govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_25-cv-01298-0

1 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
DESTINY WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiff, 
 
Civil Action No.  
1:25-cv-01298-SDG v.  
JAKE FRUGE, JR., et al., 
Defendants. 
 
 
OPINION AND ORDER  
This case concerns the intersection of veil piercing and personal jurisdiction. 
Having failed to properly serve the  limited liability company  she named as  a 
defendant,1 Plaintiff Destiny Williams finds herself litigating claims against  
Defendant Jake  Fruge, Jr. only, and here lies her fundamental issue: The only 
contacts with Georgia that might give rise to the Court’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over this case are contacts that the company made with Georgia. Fruge 
did not have any contacts with Georgia in his personal capacity. As such, Williams 
asks the Court to pierce the limited liability veil and attribute company contacts to 
Fruge for purposes of exercising personal jurisdiction over and imposing liability 
on him . But because Williams has n ot put forward factual allegations 
demonstrating that Fruge treated the companies as his alter ego, the Court will not 
 
1  Williams did not serve Champion E-Com, LLC within the 90 days specified 
under the Federal Rules, nor did she request waiver of service. As such, 
Champion E-Com is DISMISSED without prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (m). 
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pierce the veil for jurisdictional purposes. Lacking sufficient contacts with Georgia 
himself, Fruge is not subject to the personal jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, 
Fruge’s motion to dismiss [ECF 13] is GRANTED. 
I. Background 
The Court’s description of the facts is based on the well-pleaded allegations 
of the Amended Complaint. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 
(11th Cir. 1999) (“At the motion to dismiss stage, all well -pleaded facts are 
accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff.”). 
On January 11, 2023, Williams attended a live webinar to learn about an 
online business opportunity presented by Champion E-Com.
2 The webinar was 
led by Fruge who, at the time, introduced himself as the owner and CEO of  
Champion E-Com. 3 Though Williams alleges Fruge “marketed and sold” his 
business “throughout the United States, including Georgia,” she never alleges 
how she learned of Champion E-Com or Fruge. 4 Nevertheless, Williams attended 
this webinar from her home in Fulton County, Georgia and listened to Fruge 
 
2  ECF 19, ¶¶ 10–15. 
3  Id. ¶¶ 12–13. 
4  Id. ¶ 10. 
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promote the business opportunity.5 Fruge pitched webinar attendees, like 
Williams, on a  “hands-off” Amazon store of their own that would generate ever 
increasing monthly sales, ranging from approximately $5,000 in the first month, to 
$20,000 by month three, to about $50,000 in monthly sales by month six. 6 “All 
aspects” of the Amazon store setup and management would be handled by 
Champion E -Com; all that was required of interested webinar attendees was a 
$45,000 investment to get their storefront and Champion E-Com’s services 
started.7  
Based “largely” on Fruge’s representations during the webinar, Williams 
decided to participate.8 On January 31, 2023, Williams signed up, and on February 
1, 2023, she paid the $45,000 start-up fee .9 Williams signed an agreement with 
Champion E-com  (the Agreement) ,10 whereby Champion E- Com promised to 
 
5  Id. ¶ 12. 
6  Id. ¶ 15. 
7  Id. ¶¶ 13–14, ¶¶ 35–39. 
8  Id. ¶ 21. 
9  Id. ¶¶ 21–22. 
10  Williams emphasizes how the Agreement was with “Champion Ecom [sic], 
LLP” (emphasis added) despite allegedly making her payment to Champion 
E-Com, LLC. Id. ¶ 23–30. Williams alleges that the LLC did not exist until April 
14, 2023, when Champion E-Com, LLP was converted to Champion E-Com, 
LLC, a Texas limited liability company. Id. ¶ 31. That Champion E-Com was 
first an LLP before it was converted to an LLC has no bearing on the 
jurisdictional issue at the heart of this motion.  
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manage the store for two years, handling matters such as initial setup , product 
research, uploading inventory, processing orders, handling returns, and analyzing 
store metrics, among others. 11 Williams alleges that of the multiple services 
Champion E-Com promised to do for customers like her, the only services that it 
actually carried out were registering her store as a Georgia LLC and opening an 
Amazon Store account.
12 
Williams also experienced undelivered promises when she attempted to  
purchase inventory. Between May 3 and June 1, 2023, Williams charged her credit 
card three times to purchase “inventory” —she does not allege from where or for 
what—for a total of $3,594.33. 13 However, that inventory never showed up in her 
Amazon store, and Williams was unable to make a sale.14  
Also around this time, Champion E-Com assigned its agreements with all 
500 of its customers, including the Agreement  it had with Williams, to a separate 
 
11  Id. ¶ 35. See also ECF 5 -1. The Court can consider documents attached to a 
motion to dismiss without converting the motion to one for summary 
judgment if the documents are central to the plaintiff’s claim and undisputed. 
Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002); Hi-Tech Pharm., Inc. v. HBS 
Int’l Corp., 910 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir. 2018). Here, the Agreement is central 
to William’s claims and neither party disputes its authenticity. 
12  ECF 19, ¶ 30. 
13  Id. ¶ 58. 
14  Id. ¶ 59. 
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entity.15 On June 2, 2023, Champion E-Com employee Dallas Middleton emailed 
Williams to inform her that her Amazon storefront was being “transferred” to a 
new company, Digital Guidance , because Champion E-Com assigned all 
responsibilities and obligations under the Agreement to Digital Guidance. 16 
Digital Guidance required Williams to begin paying management fees , which 
Williams felt was contrary to the Agreement.17 
Come September, things still were not looking good for Williams and her 
Amazon store. The “inventory” she purchased back in May and June had never 
shown up, and on September 13, 2023, Williams finally got Fruge on the phone to 
talk about it, though she does not allege who initiated the call .
18 Fruge told 
Williams that all her inventory had been “lost,” but he promised to reimburse her 
so long as she signed a release form. 19 She signed the release form and received a 
full refund the next day. 20 On September 21, Williams paid Digital Guidance 
$5,000 for “brand approval,” which would allegedly allow her to sell brand-name 
products by companies like Nike and Amazon, but she never saw anything come 
 
15  Id. ¶¶ 47–49, 81. 
16  Id. ¶¶ 47–49. 
17  Id. ¶ 53. 
18  Id. ¶¶ 58–59. 
19  Id. ¶¶ 60–63. 
20  Id. ¶¶ 64–65. 
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of this . Eventually, Williams  disputed the  $5,000 charge with her credit card 
company.21 Williams had still not made a single sale from her Amazon store.22 
On January 2, 2024, Fruge called Williams, identifying himself as CEO of 
Champion E-Com, and more or less came clean. 23 He admitted that his business 
plan had faced problems since the beginning and was unable to do what he had 
promised on the webinar. 24 Fruge alleged ly told Williams that it would take 
“about 5 years” to get to the point where customers would actually make money 
from their investment in these Amazon storefronts.25 However, he disclaimed any 
ability to fix the investors’ issues because the contracts had been assign ed to 
Digital Guidance.26 Soon after, Fruge stopped communicating with Williams, and 
she did not hear from another Champion E-Com employee.27 
Throughout this time, Williams never met Fruge in person. All interactions 
Williams had with Fruge, Champion E-Com, and employees of Champion E-Com 
were either virtual—like the webinar—or by email or phone. Fruge is a citizen and 
 
21  Id. ¶¶ 70–72. 
22  Id. ¶¶ 42–44, 56. 
23  Id. ¶¶ 75–79. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. ¶ 79. 
26  Id. ¶ 82. 
27  Id. ¶ 86. 
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resident of Texas,28 and Williams never alleges that Fruge even once stepped into 
Georgia.29 
Nevertheless, Williams chose Georgia as the forum for this lawsuit. She 
originally filed in Fulton County Superior Court,  naming Fruge ; Champion E-
Com, LLC ; and Champion E-Com LLP as defendants. 30 On March 6, 2025, the 
Superior Court dismissed without prejudice Defendants Champion E -Com, LLC 
and Champion E-Com LLP because Williams did not timely serve them with 
process.31 Shortly thereafter, Fruge removed the case to this Court,32 and he moved 
to dismiss the complaint on March 18. 33 On April 9, Williams filed her First 
Amended Complaint (FAC), 34 which she was allowed to refile with minor 
corrections on September 26.35 Williams only named Fruge and Champion E-Com, 
LLC in the FAC.36 
 
28  ECF 19, ¶ 3; ECF 13, at 2, 8. 
29  ECF 13, at 8–9. 
30  ECF 1-1, at 3. 
31  ECF 2. 
32  ECF 1. 
33  ECF 4. 
34  ECF 10.  
35  ECFs 18, 19. 
36  ECF 19, at 1. 
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In total, Williams assert s five causes of action: (1) deceit or fraudulent 
misrepresentation against Fruge; 37 (2) fraudulent inducement against Fruge; 38 
(3) violation of the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act (FBPA) against Fruge and 
Champion E-Com; 39 (4) violation of the Georgia RICO Act against Fruge and 
Champion E-Com; 40 and (5) breach of contract against Fruge and Champion E-
Com.41 She also seeks punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. 42 Fruge again 
moves to dismiss, arguing that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him and 
that the FAC fails to state a claim.43 As to Champion E-Com, LLC, Williams never 
filed proof with this Court that she served it with process and it has not otherwise 
appeared in this lawsuit; accordingly, Williams’ claims against Champion E-Com 
are dismissed without prejudice. Fed R. Civ. P. 4(m). The only Defendant 
remaining is Fruge. 
 
37  Id. ¶¶ 94–102. 
38  Id. ¶¶ 103–08. 
39  Id. ¶¶ 109–18. 
40  Id. ¶¶ 119–28. 
41  Id. ¶¶ 129–38. 
42  Id. ¶¶ 139–44. 
43  ECF 13. 
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II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Before turning to Fruge’s motion to dismiss, the Court will first address its 
subject matter jurisdiction over this case. On its face, the FAC adequately alleges 
the existence of diversity jurisdiction: Williams is a citizen of Georgia,44 Fruge is a 
citizen of Texas, 45 and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 46 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a). While Williams only claims $45,000 in actual damages, she also requests 
treble damages, punitive damages , and attorney’s fees in connection with her 
Georgia RICO claim, which would easily exceed the $75,000 threshold. See Edwards 
v. Solomon & Solomon PC, 2022 WL 19410502, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 9, 2022) (citing 
Holley Equip. Co. v. Credit All. Corp., 821 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1987)) (noting 
that treble and punitive damages must be considered when determining the 
amount in controversy). Finally, while the Court does not know the citizenship of 
Champion E -Com, LLC,
47 that does not defeat complete diversity because 
Champion E-Com has been dismissed from this action. 
 
44  ECF 19, ¶ 1. 
45  Id. ¶ 2. 
46  Id. ¶ 4. 
47  Williams suggests that Champion E-Com, LLC is a Texas citizen solely because 
it is an LLC registered in Texas. ECF 19, ¶ 3. This is insufficient—t he 
citizenship of an LLC is determined by the citizenships of each of its members 
and submembers, which Williams has not alleged. See Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. 
v. Comcast SCH Holdings LLC, 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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III. Legal Standards 
Fruge moves to dismiss the FAC pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), alleging that the 
Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him, and, in the alternative, he moves to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the FAC fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted . Because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Fruge, it 
will not reach the 12(b)(6) motion. 
For a court to render a valid judgment against a party, it must have personal 
jurisdiction. Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980). 
Federal courts have such jurisdiction where its exercise is (1) authorized under the 
state’s long-arm statute and (2)  consistent with due process. Diamond Crystal 
Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1257–58 (11th Cir. 2010). On a 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), it is the 
plaintiff’s burden to establish in the complaint a prima facie case for the exercise 
of jurisdiction —that is, to present a case that would withstand a motion for a 
directed verdict. Id.; Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990). The Court 
treats the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint that are not controverted by 
the defendant’s evidence as true. Madara , 916 F.2d at 1514. Here, Fruge has not 
submitted any evidence challenging William’s jurisdictional allegations. 
Accordingly, the Court evaluates whether the FAC states a prima facie case for the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Fruge.  
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IV. Discussion 
Before turning to the personal jurisdiction analysis, the Court must first 
determine a preliminary matter on piercing the limited liability veil. 
A. Champion E-Com’s contacts with Georgia cannot be imputed to 
Fruge for jurisdictional purposes. 
Williams seeks to impute Champion E -Com’s contacts with Georgia to 
Fruge for jurisdictional and liability purposes. Indeed, the only way the Court can 
exercise personal jurisdiction over Fruge is if Champion E -Com’s contacts are 
imputed to him—Fruge himself lacks sufficient  contacts with Georgia . The 
Eleventh Circuit has held that  “jurisdictional veil piercing ” is consistent with 
constitutional due process because “when a defendant exerts a high degree of 
control over an entity, the contacts created by the entity are, in reality, created by 
the defendant.” United States ex rel. Bibby v. Mortg. Invs. Corp., 987 F.3d 1340, 1355  
(11th Cir. 2021) (considering the defendant’s contacts with Georgia ). Georgia 
courts likewise recognize such jurisdictional veil piercing and will treat the entity 
as an individual’s alter ego
48 if a plaintiff presents evidence that the entity “was a 
sham or that it was used to defeat a public convenience, to justify wrong, protect 
 
48  Georgia courts do not appear to distinguish between “piercing the corporate 
veil,” which suggests one entity is vicariously liable for the debts of another 
entity by virtue of the exercise of control, and “alter ego,” which implies that 
two or more entities are one and the same and should be treated as such for 
purposes of imposing liability. For purposes of this case , it is a distinction 
without a difference.  
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fraud, defend crime, or any other reason which in equity and good conscience 
would justify the disregard” of the limited liability  entities. Yukon Partners, Inc. v. 
Lodge Keeper Grp., Inc., 258 Ga. App. 1, 7 (2002). 
While Champion E-Com has only existed as an LLP and an LLC (not as a 
corporation), the same general principles for piercing the veil of a corporation 
apply to these limited liability forms. See generally Washington St. Apartments, LLC 
v. Fredd, 375 Ga. App. 815, 819–20 (2025) (discussing corporate veil piercing 
principles in the context of an LLC). That corporations are legal entities distinct 
from their shareholders, directors, officers, and employees is a foundational 
principle of corporate law. Dep’t of Transp. v. McMeans, 294 Ga. 436, 437 (2014). 
This is no less true when a limited liability entity  is wholly owned by a single 
individual. Id. Nor is this principle “altered by the fact that the sole owner uses 
and controls the corporation to promote the owner’s ends.” Id. Because limited 
liability exists to “shiel[d] individual shareholders and members from personal 
liability for the acts of the [entity],” courts should exercise “great caution . . . in 
disregarding the corporate entity.” Id. 
Even so, Georgia courts will disregard the limited liability form and pierce 
its veil if “ a corporation is a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person ” and 
the limited liability form was “used as a subterfuge so that to observe it would 
work an injustice.” Baillie Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 279 Ga. 288, 289 (2005) (citation 
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omitted). To pierce the limited liability veil, the plaintiff must show that the 
members “made [the entity] a mere instrumentality for the transaction of their 
own affairs; that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the owners no longer exist.” Id.  (citation 
omitted). This generally requires the plaintiff to adduce evidence of fraud, abuse 
of the corporate form, commingling of assets, or corporate insolvency at the time 
of the transaction. Ralls Corp. v. Huerfano River Wind, LLC, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1303, 1329 
(N.D. Ga. 2014) (citing Amason v. Whitehead, 186 Ga. App. 320, 322 (1988)). 
The alter ego claim is an equitable one, and it cannot be sustained unless 
there is an inadequate remedy at law. Baillie Lumber Co., 279 Ga. at 290. Thus, 
insolvency, “in the sense that there are insufficient corporate assets to satisfy the 
plaintiff’s claim” is a “precondition to a plaintiff’s piercing the corporate veil and 
holding individual shareholders liable on a corporate claim.” Johnson v. Lipton, 254 
Ga. 326, 327 (1985). 
To that end, Williams fails to sufficiently allege insolvency, despite it being 
a precondition to piercing the limited liability veil. Williams states that (1) “on 
information and belief, Champion E -Com, LLC was deliberately or grossly 
undercapitalized from inception, unable to meet foreseeable business liabilities” ; 
(2) that “Champion E-Com, LLC was never adequately capitalized, rendering [her] 
recourse futile without piercing”; and that (3) “Fruge intentionally kept Champion 
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E-Com, LLC undercapitalized as a mere shell to evade personal liability.” 49 These 
bald assertions, devoid of fact s, do not allow  the Court to  determine whether 
Champion E-Com is insolvent in the alter ego sense.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 578 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (“[A] 
formulaic recitation of the elements . . . will not do.”).  
Williams has also failed to allege abuse of the limited liability form. Because 
the Court could not pierce the corporate veil as to liability without the sufficient 
factual showings, the Court likewise cannot pierce the limited liability veil for 
personal jurisdiction. See Bibby, 987 F.3d at 1356. As such, the Court will not impute 
Champion E-Com’s contacts to Fruge for jurisdictional purposes. 
B. The Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Fruge under Georgia’s 
long-arm statute. 
Turning to the personal jurisdiction inquiry over Fruge, the Court begins 
with Georgia’s long-arm statu te. The  statute confers personal jurisdiction over 
non-resident defendants under six circumstances, three of which Williams argues 
apply to Fruge. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91.  Relevant here, the statute provides: 
A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction 
over any nonresident  . . .  as to a cause of action arising 
from any of the acts, omissions, ownership, use, or 
possession enumerated in this Code section, in the same 
manner as if he or she were a resident of this state, if in 
person or through an agent, he or she: 
 
49  ECF 19, ¶¶ 135–37. 
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(1) Transacts any business within this state; 
(2) Commits a tortious act or omission within this 
state, except as to a cause of action for defamation 
of character arising from the act; 
(3) Commits a tortious injury in this state caused by 
an act or omission outside this state if the tort -
feasor regularly does or solicits business, or 
engages in any other persistent course of conduct, 
or derives substantial revenue from goods used or 
consumed or services rendered in this state. 
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. The Court need only find one subsection met for its exercise of 
personal jurisdiction to be proper under the long-arm statute. 
1. Fruge has not transacted any business within Georgia. 
Under the first subsection of Georgia’s long-arm statute, the Court may 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if, “in person or 
through an agent” the defendant  “transacts any business within” Georgia. 
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1); Diamond Crystal, 593 F.3d at 1264. The literal language of the 
provision is broad: it gives  courts “the unlimited authority to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over any nonresident who transacts any business in this State .” 
Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., LLC v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, Ia., 279 Ga. 
672, 675 (2005). While in some cases, applying the literal meaning of § 9-10 -91(1) 
would “expand the personal jurisdiction of Georgia courts beyond that permitted 
by constitutional due process,” id., satisfying subsection one of the long-arm 
statute is still a prerequisite to a personal jurisdiction determination; the Eleventh 
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Circuit has made clear that courts cannot collapse subsection one and 
constitutional due process into the same inquiry. Diamond Crystal, 593 F.3d at 1261.   
Proving a nonresident defendant has transacted business within Georgia 
does not require the defendant’s physical presence in Georgia, Innovative Clinical, 
279 Ga. at 675 , and, indeed, t he statute  allows the “assertion of long-arm 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants . . . based upon business conducted 
through postal, telephonic, and Internet contacts.” Crossing Park Props., LLC v. JDI 
Fort Lauderdale, LLC, 316 Ga. App. 471, 475–76 (2012). But meeting subsection one 
of the long-arm statute “expressly depends on the actual transaction of business—
the doing of some act or consummation of some transaction—by the defendant in 
the state.” Diamond Crystal, 593 F.3d at 1260 (citing Aero Toy Store, LLC v. Grieves, 
279 Ga. App. 515, 517 (2006)). 
The Court views Williams’ factual allegations as consisting of three bases 
for how Fruge transacted business in Georgia. First, Williams alleges that she, a 
Georgia resident, came across marketing for Champion E-Com that prompted her 
to attend, from Georgia, a live webinar about the business. Second, she alleges that 
Fruge’s company—not Fruge —signed a contract with her, a Georgia resident. And 
third, she alleges that she communicated with Fruge and a Champion E -Com 
employee by phone or email on three occasions. Because the Court will not impute 
Champion E-Com’s contacts to Fruge, the contacts giving rise to personal 
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jurisdiction must be the acts of Fruge and not the company or its employees. For 
this reason, the contract between Champion E -Com and Williams, as well as the 
email sent to Williams by a Champion E -Com employee, are insufficient  to 
establish contacts by Fruge. That leaves only the webinar, the webinar marketing, 
and the two phone calls between Williams and Fruge.  
Both the webinar and Fruge’s marketing of the webinar do not show that he 
transacted business in Georgia. While Williams allege s that Fruge was “the main 
promoter and sales person [sic] of the program ,”50 she does not allege that the 
marketing was in a Georgia-specific channel, nor does she allege that it was even 
targeted at Georgia residents in a particular way. National marketing without any 
Georgia-specific focus is not the “actual transaction of business ” in Georgia. 
Diamond Crystal, 593 F.3d at 1260; see also Perrigo Co. v. Merial Ltd., 215 F. Supp. 3d 
1329, 1341–42 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (deeming national advertising and even a blog post 
written by a Georgia resident and sponsored by the defendant insufficient to show 
that the defendant transacted business within Georgia). For similar reasons, Fruge 
speaking during an online, nationally -targeted webinar —essentially live 
 
50  T he Court consider s actions taken by Fruge in his capacity as CEO of 
Champion E-Com because Georgia has rejected any sort of “fiduciary shield” 
rule that would immunize corporate officers from personal jurisdiction based 
solely upon acts taken in their capacity as corporate officers . See 
Amerireach.com, LLC v. Walker, 290 Ga. 261, 266 (2011).  
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advertising—does not constitute the transaction of business in Georgia, even if a 
Georgia resident was in (virtual) attendance. C.f. Pascarelli v. Koehler, 346 Ga. App. 
591, 596–97 (2018) (distinguishing Internet advertising, which does not constitute 
“transacting business,” from Internet websites that allow customers to have 
physical goods sent into Georgia, which does constitute transacting business).  
Williams’ two phone conversations with Fruge are also insufficient to satisfy 
§ 9-10-91(1). Williams has only alleged that one of the calls (the January 2024 call) 
was initiated by Fruge. As such, the September 2023 call cannot show that Fruge 
reached out to Georgia to transact business. See Cascade Aircraft Mgmt., LLC v. 
Velazco, 374 Ga. App. 397, 404 (2025) (finding the defendant did not transact 
business within Georgia when it “never initiated any contact” with the plaintiff). 
That hinges the application of § 9-10-91(1) on a sing le phone call—one that was 
made after Champion E-Com had assigned its contract with Williams to Digital 
Guidance. During the phone call, Fruge admitted the shortcomings of the Amazon 
storefront business model and disclaimed his ability to change the situation 
because the contracts had been assigned.  This solo communication does not 
constitute the “doing of some act or consummation of some transaction,” Diamond 
Crystal, 593 F.3d at 1260, and is therefore insufficient to establish jurisdiction over 
Fruge under § 9-10-91(1). C.f. Mem’l Healthcare Grp., Inc. v. Vickers, 922 S.E.2d 862, 
869 (Ga. Ct. App. 2025) (deeming phone calls to previous patient of hospital placed 
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after care had ended insufficient to satisfy § 9-10-91(1)); see also Perrigo, 215 F. Supp. 
3d at 1340 –41 (deeming two out -of-state phone calls insufficient to show 
defendants “did ‘some act’ or consummated ‘some transaction’”). 
2. Fruge has not committed a tort within Georgia. 
Georgia’s long-arm statute also permits the Court to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if the defendant “commits a tortious act 
or omission within” Georgia. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(2). Williams brings tort claims for 
fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement, as well as claims under 
Georgia’s FBPA and RICO statutes, which sound in tort. All four claims are based 
on the same facts: Fruge’s alleged misrepresentations during the webinar and 
subsequent telephone communications. “ For purposes of personal jurisdiction 
under Georgia ’s long -arm statute, Georgia courts have ruled that —when a 
defendant uses the telephone or email to contact a Georgia resident —defendant’s 
conduct occurs at the place where defendant speaks into the telephone or types 
and sends his email.” LABMD, Inc. v. Tiversa, Inc., 509 F. App’x 842, 844 (11th Cir. 
2013); see also Anderson v. Deas, 279 Ga.  App. 892, 893–94  (2006) (no personal 
jurisdiction existed ove r a defendant who made harassing telephone calls to a 
Georgia resident from another state); Huggins v. Boyd, 304 Ga. App. 563, 565 (2010) 
(concluding—based on Anderson—that no personal jurisdiction existed over a 
nonresident defendant who emailed Georgia residents). Williams does not allege 
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that Fruge made his misrepresentations from Georgia; as such, Williams has not 
shown that Fruge committed a tortious act or omission within Georgia. 
3. Fruge has not engaged in a persistent course of conduct 
within Georgia. 
Lastly, under O.C.G.A. § 9-10- 91(3), the Court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who commits a tortious injury in 
Georgia caused by an act or omission outside of Georgia, but it may do so only if 
the tortfeasor “regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other 
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or 
consumed or services rendered in [Georgia].”  The national advertising, webinar, 
and phone call do not constitute the “‘regular,’ ‘persistent’ or ‘substantial’” acts 
necessary to establish jurisdiction under this subsection. Mem’l Healthcare , 922 
S.E.2d at 869 (citing Innovative Clinical, 279 Ga. at 675 n.4). 
In short, Williams has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the 
exercise of jurisdiction over Fruge would be proper under Georgia’s long -arm 
statute. For this reason alone, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction to hear this case. 
C. The exercise of personal jurisdiction over Fruge would violate 
constitutional due process. 
Even if Williams’ allegations were sufficient to satisfy Georgia’s long- arm 
statute, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Fruge would be improper as a 
matter of constitutional due process.  Due process requires t he defendant to have 
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“fair warning” that his activities in the forum may subject him to jurisdiction there. 
Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); Del Valle v. Trivago GmbH, 56 
F.4th 1265, 1275 (11th  Cir. 2022). This case involves only specific personal 
jurisdiction, which “depends on an affiliation between the forum and the 
underlying controversy.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 
915, 919 (2011) (cleaned up). The Eleventh Circuit’s due process analysis for such 
jurisdiction examines whether (1) the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or  relate to” 
the defendant’s contacts with the forum, (2) the defendant “purposefully availed” 
himself of the forum, and (3) exercising personal jurisdiction would violate 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. SkyHop Techs., Inc. v. Narra, 
58 F.4th 1211, 1229 (11th Cir. 2023). 
Fundamentally, Fruge cannot be said to have “purposefully availed” 
himself of Georgia’s laws. To satisfy this step of the due process analysis, Williams 
would have to show that Fruge “deliberately reached out beyond [his] home.” Id. 
at 1230 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 359 
(2021)) (cleaned up). But here, Williams is “the only link between [Fruge] and the 
forum”—Fruge took no deliberate action to avail himself of the benefit of 
conducting business within Georgia . Walden v. Fiore , 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014). 
Rather, the business he promoted was an entirely online enterprise with a national 
market; he did not specifically target Georgia customers, he did not conduct 
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meetings in Georgia, nor, as far as the FAC suggests, did he have Georgia 
customers other than Williams. C.f. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 
1339, 1357 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding purposeful availment where defendant had an 
interactive website advertising in Florida, received orders from multiple Florida 
residents, and sent multiple shipments of goods into Florida); J. McIntyre Mach., 
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886 (2011) (plurality opinion) (considering national 
advertising without state-specific advertising insufficient to show contact with the 
forum state). For this reason, the exercise of jurisdiction over Fruge would violate 
due process.  
V. Conclusion 
Williams has not met her burden of establishing a prima facie case for the 
Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Fruge. Lacking personal jurisdiction, 
the Court GRANTS Fruge’s motion to dismiss [ECF 13] and orders that the claims 
against Fruge be dismissed without prejudice. Because it was never served with 
process, Champion E-Com, LLC is also dismissed without prejudice. 
The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case. 
SO ORDERED this 31st day of March, 2026. 
 
 
 
  Steven D. Grimberg 
United States District Judge 
 
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