govinfo:USCOURTS-vtd-2_23-cv-00581-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF VERMONT 
 
ELLEN STIMSON, ) 
         ) 
  Plaintiff,          ) 
) 
v. ) Case No. 2:23-cv-581 
) 
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY  ) 
CO., ) 
 ) 
  Defendant.    ) 
 
OPINION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff Ellen Stimson brings this action against State 
Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“State Farm”) alleging that 
State Farm failed to make adequate payment on her insurance 
claim after a fire damaged her home. The fire was reportedly 
caused by an electrical surge. Pending before the Court are 
motions for summary judgment filed by both parties (ECF Nos. 55, 
56).  Stimson has also filed a motion for sanctions (ECF No. 71) 
and a motion to exclude certain evidence from State Farm’s 
supplemental pleading (ECF No. 76).  State Farm filed responses 
(ECF Nos. 77, 78). 
 For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies both 
motions for summary judgment.  The Court also issues sanctions 
against State Farm.  The Court denies as moot, and without 
prejudice, Stimson’s motion to exclude evidence. 
Procedural Posture 
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 The scheduling order in place for this case set the summary 
judgment deadline at July 16, 2025.  See ECF No. 51.  
Previously, while discovery was still open, the Court issued an 
order granting Stimson’s unopposed motion to compel responses to 
her document requests and interrogatories, and to require State 
Farm’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness to appear for a deposition on a 
certain date and at a place designated by Stimson.  See ECF No. 
54.  In the order, the Court also held that “the parties must 
also amend the discovery schedule to account for the late 
disclosure and deposition of Defendant’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness.”  
See ECF No. 54 at 2.  Yet the parties did not file a new 
discovery schedule, perhaps because the deposition never took 
place. 
 On July 18, 2025, Stimson filed her motion for partial 
summary judgment with an accompanying memorandum and statement 
of undisputed facts.  See ECF No. 55 (and attachments).  Under 
Local Rule 7(a)(3)(A), a memorandum in opposition would have 
been due August 17, 2025.  However, State Farm did not file an 
opposition.  Because State Farm did not file any opposing 
statement, it also did not follow Local Rule 56(b), which states 
that a party opposing summary judgment “must include a response 
to each numbered paragraph in the moving party’s statement, in 
correspondingly numbered paragraphs, admitting, denying, or 
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otherwise responding to each numbered paragraph in the moving 
party’s statement.” 
 On July 28, 2025, State Farm filed a cross motion for 
summary judgment, along with an accompanying memorandum in 
support and its own statement of undisputed facts.  See ECF No. 
56 (and attachments).  State Farm’s memorandum is seven pages 
long, two pages of which are a signature page and a certificate 
of service page (both of which have empty signature lines).  ECF 
No. 56-2.  On August 6, 2025, Stimson filed her timely 
opposition along with a response to State Farm’s statement of 
undisputed facts.  See ECF No. 60. 
 This Court held a hearing on the cross motions and 
discovery issue on December 22, 2025.  At the hearing, Stimson’s 
attorney informed the Court that Stimson still had “not received 
any discovery at all,” even though State Farm’s attorney had 
represented that he received the claim file from State Farm in 
March.  ECF No. 66 at 2.  State Farm’s attorney stated that his 
office had received the documents after February, but that he 
then left the firm and received the documents again in May.  ECF 
No. 66 at 16.  He said that he was “ill equipped” to get the 
documents to Stimson “in a timely fashion.”  Id.  He said that 
his “situation changed” but that this was “not an excuse” it was 
“just a non-nefarious explanation.”  Id. at 17.  The Court 
reminded State Farm that there was “a court order here” and 
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stated that: “I’ve never, quite frankly, seen this in which I 
have issued an order saying, okay, you’ve got to have 
depositions by such and such a date, you’ve got to make full 
discovery to the other side, and have it totally ignored.”  Id. 
at 18.  The Court was trying to figure out “how this could 
possibly happen.”  Id.  State Farm’s attorney insisted that: 
Our position was not that we would not—that we would 
in—disobey a court order.  That was never my 
intention.  It was never my position.  I’ve been doing 
this for 38 years.  It’s not an excuse.  It’s the 
first and only time it’s ever happened. 
Id. at 19.  No further explanation was given by State Farm’s 
attorney as to why State Farm failed to comply with the Court’s 
order. 
 The Court set new deadlines.  State Farm had to provide 
discovery within 15 days; 30 days from that date the discovery 
depositions had to be completed; and 15 days from that date the 
parties could submit additional pleadings.  ECF No. 66 at 38. 
 At the hearing, the Court also expressed specific interest 
in whether or not there was a written agreement to the appraisal 
between the parties.  Id. at 35.  This was a fact that neither 
party had addressed in their summary judgment briefing. 
 On February 17, 2026, the parties filed a consented-to 
motion for additional time to file their supplemental briefs.  
ECF No. 69.  The Court granted the extension.  ECF No. 70.  On 
March 5, 2026, Stimson filed a Motion for Sanctions for 
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Continued Failure to Produce Discovery (ECF No. 71). On March 9, 
both parties filed supplemental memoranda (ECF Nos. 72, 73).  On 
March 21st, Stimson filed a Motion to Exclude Inadmissible 
Evidence from State Farm’s Supplemental Memorandum (ECF No. 76).  
On March 27th, State Farm filed responses to Stimson’s Motion 
for Sanctions and Motion to Exclude.  (ECF Nos. 77, 78). 
Factual Background 
The following summarized facts are undisputed1 unless 
otherwise noted, and have been taken from the statements of 
facts attached to the parties’ motions for summary judgment. 
A. Fire 
 The Plaintiff, Ellen Stimson, owns a home in Dorset, 
Vermont.  On October 15, 2022, a power surge caused an 
electrical file in the basement of Stimson’s home.  The fire 
caused significant damage to the house and to the family’s 
personal property.  At the time of the fire, Stimson was a 
policyholder with State Farm, and the damage was covered. 
B. Policy Terms 
 
1 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e): “If a party fails 
to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly 
address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 
56(c), the court may… consider the fact undisputed for purposes 
of the motion.”  Though Stimson addressed all of State Farm’s 
facts, State Farm ignored many of Stimson’s facts.  The Court 
will treat these facts as undisputed. 
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 A copy of the State Farm Homeowners Policy is filed at ECF 
No. 55-1.  “Section I” includes a list of property coverages, 
which includes “Coverage A—Dwelling”; “Coverage B—Personal 
Property”; and “Coverage C—Loss of Use.”  See id. at 8-11.   
Stimson has also provided evidence of the policy coverage 
limits, in a document titled “Declaration Pages and Homeowners 
Amendatory Endorsement” attached to her summary judgment motion 
at ECF No. 55-2.  The relevant limits include the following: 
• Coverage A Dwelling: $875,000 
o Other Structures: $87,500 
o Option ID: increase of dwelling coverage of $175,000 
o Option OL: Ordinance/Law 10%: $87,500 
o Debris Removal: Additional 5%2 available / $1,000 tree 
debris 
o Trees, Scrubs, and Landscaping: 5% of Coverage A 
amount / $750 per item 
• Coverage B Personal Property: $656,250 
• Coverage C Loss of Use: $262,5003 
 
2 In her original motion for summary judgment, Stimson listed 
this limit as $43,750, because five percent of the coverage for 
A: Dwelling is $43,750 (because 875,000 * .05 = 43,750).  In her 
supplemental pleading, she added the Option ID to the Coverage A 
amount, and listed the limit as $52,500.  ECF No. 73 at 10.  
Finally, in her motion to exclude, she explained that she 
believed that—for debris removal coverage—the limit is 5% of 
total coverage available, with a limit of $92,312.50.  ECF No. 
76 at 12.   
3 Coverage C does not appear to be at issue in this lawsuit. 
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See ECF No. 55-2 at 4-5. 
 The policy itself includes an appraisal provision that 
begins with the following language: 
Appraisal.  If you and we fail to agree on the amount 
of loss, the amount of loss will be set by appraisal 
if you and we agree to appraisal.  Only you or we may 
request and agree to appraisal.  An agreement for 
appraisal must be in writing. […]  The party 
requesting appraisal must provide the other party with 
written, itemized documentation of a specific dispute 
as to the amount of the loss, identifying separately 
each item being disputed. 
See ECF No. 55-1 at 24.  Under part (b) of the Appraisal 
section, the policy states that: 
The appraisers will then attempt to set the amount of 
the loss of each item in dispute as specified by each 
party, and jointly submit to each party a written 
report of agreement signed by them.  In all instances 
the written report of agreement will be itemized and 
state separately the actual cash value, replacement 
cost, and if applicable, the market value of each item 
in dispute. 
The written report of agreement will set the amount of 
the loss of each item in dispute and will be binding 
upon you and us. 
Id. 
Under part (c) of the Appraisal section, a process is set 
forth whereby “[i]f the two appraisers fail to agree upon the 
amount of the loss within 30 days, unless the period of time is 
extended by mutual agreement, they will select a competent, 
disinterested umpire and will submit their differences to the 
umpire.”  Id.  Under part (g), the policy states that “you and 
we do not waive any rights by agreeing to or submitting to an 
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appraisal, and retain all contractual rights to determine if 
coverage applies to each item in dispute,” and under part (j), 
it states that “a party may not agree to appraisal after that 
party brings suit or action against the other party relating to 
the amount of loss.”  Id. 
The policy also addresses lawsuits.  It says: 
Suit Against Us.  No action will be brought against us 
unless there has been full compliance with all of the 
policy provisions.  Any action by any party must be 
started within one year after the date of loss or 
damage.   
However, your right to bring legal action against us 
is not conditioned upon your compliance with the 
SECTION I – CONDITIONS, 4. Appraisal.  Once an 
appraisal award has been determined, you will not be 
permitted to file suit against us. 
See ECF No. 55-1 at 25. 
C. Appraisal Process and Suit 
 In March of 2023, Stimson was diagnosed with blood cancer 
(myeloproliferative neoplasm) and her public adjuster made State 
Farm aware of this in April of 2023.  See ECF No. 55-17 at 4; 
ECF No. 55-16 at 3.  On May 11, 2023, State Farm sent Stimson a 
letter stating that it hereby “demands an appraisal.”  See ECF 
No. 55-5.  State Farm stated that “it does not appear that we 
will be able to come to an agreement and thus wish to proceed 
with the appraisal process.”  Id. at 1.  The letter told Stimson 
that: “[p]ursuant to said terms of the policy, you are required 
to select a qualified, disinterested appraiser and are required 
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to notify us of such a selection within twenty (20) days of 
receipt of this letter.”  Id. at 3.  The letter included “the 
itemized specific areas of dispute as to the amount of the loss, 
breaking down separately each item being disputed to the best 
[sic] possible, based on the format the estimates are each 
written.”  Id. at 1-2.   The “Specific Areas of Dispute” were 
set forth as follows: 
 
ECF No. 55-5 at 2. 
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 Stimson paid for her own appraiser to represent her in the 
process.  However, State Farm’s appraiser had not agreed to an 
award by October of 2023.  At that time, Stimson requested an 
extension of the “suit against us” provision.  State Farm did 
not grant the extension. 
 Stimson filed suit on October 13, 2023. 
 On November 22, 2023, an appraisal award was issued by both 
appraisers.  See ECF No. 55-13.  The appraisers determined that 
the replacement cost value amounted to $940,272.63 and the 
actual cash value amounted to $755,990.65.  Id.  The award 
states: “This award includes all dwelling damage and is both 
final and binding.  This award includes all damage to the 
structure, including any and all third-party mitigation 
expenses.  The award is inclusive of all dwelling damages in 
totality.”  Id. 
 Stimson and her husband are living in their incomplete 
home, in the downstairs guestroom.  See ECF No. 55-16, at 3. 
D. Damages 
 Stimson hired a contractor to repair the fire damage to her 
home, and she states that she reduced the overall costs of 
repair by reducing the footprint of her home, including 
eliminating the dining room.  See ECF No. 55-16 at 2-3.  Stimson 
has attached invoices from her contractor, Blanc & Bailey, to 
her motion for summary judgment.  These invoices show that as of 
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May 31, 2024, she had already been invoiced for $1,068,147.38, 
with $169,618.02 of that amount being for repairs done for code 
compliance.  See ECF No. 55-4 at 3.  Stimson states that the 
total cost of repair to date is $1,331,770.79, though she has 
not attached additional invoices to corroborate this amount.  
See ECF No. 55-16 at ¶ 29. 
 Stimson also attached evidence relating to the damage to 
her personal property.  Sable Adjusters prepared a report of 
lost personal property, which valued the loss at $832,209.95.  
See ECF No. 55-12.  Then, Manzi Appraisers & Restoration 
prepared a separate report as to the value of antiques and 
specialty items (items not included in the Sable Adjusters 
report) and found that the estimated replacement value of these 
items was between $292,355 to $365,475.  See ECF No. 55-14. 
E. Payments 
 The amount and allocation of the insurance payments appears 
to be disputed by the parties.  Stimson attached a document 
titled “Calculations of Payments and Monies Owed” to her motion 
for summary judgment.  See ECF No. 55-11; see also ECF No. 73-7. 
According to Stimson’s calculation, State Farm has paid a total 
of $1,384,248.04.4  This amount was made up of $939,812.63 for 
 
4 In her Supplemental Pleading updated exhibit, Stimson lists the 
Coverage A loss paid as $939,998.59, which changes the total to 
$1,384,434. 
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Coverage A loss (house/structure); $311,169.16 for Coverage B 
loss (contents of the house); and $133,266.25 for Coverage C 
loss (loss of use). Id.  Stimson argues that she is entitled to 
$110,187.37 in addition under Coverage A (and at least another 
$460 under the appraisal alone), as well as: $345,080.84 for the 
contents of the house; $43,750.00 for debris removal; and 
$87,500.00 for ordinance/law compliance.5 
 State Farm asserts in its statement of facts that it paid 
Stimson a total of $942,000.00 under the Policy’s “Coverage A,”; 
that prior to the appraisal determination State Farm had 
advanced payments totaling $796,112.73 for the dwelling alone; 
and that Stimson received a total amount of payments of 
$1,387,851.90.  See ECF No. 56-1 at 1-2.  Stimson disputes all 
three of these amounts, and points out that the documents cited 
to by State Farm show different amounts than the amounts cited 
by State Farm (with variances between $460 and $3,357.86).  See 
ECF No. 60-1 at 6-7. 
F. Additional Facts Highlighted in the Supplemental Pleadings 
 
5 Stimson also claims that she is owed payments from State Farm 
for “landscaping” and “other structures,” but in her summary 
judgment motion she reserves these amounts/issues for trial.  
See ECF No. 55 at 8 n.4.  In her supplemental pleading she 
changes tack and asks the Court to award her the full amounts of 
coverage under the policy “so the entire case can be resolved.”  
ECF No. 73 at 14.  She also updates the amounts owed by State 
Farm to be a total of $596,082.25. 
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As described above, both parties filed for summary judgment 
before State Farm responded to Stimson’s discovery requests and 
produced individuals for depositions.  After State Farm produced 
the claims file to Stimson and after Stimson deposed Gino 
Radovic, both parties filed supplemental pleadings.  ECF Nos. 
72, 73.   Some additional facts were uncovered in the 
supplemental pleadings, and one particular fact is noteworthy: 
the parties directed the Court’s attention to a letter dated May 
18, 2023, sent by Sabel Adjusters on behalf of Stimson.  That 
letter responds to State Farm’s demand for an appraisal, and 
states: “This letter is to inform you that, on behalf of the 
insured… we accept State Farm’s demand for an appraisal.”  See 
ECF No. 73-5 at 1.  The letter also selects an appraiser.  Id.   
The additional facts contained in State Farm’s supplemental 
pleading are addressed in the sanctions section of this opinion. 
Analysis 
 The Court begins its analysis by addressing the outstanding 
discovery and sanctions issue and then moves on to the pending 
motions for summary judgment. 
I. State Farm Discovery Sanctions. 
As summarized above, this Court issued a discovery order 
that State Farm chose not to comply with.  At a hearing in 
December of 2025, the Court attempted to figure out why State 
Farm had ignored Stimson’s discovery requests, ignored Stimson’s 
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motion to compel discovery, and then ignored the Court’s 
discovery order.  Counsel for State Farm explained that he had 
left his former firm, and that although he had not intended to 
disobey a court order he had been ill-equipped to comply.  The 
Court set new deadlines.  After the hearing, State Farm did take 
some steps to comply.  Stimson was able to depose Gino Radovic 
on February 23, 2026, though she complained that he had not been 
shown a copy of the Notice of Deposition, had not brought any of 
the documents listed in the Schedule of Documents, and could not 
explain why State Farm had failed to provide certain discovery.  
ECF No. 71 at 6. On January 14, 2026, State Farm produced the 
entire claim file (10,467 pages).  ECF No. 71 at 5.  The next 
day, State Farm sent unsigned answers to Stimson’s first set of 
discovery requests, in which State Farm responded “Contained in 
claim file” to almost every interrogatory and request for 
production without further elaboration.  See ECF No. 71-9. 
Counsel for Stimson followed up and requested complete 
discovery responses.  ECF No. 71 at 6.  State Farm provided new 
responses on January 27.  ECF No. 71-12.  As Stimson points out, 
these responses included numerous objections even though under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure objections were long waived 
because the responses were untimely.6  Moreover, many of these 
 
6 Federal Rule 33 of Civil Procedure explicitly states that “the 
responding party must serve its answers and any objections 
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objections were impermissible boilerplate objections.  See, 
e.g., American Rock Salt Co., LLC v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 228 
F.R.D. 426, 432 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Moreover, generalized 
objections that discovery requests are vague, overly broad, or 
unduly burdensome are not acceptable, and will be overruled.”); 
Pegoraro v. Marrero, 281 F.R.D. 122, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(“‘[B]oilerplate objections that include unsubstantiated claims 
of undue burden, overbreadth and lack of relevancy,’ while 
producing ‘no documents and answer[ing] no interrogatories…are a 
paradigm of discovery abuse.’”).  In a few answers, State Farm 
merely again referred to the entirety of the claim file.7  ECF 
No. 71-12.  State Farm responds that its written responses, 
“submitted on January 26, 2026, identified claim participants 
and provided key figures and supporting materials, reflecting 
 
within 30 days after being served with the interrogatories” and 
that “the grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be 
stated with specificity.  Any ground not stated in a timely 
objection is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses 
the failure.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2), (4).  Rule 34 also 
requires responses within 30 days, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 
34(b)(2)(A), and though it does not have a specific waiver 
provision courts read one in.  See, e.g., Horace Mann Ins. Co. 
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 238 F.R.D. 536, 538 (D. Conn. 2006) 
(explaining courts apply Rule 33’s waiver language to Rule 34 
and citing cases); Land Ocean Logistics, Inc. v. Aqua Gulf 
Corp., 181 F.R.D. 229, 236-37 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Courts have held 
that a failure to respond or object to a [Rule 34] discovery 
request in a timely manner waives any objection which may have 
been available.”).   
7 Stimson also argues that the Interrogatories were not properly 
signed.  ECF No. 71 at 6. 
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substantive engagement rather than evasion.”  ECF No. 78 at 2.  
State Farm does acknowledge a “delay in its responses.”  Id. 
On March 5th, Stimson filed a motion for sanctions against 
State Farm, citing to the continued discovery noncompliance.  
ECF No. 71.  Stimson asks the Court to “enter a default judgment 
against State Farm on all claims as a sanction commensurate with 
the scope and persistence of its noncompliance.”  ECF No. 71 at 
9 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vi)).  In the meantime, 
State Farm filed a supplemental pleading (which the Court had 
permitted the parties to do).  State Farm’s pleading is 477 
pages long, because State Farm chose not to file the exhibits 
separately.  ECF No. 72.  For the most part, State Farm—where it 
chooses to provide citations--refers generally to the exhibits, 
rather than identifying specific page numbers to assist the 
Court.8  On March 11th, State Farm filed an additional 301 pages 
 
8 For example, State Farm cites to its Exhibit 65 for the 
proposition that “[t]he claim file further substantiates State 
Farm’s valuation method with detailed, line-by-line inventories 
of all claimed personal property” because it has “inventories, 
often prepared in conjunction with the public adjuster, list 
each item’s description, room, quantity, replacement cost, 
estimated age, condition, applicable sales tax, depreciation 
rate and amount, actual cash value, and categories for 
‘estimate’, ‘documentation’, and ‘per invoice’ payments.”  ECF 
No. 72 at 15.  Yet Exhibit 65 is a 117-page “change report” with 
the following categories: description, qty, remove (all set at 
“0.00”), replace, “O&P” (all set at “0.00”) and “total.”  See 
ECF No. 72 at pp 144-261.  State Farm claims that “only the ACV 
will be paid” until after repair or replacement, ECF No. 72 at 
18, yet it provides an exhibit that it claims shows actual cash 
value but that only has a category for “replace.”  Moreover, as 
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of a deposition with the Court, and on March 17th, State Farm 
again filed the same 301 pages with a cover page.  ECF Nos. 74, 
75. 
On March 27, State Farm filed responses to Stimson’s Motion 
for Sanctions and Motion to Exclude.  ECF Nos. 77, 78.  State 
Farm argues that Stimson did not show an intentional nor bad 
faith violation of the court order, nor willful noncompliance or 
prejudice warranting sanctions.  ECF No. 78 at 5.  State Farm 
did not explain the delay in its responses nor did State Farm 
explain why it believes “substantive engagement” rather than 
full compliance would be sufficient to cure its previous 
defiance of this Court’s order.   
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A), failure 
to obey an order to provide discovery may be sanctioned with 
further just orders, including “directing that the matters 
embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as 
established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party 
claims;” or “prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting 
 
Stimson points out, State Farm makes no attempt to further 
authenticate, explain, introduce, or summarize this exhibit—it 
merely cites to it.  State Farm responds that Rule 56 “allows 
reliance on materials that could be presented in admissible form 
at trial.”  ECF No. 77 at 2; see also Smith v. City of New York, 
697 Fed. Appx. 88 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[S]o long as the evidence in 
question will be presented in admissible form at trial, it may 
be considered on summary judgment.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing 
designated matters in evidence;” or “striking pleadings in whole 
or in part;” or even “dismissing the action or proceeding in 
whole or in part.”  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).  The 
district court has wide discretion when imposing sanctions under 
Rule 37, and its discretion may be evaluated on appeal with 
factors including the “willfulness of the non-compliant party or 
the reason for noncompliance;” the “efficacy of lesser 
sanctions”; the “duration of the period of noncompliance;” and 
“whether the noncompliant party has been warned of the 
consequences of noncompliance.”  World Wide Polymers, Inc. v. 
Shinkong Synthetic Fibers Corp., 694 F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 
2012).  Where a party seeks to frustrate the design of the 
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “by 
disobeying discovery orders, thereby preventing disclosure of 
facts essential to an adjudication on the merits, severe 
sanctions are appropriate.”  Daval Steel Products, Div. of 
Francosteel Corp. v. M/V Fakredine, 951 F.2d 1357, 1365 (2d Cir. 
1991). 
In this case, Stimson first noticed the deposition in 
December of 2024, and sent discovery requests shortly 
thereafter.  State Farm did not schedule the deposition, and did 
not respond to the discovery.  See ECF No. 54.  Stimson moved to 
compel in April of 2025. State Farm did not respond, and this 
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Court granted that motion on June 25, 2025, ordering State Farm 
to provide responses to the discovery within 14 days.  See ECF 
No. 54 at 2.   
When Stimson filed for summary judgment in mid-July, State 
Farm had apparently taken no steps to comply with this Court’s 
order.  Moreover, State Farm filed its own motion without 
acknowledging, or explaining, its defiance of the rules of 
discovery or the orders of this Court.  In its motion, State 
Farm wrote that despite “nearly two (2) years of litigation, the 
Plaintiff has uncovered no admissible evidence to support any of 
her counts alleged in the Complaint.”  See ECF No. 52-2.  Yet 
State Farm did not mention its apparent refusal to participate 
in discovery.   
At the hearing held by the Court in December, counsel for 
State Farm explained that he had left his former firm, and that 
although he had not intended to disobey a court order, he had 
been ill-equipped to comply.  The Court set new deadlines.  
State Farm has since produced its entire claims file to Stimson, 
and has provided access to Gino Radovic in order for his 
deposition to be taken.  However, it has been over a year since 
Stimson first sent out her first set of discovery responses.  In 
that time, State Farm breezed past two Court-imposed deadlines, 
and it is not clear—still—that State Farm has made a good faith 
effort to answer her requests.   
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State Farm has been given chance after chance to explain to 
this Court why its failure to participate in discovery was 
anything but willful, and has failed to do so.  In its 
supplemental pleading, State Farm merely stated that it had 
“provided Plaintiff with the entire claim file on January 14, 
2026.”  ECF No. 72 at 1.  In its response to Stimson’s Motion 
for Sanctions, it acknowledged—without explaining—a delay.  ECF 
No. 78 at 2.  It stated that its late responses “reflect[] 
substantive engagement.”  Id. 
The Court finds that State Farm has ignored not only the 
discovery process in this case, but also this Court’s direct and 
explicit orders on discovery.  State Farm has not taken 
advantage of either its initial opportunity to respond to 
Stimson’s motions, or its subsequent opportunities to come into 
full compliance after the Court issued an order and held a 
hearing.  State Farm had every opportunity not only to comply 
with discovery, but also to explain to this Court its reason for 
failing to do so.  Instead, State Farm has ignored Stimson, this 
Court, and its discovery obligations.  This behavior is 
improper.   
As a sanction for State Farm’s continued noncompliance, the 
Court is striking State Farm’s supplemental brief in support of 
its motion for summary judgment.  ECF No. 72.  The Court will 
not consider the new arguments made, or exhibits filed with, the 
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supplemental pleading.  The Court issues this sanction as a 
discovery sanction for continued noncompliance; however, the 
Court also notes that—even were the Court to have considered the 
pleading—it is not the role of a Court to “hunt[] through 
voluminous records without guidance from the parties.”  N.Y. 
State Teamsters Conf. Pension & Ret. Fund v. Express Servs., 
Inc., 426 F.3d 640, 649 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
This sanction deals with State Farm’s noncompliance at the 
summary judgment stage.  For the purposes of trial, the Court 
invites Stimson and State Farm to submit further briefing on 
what evidence State Farm should be precluded from relying upon.  
The Court will consider precluding all evidence that State Farm 
should have identified, but did not, in its discovery responses.  
Some types of evidence, such as experts or expert reports, may 
not have been disclosed by State Farm and likely cannot be 
identified this late in the proceedings. 
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) provides that when a party fails to obey a 
discovery order, “[i]nstead of or in addition to [granting 
relief available under Rule 37(b)(2)(A)], the court must order 
the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both 
to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, 
caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially 
justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses 
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unjust.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).  State Farm has not 
provided the Court with any reason for its noncompliance that 
would lead the Court to determine that State Farm’s failure was 
justified, or that an award of expenses would be unjust.  
Accordingly, within 30 days of this motion, Stimson’s counsel 
may serve and file an affidavit detailing the reasonable costs 
and attorney’s fees incurred in drafting and filing Stimson’s 
motion to sanction State Farm (ECF No. 71).  Within fourteen 
days of the filing of the affidavit, State Farm shall serve and 
file its objection, if any, to the costs and fees request. 
II. Cross Motions for Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a).  A genuine dispute exists where “the evidence is 
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party,” while a fact is material if it “might affect 
the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”  Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  On a motion for 
summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be 
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his 
favor.”  Id. at 255. 
The moving party always “bears the initial responsibility 
of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and 
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identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). “Once the moving party demonstrates that there are no 
genuine issues of material fact, the nonmoving party must come 
forth with evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to 
find in [its] favor.” Spinelli City of New York, 579 F.3d 160, 
166 (2d Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus, a nonmoving party can 
defeat a summary judgment motion only by coming forward with 
evidence that would be sufficient, if all reasonable inferences 
were drawn in [its] favor, to establish the existence of [an] 
element at trial.” Id. at 166-67 (alterations in original) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
In cases involving cross-motions for summary judgment, “the 
court must evaluate each party’s motion on its own merits, 
taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences 
against the party whose motion is under consideration.”  Coutard 
v. Mun. Credit Union, 848 F.3d 102, 114 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting 
Schwabenbauer v. Bd. of Educ., 667 F.2d 305, 314 (2d Cir. 
1981)).  Where a party has not responded to another party’s 
motion for summary judgment, Rule 56 still requires the Court to 
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examine and verify that the submission suffices to support an 
entry of judgment.  Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 BEARGRAM Co., 
373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Jackson v. Fed. 
Express, 766 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Rule 56 does not 
allow district courts to automatically grant summary judgment on 
a claim simply because the summary judgment motion, or relevant 
part, is unopposed.”).  However, “a partial response arguing 
that summary judgment should be denied as to some claims while 
not mentioning others may may be deemed an abandonment of the 
unmentioned claims.”  Jackson, 766 F.3d at 195. 
 This opinion goes through each count that the parties have 
moved for summary judgment upon, addressing each motion in turn. 
“Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity 
apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.”  
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 
(1996). Accordingly, Vermont law governs the substantive claims.  
See British Int’l Ins. Co. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A., 342 
F.3d 78, 81 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying law of forum state in 
diversity case in absence of disagreement, without conducting 
choice of law analysis).   
A. Breach of Contract 
To recover damages for breach of contract in Vermont, a 
party must show the existence of a contract, material breach of 
a contractual duty, and damages.  See Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, 
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Inc. v. Coronet Priscilla Ice Cream Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1206, 
1212 (D. Vt. 1996) (existence of contract and breach of 
contractual duty); Foti Fuels, Inc. v. Kurrle Corp., 2013 VT 
111, ¶ 34 n.4 (recovery on the basis of damages).  
“Interpretation of an insurance policy, like other contracts, 
involves the resolution of a question of law” and interpretation 
begins with giving “effect to the plain meaning of the terms of 
the policy if the meaning is unambiguous.”  Town of Ira v. Vt. 
League of Cities and Towns, 2014 VT 115, ¶ 5.  Where there is 
ambiguity, Vermont courts construe policy language “in favor of 
the insured.”  Id. 
1. Breach of Contract for Coverage A (and Add-Ons) 
State Farm has moved for summary judgment on all claims in 
this case, including the breach of contract claim.  See ECF No. 
56-2 at 3-4.  State Farm argues that there is no dispute about a 
contractual breach, because State Farm participated in an 
appraisal and paid a total of “approximately $942,000.00” under 
Coverage A for Ms. Stimson’s dwelling.  See id. at 3.  Drawing 
all reasonable inferences for Stimson, neither of these facts 
warrant summary judgment for State Farm.   
State Farm argues that there was no contractual breach 
where an appraisal was ongoing at the time that Stimson filed 
suit in this case.  To support its position, State Farm quotes 
the insurance policy as stating: “Appraisal. If you and we fail 
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to agree upon the amount of loss, the amount of loss will be set 
by appraisal.”  ECF No. 56-2 at 3.  In fact, the full policy 
reads: “If you and we fail to agree on the amount of loss, the 
amount of loss will be set by appraisal if you and we agree to 
appraisal.  Only you or we may request and agree to appraisal.  
An agreement for appraisal must be in writing.”  ECF No. 55-1 at 
24 (bold and italic emphasis in original; underline emphasis 
added).  The plain language of the policy clearly conditions the 
appraisal setting the amount of loss upon agreement by both 
parties to the appraisal—and, in fact, upon that agreement being 
made in writing.  Stimson states that State Farm “demanded” that 
she participate in an appraisal (ECF No. 55-16 at 3).  Insurance 
policies can give either party the right to demand an appraisal 
in the event of disagreement.  See, e.g., Milligan v. CCC Info. 
Servs. Inc., 920 F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2019) (insurance policy 
stated: “If we and the insured do not agree on the amount of 
loss, either may, within 60 days after proof of loss is filed, 
demand an appraisal of the loss.”); Duane Reade, Inc. v. St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 600 F.3d 190, 193 n.3 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(explaining that policy allows “either party” to “demand 
appraisal by two appraisers and an umpire” if they cannot agree 
on the amount of loss).  This policy does not.  This policy 
requires written agreement.   
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After the Court expressed particular interest in whether 
there was a written agreement in the December hearing, the 
parties directed the Court’s attention to a letter sent from 
Sabel Adjusters, LLC, on behalf of Stimson, on May 18, 2023.  
That letter responds to State Farm’s demand for an appraisal, 
and states: “This letter is to inform you that, on behalf of the 
insured… we accept State Farm’s demand for an appraisal.”  See 
ECF No. 73-5 at 1.  The letter also selects an appraiser.  Id.  
This letter was sent in response to State Farm’s demand letter, 
which on the one hand was a demand that told Stimson she was 
“required” to select an appraiser, yet on the other hand 
directly quoted the appraisal language of the policy.   
With that said, whether or not Stimson’s response 
constituted an agreement, Stimson has presented evidence that 
State Farm’s appraiser delayed the appraisal for so long that 
Stimson filed this suit and withdrew from the appraisal.  See, 
e.g., ECF No. 55-7 (email from Stimson in October of 2023, 
stating that State Farm’s appraiser “has now stopped returning 
phone calls, and dragged his feet for four months.”).  It is 
undisputed that she filed suit in October of 2023, while the 
appraisal award was not handed down until November of 2023.  The 
policy allowed Stimson to file suit until an award had been 
issued. See ECF No. 55-1 at 25 (“Once an appraisal award has 
been determined, you will not be permitted to file suit against 
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us.”).9  Moreover, though State Farm argues that it has paid the 
amount of the appraisal, the policy states that there shall be a 
“written report of agreement” signed by the appraisers, and that 
“in all instances the written report of agreement will be 
itemized and state separately the actual cash value, replacement 
cost, and, if applicable, the market value of each item in 
dispute.”  ECF No. 55-1 at 24.  Yet here, the specific items in 
dispute—of which there were 27 in State Farm’s initial demand 
for appraisal—were all mushed together into an appraisal award 
that included only one value that purported to include “all 
dwelling damages in totality.”  This failure to follow the terms 
of the policy in completing the appraisal may be why State Farm 
and Stimson disagree on what items were covered by the 
appraisal, but it does not mean—as State Farm argues—that there 
was no breach of contract.  
Finally, Stimson has presented evidence that State Farm has 
not even paid for the full appraisal amount (and that State Farm 
is instead $460 short).  Tellingly, State Farm only argues in 
 
9 Of note, this policy is not a policy in which appraisal is a 
“condition precedent” to suit.  First, because the express terms 
of the policy state the opposite: that if an award is issued, at 
that time suit may no longer be filed.  ECF No. 55-1 at 25 
(“Once an appraisal award has been determined, you will not be 
permitted to file suit against us.”).  Second, because there is 
no other language that would indicate appraisal is a condition 
precedent to suit.  See, e.g., C
OUCH ON INSURANCE § 210:49 
Particular policy language as establishing precondition (3d ed. 
2025). 
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its motion that it has paid an “approximate” total under the 
policy, and that it has not breached the contract.  State Farm 
does not argue that it has obtained any kind of waiver from 
Stimson.  In Vermont, however, it is not enough for the insurer 
to pay amounts on a claim and unilaterally claim that payments 
made satisfy the amount owed.  As the Vermont Supreme Court 
stated in a vehicle repair case: 
To whatever extent the trial court concluded that 
defendant had fully satisfied its contractual 
obligation under the policy because defendant made 
payments on the collision claims in some amount, this 
was error.  Whether the amounts paid by defendant 
satisfied defendant’s obligation to its insured was 
the central disputed issue here.  And it is undisputed 
that defendant did not obtain a release of claim or 
otherwise satisfy the elements of a complete defense 
foreclosing the insureds, and thus plaintiff’s, 
ability to contest the sufficiency of the payments. 
Parker’s Classic Auto Works, Ltd. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Company, 2019 VT 46, ¶ 11.  Whether State Farm has satisfied its 
contractual obligation under the policy is at issue here: State 
Farm cannot win summary judgment by arguing that it has paid 
some amount.  Drawing all inferences for Stimson, the Court must 
deny State Farm’s motion for summary judgment on this count. 
Turning to Stimson’s motion for summary judgment under 
Coverage A, the Court also finds that there are disputed 
material facts for this breach of contract claim.  Though this 
Court does not agree with State Farm’s argument that Stimson was 
bound by the appraisal amount as to the entirety of Coverage A, 
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ultimately—drawing all inferences in favor of State Farm—the 
Court cannot say that Stimson has presented enough evidence to 
be entitled to summary judgment on the full amount of her policy 
limit for Coverage A.  Stimson has attached invoices saying that 
as of May 31, 2024, she had already been invoiced for 
$1,068,147.38, with $169,618.02 of that amount being for repairs 
done for code compliance.  See ECF No. 55-4 at 3.  She has not 
clearly shown that she is entitled to the full remainder of her 
policy limit for Coverage A and its subsets, as she argues in 
her supplemental memorandum, and indeed she now asks for summary 
judgment upon some items—such as landscaping—that were not 
included in her initial partial motion for summary judgment and 
that she admits she has not yet completed the landscaping for.  
See, e.g., ECF No. 73 at 14 (asking the Court to award Stimson 
the full $52,500 for landscaping without attaching receipts for 
landscaping: “Though Ms. Stimson has spent some money on trees, 
shrubs and landscaping, she is unable to do all the landscaping 
until the house is repaired and she has received the money to 
restore the landscape.”).   
In sum, the Court denies both motions for summary judgment 
as they relate to the breach of contract claim under Coverage A.  
However, the Court has found that the appraisal agreement was 
not binding upon the parties because it did not properly list 
out the disputed items of disagreement.  With this question of 
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law taken care of, the parties may muster their remaining 
evidence as to Coverage A and present it at trial. 
2. Breach of Contract for Coverage B  
As for the breach of contract claim for Coverage B 
(coverage for personal property within the house), State Farm 
devoted one sentence to it: “Plaintiff Has Produced No Evidence 
that State Farm Had No Reasonable Basis for Disputing Amounts 
Sought By Plaintiff Under the Policy Relating to Personal 
Property”.  ECF No. 56-2 at 4.  The Court denies State Farm’s 
motion for summary judgment as it is based upon this cursory 
statement. 
Turning to Stimson’s motion for summary judgment on the 
breach of contract claim for Coverage B, she provided the 
following evidence in support of her claim: (1) a report of lost 
personal property completed by Sable Adjusters, valuing the loss 
at $832,209.95;
10 and (2) a separate report as to the value of 
antiques and specialty items prepared by Manzi Appraisers & 
Restoration, estimating the replacement value of these items as 
between $292,355 and $365,475.  ECF Nos. 55-12, 55-14. Stimson 
also provided an affidavit explaining the process of using Sabel 
Adjusters and Manzi Appraisers, and stating that she agreed that 
the values of the personal property loss were accurate.  ECF No. 
 
10 The report lists the RCV as $832,209.95 and the ACV as 
$881,592.10.  ECF No. 55-12 at 105. 
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55-16 at 6.  And she explained that her policy limit is capped 
at $656,250).  ECF No. 55-2 at 4-5. 
 State Farm may value the personal property at $489,072.77.  
At least, there was a “Change Report” in the claims file that 
both Stimson and State Farm have referred to.  ECF No. 73-10.  
However, as mentioned above, this report provides minimal 
information and it has not been explained to the Court.   
The Court finds that, at this stage, there are still 
genuine issues of material facts such that it cannot grant 
summary judgment to Stimson at this stage.  She may present her 
valuations at trial to answer questions about the valuation of 
her personal property and the categories/items of property that 
were included in the appraisals, and at that time she may also 
address the questions around how much State Farm has paid under 
Coverage B and how much is left to be paid. 
3. Bad Faith 
Stimson pled a separate count for “good faith and fair 
dealing” and “bad faith” in her complaint.  See ECF No. 6 at 2-
3.  In her motion for summary judgment, however, she briefed and 
analyzed good faith in conjunction with her breach of contract 
briefing, and she separately addresses bad faith.  She concludes 
by asking the Court for summary judgment on her “breach of 
contract, bad faith” and VCPA claims.  See ECF No. 55 at 25.   
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Stimson only mentions the “covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing” in conjunction with her breach of contract briefing, 
and does not separately move for summary judgment on this Count.  
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every 
contract.  Carmichael v. Adirondack Bottled Gas Corp. of Vt., 
161 Vt. 200, 208 (1993). “There is no exemption for insurance 
policies.” Shulman v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 767 F. Supp. 
3d 116, 120 (D. Vt. 2024). In some ways, the covenant provides a 
broader cause of action because breach of the underlying 
contract is not necessary to show that the covenant has been 
breached; the covenant also covers actions taken in terminating 
or winding up a contract as well as contract enforcement.  See 
Tanzer v. MyWebGrocer, Inc., 2018 VT 124, ¶¶32-33.  However, the 
Vermont Supreme Court has been clear that it “will not recognize 
a separate cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing when the plaintiff also pleads a 
breach of contract based upon the same conduct.”  Id. “To the 
extent that” a party’s good faith and fair dealing claim is 
duplicative of its breach-of-contract claim, “it cannot be 
sustained as a matter of law.”  Beldock v. VWSD, LLC, 2023 VT 
35, ¶53; see also Shulman, 767 F. Supp. 3d at 120 (good faith 
and fair dealing covenant “does not replace express contract 
provisions, and when those appear in the parties’ contract, a 
breach is governed by conventional principles of contract law” 
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whereas “[i]t is disputes not governed by the terms of the 
contract that may give rise to a claim of breach of the 
covenant.”).  Accordingly, this Court will only analyze the 
separate conduct that Stimson pled under her “bad faith” 
section.   
“For an insured to establish a claim of bad faith against 
its insurer it ‘must show that (1) the insurer had no reasonable 
basis to deny the insured the benefits of the policy, and (2) 
the company knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that it had 
no reasonable basis for denying the insured’s claim.’”  Fine 
Paints of Eur., Inc. v. Acadia Ins. Co., No. 2:08-cv-81, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24188, 2009 WL 819466, *20 (D. Vt. Mar. 24, 
2009) (quoting Peerless Ins. Co. v. Frederick, 177 Vt. 441 (Vt. 
2004).  A “fairly debatable” claim is not sufficient for a bad 
faith claim.  Bushey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 164 Vt. 399, 403 (Vt. 
1995). 
Stimson argues that there are two reasons State Farm acted 
in bad faith.  First, State Farm demanded that Stimson agree to 
go forward with the appraisal process, even though the policy 
specifically stated that an appraisal may only happen if the 
parties both agree to engage in the appraisal.  Drawing all 
inferences for State Farm, this conduct is not enough for 
summary judgment.  Though the Court holds that Stimson is not 
ultimately legally bound by the appraisal, it does not follow 
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that sending a letter with the word “demand” to Stimson, and 
then having her participate in the appraisal process, rises to 
the level of “knowing or reckless conduct required for a finding 
of bad faith.”  Murphy v. Patriot Ins. Co., 2014 VT 96, ¶ 24.  
Second, Stimson argues that State Farm refused to pay, 
without any basis for this refusal, her expenses incurred for 
building ordinance or law compliance, debris removal, and the 
remaining balance of her personal property.  As with her Vermont 
Consumer Protection Act claim, it may be that Stimson’s bad 
faith allegation extends beyond the mere breach of contract 
claim because Stimson states that State Farm used the appraisal 
process to run out the clock and prevent her from filing suit to 
enforce her rights under the contract—all while State Farm was 
aware that she was in a vulnerable position (having been 
diagnosed with cancer).  Drawing all inferences for State Farm, 
however, the Court cannot say that Stimson has demonstrated that 
there is no genuine dispute of material facts on this claim at 
this stage.  Stimson has not developed the factual record enough 
at this time for the Court to be able to conclude that her bad 
faith claim extends beyond a claim that was fairly debatable. 
B. Vermont’s Consumer Protection Act 
 In Vermont, a coverage dispute is insufficient to show 
consumer fraud.  To recover under the Consumer Fraud Act: “(1) 
there must be a representation, practice, or omission likely to 
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mislead the consumer; (2) the consumer must be interpreting the 
message reasonably under the circumstances; and (3) the 
misleading effects must be material, that is, likely to affect 
the consumer’s conduct or decision with regard to a product.”  
Greene v. Stevens Gas Serv., 177 Vt. 90 (Vt. 2004) (quoting 
Peabody v. P.J.’s Auto Vill., Inc., 153 Vt. 55 (Vt. 1989)).  Yet 
“a mere coverage dispute is insufficient to show consumer 
fraud.”  Id.   
 Here, Stimson has shown evidence of serious facts 
surrounding the denial of her coverage. She has claimed that 
State Farm “kept promising” her that it was “there for her,” and 
she has stated that had she “known that State Farm would not 
honor its commitments to its policy, then she would have looked 
to other insurance companies.”  See ECF No. 55 at 23-24.  
Stimson claims that “[a]n insurance company failing to timely 
pay claims is something that clearly offends the public, since 
that is the reason people buy insurance.”  See ECF No. 60 at 16.  
This is not enough, however, for her to win on summary judgment, 
because “[u]nder that logic, any denial of coverage becomes 
consumer fraud.”  Fine Paints of Eur., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 24188, at *20-21. 
 Turning to State Farm’s motion, the Court cannot grant that 
either.  Drawing all factual inferences for Stimson, she has 
evidence that would tend to show that State Farm sold her plans 
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that it has since not only denied her coverage of, but also 
point-blank ignored.  This case is thus distinguishable from 
Mooers v. Middlebury Coll., No. 2:20-cv-00144, 2021 WL 4225659 
(D. Vt. Sept. 16, 2021), wherein Middlebury’s statements 
regarding its educational services could not reasonably be 
interpreted to create an expectation “that those on-campus 
services would continue, uninterrupted and unchanged, in the 
midst of a pandemic.”  Id. at *11.  The Court denies both 
summary judgment motions on this claim. 
Conclusion 
 For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS the 
following: 
• The Court sanctions State Farm by striking its supplemental 
pleading (ECF No. 72).  The parties may submit additional 
briefing addressing whether State Farm should also be 
sanctioned at the trial stage by the preclusion of certain 
evidence. 
• The Court grants Stimson reasonable costs and attorney’s 
fees incurred in drafting and filing Stimson’s motion to 
sanction State Farm (ECF No. 71). Accordingly, within 30 
days of this opinion, Stimson’s counsel may serve and file 
an affidavit detailing the reasonable costs and attorney’s 
fees, and within fourteen days of the filing of the
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• affidavit, State Farm shall serve and file its objection, 
if any, to the costs and fees request. 
• The Court DENIES Stimson’s summary judgment motion (ECF No. 
55). 
• The Court DENIES State Farm’s summary judgment motion (ECF 
No. 56). 
• Having fashioned its own sanctions regarding State Farm, 
the Court DENIES as moot Stimson’s pending motions 
regarding sanctions and to exclude State Farm’s 
supplemental memorandum.  Those motions are denied without 
prejudice.  ECF Nos. 71, 76. 
• The Court sets a pretrial conference date of June 8th, 
2026, at 11:30 a.m. 
• The Court sets a jury selection date for trial of August 
31, 2026, at 9:30 a.m. 
 
DATED at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this 31
st 
day of March 2026. 
 
      /s/ William K. Sessions III 
      Hon. William K. Sessions III 
      U.S. District Court Judge 
 
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