govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-02046-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
 
 
MICHAEL SCHIFANELLI , 
 
  Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
JOHN LOVEDAY, 
 
  Defendant. 
 
Civil Action No. 25 - 2046 (LLA) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION  AND ORDER 
Plaintiff Michael Schifanelli, proceeding pro se, brings this action against Metropolitan 
Police Department (“MPD”) Sergeant John Loveday  under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , alleging that 
Sergeant Loveday violated the Fourth Amendment by unlawfully extending a traffic stop without 
reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity.  ECF No. 7.  Sergeant Loveday has moved to dismiss 
for insufficient service of process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  12(b)(5) and for failure 
to state a claim under Rule  12(b)(6).  ECF No. 12.  For the reasons explained below, the court 
denies the Rule 12(b)(5) motion as moot and denies the Rule 12(b)(6) motion on the merits. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The following factual allegations from Mr.  Schifanelli’s amended complaint, ECF No. 7, 
and oppositions to Sergeant Loveday’s motion to dismiss, ECF Nos. 19, 21, are accepted as true, 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 
151-52 (D.C.  Cir. 2015) (per curiam) .  On April 13, 2022, Mr. Schifanelli was driving on 
California Street, NW, in the District of Columbia when MPD Officer Nicole Koenigsmann 
conducted a traffic stop based on Mr.  Schifanelli’s failure to use a turn signal , ECF No. 7, at 1, 
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although no “such infraction [had] occur[red],” ECF No.  19, at 1.1  Two posterboard signs were 
attached to Mr. Schifanelli’s car—one written in English on the rear of the vehicle and one written 
in Russian on the side—“communicating [his] perspective” about the “present conflict” between 
Russia and Ukraine.  ECF No.  7, at  1.  The signs read: “U.S. finally provokes Russia into 
self-defense by U.S./N.A.T.O. hovering on Russia’s doorstep as a constant, troublesome and 
inescapable threat to Russia.  U.S. (gov) cause of war.”  ECF No. 19, at 2. 
Twenty minutes after Officer Koenigsmann initiated the stop, Sergeant Loveday arrived.  
ECF No.  7, at  2.  Sergeant Loveday questioned Mr.  Schifanelli about the signs , id., and he 
responded that “Russia is acting in self-defense to the U.S. presence in . . . Ukraine,” ECF No. 19, 
at 3.  Sergeant Loveday told Mr.  Schifanelli to wait until the U.S. Secret Service arrived.  ECF 
No. 7, at 2; see ECF No.  19, at  3; ECF No.  22, at  5 (conceding that Sergeant  Loveday 
“summon[ed] the assistance of the Secret Service”).  About fifteen to twenty minutes later, the 
Secret Service arrived and an officer questioned Mr. Schifanelli about the signs.  ECF No. 7, at 2.  
Sergeant Loveday conferred with the Secret Service for another thirty minutes .  Id.  The Secret 
Service officer who had questioned Mr. Schifanelli then told Mr. Schifanelli that his detention was 
warranted because of “heightened security” concerning the war in Ukraine but that he was free to 
leave.  Id.  The traffic stop lasted at least one hour “or even substantially longer.”  Id. 
In October  2022, Mr. Schifanelli filed an action against Sergeant  Loveday and 
Officer Koenigsmann in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.  ECF No. 1-2, at 56; see 
Statement of Claim, Schifanelli v. Loveday, No. 2022-SC3-1469 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 19, 2022).  
He later moved to voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice.  Mot. to Dismiss, Schifanelli, 
 
1 When citing ECF Nos. 1-2, 7, 7-2, 19, and 21, the court refers to the CM/ECF-generated numbers 
at the top of each page rather than any internal pagination. 
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No. 2022-SC3-1469 (D.C.  Super. Ct. Mar.  31, 2023); see ECF No. 1-2, at  56.  In March 2025, 
Mr. Schifanelli re-filed his case against Sergeant  Loveday and Officer Koenigsmann in Superior 
Court.  ECF No.  1-2, at 56; see Statement of Claim, Schifanelli v. Loveday , No. 2025-SCB-422 
(D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2025).  In June 2025, the Office of the Attorney General for the District 
of Columbia (“OAG”), which represents Sergeant Loveday, removed the case to this court.  ECF 
No. 1. 
Mr. Schifanelli then filed an amended complaint , which name d Sergeant Loveday as the 
sole Defendant.  ECF No.  7; see ECF No.  8, at  1 (explaining that he intended to dismiss 
Officer Koenigsmann from the case because “she played only a minor role in the incident”) .  In 
his amended complaint, Mr. Schifanelli alleges that “there was no reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause from the initiation of the [traffic] stop to its completion” and that the stop was unlawfully 
extended “beyond [one involving] a turn -signal infraction” and the “time that would have been 
needed to issue the ‘warning ticket,’” “perform a standard ‘driver/vehicle check,’” and “complete 
the stop.”  ECF No.  7, at 2.  Specifically, while the entire traffic stop “lasted for approximately 
[one] hour,” Mr. Schifanelli contends that the additional forty-five minutes—which began when 
Sergeant Loveday arrived —“constituted an [u]nreasonable [s]eizure” under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Id.  Based on these facts, Mr.  Schifanelli asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, see id. at 1; ECF No. 7-1, at 2, and requests $8,000 in compensatory and punitive damages 
for the “substantial mental distress” and “humiliation” that he experienced, ECF No. 7, at 3. 
After filing his amended complaint, Mr.  Schifanelli sought leave to effect service on 
Sergeant Loveday through alternate means.  ECF No. 8.  Sergeant Loveday, represented by OAG, 
filed a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process under Rule 12(b)(5) and for failure to 
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  ECF No. 12, at 6-12.  Because Mr. Schifanelli had detailed his 
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efforts to serve Sergeant Loveday, ECF No.  8, and in light of OAG’s entry of appearance as 
Sergeant Loveday’s counsel, the court held the motion to dismiss in abeyance and directed OAG 
to either accept service on behalf of Sergeant Loveday or detail how Mr.  Schifanelli could serve 
him, Aug. 19, 2025 Minute Order.  After OAG provided a method by which Mr. Schifanelli could 
serve Sergeant  Loveday, ECF No.  13, Mr.  Schifanelli effected service,  ECF Nos. 16, 17.  The 
court thereafter issued a Fox/Neal order in which it directed Mr. Schifanelli, who is proceeding in 
this matter pro se, to file a brief in opposition to Sergeant Loveday’s motion to dismiss and advised 
him of the consequences of failing to do so.  ECF No. 18.  Mr. Schifanelli filed an opposition three 
days later.  ECF No. 19.  Because it appeared to the court that Mr. Schifanelli may have filed his 
opposition before receiving the court’s Fox/Neal order, the court permitted him to file an amended 
opposition.  ECF No.  20.  Following Mr.  Schifanelli’s amended opposition, ECF No.  21, 
Sergeant Loveday filed a reply, ECF No. 22.  The motion is fully briefed.  ECF Nos.  12, 19, 21, 
22. 
II. LEGAL STANDARDS 
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court will dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Iqbal, 556 
U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  “A claim has facial 
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id.  In evaluating a motion under 
Rule 12(b)(6), a court accepts all well -pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true.  See 
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also Atherton v. D.C. Off. of Mayor, 
567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  Although the plausibility standard does not require “detailed 
factual allegations,” it “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of 
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the elements of a cause of action will not do.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at  555.  Nor will “‘naked 
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” suffice.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at  678 (alteration 
in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 
Pleadings by pro se litigants are generally held “to less stringent standards than formal 
pleadings drafted by lawyers.”  Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam).  The 
court therefore “liberally construe[s]” the amended complaint and all pro se filings.  Erickson, 551 
U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see Brown, 789 F.3d at 151-52.  
This liberal construction “is not, however, a license to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”  Sturdza v. United Arab Emi rates, 658 F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (D.D.C.  2009).  Thus, 
“the complaint must still present a claim on which the Court can grant relief” in order to defeat a 
motion to dismiss under Rule  12(b)(6).  Smith v. Scalia , 44 F. Supp. 3d 28, 36 (D.D.C. 2014) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Budik v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., 937 F. Supp. 
2d 5, 11 (D.D.C. 2013)). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Officer Koenigsmann 
In his amended complaint, ECF No. 7, Mr. Schifanelli names Sergeant Loveday as the sole 
Defendant, and he separately represents that he “is seeking” to “dismiss[]” Officer Koenigsmann, 
ECF No. 8, at 1.  Because Mr. Schifanelli has withdrawn his claims against Officer Koenigsmann 
in his amended complaint, Officer Koenigsmann is no longer a party to this suit.  See Pinson v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Just. , 69 F. Supp. 3d 108, 113 (D.D.C. 2014) (explaining that “ once an amended 
complaint is filed, it supersedes the original,” deprives the “first complaint . . . of any legal effect,” 
and “mak[es] the new complaint the operative document”). 
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B. Sergeant Loveday 
1. Rule 12(b)(5) 
While Sergeant Loveday originally contested service in his motion to dismiss, ECF No. 12, 
at 6-7, he now  concedes that Mr.  Schifanelli has properly effected service , ECF No.  17.  
Accordingly, the court denies as moot Sergeant  Loveday’s motion to dismiss pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(5). 
2. Rule 12(b)(6) 
In seeking dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), Sergeant Loveday contends that Mr. Schifanelli 
has not plausibly stated a claim under Section 1983 for a violation of the Fourth Amendment, ECF 
No. 12, at 7-10, and maintains that he is entitled to qualified immunity, id. at 10-12.  The court is 
not persuaded on either front, and it accordingly denies Sergeant Loveday’s motion to dismiss. 
a. Fourth Amendment 
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any “person who, under color 
of . . . State . . . or the District of Columbia [law]” deprives an individual of the “rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”  42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The Fourth Amendment 
prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  A person is seized under 
the Fourth Amendment “when physical force is used to restrain [his] movement or when [he] 
submits to an officer’s show of authority.”  United States v. Gamble , 77 F.4th 1041, 1044 
(D.C. Cir. 2023)  (quoting United States v. Delaney , 955 F.3d 1077, 1081 (D.C.  Cir. 2020)) .  
Officers conducting a traffic stop effect a “seizure of the driver [and any passengers] ‘even though 
the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.’”  Brendlin v. California, 
551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007)  (quoting Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)) .  “[T]he 
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tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic -stop context is determined by the seizure’s 
‘mission,’” which is “to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop[] and attend to related 
safety concerns.”  Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015) (citation s omitted) 
(quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)).  “Because addressing the infraction is the 
purpose of the stop, it may ‘last no longer than necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose ’” and must 
“end[] when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.”  
Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality 
opinion)). 
The traffic-related “mission” includes “ determining whether to issue a traffic ticket ,” as 
well as “checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against 
the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.”  Id. at 355.  
“On-scene investigation into other crimes  . . . detours from that [traffic] mission,” as do “ safety 
precautions taken in order to facilitate such detours.”  Id. at 356.  “A traffic stop may be extended 
beyond the point of completing its [traffic] mission if an officer develops a reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity. ”  United States v. Blackson , No.  25-CR-269, 2026 WL 63329, at  *7 
(D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2026)  (quoting United States v. Wallace , 937 F.3d 130, 138 (2d  Cir. 2019)).  
Reasonable suspicion requires an officer to have “a particularized an d objective basis for 
suspecting the particular person ” of a crime .  Heien v. North Carolina , 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014) 
(quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014)).  That is, the “officer must be able to 
articulate more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch”’ of criminal activity.”  
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). 
Sergeant Loveday asserts that Mr.  Schifanelli has failed to state a claim under the 
Fourth Amendment because Mr. Schifanelli’s “vehicle aroused suspicion of ‘multiple potential 
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offenses,’” ECF No. 12, at 9 (quoting Robinson v. District of Columbia, No. 15-CV-100, 2019 WL 
498741, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2019)),2 meaning that “the duration of the investigation during the 
traffic stop . . . was not unreasonable,” id. at 7.  As the argument goes, Sergeant Loveday’s concern 
about the signs attached to Mr.  Schifanelli’s vehicle made “briefly delaying an investigation to 
summon the expertise of the Secret Service,” which “serve[s] a ‘distinctive role in promoting 
national security,’ not unreasonable as a means of dispelling any lingering suspicion.”  Id. at 10 
(citation omitted) (quoting Lovett v. United States , No. 23-CV-2879, 2024 WL 4286054, at *7 
(D.D.C. Sep. 25, 2024)).  Mr. Schifanelli responds that the traffic stop extended well  beyond the 
time necessary to issue a traffic ticket for a turn-signal violation.  ECF No. 19, at 1-4; ECF No. 21, 
at 1-4.  He maintains that the stop was prolonged for the sole purpose of conducting an unrelated 
investigation into the signs on his car  and that Sergeant Loveday lacked reasonable suspicion of 
any criminal activity , rendering his extended detention unconstitutional under Rodriguez.  ECF 
No. 19, at 1; ECF No. 21, at 1. 
Mr. Schifanelli has the better argument.  Accepting his well-pleaded allegations as true and 
drawing all inferences in his favor, as the court must, Mr. Schifanelli has plainly stated a 
Section 1983 claim based on the Fourth Amendment.  That is, even if the initial traffic stop was 
lawful,3 Mr. Schifanelli has sufficiently alleged that Sergeant Loveday unlawfully prolonged the  
 
2 Although Sergeant Loveday purports to quote Sherrod v. McHugh , 334 F. Supp. 3d 219, 245 
(D.D.C. 2018), the quoted material appears in Robinson.  See ECF No. 12, at 9. 
3 Sergeant Loveday contends that Mr. Schifanelli challenges only the duration of and not the basis 
for the traffic stop.  See ECF No.  12, at  7.  But Mr.  Schifanelli clearly disputes 
Officer Koenigsmann’s reason for stopping him.  ECF No.  7, at 2 (“[T]here was no reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause from the initiation of the stop to its completion . . . .”); see ECF No. 19, 
at 1 (asserting that the “alleged turn signal infraction  . . . did not, in actuality, occur”).  Because 
Mr. Schifanelli has withdrawn his claims against Officer Koenigsmann, ECF No. 7; ECF No.  8, 
at 1, and because Sergeant Loveday does not seek dismissal of the Fourth  Amendment claim to 
the extent that it challenges the basis for the traffic stop, the court need not resolve this dispute. 
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stop for a distinct investigation that had no apparent connection to the traffic violation and for 
which he lacked reasonable suspicion.  ECF No. 12, at 9. 
The sole purpose of the “traffic mission” was to address Mr. Schifanelli’s failure to use a 
turn signal.  ECF No.  7, at 1-2; see generally ECF Nos.  12, 22 (failing to articulate any other 
traffic-related infraction).  Sergeant Loveday arrived on the scene of the traffic stop about twenty 
minutes after Officer Koenigsmann had initially detained Mr. Schifanelli.  ECF No. 7, at 2.  Upon 
arrival, Sergeant Loveday questioned Mr.  Schifanelli about the signs on his vehicle, id.—which 
had no connection to the traffic mission —and then “summoned” Secret Service to the scene for 
further investigation, ECF No.  19, at 3.  The Secret Service had no obvious  reason to become 
involved in a traffic stop predicated on a “turn -signal infraction.”  ECF No.  7, at  2.  And 
Sergeant Loveday has not suggested that the Ukraine -related signs had anything to do with 
Officer Koenigsmann’s traffic stop, nor has he identified any traffic law that the signs violated or 
otherwise explained why it was necessary to enlist the Secret Ser vice to deal with a sign -related 
traffic infraction. 
To be sure, Mr.  Schifanelli has not identified a precise moment during the stop when 
Officer Koenigsmann completed —or “reasonably should have” finished —“checking 
[Mr. Schifanelli’s] license, determining whether there [we]re outstanding warrants against 
[him], . . . inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance,” and writing any traffic 
ticket.  Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354-55.  The permissible duration of Officer Koenigsmann’s traffic 
mission presents a fact -bound question that turns on how quickly an officer “with reasonable 
diligence” could complete the specific traffic -related tasks at issue.  Blackson, 2026 WL 63329, 
at *6; see United States v. Johnson , 166 F.4th 1116, 1119 (8th  Cir. 2026) (“ Officers must be 
‘reasonably diligent ’ and should act ‘expeditiously’ in carrying out [traffic] tasks.” (quoting 
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Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at  357)).  It is thus entirely possible that some portion of Mr. Schifanelli’s 
forty-five minute detention after Sergeant Loveday’s arrival was still related to the traffic mission. 
Mr. Schifanelli’s allegations are nonetheless sufficient at the motion -to-dismiss stage to 
plead a prolonged detention beyond the traffic mission, either because Officer Koenigsmann had 
completed her traffic mission before Sergeant Loveday and the Secret Service concluded their 
investigation and allowed Mr. Schifanelli to leave—meaning the stop was prolonged for the sole 
purpose of a non-traffic mission—or because the sign-related interrogation, the wait for Secret 
Service to arrive, and the subsequent Secret Service investigation caused Officer Koenigsmann to 
complete the traffic stop long after it should have concluded had she worked expeditiously.   As 
Mr. Schifanelli has described the traffic stop, there is nothing to suggest that a reasonably diligent 
officer would take “approximately [one] hour (or even substantially longer)” to complete a simple 
traffic mission with seemingly no issues related to his license, registration, or any warrants.  ECF 
No. 7, at 2.  That is enough to survive a motion to dismiss.  See Cape v. San Jose Police Dep’t , 
No. 25-CV-740, 2025 WL 2197143, at *5-7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2025) (liberally construing a pro se 
plaintiff’s allegations of a prolonged detention and, in light of the “fact-specific inquiry,” denying 
a motion to dismiss a Section 1983 claim).  Indeed, courts have found shorter detentions to violate 
the Fourth Amendment under Rodriguez.  See, e.g., Johnson, 166 F.4th at 1117, 1119 (reversing 
the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress based on Rodriguez in a case with an officer who 
“normally” needed “five or six minutes to complete and explain a traffic ticket” and would have 
completed the traffic mission in approximately twenty minutes but prolonged the stop by two extra 
minutes for a canine team to ar rive); United States v. Clark , 902 F.3d 404, 406, 410-11 (3d Cir. 
2018) ( affirming the suppression of evidence and concluding that an officer impermissibl y 
extended a twenty-three minute traffic stop to ask about the driver’s criminal history rather than 
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complete the traffic mission); see also Blackson, 2026 WL 63329, at *3, *5 (concluding that MPD 
officers prolonged a twenty-seven-minute traffic stop when one officer took twenty -two minutes 
to write four traffic tickets after completing database checks while other officers on scene did not 
help and instead waited for a canine patrol officer to arrive). 
As to any reasonable suspicion, Sergeant Loveday does not assert that he or the Secret 
Service had an articulable basis to think that Mr.  Schifanelli had committed a crime.  
Sergeant Loveday concedes that the non -traffic investigation targeted the signs attached to 
Mr. Schifanelli’s car, see ECF No. 12, at 9-10; ECF No.  22, at 2-3, but he has not identified a 
crime that Mr. Schifanelli plausibly committed by displaying materials about the war in Ukraine, 
cf. Estep v. Dallas County, 310 F.3d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding that a National 
Rifle Association sticker on a vehicle did not create reasonable suspicion that a driver was 
dangerous and “might gain immediate control of a weapon”).  In Sergeant Loveday’s telling, “the 
signage on [Mr. Schifanelli’s] vehicle aroused suspicions of ‘multiple potential offenses and 
investigations [that could be] at issue.’”  ECF No.  12 at 9 (second alteration in original) (quoting 
Robinson, 2019 WL 498741, at *4).  But the court is left to speculate what those offenses were 
and what reasonable, articulable facts tied Mr. Schifanelli to them.  For that reason, the cases on 
which Sergeant Loveday relies are inapposite because, in each, officers had reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity.  See United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 68 2-88 (1985) (holding that a 
stop’s duration did not violate the Fourth  Amendment in a case involving clear suspicion of 
marijuana trafficking and “delay  . . . attributable . . . to the [suspect’s] evasive actions”) ; 
Robinson, 2019 WL 498741, at  *1-4, *6  (finding an extended detention lawful when officers 
observed a suspect trespassing, the suspect admitted to having a gun but was later identified as an 
off-duty MPD officer, and it took an hour to confirm the suspect’s employment); James v. United 
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States, 48 F. Supp. 3d 58, 66 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding no plausible Fourth Amendment claim based 
on allegations of a “ brief detention in handcuffs ” while  officers “investigated . . . [a] crying 
woman’s injury, her allegations against [the plaintiff], and her need for medical treatment ”); see 
also ECF No. 12, at 8-10.  On the facts alleged, the court cannot even conclude Sergeant Loveday 
had a hunch that Mr. Schifanelli was engaged in criminal activity. 
Nor is the court persuaded by Sergeant Loveday’s reliance on “national security concerns” 
that supposedly warranted a Secret Service investigation to “dispel[] any lingering suspicion.”  
ECF No.  12, at  9-10.  The argument is circular because it assumes suspicion existed when 
Sergeant Loveday has not articulated any suspicion in the first instance or explained why the signs’ 
content implicated the United States’ national security.  See ECF No. 19, at 2 (describing the signs 
as expressing the view that the United States’ expansion of NATO provoked Russia to invade 
Ukraine in self -defense).  The Fourth  Amendment requires reasonable suspicion of a crime and 
provides no get -out-of-reasonable-suspicion-free card for those vaguely invoking heightened 
national security risks. 
Sergeant Loveday’s final argument about reasonable suspicion  evinces a clear 
misunderstanding of the Fourth Amendment.  Sergeant Loveday maintains that the “dispositive 
issue in this case” is not “whether [his] suspicions themselves were reasonable, but instead whether 
the duration of the investigation was reasonable” in “light of  . . . whatever [his suspicions] may 
have been.”  ECF No.  22, at 3-4.  In other words , Sergeant Loveday views the “content of the 
messaging” on the signs that he and the Secret Service were investigating as “irrelevant.”  Id. at 4.  
This logic cannot be squared with Rodriguez: the entire reason a prolonged traffic stop violates the 
Fourth Amendment is because officers persist in investigating criminal activity—either instead of 
or well after completing any traffic mission—without reasonable suspicion of criminal activit y.  
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See 575 U.S. at  354.  The central question is thus what suspicion Sergeant  Loveday had and 
whether he satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s demand for articulable suspicion of a crime  before 
further restraining Mr. Schifanelli’s liberty.  And there is no way to assess that question unless 
Sergeant Loveday identifies the “multiple potential offenses” he believed  that the Secret Service 
needed to investigate.  ECF No. 12, at 8 (quoting Robinson, 2019 WL 498741, at *4).  At bottom, 
Mr. Schifanelli has stated a claim under Section 1983 based on a Fourth Amendment violation. 
b. Qualified immunity 
“Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from suit under [Section] 1983 unless 
their conduct violates clearly established law. ”  Zorn v. Linton , No. 25-297, 2026 WL 795469, 
at *2 ( U.S. Mar. 23, 2026)  (per curiam) .  Applying that proposition involves two questions : 
“(1) whether the facts in the record show the officers’ conduct violated a constitutional right, and 
if so, (2)  whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the incident.”  
Corrigan v. Dist rict of Columbia , 841 F.3d  1022, 1029 (D.C.  Cir. 2016).  As the court has 
explained, Mr.  Schifanelli has plausibly alleged a Fourth  Amendment violation, see supra  
Section III.B.2.a, which satisfies the first prong of the qualified -immunity analysis, so the court  
need only address whether the right was clearly established. 
“A right is clearly established when it is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official 
would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”  Zorn, 2026 WL 795469, at  *2 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna , 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) 
(per curiam)).   “[E]arlier cases involving ‘fundamentally similar’ facts can provide especially 
strong support for a conclusion that the law is clearly established,” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 
741 (2002), but there need not be a “‘“case directly on point,”’” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 
(2017) (per curiam) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna , 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam)) .  Rather, 
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“existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate .”  
Mullenix, 577 U.S. at  12 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).   This requires 
“controlling authority” or “a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority.”   District of 
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting al-Kidd, 
563 U.S. at  741-42).  And, the Supreme Court has repeatedly caution ed that courts should not 
define “clearly established law” at “ a high level of generality.”  Pauly, 580 U.S. at  79 (quoting 
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742); see, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014); al-Kidd, 563 
U.S. at 742 (collecting cases). 
Sergeant Loveday asserts that  he is entitled to qualified immunity even if he violated 
Mr. Schifanelli’s Fourth  Amendment rights  because it was not clearly established that he was  
prohibited from extending a traffic stop to question Mr.  Schifanelli about signs attached to his 
vehicle and then waiting on Secret Service to arrive and “conduct an additional investigation .”  
ECF No. 12, at  11-12; see ECF No.  22, at  4-6.  Mr. Schifanelli points to Rodriguez, which he 
argues clearly established the proposition that police officers cannot “exten[d]” a traffic stop 
“[a]bsent reasonable suspicion” of a crime.  ECF No.  19, at 1, 5 (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 
at 353); see ECF No. 21, at 1, 4-5 (same).  At this early stage in the litigation  and based on the 
parties’ arguments, the court concludes that Sergeant Loveday is not entitled to qualified 
immunity. 
To begin, Sergeant  Loveday incorrectly suggests that the only clearly established law 
Mr. Schifanelli has identified is the general right to be free from unreasonable seizures.  ECF 
No. 22, at  4-5.  That m isunderstands Mr.  Schifanelli’s argument .  Had he  only referred to the 
Fourth Amendment’s text, Mr. Schifanelli would have defined the right at too high a level of 
generality.  See Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12.  But Mr. Schifanelli cites Rodriguez and asserts that 
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Sergeant Loveday unlawfully extended the traffic stop.  ECF No.  19, at 1, 5; ECF No.  21, at 1, 
4-5.  In his reply, Sergeant Loveday does not acknowledge Rodriguez, let alone contest 
Mr. Schifanelli’s claim that Rodriguez created clearly established law.  See generally ECF No. 22.  
While Mr. Schifanelli has the burden of showing that the “particular right in question  . . . was 
clearly established,” Dukore v. District of Columbia , 799 F.3d 1137, 1145 (D.C.  Cir. 2015), it is 
“well-settled that ‘where a party fails to respond to arguments in opposition papers, the Court may 
treat those specific arguments as conceded,’” Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 520 
F. Supp. 3d 38, 50 (D.D.C. 2021) (quoting Dinkel v. MedStar Health, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 49, 58 
(D.D.C. 2012)).  The court considers the argument to be conceded  because Sergeant  Loveday 
should have responded to the legal issue at the core of his qualified -immunity defense.  Yet even 
if the court construed Sergeant Loveday’s motion and reply as contesting whether Rodriguez 
clearly established that the Fourth  Amendment prohibits an extension of a traffic stop without 
reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity , the court would reject the argument on the merits .  
The court is mindful that the particular law must be “sufficiently clear” so that any officer “would 
have understood that what he [wa]s doing violates [the Fourth  Amendment].”  Zorn, 2026 WL 
795469, at *2 (quoting Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 5).  Rodriguez clears that high bar. 
In Rodriguez, a police officer observed a vehicle veer onto the shoulder of a highway.  575 
U.S. at 351.  Because state law prohibited driving on highway shoulders, the officer —who was 
part of a K-9 unit and had his dog in the patrol car—conducted a traffic stop.  Id.  The officer asked 
the driver, Mr. Rodriguez, for his license, registration, and proof of insurance and requested that 
Mr. Rodriguez “accompany him [back] to the patrol car.”  Id.  After Mr. Rodriguez declined to 
leave his own vehicle, the officer conducted a records check and returned to Mr. Rodriguez’s car 
to question Mr. Rodriguez and the passenger about “where [they] were coming from and where 
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they were going.”  Id.  The officer then conducted a records check on the passenger  “and called 
for a second officer” before “writing a warning ticket for [Mr.] Rodriguez” for the traffic violation.  
Id.  Once the officer finished writing the ticket and returned the occupants’ documents, he asked 
for permission to “walk  his dog  around [Mr .] Rodriguez’s vehicle.”  Id. at 352.  After 
Mr. Rodriguez refused to provide consent, the officer ordered him and the passenger out of the car 
and waited for backup to arrive.  Id.  Another officer arrived five minutes later, the primary officer 
then had his dog conduct an open -air sniff of Mr.  Rodriguez’s car, and the dog alerted to the 
presence of narcotics.  Id.  Upon conducting a search, the officers  recovered methamphetamine.  
Id. 
The Supreme Court held that the “dog sniff” was “aimed at ‘detect[ing] evidence of 
ordinary criminal wrongdoing’”  unrelated to the traffic mission  behind the stop.   Id. at 355 
(alteration in original) (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000)) ; see id. 
at 356 (“Lacking the same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary [traffic] inquiries, a 
dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic mission.”).  The Court explained 
that a “general interest in criminal enforcement” that leads to “[o]n-scene investigation into other 
crimes” and “ adds time to ” the traffic stop is constitutionally permissible only if the officer has 
“reasonable suspicion of criminal activity [that] justifie[s]” continued detention.  Id. at 356-58 
(emphasis added). 
For qualified -immunity purpo ses, Rodriguez clearly establishes that  the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits  law enforcement from “prolong[ing] —i.e., add[ing] time to —the 
[traffic] stop” for the sole purpose of conducting a criminal investigation unrelated to the traffic 
mission unless that investigation is supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity.  Id. at 357 (internal quotation marks omitted); see McLeod v. Mickle, 765 F. App’x 582, 
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585 n.2 (2d  Cir. 2019)  (summary order)  (“Rodriguez was decided in April  2015, clearly 
establishing such a right well before [the officer] stopped [the plaintiff] in June 2016.”); see also 
Houston v. Reeves , No. 24-7268, 2026 WL 674346, at  *3 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2026) (per curiam) 
(affirming the denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment and citing Rodriguez and Circuit 
precedent to explain that the “unreasonable prolonging of [the plaintiff’s] detention” was clearly 
established); Jarvis v. City of Daytona Beach, No. 24-13456, 2026 WL 323259, at *7-8 (11th Cir. 
Feb. 6, 2026) (per curiam) (same); Kummer v. Embley, No. 25-CV-548, 2026 WL 472733, at  *7 
(D. Utah Feb.  19, 2026) ( holding that Tenth  Circuit precedent applying Rodriguez was clearly 
established); Parada v. Anoka County , 332 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1241 (D.  Minn. 2018) (“Caballes 
and Rodriguez clearly establish that a seizure cannot extend beyond the time necessary to issue a 
traffic ticket.”). 
This formulation of Rodriguez’s holding for the qualified-immunity analysis is appropriate 
because it balances two competing issues: on one hand, it is “‘particularized’ [enough] . . . so that 
the ‘contours’ of the right are clear to a reasonable official ,” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 
665 (2012) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)); on the other, it is consistent 
with the fact that “‘it is error to demand [the] specificity ’ of a factual twin,” Soukaneh v. 
Andrzejewski, 112 F.4th 1 07, 123 (2d  Cir. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Collymore v. 
Krystal Myers, RN, 74 F.4th 22, 30 (2d  Cir. 2023)) ; see Hicks v. Ferreyra , 64 F.4th 156, 171 
(4th Cir. 2023) (“ The ‘key inquiry ’ is not whether a court has ‘considered identical factual 
circumstances and held that an officer ’s conduct violated particular constitutional rights, ’ but 
whether officers . . . have been provided fair warning, with sufficient specificity, that their actions 
would qualify as a deprivation of an individual ’s rights.” (quoting Betton v. Belue, 942 F.3d 184, 
193-94 (4th Cir. 2019))); see also Cruise-Gulyas v. Minard , 918 F.3d 494, 497 (6th  Cir. 2019) 
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(“While [Rodriguez and a prior Sixth  Circuit case] are not factually identical  [to this one] , they 
establish clear, specific principles that answer the questions this case asks.”). 
Although Rodriguez involved a drug -sniffing dog, the Court’s holding unmistakably 
applies whenever officers, lacking reasonable suspicion of any crime,  extend a traffic stop for an 
unrelated and unwarranted criminal investigation.  Cf. Dukore, 799 F.3d at 1144 (explaining that 
“the right . . . is ‘not the general right to be free from retaliation for one’s speech, ’ but rather ‘the 
more specific right to be free from  a retaliatory arrest that is otherwise supported by probable 
cause’” (quoting Reichle, 566 U.S. at 665)).  Other courts have likewise concluded that Rodriguez 
is clearly established for the same principle that this court applies today.  See Houston, 2026 WL 
674346, at  *1-3 (affirming the denial of qualified immunity in a case that did not involve a 
drug-sniffing dog based in part on Rodriguez); Jarvis, 2026 WL 323259, at *7-8 (same); Bellows 
v. Grand Isle Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 25-CV-390, 2026 WL 370862, at *10-11 (D. Vt. Feb. 10, 
2026) (citing Circuit precedent that Rodriguez is clearly established law and denying a motion to 
dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity in a case that did not involve a drug -sniffing dog or a 
search of a car); Cain v. City of Yucaipa, No. 24-CV-1682, 2025 WL 2019999, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. 
June 9, 2025) (denying a motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity in a 
case that did not involve a drug-sniffing dog because Rodriguez is clearly established law).  Aside 
from the Rodriguez officer’s use of a drug-sniffing dog, this case parall els Rodriguez in every 
relevant way.  There, as here, an officer conducted a traffic stop for a discrete traffic violation.  
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 351; ECF No. 7, at 1.  There, as here, the officer conducting the initial stop 
added time by summoning backup for non-traffic purposes.  Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 351-52; ECF 
No. 19, at  3; ECF No.  22, at  2.  And there, as here, the purpose of the extension was for an 
unrelated investigation into activity that bore no connection to the traffic violation or the 
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safety-related mission of the traffic stop.  Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at  352, 355 -57; see supra 
Section III.B.2.a; ECF No. 7, at 2; ECF No. 19, at 2-3. 
Mr. Schifanelli has plausibly alleged that Sergeant Loveday lacked any reasonable, 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity and that Sergeant  Loveday violated the Fourth 
Amendment by requesting Secret Service to respond  and investigate signs about the war in 
Ukraine.  And because any reasonable officer would have known by April 2022 that Rodriguez 
prohibited him from prolonging a traffic stop for this unrelated investigation, Sergeant Loveday is 
not entitled to qualified immunity at this time.4 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Sergeant Loveday’s Motion to 
Dismiss, ECF No. 12, DENIED, and Sergeant Loveday shall file an answer to Mr. Schifanelli’s 
amended complaint, ECF No. 7, on or before April 14, 2026.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A). 
  
LOREN L. ALIKHAN  
United States District Judge  
Date: March 31, 2026 
 
4 The court “note[s] that although [Mr.  Schifanelli’s] complaint adequately alleged a violation of 
clearly established law, development of the factual record through discovery may bring to light 
new information that could affect the qualified immunity analysis.”  Meshal v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t 
of Pub. Safety, 117 F.4th 1273, 1288 n.6 (11th  Cir. 2024).  Accordingly, “[Sergeant  Loveday is] 
free to reassert qualified immunity on a motion for summary judgment and at trial, if there is one.”  
Id. (collecting cases). 
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