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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
MCALLEN DIVISION 
 
 
MELISSA AGUERO RAMIREZ, 
 
              Plaintiff, 
 
VS. 
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    CIVIL ACTION NO. 7:24-CV-00541  
  
PHARR-SAN JUAN-ALAMO 
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
 
              Defendant. 
 
 
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 
 Before the Court is Defendant Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Independent Schol District’s Motion 
to Dismiss Plaintiff Melissa Ramirez’s original complaint. (Dkt. No. 10). After careful 
consideration, the Court finds that Defendant’s motion should be and is DENIED. 
Background 
This dispute arises from the termination, by contract nonrenewal, of Plaintiff Melissa 
Ramirez, a former Professional Development Director who worked for Defendant Pharr-San Juan-
Alamo Independent Schol District (PSJA ISD). Dkt. No. 1, Exh. 1, at ¶5.1. On October 30, 2023, 
after being diagnosed with major depressive disorder with neurovegetative symptoms, Plaintiff 
commenced leave from her job under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) , which in 
relevant part entitles an employee to 12 weeks of  unpaid leave for the care of one’s own serious 
medical condition and protects her right to be reinstated afterwards. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). 
Plaintiff says her FMLA leave was approved by her employer after submission of an FMLA form. 
Dkt. No. 1, Exh. 1, at ¶5.1.  Although Plaintiff’s leave was initially set to expire on February 12, 
2024, PSJA ISD allowed Plaintiff to use her accumulated sick leave days to extend her leave until 
April 2, 2024. Id. Plaintiff returned to work on April 3, 2024. Id.  
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 31, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Following her return, Plaintiff claims that her office location was changed twice —
allegedly without assistance in relocating her belongings —to incongruous locations such as the 
ISD’s police station. Id. at ¶ 5.3 . Then, on June 3, 2024, Plaintiff received an email from the 
Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources  Rebeca Garza  which notified her that “[t] he 
superintendent is not planning to take your current contract for  renewal.” Id. at ¶ 5.2. A formal 
letter confirming this decision  was sent  by Garza  on July 18, 2024, stating that Plaintiff’s 
employment would terminate on August 20, 2024. Id. at ¶ 5.3. Plaintiff claims that until then, she 
was under no notice of any reason—performance issues or otherwise—as to why her job might be 
in jeopardy. Id. at ¶ 5.2. Plaintiff states that she had never been evaluated by Garza or PSJA ISD’s 
Superintendent Alejandro Elias. Id. Moreover, Plaintiff claims that neither the letter nor the email 
provided her with any explanation as to why she was being terminated, nor did Garza or Elias ever 
meet with her regarding the reason for her termination. Id. at ¶ 5.4. 
Plaintiff brought suit in state court, contending that PSJA ISD terminated her position with 
the school district in retaliation for taking FMLA leave, both violating the Act and interfering with 
her rights under it. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(2). After removal on federal-question grounds, Defendant 
brought the instant motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 10. Defendant puts forward two arguments: first, 
that Plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim is barred by  PSJA ISD’s sovereign immunity under the 
Eleventh Amendment and should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1); and second, even if it is not 
barred, that Plaintiff’s pleading offers no evidence of the retaliation element of an FMLA 
retaliation claim—in other words, no evidence that Plaintiff was terminated because she availed 
herself of FMLA leave—and should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). 
After careful consideration, the Court finds neither argument convincing. Defendant ISD 
does not qualify as an “arm of the state” so as to be eligible for state sovereign immunity under 
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the Eleventh Amendment; furthermore, Plaintiff has plead sufficient factual matter, accepted as 
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. 
Standard of Review 
 A court properly dismisses a case for lack of subject -matter jurisdiction under Rule 
12(b)(1) “when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”  Home 
Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison , 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 ( 5th Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996)); see FED. R. CIV. 
P. 12(b)(1).  A party challenging jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may do so through a “facial 
attack” on the complaint, or through a “factual attack” relying on evidence outside the pleadings.  
Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp. , 613 F.2d 507, 511 ( 5th Cir.), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 953 
(1980).  The former “requires the court merely to look and see if plaintiff has sufficiently alleged 
a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the 
purposes of the motion. ”  Id.  “When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other 
Rule 12 motions, the court  should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before 
addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(per curiam). 
On the other hand, “Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the filing of motions to dismiss asserting, as 
a defense, a plaintiff’s ‘failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,’” and is read in 
conjunction with the federal pleading standard.  Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. 
Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899 ( 5th Cir. 2019) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 677 -68 (2009); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief 
must contain…a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief[.]”).  “Thus, claims may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) ‘on the basis of a dispositive issue 
of law,’” and also “if the complaint does not contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 
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‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 920 F.3d at 899 
(quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).  The “plausibility” 
standard does not require detailed factual allegations, but a party’s “obligation to provide the 
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment]’ to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted); accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  To “show” that the 
pleader is entitled to relief, the well-pleaded facts of the complaint and any other matters properly 
considered1 must allow the court, drawing on its “judicial experience and common sense,” to infer 
“more than the mere possibility of misconduct.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
Analysis 
I. Sovereign Immunity 
The Court must begin with the question of subject matter jurisdiction, taking, in this case, 
the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint as true for the purposes of the motion . Defendant argues 
that because PSJA ISD “ a political subdivision of the state ,” Defendant is entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity. Therefore, says Defendant, Plaintiff is required to establish 
jurisdiction by demonstrating a legislative abrogation of that sovereign immunity. Under the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland , the “the [FMLA’s] self-
care provision is not a valid abrogation of the States’ immunity from suit.” 566 U.S. 30, 37 (2012).  
However, Defendant’s argument begins from an assumed premise: that PSJA ISD is indeed 
an “arm of the state” protected by sovereign immunity. In order for a party to be protected by the 
 
1  “Generally, a court ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion may rely on the complaint, its proper attachments, 
‘documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial 
notice.’”  Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Dorsey v. 
Portfolio Equities, Inc. , 540 F.3d 333 , 338 (5th Cir. 2008)); see also Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. 
Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (court’s review on 12(b)(6) motion “is limited to 
the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to 
dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint”).  
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“background constitutional principle that states, as separate sovereigns, are inherently immune 
from suit without their consent,” that party must either be a state, or an “arm of the state”—that is, 
an “entit[y] which [is] effectively the state itself because ‘the state is the real, substantial party in 
interest’ to the lawsuit.” Springboards to Educ., Inc. v. McAllen Indep. Sch. Dist. , 62 F.4th 174 , 
178 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Hudson v. City of New Orleans, 174 F.3d 677, 681 (5th Cir. 1999)).  
On first impression, a court must use the Clark factors to determine whether a type of entity 
is an arm of the state. See Clark v. Tarrant Cnty. , 798 F.2d 736, 744 –45 (5th Cir. 1986). 2 As 
Plaintiff points out, however, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Springboards to Educ ation, Inc. v. 
McAllen Independent School District controls the analysis here. In that case, the Fifth Circuit, 
extensively cit ing Texas case law and statutes , determined that McAllen Independent School 
District (ISD) was not an arm of the state for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. McAllen, 
62 F.4th at 183 –84. And even though the neighboring Mission ISD “ depends on the state for 
roughly 72% of its funding, which is a higher proportion ” than McAllen ISD (affecting Clark 
factor 2), the Court still relied squarely on McAllen to find that “Mission is not an arm of the state 
for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment ” either, and “ so it is not entitled to immunity .” 
Springboards to Educ., Inc. v. Mission Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 21-40337, 2023 WL 3094185, at *2 
(5th Cir. Apr. 26, 2023). 
PSJA ISD is an independent school district similar to its neighboring Mission and McAllen 
ISDs. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. McKinney , 936 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1996) (“ [A]n 
independent school district is more like a city or county than it is like an arm of the State of Texas 
and is amenable to suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment .”). Just as in the Mission 
 
2 The Clark factors are as follows: “(1) whether state statutes and case law view the entity as an arm of the 
state; (2) the source of the entity’s funding; (3) the entity’s degree of local autonomy; (4) whether the entity 
is concerned primarily with local, as opposed to statewide, problems; (5) whether the entity has the authority 
to sue and be sued in its own name; and (6) whether it has the right to hold and use property.” McAllen, 62 
F.4th at 178–79. 
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case, PSJA ISD is  “bound by the same Texas case law and statutes as the school district 
in McAllen.” Id. Neither party has claimed that the source of PSJA ISD’s funding is significantly 
different in any way. Even if it was, PSJA ISD would still “ maintain the power to levy certain 
taxes and issue bonds,” McAllen, 62 F.4th at 183–84 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 45.001, 45.002), 
and “[t]he ability to self-finance weighs heavily against immunity,” id. at 184 (citing Pendergrass 
v. Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm’n, 144 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1998)). Otherwise, the 
parties have not identified any notable differences between PSJA ISD and the aforementioned 
school districts that might affect this Court’s Clark-factor analysis. Absent some distinction, 
McAllen controls.  
Therefore, PSJA ISD is not an “arm of the state” for purposes of sovereign immunity, and 
thus is not subject to such immunity; Defendant’s question of abrogation is not reached. 
Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss is denied.  
II. Failure to State a Claim 
Defendant also moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 
claim. Plaintiff seems to plead both an FMLA interference claim and an FMLA retaliation claim. 
Dkt. No. 1, Exh. 1, at ¶ 6.1; see also Way v. City of Missouri City, 133 F.4th 509, 523–25 (5th Cir. 
2025) (describing the elements of the two claims). However, Defendant’s challenge focuses solely 
on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. To make out a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, a plaintiff 
must establish: “(1) [s]he is protected under the FMLA; (2) [s]he suffered an adverse employment 
decision; and either (3a) that the plaintiff was treated less favorably than an employee who had not 
requested leave under the FMLA; or (3b) the adverse decision was made because of the plaintiff’s 
request for leave.” Hester v. Bell -Textron, Inc. , 11 F.4th 301, 305 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting 
Bocalbos v. Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 1998)). “If she does that, the burden 
shifts to [Defendant] to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for firing her .” Watkins v. 
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Tregre, 997 F.3d 275, 284 (5th Cir. 2021). If the Defendant does that, “ the burden shifts back to 
[Plaintiff] to show that [Defendant]’s proffered reason is pretext for retaliation.” Id.  
At this stage, Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff was protected under the FMLA, nor 
that she suffered an adverse employment decision. Rather, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not 
shown the third element: that the adverse decision was made because  of Plaintiff’s request for 
leave. First, Defendant claims that “[t] emporal proximity alone does not establish causation 
without additional evidence of discriminatory intent.” Dkt. No. 10, at p.5. But that is not the law. 
Rather, the Supreme Court has indi cated that a plaintiff can likely establish a  causal link at the 
prima facie stage through “very close” temporal proximity between  a plaintiff’s leave and her 
termination. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001). Indeed, the Fifth Circuit 
has repeatedly found that “ temporal proximity between the end of FMLA leave and an adverse 
employment action can substantiate a causal connection for purposes of establishing a prima facie 
case.” Murillo v. City of Granbury , No. 22 -11163, 2023 WL 6393191 , at *3  (5th Cir. Oct. ” 2, 
2023) (citing Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., L LC, 277 F.3d 757, 768 –69 (5th Cir. 2001) ). 
Termination “one month after [Plaintiff]’s FMLA leave expire[s] . . . is close enough in time to 
create a causal connection.” Campos v. Steves & Sons, Inc., 10 F.4th 515, 528 (5th Cir. 2021). And 
yet, it is likely that “two-and-one-half months is the outermost limit.” Decou-Snowton v. Jefferson 
Par., No. 24-30079, 2024 WL 4879466, at *6 (5th Cir. Nov. 25, 2024) (collecting cases); Campos, 
10 F.4th at 528. Finally, “the plaintiff does not have to show that the protected activity is the only 
cause of her termination.” Mauder v. Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cnty., Tex., 446 F.3d 574, 583 
(5th Cir. 2006). 
Plaintiff returned to work at conclusion of her FMLA leave on April 3, 2024. There is some 
ambiguity, however, as to which date to consider Defendant’s adverse employment action. 
Plaintiff says she was first notified of her impending contract termination v ia an informal email 
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from the HR Director on June 3, 2024. Dkt. No. 1, Exh. 1, at ¶ 5.2. She received an official letter 
stating the same on July 18, 2024, and her contract termination was effective on August 20, 2024. 
Id. at ¶ 5.3. Measuring from Plaintiff’s initial email notice would place the adverse action exactly 
two months from the end of her FMLA leave. Measuring from her official letter or actual 
termination date, however, would take Plaintiff well outside the temporal proxi mity sufficient to 
create a causal connection. There is some support for considering Plaintiff’s first notice to be an 
adverse employment action. See Vicari v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. , 546 F. Supp. 2d 387 , 412–13 
(W.D. Tex.) (finding notice of contract no nrenewal to be Title VII adverse employment action 
even though plaintiff resigned before official termination). After all, if a court may only consider 
Plaintiff’s official termination date as the earliest date of adverse action, an employer wishing to 
retaliatorily terminate their employee could avoid a causation finding by scheduling all termination 
dates several months out from employee leave. Rather, as long as consequences do actually result, 
see Pierce v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just., Institutional Div., 37 F.3d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir. 1994), it 
makes more sense to ask when the decision to take adverse employment action occurred.  
Here, Plaintiff’s pleadings indicate that decision occurred exactly two months after she 
returned from leave. Although borderline, that period of time could support a causal connection 
on its own. See Campos, 10 F.4th at 528 (agreeing with a case that “ allow[ed] two-and-a-half 
months to establish causation in a Title VII retaliation claim ”). Even if it could not, however, 
Plaintiff has plead other facts that could help bolster causation. In evaluating retaliation cases 
courts can consider several other factors, including “the employee’s past disciplinary record, and 
whether the employer followed its usual procedures in carrying out the adverse employment 
action.” Perkins v. Child Care Assocs., 751 F. App’x 469, 474 (5th Cir. 2018) (collecting cases).  
Plaintiff has alleged that she was “under no notice of any performance issues or threat from 
Defendant[] . . . that Plaintiff’s job was in jeopardy ” and that she  “had never been  evaluated by 
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Rebeca Garza or Superintendent Elias during the duration of Plaintiff’s employment.” Dkt. No. 1, 
Exh. 1, at ¶ 5.2. Even more relevant is Plaintiff’s claim that she was provided with no explanation 
for her termination, either directly or in her notice letters; indeed, there is no indication that she 
has been provided with an explanation to this day. Id. at ¶¶ 5.3–5.4. Plaintiff has also alleged that 
Defendant changed her office location twice —without providing moving assistance —soon after 
her return from FMLA leave, the second of which was incongruously into the ISD police station. 
These actions could plausibly imply at  least some level of hostility. Accepting her facts as true, 
then, Plaintiff’s facts are far from the employee’s in Mauder, who’s “termination should not and 
did not take him by surprise. ” Mauder, 446 F.3d at 585. The dearth of explanation for Plaintiff’s 
firing says otherwise. The foregoing facts and the proximity of Plaintiff’s leave to her termination, 
“taken as a whole,” Richardson v. Monitronics Int’l, Inc., 434 F.3d 327, 335 (5th Cir. 2005), are 
sufficient to state a prima facie claim of FMLA discrimination.  
Under the usual  McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applied in these cases, 3  
the burden would now shift to Defendant to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for firing 
Plaintiff, after which Plaintiff would have to show that reason was a mere pretext. But the burden 
only shifts back to Plaintiff “ if” Defendant provides such a reason. Tregre, 997 F.3d  at 284 
(emphasis added). At this point in the case, Defendant has articulated no reason, much less a 
legitimate, nonretaliatory one, for Plaintiff’s termination. “ Since Defendant[] ha[s] not offered a 
legitimate or nonretaliatory reason for terminating Plaintiff, Plaintiff is not required to prove 
pretext regarding Defendant[’s] stated reason for termination.” Crane v. Gore Design Completion, 
Ltd., 21 F. Supp. 3d 769, 781 (W.D. Tex. 2014).  
 
3 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Tatum v. S. Co. Servs., 930 F.3d 709, 713 
(5th Cir. 2019). 
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Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met the basic requirements of Rule 12(b)(6); 
she has plead sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face. Thus, Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss fails. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.  
 SO ORDERED March 31, 2026, at McAllen, Texas. 
 
 
______________________________ 
Randy Crane 
Chief United States District Judge 
 
 
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