govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-02573-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
JOE ALTER., 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 
v. 
 
Case No. 1:25-cv-2573-RCL 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., 
 
 Defendants.  
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 Plaintiff Joe Alter filed this pro se  suit against the United States of America, the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, objecting to the 
existence of the doctrine of standing developed in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555 
(1992), as it applies to structural constitutional claims.  The challenge comes after Plaintiff, a 
frequent pro se litigant, has had several suits dismissed on standing grounds in this Court and in 
others.  See, e.g., Alter v. U .S. Dep’t of Gov’t Efficiency, No. 1:25-cv-1162, 2025 WL  1279354 
(D.D.C. May 3, 2025), aff’d, No. 25-5172, 2025 WL 2463705 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 27, 2025).  Plaintiff 
now seeks a series of judicial declarations stating that structural constitutional claims should not 
be dismissed on standing grounds before they are adjudicated on the merits , as well as a specific 
declaration that dismissal of Plaintiff’s previous suits “demonstrate[s] a systemic misuse of 
standing doctrine.”  Compl. at 15–17.  Defendants move to dismiss the complaint, arguing that this 
Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff’s complaint fails to establish Article III 
standing.
1  For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED. 
 
1 Defendants state in their Motion to Dismiss that they are moving pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), but their filing plainly seeks dismissal for lack of standing.   Mot . to Dismiss  at 1.  However, it is clearly 
established that a challenge to the standing of a party,  when raised as a motion to dismiss, proceeds pursuant to Rule 
 
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I. LEGAL STANDARD 
A challenge to the standing of a party, when raised as a motion to dismiss, proceeds 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).  Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  “As the party 
invoking federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff  bears the burden of establishing standing.”  Strunk v. 
Obama, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2011) ( first citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t , 
523 U.S. 83, 104 (1998), and then citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).  To establish Article III standing, 
a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a concrete injury in fact that is (2) traceable to the complained-of 
conduct, and (3) redressable by the relief sought.  See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.  “[T] he 
requirement that courts liberally interpret pro se pleadings does not dispense with the constitutional 
requirement of standing.”  Strunk, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 3.    
II. DISCUSSION 
Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged facts to establish standing; 
rather, they contend t hat he presses an “undifferentiated, generalized grievance” about the very 
existence of the standing doctrine.  Mot. to Dismiss at 3 (quoting Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 
442 (2007)).  The Court agrees.  
To establish the first element of Article III standing, “injury in fact,” a plaintiff must show 
“an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual 
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citation omitted).  Here, 
Plaintiff has not shown an invasion of a legally protected interest that is particular to him.  Though 
he points to several of his own previous lawsuits that were dismissed for lack of standing, his 
complaint is that the doctrine of standing is unconstitutional because it prevents all citizens from 
 
12(b)(1).  Haase v. Sessions , 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987).   That’s because standing is a jurisdictional matter 
and “a Rule 12(b)(1) motion imposes on the court an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope 
of its jurisdictional authority.”  Johnson v. District of Columbia , 71 F. Supp. 3d 155, 158 (D.D.C. 2014) ( citation 
omitted).  For this reason, the Court construes Defendants’ motion as one raised under Rule 12(b)(1). 
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bringing structural constitutional claims. See Compl. at 2-3. The Supreme Court has previously 
foreclosed this argument: a "litigant 'raising only a generally available grievance about 
govemment---claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the 
Constitution and laws .. . does not state an Article III case or controversy.'" Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 706 (2013) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74). Because Plaintiff fails to 
present a personalized injury in his Complaint or in his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (where 
he instead relies on the argument that "[t]he Constitution does not condition judicial review of 
alleged constitutional violations on a showing of personal tragedy," Opp'n at 14), the Court finds 
that Plaintiff has not established Article III standing. 
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the case is 
DISMISSED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Date: 'f .. Jo · -Z..C,, -- -------
Royce C. Lamberth 
United States District Judge 
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