govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_24-cv-02645-1

1 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
CHU YOUNG YI, 
GDC No. 776776, 
Yi, 
 
Civil Action No.  
1:24-cv-02645-SDG v.  
MITCHELL JOHNSTON, 
Defendant. 
 
 
OPINION AND ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on United States Magistrate Judge Anna W. 
Howard’s Final Report and Recommendation (R&R) [ECF 30] that Defendant  
Mitchell Johnston’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF 25] be granted. Plaintiff Chu Young 
Yi objects to the R&R [ECF 35]. Also pending is Yi’s Motion for Status [ECF 34] in 
which he sought an update on his case. After careful consideration of the record 
as well as Yi ’s objections, the Court OVERRULES  the objections , ADOPTS the 
R&R, and GRANTS Johnston’s M otion to D ismiss. Yi’s Motion for S tatus is 
DENIED as moot.  
I. BACKGROUND 
On May 30, 2024, Yi signed his pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint 
alleging constitutional violations that occurred on June 2, 2022 during Yi’s intake 
into the Gwinnett County Jail. 1 That complaint named the Gwinnett County 
 
1  ECF 1. 
Case 1:24-cv-02645-SDG     Document 38     Filed 03/31/26     Page 1 of 10
2 
Sheriff Keybo Taylor, Health Services Administrator Laurente E. Smink, and 
Correct Health as defendants. 2 After screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, 
United States Magistrate Judge J. Clay Fuller found that Yi failed to state a claim 
against any of the named defendants but gave Yi an opportunity to amend his 
complaint to name the individuals he alleges actually violated his constitutional 
rights.
3 In his first amended complaint (FAC), received by the Court on August 8, 
2024, Yi named “Officer Johnson” as the only defendant and alleged that the officer 
used excessive force against him on June 2, 2022. 4 After conducting the required 
frivolity screening, th e Court allowed Yi’s claims against “Officer Johnson ” to 
proceed.5 On December 5, 2024, Yi alerted the Court that he had learned that the 
correct name of the officer he intended to sue is “M. Johnston.”6 Ultimately, Officer 
Mitchell Johnston was identified, waived service , and filed a Motion to Dismiss, 
arguing that the claims against him are barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations.
7  
 
2  Id. 
3  ECF 3, at 4, 6–7. 
4  ECF 5, at 4. 
5  ECF 7; ECF 9. 
6  ECF 13. 
7  ECF 25. 
Case 1:24-cv-02645-SDG     Document 38     Filed 03/31/26     Page 2 of 10
3 
Judge Howard’s R&R found that the statute of limitations expired on June 
2, 2024, three days after Yi signed his complaint. 8 Judge Howard further found 
that the amended complaint that named “Officer Johnson,” signed on July 30, 
2024, did not relate back to the date of the original complaint under either O.C.G.A. 
§ 9-11-15(c) or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). 9 Critically, Judge Howard 
determined that Johnston, the newly -named defendant, did not receive actual 
notice of this action before the statute of limitations expired and that there was no 
showing that Johnston knew or should have known that , but for a mistake 
concerning identity, the original action would have been brought against him. 10 
Finally, Judge Howard pointed out that Yi failed to allege any grounds for tolling 
the statute of limitations.11 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
A district judge has a duty to conduct a “careful and complete” review of an 
R&R. Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732, 732 (11th Cir. 1982). The party 
challenging a R&R must file written objections that specifically identify the 
 
8  ECF 30, at 7; see Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1182 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to 
§ 1983 suits filed in Georgia.).  
9  ECF 30, at 7. 
10  Id. at 7–10. 
11  Id. at 11. 
Case 1:24-cv-02645-SDG     Document 38     Filed 03/31/26     Page 3 of 10
4 
portions of the proposed findings and recommendations to which an objection is 
made and must assert a specific basis for the objection. United States v. Schultz, 565 
F.3d 1353, 1361 (11th Cir. 2009).  The Court reviews any portion of a R&R that is 
the subject of a proper objection on a de novo basis. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In contrast, 
the Court need only review those portions of a R&R to which no objection is made 
for clear error.  Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006). 
“Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be considered by the district 
court.” Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988). After conducting its 
review, the Court retains broad discretion to accept, reject, or modify a magistrate 
judge’s proposed findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Williams, 
557 F.3d at 1290–92. 
When a litigant chooses to proceed pro se, his pleading is “held to less 
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers ” and must be 
“liberally construed. ” Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation and 
quotation omitted); see also Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006), 
abrogated in part on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010). But even a 
pro se plaintiff must comply with the threshold requirements of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding 
that “once a pro se IFP litigant is in court, he is subject to the relevant law and rules 
of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ”). The leniency the Court 
Case 1:24-cv-02645-SDG     Document 38     Filed 03/31/26     Page 4 of 10
5 
must apply does not permit it “to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro 
se litigant] in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 
F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Randall v. 
Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Yi raises four objections to the R&R, though undersigned interprets one of 
the objections to be duplicative of two others. As such, undersigned considers Yi 
to be raising three objections, namely that: (1) the R&R failed to consider that Judge 
Fuller gave Yi an opportunity to amend his complaint after Judge Fuller 
determined that Yi failed to state a claim against a party that could be sued; (2) the 
R&R misapplied Rule 15(c)’s knowledge requirement in not finding that Johnston 
knew or should have known that he was the intended defendant; and (4) the R&R 
erred in not applying equitable tolling.12  
A. The R&R consider ed that Yi was granted leave to amend and 
correctly concluded that it does not affect the statute of limitations. 
While Yi contends that the R&R did not consider that Judge Fuller gave Yi 
an opportunity to amend, this contention is inaccurate. Judge Howard’s R&R  
 
12  ECF 35, at 4–9. In Yi’s third objection, he argues that the date he signed the 
original complaint is controlling under equitable principles because Gwinnett 
County was put on notice of the nature of his claims and the time period in 
which they accrued. Id. at 7–8. Undersigned considers this objection to be a 
combination of his second and fourth objections relating to the R&R’s 
application of Rule 15(c) and equitable tolling. 
Case 1:24-cv-02645-SDG     Document 38     Filed 03/31/26     Page 5 of 10
6 
provided a detailed timeline of the procedural history of this case, including Judge 
Fuller’s order dismissing the claims raised against the named defendants and 
granting Yi an opportunity to amend his complaint to name the individuals who 
actually violated his rights.13 As filed, his original complaint failed to state a claim 
for relief because the defendants he named are not liable for the alleged unlawful 
conduct of the actual wrongdoer. In deference to Yi’s pro se status, Judge Fuller 
allowed him an opportunity to amend, informing him that he is required to name 
the individuals he contends violated his rights. However, this holding did not 
extend the statute of limitations as to those unnamed defendants. The Court is still 
bound to follow the statute of limitations unless equitable tolling applies or the 
claims against Johnston properly relate back to the original complaint. See Fed. R. 
Civ P. 15(c); O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c). See also Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 
F.3d 958, 971 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Baldwin Cty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 
147, 152 (1984)) (“Procedural requirements established by Congress for gaining 
access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague 
sympathy for particular litigants.”). 
 
13  ECF 30, at 1–4. 
Case 1:24-cv-02645-SDG     Document 38     Filed 03/31/26     Page 6 of 10
7 
B. The R&R did not err in its application of Rule 15(c)’s knowledge 
requirement. 
The R&R correctly applied Rule 15(c) and O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c) to determine 
that the FAC does not relate back to the date that the original complaint was filed. 
As explained in the R&R, the second and third requirements of the relates -back 
doctrine require the new defendant to have received sufficient notice of the action 
within the limitations period and to have known (or for the court to find he should 
have known) that, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity, the 
action would have been brought against him. See  O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c);  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 15(c); Wallick v. Lamb, 289 Ga. App. 25, 26 (2007).  Judge Howard correctly 
noted that under the facts of this case, there is nothing to indicate that Johnston 
received any notice of the original complaint within the limitations period. 14 In 
fact, there is nothing to indicate that the originally-named defendants or anyone 
affiliated with the Gwinnett County Jail had actual knowledge of the action before 
the limitations period expired. This is because Yi signed the original complaint just 
three days before the statute of limitations expired, and it was postmarked and 
received by the Court after  the limitations period expired.
15 To the extent that Yi 
argues Johnston should have known that action would have been brought against 
 
14  Id. at 8–10. 
15  Id. at 8–9. 
Case 1:24-cv-02645-SDG     Document 38     Filed 03/31/26     Page 7 of 10
8 
him because Johnston is the person who violated Yi’s rights, this contention 
misunderstands the law. 16 “Knowledge of the underlying events that establish a 
claim is not the equivalent to knowledge of the action.” Bloom v. Alvereze, 498 F. 
App’x 867, 873 (11th Cir. 2012). Thus, Judge Howard was correct in finding that Yi 
could not establish that the amended complaint naming “Officer Johnson” related 
back to the date of the original complaint. 
C. The R&R did not err in its equitable tolling analysis. 
In his final objection, Yi contends that he made a good faith attempt to hold 
the responsible officials accountable and equitable tolling should apply. Yi argues 
that he “did everything he reasonably could.”
17 While this may be true, the 
standard for equitable tolling includes more than just a plaintiff’s diligence. As the 
R&R correctly notes, it also generally requires t he party seeking tolling to prove 
 
16  Yi cites Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538 (2010), in support of this 
argument, asserting that “the controlling inquiry is what the defendant knew 
or should have known, not the plaintiff’s subjective knowledge or diligence.” 
ECF 35, at 6. Yi’s statement is true, and it also recognizes the problem: the 
defendant must have knowledge—but that “knowledge” refers to knowledge 
of the lawsuit, not the events giving rise to the lawsuit. Krupski, 560 U.S. at 550 
(“[R]epose would be a windfall for a prospective defendant who understood, 
or who should have understood, that he escaped suit during the limitations 
period only because the plaintiff misunderstood a crucial fact about his 
identity.”). 
17  ECF 35, at 9.  
Case 1:24-cv-02645-SDG     Document 38     Filed 03/31/26     Page 8 of 10
9 
that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely 
filing. See Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 971. 
Yi has not alleged an extraordinary circumstance that prevented him from 
timely filing. He does not explain  why he waited until just three days before the 
statute of limitations expired to execute a complaint. While he notes that he has 
been incarcerated, he fails to explain what circumstances prevented him from 
filing earlier within the two -year limitation period. Incarceration, standing alone, 
is not an extraordinary circumstance for the purpose of equitable tolling.  See, e.g., 
Sanchez v. United States, 170 F. App ’x 643, 647 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding no 
extraordinary circumstance for a prisoner who experienced  an eleven-day 
lockdown because he had eleven months to file his petition before the lockdown 
occurred); Miller v. Fla., 307 F. App ’x 366, 367–68  (11th Cir. 2009) (finding no 
extraordinary circumstance for a prisoner who se close-management status 
prevented him from visiting the prison library and from consulting with prison 
law clerks ); Lang v. Alabama, 179 F. App ’x 650, 652 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding no 
extraordinary circumstances for a prisoner who had “significant health problems” 
but failed to provide evidence why he could not “sit in the law library for less than 
30 minutes ”). Had Yi not filed his complaint so close to the date the statute of 
limitations expired , he would have learned sooner that he must name the 
individual who he contends actually violated his rights and could have timely 
Case 1:24-cv-02645-SDG     Document 38     Filed 03/31/26     Page 9 of 10
10 
filed an amended complaint naming Johnston. Accordingly, Yi’s fourth objection 
is overruled. 
While the Court sympathizes with Yi’s situation, it is bound to follow the 
law. Yi has failed to allege an extraordinary circumstance that would allow for 
equitable tolling, nor do the facts of this case allow the Court to find  that the FAC 
relates back to the original complaint. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Undersigned agrees with Judge Howard that this matter should be 
dismissed because it is barred by the statute of limitations.  Accordingly, Yi’s 
objections are OVERRULED, and the R&R [ECF 30] is ADOPTED as the order of 
the Court. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF 25] is GRANTED. Yi’s Motion for 
Status [ECF 34] is DENIED as moot .  The Clerk is DIRECTED to update the 
Defendant’s name on the docket from “Officer Johnson” to “Mitchell Johnston”. 
The Clerk is further DIRECTED to close this case. 
SO ORDERED this 31st day of March, 2026. 
 
 
  Steven D. Grimberg 
United States District Judge 
 
Case 1:24-cv-02645-SDG     Document 38     Filed 03/31/26     Page 10 of 10

Passage view · GavelSight