not just merely the moment force is used. 
Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 80 (2025) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at  427–28). To determine 
whether the force applied was unreasonable, the Court considers the following factors:  “the 
severity of the crime,” “whether the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the 
officers or others,” and “whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by 
flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.  The balancing of these factors is imprecise, and “[a]ll that can 
realistically be expected [of a reviewing court] is to make some assessment as to the extent to 
which each relevant factor is present and then somehow make an aggregate assessment of all the 
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factors.” Brown v. City of New York, 798 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2015). Under Graham, the 
officers’ “underlying intent or motivation” is irrelevant to the reasonableness inquiry. See 
Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.  
Moreover, the extent of the injury is also relevant for courts’ consideration of an 
excessive force claim. Abreu v. Nicholls, 368 Fed.App’x. 191, 193 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he extent 
of injury is a relevant factor.”). On one end of the spectrum, “[r]easonable force does not become 
unconstitutional merely because it caused the plaintiff serious injury.” Walker v. Thibault, 2023 
WL 7701726, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2023), aff'd, 2025 WL 294507 (2d Cir. Jan. 24, 2025) 
(quoting Otero v. Town of Southampton, 194 F. Supp. 2d 167, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)). On the 
other end of the spectrum, courts in this Circuit sometimes impose a de minimis requirement on 
the injury caused by the use of force. See Lemmo v. McKoy, 2011 WL 843974, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 8, 2011) (arguing that injuries cannot merely be de minimis, if a Fourth Amendment 
excessive force claim is to succeed); but see Barcomb v. Kraeger, 2016 WL 2644885, at *4 (D. 
Conn. May 5, 2016) (rejecting such a requirement).  
“Given the fact-specific nature of the inquiry, granting summary judgment against a 
plaintiff on an excessive force claim is not appropriate unless no reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that the officers’ conduct was objectively unreasonable.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. 
Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 123 (2d Cir. 2004).   
In this case, the balancing test favors Defendants, and granting them summary judgment 
is therefore appropriate.  
The crime’s severity, see Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, weighs in favor of Defendants. The 
main reason for the confinement was Plaintiff’s suicidality, which is not a crime in New York. 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 775 n.13 (1997).  
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The threat posed to the Defendants by the Plaintiff and his resisting arrest, see Graham, 
490 U.S. at 396, favors Defendants. Though it is disputed whether “Plaintiff . . . slapped at 
Trooper Vasto’s extended arm,” Resp. to SMF ¶¶19–20, the footage clearly shows Plaintiff 
making forceful forward contact between his hand and Vasto’s arm.  See Vasto Footage at 
0:09:10–0:09:15; Kolach Footage at 0:07:44–0:07:48. When Officer Vasto grabbed Plaintiff’s 
arm and began to take him down, Plaintiff had just swung his right hand towards Defendant 
Vasto’s arm. Kolach Footage at 0:07:45–0:07:50. Plaintiff had thus exhibited a willingness to 
use physical force against the officers, putting their safety at risk. Plaintiff’s argument that “[t]he 
body-camera footage shows Plaintiff posed no immediate threat to anyone – much less to the 
officers – before defendants forcibly took him to the ground” is thus plainly contradicted by said 
body-camera footage. Compare Resp. at 6 with Vasto Footage at 0:09:10–0:09:15, and Kolach 
Footage at 0:07:44–0:07:50. 
In balancing these factors, the Court recognizes the need for officers to maintain control 
of the situation. See Alvear v. Kamel, No. 18CV4255NGGCLP, 2023 WL 5593914, at *7 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2023). The Plaintiff, at the point the Defendants took him down, was 
distressed, angry, and becoming violent. See Kolach Footage at 0:07:45–0:07:50. The use of 
some force, by Defendants, to secure Plaintiff’s person at that moment is objectively reasonable. 
Cf. Lieberman v. City of Rochester, 2011 WL 13110345, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2011), aff’d, 
558 F. App’x 38 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The right to make a lawful arrest carries with it the right to use 
reasonable force to effectuate that arrest.”). 
The Court concludes that no reasonable fact finder could find that taking Plaintiff down, 
handcuffing him, and then proceeding to secure transport for him to seek evaluation for his 
mental health issues, was constitutionally unreasonable.  
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The Court finds two aspects of the encounter particularly convincing. First, there is no 
indication that Defendants used more force than was necessary to take Plaintiff down. See, 
Plaintiff Dep. at 27–28; Vasto Declaration ¶¶12–13; Kolach Declaration ¶¶13–14; Vasto 
Footage at 0:09:14–0:09:26; Kolach Footage at 0:07:47–0:08:00. The Court notes the lack of 
gratuity in the force used. Douglas v. City of New York, No. 18 CIV. 9327 (KPF), 2022 WL 
294075, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2022) (reasoning that the force used was not gratuitous and 
weighing that fact in favor of the defendants). “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long 
recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the 
right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 
396. The force used by Defendants was the “degree of physical coercion [necessary] to effect 
[the arrest],” and was therefore constitutionally permissible.  
    Second, Defendants are not alleged to have taken any action that would have broken 
his hand, other than bringing him to the ground. The breaking of plaintiff’s hand is the most 
severe of plaintiff’s injuries. See Amend. Compl. ¶10. It fulfills any de minimis requirement. See 
Coffey v. Broome Cnty., 2025 WL 2391724, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2025) (holding that a 
fractured bone is more than a de minimis injury). The Court assumes, for purposes of this 
Motion, that the Plaintiff broke his hand during his encounter with Defendants.
2 “While the 
fractured . . . bone is . . . serious, it is not a surprising result of a reasonable police response to 
[plaintiff’s] conduct.” Flanigan v. Town of Colchester, 171 F.Supp.2d 361, 366 (D. Vt. 2001). 
The mere fact of the injury is not dispositive. See id. at 365–66. (granting summary judgment to 
 
2 Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts could allow one to infer that Plaintiff broke his hand 
punching a sign in the hospital bathroom. See SMF ¶¶37–39.  Plaintiff disputes this, arguing 
Defendants broke his hand. Resp. at 7–8. As this is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, 
the Court interprets the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff.  
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defendant officers, who broke plaintiff’s bone during a takedown arrest).  The question for the 
Court is whether taking Plaintiff down in the manner done by Defendants was reasonable.  
In similar cases, courts in this Circuit have granted summary judgment to defendants. See  
Liebermann v. City of Rochester, 2011 WL 13110345, at *1, 5 (finding that in a volatile situation 
following a “scuffle”, it was not excessive force for defendant police officers to “throw[] [the 
plaintiff] to the ground and handcuff[] [him].”; Brayshaw v. City of Burlington, 2015 WL 
1523019, at *2, 10–12 (D. Vt. Apr. 3, 2015) (finding that it was not excessive force when a 
plaintiff “sw[ung] his free arm in such a manner that he could potentially strike [the defendant 
officer],” and the officer responded by taking the plaintiff to the ground, resulting in a head 
laceration and fractured bones) 
In the extant case, Plaintiff also “sw[ung] his . . . arm in such a manner that he could 
potentially strike” Defendant Vasto, was taken down, and suffered similar injuries as the 
Brayshaw plaintiff. Compare id. at 2, with SMF ¶¶25, 40. The Defendants in this case, like the 
defendant in Brayshaw, are therefore also entitled to summary judgment on the excessive force 
claim.
3 The excessive force claim is therefore dismissed.    
B. False Arrest/ Unlawful Imprisonment  
“False arrest and false imprisonment . . . are two names for the same tort.” Blanco v. 
Success Acad. Charter Schs., Inc., 722 F. Supp. 3d 187, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting Davis v. 
Rodriguez, 364 F.3d 424, 433 (2d Cir. 2004)). Therefore, these claims are analyzed together.  
 
3 Defendants argue in the alternative that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the 
excessive force claim. See Mot. at 14–16. As this Court rules for Defendants on the merits of the 
excessive force claim, it need not evaluate the qualified immunity defense. See Bettis v. Bean, 
2015 WL 5725625, at *14 (D. Vt. Sept. 29, 2015). 
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Defendants make three arguments as to why they should be granted summary judgment 
on the false arrest/false imprisonment claims. First, they argue that they did not arrest Plaintiff. 
Mot. at 10–11. Second, they argue that they had probable cause to detain and transport Plaintiff 
under New York Mental Hygiene Law §9.41 [“MHL §9.41”]. Id. at 11–13. Third, they argue 
they should be granted qualified immunity for the false arrest / false imprisonment claims. Id. at 
14–16.  
For the reasons that follow, this Court grants Defendants summary judgment on 
Plaintiff’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims, as they had probable cause to detain 
Plaintiff. 
“In analyzing § 1983 claims for unconstitutional false arrest, [courts] have generally 
looked to the law of the state in which the arrest occurred.” Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 151 
(2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Davis v. Rodriguez, 364 F.3d 424, 433 (2d Cir.2004)). “Under New York 
law, the elements of a false arrest and false imprisonment claim are: ‘(1) the defendant intended 
to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did 
not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.’” 
Hernandez v. United States, 939 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting McGowan v. United 
States, 825 F.3d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 2016) (per curiam)). This Court proceeds by assuming that 
defendants confined plaintiff, and therefore focuses its analysis on whether the confinement was 
privileged.  
A confinement is privileged if it is done with legal authorization. See Hernandez, 939  
F.3d at 199. Specifically, if an individual is taken into custody pursuant to MHL §9.41, the 
confinement is privileged. Glowczenski v. Taser Int’l Inc., 2010 WL 1936200, at *5–6 (E.D.N.Y. 
May 13, 2010) (“If applicable, section 9.41 would be a privilege that justified the police taking 
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[the plaintiff] into custody.”); see Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 240 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(applying the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard to this provision).  
 MHL §9.41 states in relevant part:  
Any . . . police officer who is a member of the state police or of an authorized police 
department . . . may take into custody any person who appears to be mentally ill and is 
conducting themself in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to [the person] 
or others. Such officer may direct the removal of such person or remove such person to 
any hospital specified in subdivision (a) of section 9.39 of this article. 
 
MHL §9.41(a). “[L]ikely to result in serious harm” is defined in the statute as “a 
substantial risk of physical harm to the person as manifested by threats of or attempts at suicide 
or serious bodily harm or other conduct demonstrating that the person is dangerous to 
themselves.” MHL §9.01(c). 
To detain someone under MHL §9.41, officers must have “probable cause.” Bayne v. 
Provost, 2005 WL 1871182, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2004). “[P]robable cause exists when 
officers ‘have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that 
are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested 
has committed or is committing a crime.’” Id. (quoting Posr v. Court Officer Shield No. 207, 180 
F.3d 409, 414 (2d Cir. 1999)). Therefore, the crux of the inquiry is  
whether the facts and circumstances known to [the police officers] at the time they 
 determined to take Plaintiff into custody were sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable 
  caution in the belief that Plaintiff might be ‘mentally ill and conducting himself in a 
 manner likely to result in serious harm to’ himself as those terms are defined by the 
 MHL.  
Id. at 7.   
Defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted on Plaintiff’s false arrest/ 
false imprisonment claim, as Defendants had probable cause to detain Plaintiff under MHL 
§9.41. Mot. at 11–12. They argue that probable cause obtained “based upon the information 
[Defendants] received regarding the fact that Plaintiff had gotten out of his mother’s vehicle in 
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the middle of the interstate along with statements provided to Defendants by Plaintiffs [sic] 
mother, indicating that Plaintiff made verbal statements to her about wanting to end his own 
life.” Mot. at 13.  Plaintiff, conversely, argues that Defendants lacked probable cause, as the 
dispatch reports were unverified, Defendants “did not confirm Plaintiff was the person described 
in the dispatch,” and Plaintiff’s interaction with Defendants “would [not] lead a reasonable 
person to believe he posed a present danger to himself or others.” Resp. at 10–11. Plaintiff’s 
dispute that he had walked in the middle of I-787, Resp. ¶9, and this Court, for purposes of this 
motion, infers that Plaintiff did not walk in the middle of the highway.  
Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, as is required at summary 
judgment, this Court is persuaded by Defendants’ argument that probable cause to detain 
Plaintiff existed. From Defendants’ perspective, there was “a substantial risk of physical harm” 
to Plaintiff, as they had reason to believe he had walked in the middle of I-787. See SMF ¶7. 
Officer Vasto had been informed that Plaintiff’s presence in I-787 appeared to be a “mental 
health issue.” Vasto Footage at 0:04:01–0:04:04. Ms. Beeks called out to Defendant Kolach, 
“No, he’s not good,” when he asked Plaintiff how he was. Supra section II(B). “A reasonable 
police officer is justified is relying upon a citizen’s warning that another person has threatened 
suicide.” Bayne, 2005 WL 1871182, at *7. It follows that a reasonable police officer is justified 
in relying upon reports of suicidal behavior. A reasonable officer in the Defendant officers’ 
position, having been warned of Plaintiff’s behavior on I-787, would infer that there was a 
“substantial risk” that Plaintiff was going to harm himself.  
Plaintiff argues that “when defendants arrived on Morrison Ave, Plaintiff was merely 
walking on the sidewalk. . . . He was not harming himself, harming others, or breaking any 
laws.” Resp. at 11. While that may be true, it is insufficient to refute the presence of probable 
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cause regarding the threat posed by Plaintiff to himself. Mere minutes passed between the 
officers being told about Plaintiff, to the officers encountering him. See Vasto Footage at 0:00:40 
(Defendant Vasto reporting that he is en route), 0:08:45 (Defendant Vasto exits vehicle); Kolach 
Footage at 0:01:55 (Officer Kolach acknowledging report of an individual walking in the middle 
of I-787), Kolach Footage at 0:07:12 (Officer Kolach leaves the vehicle). An officer of 
reasonable caution could infer that Plaintiff’s suicidality remained throughout that period, even 
if, at the moment they encountered him, Plaintiff was walking properly on the sidewalk.    
Plaintiff argues that Defendants did not know that the person they interacted with was the 
same person who had allegedly walked on I-787. Resp. at 10–11. But Defendants need only have 
probable cause to detain someone, not absolute certainty. See Bayne, 2005 WL 1871182, at *6.  
Defendants had multiple pieces of evidence to reach the conclusion that Plaintiff and the person 
who had apparently walked on I-787 were the same person. Police dispatch had told Defendants 
that plaintiff was on Morrison Avenue, where he was found. See Supra Part II(A–B). Police 
dispatch gave Defendants the make and model of Ms. Beeks’ car. Supra Part II(A). Police 
dispatch told Defendants when they had passed Ms. Beeks’ vehicle. Id. Defendants’ body camera 
footage shows no other cars pulled over on Morrison Avenue, or any other pedestrians. See, e.g., 
Vasto Footage at 0:08:45–0:08:47. A person of reasonable caution would conclude, correctly, 
that Plaintiff was the person who had allegedly walked in the middle of I-787.    
Plaintiff analogize to Kerman, arguing that it provides support for declining to grant 
summary judgment in this case. Resp. at 10; see 261 F.3d 229. There are significant differences 
between the facts that Kerman relied on in refusing to grant summary judgment, and the extant 
case. The Kerman court relied on the lack of corroboration of the 911 call, which had mentioned 
a gun, yet officers failed to find one. 261 F.3d at 240. In the extant case, there was no failure to 
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corroborate allegations from the 911 call. See Supra section II(A–B). Additionally, in Kerman, 
the court found it significant that officers had hung up on a doctor who could have provided 
information about the plaintiff’s medical condition. Id. at 241. For the Kerman court, this showed 
a failure to investigate. Id. No analogous situation arose in this case. In fact, as the record 
demonstrates, the Officers investigated the situation and received corroborating evidence—Ms. 
Beeks saying that her son was “not good”—even after arriving on scene. Kolach Footage at 
0:07:15–0:07:20.  
Defendants reasonably believed that Plaintiff had walked in the middle of I-787 as part of 
a mental health issue. That alleged conduct is sufficient to trigger §9.41, allowing police to 
detain someone for the detainee’s own safety. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary 
judgment on the false arrest and false imprisonment claims.
4   
V. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, it is hereby: 
ORDERED, that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Dkt. No. 30, is 
GRANTED; and it is further 
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s amended complaint, Dkt. No. 13, is DISMISSED without 
prejudice; and it is further 
ORDERED, that the Clerk is respectfully directed to close this action; and it is further  
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on all 
parties in accordance with the Local Rules.  
 
 
4 As this Court finds that the arrest was constitutionally permissible, it does not reach the 
qualified immunity argument. See Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2006) (declining 
to reach qualified immunity on a false arrest claim, after holding that there was probable cause to 
make an arrest). 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
 
DATED: March 31, 2026 
 Albany, New York 
      
            
LAWRENCE E. KAHN 
United States District Judge 
 
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