govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_24-cv-05305-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
 
Ngambula Wabibi, individually 
and as surviving parent of Francis 
Wabibi, et al., 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
Fulton County, Georgia, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
 
________________________________/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case No. 1:24-cv-5305-MLB 
 
 
 
 
OPINION & ORDER 
 Francis Wabibi died while being he ld at the Fulton County jail.  His 
parents and the administrator of his estate sue Fulton County and two 
people who work at the jail—Sher iff Patrick Labat and Lieutenant 
Antonio Richardson—for causing that  death.  (Dkt. 36.)  The Court 
dismissed Plaintiffs’ init ial complaint as a shotgun pleading (Dkt. 35), 
and Defendants move to dismiss Pl aintiffs’ amended complaint for the 
same reason and others.  (Dkt. 38. )  The Court dismisses the amended 
complaint for failure to state a claim. 
  
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I. Background 
Mr. Wabibi suffered from ment al health problems, including 
schizophrenia.  (Dkt. 36  ¶ 27.)  In September 2022, police arrested him 
for loitering and obstructing a police officer and took him to the Fulton 
County Jail.  (Id. ¶¶ 29, 32.)  On October 31, 2022, Mr. Wabibi’s cellmate 
attacked him, making his nose bleed.  (Id. ¶ 33.)  Two officers responded 
to the incident and placed Mr. Wabibi in a different cell.1  (Id. ¶¶ 34–43.)  
Four days later, Mr. Wabibi’s ne w cellmate hit him in the head.  ( Id. 
¶ 54.)  It is unclear whether Mr. W abibi was injured, but a detention 
officer told Lieutenant Richardson about the incident.  ( Id. ¶ 54.)  
Lieutenant Richardson recommended placing Mr. Wabibi in a different 
cell.  (Id. ¶ 57.) 
Guards put him in a cell wi th Simeon Keith Lucas.  ( Id. ¶ 62.)  
Plaintiffs allege Lucas was a “known  violent inmate who had previous 
 
1 Plaintiffs’ initial comp laint included charges ag ainst several other jail 
employees who moved Mr. Wabibi from cell to cell or otherwise interacted 
with him.  Those defendants incl uded Detention Officer S. Tilley, 
Sergeant William Peek, Captain Jamarl Johnson, and Cadet Deputy 
Anthony Okonkwo.  Plaintiffs did not include claims against those people 
in their amended complaint, and the Court concludes Plaintiffs 
abandoned the claims.  For that reason  (and for clarity) the Court does 
not mention these individuals by name in its discussion of the facts.  
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convictions for robbery, terroristic threats, stalking, intimidation, 
larceny, and cocaine-related offenses.”  ( Id.)  Plaintiffs further allege—
upon information and belief—that Lu cas had a violent reputation and 
weighed approximately 65 pounds more than Mr. Wabibi.  (Id. ¶¶ 63–64.)  
On November 23, 2022, an officer found  Mr. Wabibi dead on the floor of 
his cell with his hands and ankles bound.  (Id. ¶ 67.)  Lucas had strangled 
and beaten Mr. Wabibi to death.  (Id. ¶¶ 69, 74-76.)   
 Plaintiffs’ amended complaint asse rts four federal constitutional 
claims: a failure to protect claim against Lieutenant Richardson, two 
supervisory liability claims agains t Sheriff Labat, and a municipal 
liability claim against Fulton County.  ( Id. ¶¶ 148–216.)  The complaint 
also seeks damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.  
II. Standard of Review 
“Under Federal Rule of  Civil Procedure 8(a)(2 ), a pleading must 
contain a ‘short and plain statemen t of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 667-78 
(2009).  A court may dismiss a pleading for “failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.”  F ED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).  “To survive a 
motion to dismiss, a complaint must  contain sufficient factual matter, 
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accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’”  Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 678.  At the stage of a mo tion to dismiss, “all well-pleaded 
facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are 
construed in the light most fav orable to the plaintiff.”  Bryant v. Avado 
Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999).  
III. Discussion 
A. Shotgun Pleading 
The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ first complaint as a shotgun 
pleading.  (Dkt. 35.)  Defendants say Plaintiffs failed to fix those problems 
and the amended complaint remains a shotgun complaint.  (Dkt. 38-1 at 
5–9.)  Though by no means a model of clarity, the amended complaint 
does not contain the defects that doomed Plaintiffs’ prior complaint. 
The Court, for example, concluded the original complaint “violate[d] 
the rule requiring discrete claims to be separated by count” because each 
count “glommed together” various th eories of liability against several 
Defendants, leaving them without adequate notice of which claims were 
asserted against which Defendant.  (Dkt . 35 at 5.)  Plaintiffs fixed that, 
with each count seeming to involve only one Defendant.  (Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 148–
216.)  Even so, Defendants argue th at, “[while] the headings in the 
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amended complaint make reference to one claim, the body of the amended 
complaint tells a different story.”  (D kt. 38-1 at 8.)  Specifically, they 
argue that, even though  Plaintiffs label Count s II and II as involving 
Sheriff Labat’s “supervisory liability,” the allegations within those counts 
“relate[] to [unconstitutional] cust oms…, failure to supervise, … [and] 
deliberate indifference”—claims that do not fall under the heading of 
“supervisory liability.”  (Id.)  So the Court begins by determining whether 
Plaintiffs seek to assert direct claims against Sheriff Labat or to hold him 
responsible in his supervisory capacity.   
Under Eleventh Circuit precedent,  Plaintiffs could hold Sheriff 
Labat directly liable for deliberate indifference to Mr. Wabibi by showing 
Sheriff Labat “subjectively knew of [a] substantial risk of serious harm” 
but “knowingly or recklessly disreg arded that risk by failing to take 
reasonable measures to abate it” and that the risk caused Mr. Wabibi’s 
injuries.  Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty. , 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(internal citation omitted); Marsh v. Butler Cnty. , Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 
1028 (11th Cir. 2001) (“An Eighth Amendment violation will occur when 
a substantial risk of serious harm, of  which the official is subjectively 
aware, exists and the of ficial does not respond reasonably to the risk.”) 
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(internal citation omitted).  On the other hand, “[i]t is well established in 
this Circuit that supervisory offici als are not liable under § 1983 for the 
unconstitutional acts of their subord inates on the basis of respondeat 
superior or vicarious liability.”  Christmas v. Harris Cnty., Georgia , 51 
F.4th 1348, 1354–1355 (11th Cir. 2022).  To establish Sheriff Labat’s  
supervisory liability under § 1983, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege either 
his personal participation in uncon stitutional conduct by one of his 
subordinates or some “causal co nnection” between his actions and 
unconstitutional conduct by one or more of his subordinates.  Myrick v. 
Fulton County, Geogia, 69 F.4th 1277, 1297 (11t h Cir. 2023).  Plaintiffs 
can establish a causal connection suffi cient to establish Sheriff Labat’s 
supervisory liability by  (1) showing Sheriff Labat  knowingly failed to 
correct a “history of widespread abuse” that led to a subordinate’s 
unconstitutional conduct, (2) showing Sheriff Labat adopted a custom or 
policy that resulted in a subordinat e’s unconstitutional conduct, or (3) 
demonstrating facts that “support an inference that [Sheriff Labat] 
directed subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that subordinates would 
act unlawfully and failed to st op them from doing so.”  Id. at 1298 
(emphasis added).   
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The best the Court can tell, Plaintif fs do not allege Sheriff Labat’s 
direct liability in Counts II and III.  Indeed, they label these counts as 
asserting “supervisory liability.”  Within the supervisory liability rubric, 
they don’t allege his “personal participation” in any conduct involving Mr. 
Wabibi.  Rather, Counts II and III in clude a hodgepodge of allegations 
that appear directed at the second  avenue for establishing a “causal 
connection,” specifically that Sheriff Labat adopte d customs or policies 
that resulted in his subordinate’s deliberate indifference to Mr. Wabibi’s 
constitutional rights.  In Count II, Plaintiffs allege Sheriff Labat oversaw 
a custom of “inadequate supervision/staffing” and, in Count III, a custom 
of “inadequately investigating vi olence.”  (Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 169–72, 188.)  
Plaintiffs then allege those two cu stoms “resulted in [Sheriff] Labat’s 
subordinates acting with deliber ate indifference to Mr. Wabibi’s 
constitutional rights.”  (Id. ¶¶ 172, 191.)  Those allegations should have 
tipped off Defendants that Plaintiffs were proceeding under the “custom 
or policy” avenue for establishing a “causal connection” between Sheriff 
Labat and a subordinate’s conduc t that violated Mr. Wabibi’s 
constitutional rights. 
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Admittedly, a few allegations could be read to suggest a direct claim 
against Sheriff Labat under Hale or Marsh.  (See id. ¶¶ 174–75, 193–94.)  
Indeed, Plaintiffs cite Hale in Counts II and III.  (Id. ¶¶ 176, 195.)  Those 
allegations, however, do not transform those counts into something other 
than claims for supervisory liability. 2  Most of the allegations in Counts 
II and III describe policies carried out by Sheriff Labat’s subordinates 
 
2 The Court believes Plaintiffs’ confusion (evidenced by their possible 
intermingling of theories of direct and supervisory liability in Counts II 
and III) and Defendants’ confusion (reflected in their argument that the 
amended complaint remains a shotgun pleading for that reason) likely 
stem from the murky distinction between “direct” deliberate indifference 
claims and (some) supervisory liab ility claims under Eleventh Circuit 
precedent.  As explained, Marsh and Hale found sheriffs directly liable 
for knowing of and failing to “respond  reasonably to” a “substantial risk 
of serious harm” that caused the pl aintiff a constitutional injury.  See 
Hale, 50 F.3d at 1582–85; Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1028–34.   B u t  Myrick 
considered substantially similar claims and identified the “first” avenue 
of supervisory liability as involving “a history of widespread abuse [that] 
puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged 
deprivation.”  69 F.4th at 1289.    Th e Court sees little daylight between 
those claims.  Both entail showin g (1) the sheriff wa s aware of some 
substantial risk to inmate safety at  the facility, (2) did not respond in a 
reasonable manner to mitigate the risk , and (3) that failure resulted in 
someone violating a prisoner’s constitutional rights.  All this to say, even 
if Plaintiffs’ amended complaint contains some allegations purporting to 
raise a “direct” claim against Sheriff Labat a la Marsh or Hale, those 
allegations can be construed as so unding in the “first avenue” of 
supervisory liability—a theory of liability the Court does not believe 
Plaintiffs intend to assert but co nsiders below in an abundance of 
caution.    
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and explicitly tie Mr. Wabibi’s deat h to the subordinat es’ execution of 
those policies (with no involvement by Sheriff Labat).  In that context, 
any allegations suggesting a “direct”  claim are a non-sequitur.  Those 
isolated allegations do not counterac t the main thrust of Counts II and 
III which, read as a whole, assert a causal connection between Sheriff 
Labat’s supervisory conduct and the deliberate indifference of others 
under the “second avenue” of supervisory liability.  (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 168–
72, 176, 187, 191.)  Given the substance of Counts II and III and 
Plaintiffs’ identification of them as asserting “supervisory liability,” the 
Court finds “Defendants [had] adequate notice of the claims against them 
and the grounds upon whic h each claim rests.”  Weiland v. Palm Beach 
Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). 
A couple of caveats.  The Co urt construes Counts II and III as  
asserting only supervisory liability claims against Sheriff Labat and 
relying only on the “second ave nue” for demonstrating a “causal 
connection.”3  The Court dismissed the original complaint in part because 
 
3 There are no allegations that Sher iff Labat “directed subordinates to 
act unlawfully or knew that subordinates would act unlawfully and failed 
 
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it “bundle[d] together distinct theories of liability.”  (Dkt. 35 at 5.)  The 
Court assumes Plaintiffs complied wi th that Order and thus construes 
these counts as asserting only one theory of liability each.  The Court 
further construes Plaintiffs’ claims as seeking to hold Sheriff Labat liable 
for the alleged deliberate indiffere nce of Lieutenant Richardson.  
Plaintiffs don’t specifically identi fy Lieutenant Richardson as the 
relevant subordinate for the claims against Sheriff Labat.  But that’s the 
only possible conclusion.  Plaintiffs allege in Count II, for example, that 
“Mr. Wabibi’s constitutional rights were violated by Defendant Labat’s 
subordinates as he was left without supervision to be attacked.”  (Dkt. 36 
¶ 168.)  And elsewhere in the amende d complaint, Plaintiffs allege 
Lieutenant Richardson was responsible for that lack of supervision.  (Id. 
¶ 151 (alleging Lieutenant Richardson transferred “Mr. Wabibi into a cell 
with Loosecase Lucas with little to no supervision”), ¶ 153 (same), ¶ 154 
(same).)  Count III also alleges a violation of Mr. Wabibi’s constitutional 
rights arising from his placement in  the cell with Lucas, a decision 
 
to stop them from doing so.”  Myrick, 69 F.4th 1298.  So the Court does 
not consider that (third) avenue of demonstrating a causal connection.  
 
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Plaintiffs attribute to Lieutenant Richardson.  ( Id. ¶ 187.)  And while 
Plaintiffs conclusorily allege Lieu tenant Richardson knew Lucas was a 
threat to Mr. Wabibi (Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 45, 58, 61), they do not allege any other 
guard had that knowledge.  All of this supports the Court’s interpretation 
of Plaintiffs’ claims in Counts II and III as alleging Sheriff Labat’s 
supervisory liability aris ing from his adoption of customs or policies of 
“inadequate staffing/supervision” and “inadequate systems to investigate 
violence” that “result[ed] in [L ieutenant Richardson’s] deliberate 
indifference” to Mr. Wabibi’s constitutional rights.  (Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 172, 188; 
Myrick, 69 F.4th at 1298.)  To the extent the Court misconstrues 
Plaintiffs’ intent, that’s Plaintiffs’ fault.   
The Court’s prior order also found the original complaint “violate[d] 
the rule against including conclusory , vague, and immaterial facts not 
obviously connected to any particular cause of action.”  (Dkt. 35 at 5.)  In 
doing so, the Court noted the original complaint “contain[ed] allegations 
about incidents that happened at the Fulton County Jail after [Mr. 
Wabibi’s] death on November 23, 2022.”  (Id. at 6.)  Defendants argue the 
amended complaint still does this beca use it contains several references 
to a November 2024 Department of Justice investigation of conditions at 
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the jail.  (Dkt. 38-1 at 7.)  Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, however, 
removes several of the allegations po stdating Mr. Wabibi’s death.  And 
while it does reference a 2024 DOJ in vestigation, that investigation 
involved several incidents that occurred before Mr. Wabibi’s death.  (See, 
e.g., Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 111–47.)  In any even t, the Court disregards any 
allegations about incidents that occurred afterward.    
With these parameters, the Court refuses to dismiss the amended 
complaint as an impermissible shotgun pleading. 
B. Failure-to-Protect Clai m Against Lieutenant 
Richardson 
In Count I, Plaintiffs claim Lieu tenant Richardson violated Mr. 
Wabibi’s Fourteenth Am endment rights by faili ng to take reasonable 
steps to protect him from Lucas.  (Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 149–64.)  Although failure-
to-protect claims are governed by  the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause, claims involving the alleged mistreatment 
of arrestees or pretrial detainees  in custody—like Mr. Wabibi—are 
governed by the Fourteenth Am endment’s Due Process Clause.  See 
Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Ci r. 1996).  In any event, 
Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims apply the 
same standard, “so decisional law involving prison inmates applies 
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equally to cases involving arrestees or pretrial detainees.”  Id.  The Court 
thus “may properly analyze [Mr. Wabibi’s] claim und er the Eighth 
Amendment as certainly states may not impose on pretrial detainees 
conditions that would violate a conv icted prisoner’s Eighth amendment 
rights.”  Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995). 
Inherent in the Eighth Amendmen t’s right to be free from the 
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment is an inmate’s right to be free 
from violence at the hands of other inmates.  Farmer v. Brennan , 511 
U.S. 825, 833 (1994).  This right imposes a duty on prison officials to 
protect inmates from other inmates.  Id.  That said, not “every injury 
suffered by one inmate at the hand s of another” translates into a 
“constitutional liability for prison o fficials responsible for the victim’s 
safety.”  Id. at 834.  To state a claim against a prison official for failing to 
protect one inmate from another inmate, a plaintiff must plausibly allege 
(1) he or she faced “a substantial risk of serious harm” while incarcerated, 
(2) the defendant acted or failed to ac t with “deliberate indifference to 
that risk,” and (3) causation, mean ing the prison official’s deliberate 
indifference caused the plaintiff’s injuries.  Caldwell v. Warden, FCI 
Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014).  Deliberate indifference 
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requires (1) subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm; 
(2) disregard of that risk; (3) by co nduct that is more than gross 
negligence.  Goodman v. Kimbrough , 718 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 
2013).  Under this standard, “liab ility requires consciousness of a 
risk.”  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 840.  The defendant prison official “must both 
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the 
inference.”  Id. at 837.  As such, a prisoner-plaintiff must allege “that the 
defendant official was subjectively aware that his own conduct—again, 
his own actions or inacti ons—put the plaintiff at  substantial risk of 
serious harm.”  Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1258 (11th Cir. 2024). 
In other words, that “the defendant prison official actually knew of a 
substantial risk of serious harm, not just that he  should have known .”  
Id. at 1257 (emphasis in original).  
Lieutenant Richardson argues Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged 
the second element—that he was deliberately indifferent to a substantial 
risk of serious harm to Mr. Wabibi when he placed Mr . Wabibi in a cell 
with Lucas.  (Dkt. 38-1 at 11–15.)  Spec ifically, he says Plaintiffs have 
not plausibly alleged he had actu al knowledge that Lucas posed a 
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substantial risk of harm to Mr. Wabibi.  (Dkt. 38-1 at 11–15.)  He instead 
characterizes Plaintiffs’ allegati ons of deliberate indifference as 
conclusory assertions that he was aware only of “generalized facts about 
cellmate-on-cellmate danger.”  ( Id. at 14–15.)  The Court agrees with 
Lieutenant Richardson. 
Plaintiffs identify five facto rs they say show Lieutenant 
Richardson’s actual knowledge that placing Mr. Wabibi in a cell with 
Lucas would expose Mr. Wabibi to a substantial risk of serious harm:  (1) 
Lucas’s violent “criminal past,” ( 2) Lucas’s “violent proclivities and 
reputation,” (3) Mr. Wabibi’s “prior victimization” from former cellmates, 
(4) Mr. Wabibi’s mental health issu es, and (5) the weight differential 
between Lucas and Mr. Wabibi.  (Dkt. 36 ¶ 150.)  But even if these were 
“specific facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial 
risk of serious harm exist[ed],” Pl aintiffs do not allege Lieutenant 
Richardson was actually aware of these facts.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 
837.  And even if Lieutenant Richardson was aware of some of these facts, 
his knowledge—at most—demonstrate d a “generalized awareness of 
risk” of harm to Mr. Wabibi, specifically that Lucas could be a dangerous 
person, and that is insufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference.  
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See Carter v. Galloway , 352 F.3d 1346, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(evidence guard knew inmate was “a  ‘problem inmate’ with a well-
documented history of prison diso bedience and had been prone to 
violence” merely established a “generalized awareness of risk” but failed 
to show defendant guards drew an inference that inmate constituted 
serious threat of harm to plaintiff).   
The Court concludes this for several reasons.  First, Plaintiffs fail 
to allege Lieutenant Richardson kn ew Lucas was violent.  The closest 
Plaintiffs come is their allegation that “[u]pon information and belief, 
inmate Simeon Keith Lucas earned the alias ‘Loosecase’ and possessed a 
notoriously violent reputation.”  (D kt. 36 ¶ 63.)  The Court need not 
assess the significance of Lucas’s alleged reputation because Plaintiffs do 
not allege Lieutenant Richardson was aware of it.  And to plausibly allege 
his liability, they must do that.  Even if the Court accepted this allegation 
“upon information and belief” as true  and even if the Court attributed 
that knowledge to Lieutenant Richar dson, it would not be enough.  As 
explained, “before [a prison guard’s] awareness arises to a sufficient level 
of culpability, there must be much more than mere awareness of [the 
inmate’s] generally pr oblematic nature.”  Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349; see 
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also Mann v. Palmer , 713 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2013) (“We do not 
have to take as true [plaintiff’s]  allegations ‘upon information and 
belief.’”).  There must be evidence  Lieutenant Richardson drew an 
inference from that awareness that Lucas posed a substantial risk to 
Plaintiff.  Lucas’s alleged reputation  as a “loosecase,” even if known to 
Lieutenant Richardson, does not cro ss this threshold.  Similarly, 
Plaintiffs’ repeated allegations that Lucas was a “known violent inmate” 
does not change this conclusion.  ( See Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 59, 62.)  Not only are 
those allegations wholly conclusory, but they also fail to allege Lieutenant 
Richardson knew Lucas was violent and posed a significant a risk to Mr. 
Wabibi.  (See Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 63, 150.)  Plaintiffs’ allegation that Lucas was 
violent and had convictions for viol ent crimes fares no better since 
Plaintiffs don’t allege Lieutenant Ri chardson knew of Lucas’s criminal 
history or concluded from it that Lucas posed a substantial risk of serious 
harm to Mr. Wabibi.  (See id. ¶¶ 59–61.)   
Second, while Plaintiffs allege Lieutenant Richardson was aware of 
Mr. Wabibi’s “prior victimization from former inmates,” they do not allege 
he inferred a substantial risk of serious harm from this knowledge—nor 
could they.  (Dkt. 36 ¶ 150.)  The only  prior incident Plaintiffs allege 
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Lieutenant Richardson knew about was the “open hand strike” Mr. 
Wabibi received from a former cellmate.4  (Dkt. 36 ¶ 54.)  But Lieutenant 
Richardson’s knowledge of this rela tively minor incident involving one 
inmate does not show he was subjec tively aware of a particularized, 
substantial risk that Lucas would seriously harm Mr. Wabibi as opposed 
to a mere “generalized awareness of risk.”  See Carter, 352 F.3d at 1351; 
see also Cassady v. Dozier, 2022 WL 988315, at *11 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 
2022) (“Plaintiff has provided no prec edent, and the Court could not on 
its own find any, that establishes [d efendant prison official] would have 
subjectively known plaintiff was at a substantial risk of assault in Dorm 
G-2 on April 20th because she was … a pr ior victim of sexual assault.”).  
Plaintiffs’ allegation that Lieutenant  Richardson was aware of a single 
instance of Mr. Wabibi’s “prior vict imization”—one in which he was not 
seriously injured, or perhaps even injured at all—does not permit the 
“inferential leap” that Lieutenant Richardson actually knew Mr. Wabibi 
faced a serious risk of being killed by Lucas.  See Carter, F.3d at 1350.  
 
4 Plaintiffs also allege Mr. Wabibi was the victim of another assault by a 
cellmate (and “received a bloody nose ”) but don’t alle ge Lieutenant 
Richardson knew about that incident.  (See Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 33–44.) 
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To hold otherwise would allow a plaint iff to establish he or she faced a 
substantial risk of harm from every inmate once they suffered an assault 
from any other inmate.  While the Co urt leaves open the idea that a 
plaintiff may assert a deliberate indi fference claim based on his or her 
particular vulnerability or suscepti bility to victimization, such a 
situation cannot arise from a single punch.      
Third, Plaintiffs’ allegation Lieu tenant Richardson knew of Mr. 
Wabibi’s general mental health issues is not an allegation he knew of a 
substantial risk of serious harm.  Th is allegation does little more than 
suggest Mr. Wabibi was merely a “p roblem inmate,” rather than an 
inmate whose mental health posed a substantial risk of harm to himself 
or other inmates.  See Carter , 352 F.3d at 1351 (“Defendants only 
possessed an awareness of Inmate Barnes’s propensity for being a 
problematic inmate; to find Defe ndants sufficiently culpable would 
unduly reduce awareness to a more ob jective standard, rather than the 
required subjective standard … Such a generalized awareness of risk in 
these circumstances does not sa tisfy the subjec tive awareness 
requirement.”); contra D.M. v. Chatman, 2015 WL 11233083, at *9 (N.D. 
Ga. May 19, 2015) (“Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts at the motion to 
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dismiss stage to show that Defend ants knew Patton was more than a 
‘problem inmate’ … he was a predat or, frequently attacking residents 
and guards alike, and thus posed a substantial risk to other residents.”).  
And although Plaintiffs  twice allege “[Lieutenant] Richardson had 
subjective knowledge of a substantia l risk to Mr. Wabibi due to his 
schizophrenia,” these conclusory alle gations of a generalized awareness 
of risk—again—cannot satisfy the su bjective awareness requirement on 
a failure to protect claim.  (Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 45, 58; see Donaldson v. Georgia 
Dep't of Corr., 2023 WL 4290059, at *3 (M.D. Ga. June 30, 2023) (finding 
allegation “Defendant [prison offici als] knew that [decedent] had a 
history of suicidal behavior and had been diagnosed with mental health 
conditions” was a “textbook concluso ry fact” insufficient to support a 
claim for deliberate indifference).).  Again, to hold otherwise would place 
inmates with some level of mental i llness in a special category without 
regard to each inmate’s specific di fficulties or any prison official’s 
knowledge of an individualized risk.     
 Finally, Plaintiffs’ allegation of the weight difference between 
Lucas and Mr. Wabibi is unavailing be cause they only allege this fact 
“upon information and belief” and fail to allege Lieutenant Richardson 
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was subjectively aware of the sixty-pound weight differential.  (See Dkt. 
36 ¶ 64.)  And, at any rate, mere knowledge that one inmate is bigger and 
stronger than another cannot establish actual knowledge that the bigger 
inmate poses a substantial risk to the smaller inmate.  Being big or 
strong does not automatically make an inmate a threat to other inmates. 
 Stripping allegations made on in formation and belief, the complaint 
merely alleges Lieutenant Richar dson had actual knowledge of a 
substantial risk of harm to Mr. W abibi because he was aware of his 
general mental state and a single inst ance of his prior victimization.  
Those two allegations, standing alone, do not plausibly suggest 
Lieutenant Richardson was aware of more than a generalized risk of 
harm when he placed Mr. Wabibi in a cell with Lucas.  In effect, Plaintiffs 
contend only that Lieutenant Rich ardson “should have known” of a 
substantial risk of serious harm but have no allegations plausibly 
showing that he “actually knew” of such a risk.  See Wade, 106 F.4th at 
1257; see also Franklin v. Curry , 738 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(“The district court erred by finding allegations that [defendant prison 
officials] ‘knew or should have know n’ of a substantial risk of serious 
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harm sufficient to state a deliberat e indifference claim.”)  “Deliberate 
indifference, [however,] requires more than constructive knowledge.”  Id.   
Plaintiffs have not plausibly alle ged their failure-to-protect claim 
in Count I. 
C. Supervisory Claims Against Sheriff Labat 
 
As explained, the Court interpre ts Count II as asserting a § 1983 
supervisory liability claim against Sheriff Labat for adopting a “custom, 
practice, and course of conduct” of conducting “visual security rounds 
rather than sufficient security rounds”  and “routinely understaffing” the 
facility (Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 165–183) in a manner that resulted in Lieutenant 
Richardson acting with deliberat e indifference to Mr. Wabibi’s 
constitutional rights, and Count II I as asserting a § 1983 supervisory 
liability claim against Sheriff Labat for overseeing a “custom, practice, 
and course of conduct” by which Fulton County Jail officials would 
inadequately investigate violence at the facility ( Id. ¶¶ 184–202) in a 
manner that resulted in Lieutenant Richardson acting with deliberate 
indifference to Mr. Wabibi’s constitutional rights.  ( See Section III.A, 
supra; Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 172, 191.)   
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Even assuming Sheriff Labat adop ted those customs or policies, 
Plaintiffs’ claims still fail because they do not plausibly allege a causal 
connection between those customs or policies and any deliberate 
indifference by Lieutenant  Richardson that resu lted in Mr. Wabibi’s 
death.  As the Court already conclu ded, Plaintiffs have not plausibly 
alleged Lieutenant Richardson acted with deliberate indifference to Mr. 
Wabibi’s constitutional ri ghts.  So even if a custom or policy existed, it 
did not result in deliberate indifference by Sheriff Labat’s subordinate in 
this instance.  See Knight through Kerr v. Miami-Dade Cnty. , 856 F.3d 
795, 821 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]here can be no policy based or supervisory 
liability when there is no underlyin g constitutional violation.”)  And 
perhaps even more fundamentally, Plai ntiffs neither allege the jail was 
understaffed nor that security roun ds were inadequate on the night 
Lucas killed Mr. Wabibi or that th ose practices impacted any decision 
Lieutenant Richardson made that night.
5  Nor can they plausibly claim 
that, had Sheriff Labat identified the “root causes” of violence at the jail 
or implemented certain unspecified “corrective measures,” Lieutenant 
 
5 In fact, Plaintiffs actually allege security rounds did occur on the night 
Mr. Wabibi was killed.  (Dkt 36 ¶¶ 66–68.) 
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Richardson would have prevented Lucas—an inmate he had little reason 
to believe posed a threat to Mr. W abibi—from attacking his cellmate.  
Thus, Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege a causal connection between any 
conduct by Sheriff Labat and any violation of Mr. Wabibi’s constitutional 
rights.  In other words, Plaintiffs fail to allege Sheriff Labat adopted a 
custom or policy that resulted in Lieutenant Richardson acting with 
deliberate indifference to Mr. Wabibi’s safety.  
The Court has thoughtfully cons idered the claims it believes 
Plaintiffs intended to assert in Coun ts II and III.  But even if Plaintiffs 
were somehow traveling under the “first avenue” of establishing a causal 
connection for supervisory liability—that  Sheriff Labat was on notice of 
the need to correct a history of widespread abuse but failed to do so—
Counts II and III would still fail for two reasons.  See Myrick, 69 F.4th at 
1298.  First, although Plaintiffs purport to describe a history of abuses at 
Fulton County Jail, (Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 79–134),  they never plausibly allege 
Sheriff Labat knew about that history such that he was on notice of the 
need for corrective measures.  See Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 
(11th Cir. 1990) (“The deprivations th at constitute widespread abuse 
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sufficient to notify the supervising official must  be obvious, flagrant, 
rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.”).   
Second, Plaintiffs’ allege d history is rife with  allegations from the 
2024 DOJ investigation that do not post-date Mr. Wabibi’s death.  As 
explained, the Court warned Plaint iffs that those allegations were 
irrelevant and should not be included  in the amended complaint.  (Dkt. 
35 at 5–6.)  Plaintiffs only compli ed in part, continuing to include 
allegations from after Mr. Wabibi’s death and/or parroting conclusions 
from the 2024 DOJ report, with no in dication those conclusions were 
drawn from events before Mr. Wabibi’s death.  (See, e.g., Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 105 
(“On July 13, 2023, the U.S Department  of Justice Civil Rights Division 
(DOJ) announced it had opened a civ il investigation into the conditions 
in Jail.”); 106 (“Within weeks of opening the investigation, six more men 
had died in the Jail, one person was found unresponsive in his cell after 
his cellmate strangled him…”); 107 (“The DOJ announced on November 
15, 2024 its findings that conditions of confinement at the Fulton County 
Jail in Georgia violate the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.”).)  
This failure infects the entirety of Pl aintiffs’ allegations of a history of 
abuse at Fulton County Jail as th e Court is unable to tell which 
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allegations it can consider and which it cannot.  See Hines v. Jefferson , 
338 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 1307 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (plaintiff may show deliberate 
indifference by submitting “evide nce of a history of widespread prior 
abuse by . . . personnel that would ha ve put the [defendant] on notice of 
the need for improved training or  supervision.”) (emphasis added); 
Thompson v. Sheriff, Pinellas Cnty. Fl., 542 F. App’x 826, 829 (11th Cir. 
2013) (“We conclude that such post-incident complaints could not have 
put the Sheriff on notice of a need for supervision.”).   
These deficiencies foreclose a find ing of supervisory liability on a 
theory of widespread abuse.  And no matter how much the Court tries, it 
can see no possibility that Plaintiffs assert claims under the final avenue 
for supervisory liability because th ey never suggest Sheriff Labat 
“directed” his subordinates in how they treated Mr. Wabibi or knew they 
would act unlawfully towards him.   
In all, Counts II and III fail to allege plausibly the requisite 
“personal participation” or “causal connection” to support Sheriff Labat’s 
supervisory liability.  Those counts are dismissed.   
  
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D. Municipal Liability Claim Against Fulton County 
Count IV of the amended complaint brings a Monell claim against 
Fulton County for its failu re to adequately fund and staff the Fulton 
County Jail.  (Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 203–216.)   A Monell claim is derivative of—and 
thus requires—an underlying constitutional violation.  City of L.A. v. 
Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986); see also Baker v. City of Madison, 
Alabama, 67 F.4th 1268, 1282 (11th Cir. 2023)  (“Because there was no 
underlying constitutional violation, [plaintiff’s] municipal liability claim 
against the city fails as a matter of law.”)  As the Court concluded supra, 
the amended complaint fails to alle ge an underlying constitutional 
violation by Defendants Lieutenant  Richardson or Sheriff Labat.  
Without a constitutional violation, Plaintiffs cannot maintain their 
Monell claim. 
IV. Conclusion 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (Dkt. 38). 
SO ORDERED this 31st day of March, 2026. 
 
   
 
1 (1 1 (1 
MICH" KEL  L.  BROWN 
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